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Abstract 
This dissertation examines freelance warfare in the ancient world.  The ‘freelancer’ needs 
to be understood as a unified category, not compartmentalized as three (or more) groups: 
pirates, bandits, and mercenaries.  Throughout, I contend that ancient authors’ perception 
and portrayal of the actions of freelancers dramatically affected the perceived legitimacy 
of those actions.  Most other studies (e.g. Shaw 1984, de Souza 1999, Grünewald 1999, 
Pohl 1993, Trundle 2004,  Knapp 2011) focus on ‘real’ bandits and on a single one of 
these groups.  I examine these three groups together, but also ask what semantic baggage 
words like latro or leistes had to carry that they were commonly used in invectives.  Thus 
rhetorical piracy is also important for my study. 
The work unfolds in three parts.  The first is a brief chronological survey of ‘freelance 
men of violence’ of all stripes down to the second century BC.  Freelancers engage in, at 
best, semi-legitimate acts of force.  Excluded are standing paid forces and theft by means 
other than force, vis.  In a form of ancient realpolitik, the freelancer was generally more 
acceptable to states than our aristocratic historians would prefer that we believe.  
Moreover, states were more concerned with control of these ‘freelancers’ than in their 
elimination.  The second section explains events of the second and first century in greater 
detail.  The observations made in the first section hold true in the second, despite being 
depicted differently by ancient historians.  The third section focuses on the historians, 
historical accounts and rhetoric employed.  The historians make motivations less 
pragmatic and more idealistic.  Additionally, the perception of piracy was affected by 
triumphal politics, consular authority, and employment of mercenaries 
Overall, the chief semantic burden of pirate-terms is to convey legitimacy: individuals 
that possess power that they should not.  Condemnation of these figures is not rooted in 
their actions of plundering (rarely dissimilar from official acts of war) but instead their 
holding any such power in the first place.  In short, this study reveals that the ‘at-large’ 
soldier was far more complex and far more influential than is normally shown by either 
ancient or modern historians. 
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Introduction 
 
In this study, I assess the description of various individuals, groups, and even 
states as piratical or otherwise engaging in ‘illegitimate’ violence for gain in the ancient 
Mediterranean world.  Illegitimate acts of violence undertaken for the sake of plundering 
are commonplace—yet so also are legitimate, state-sponsored, acts of violence for the 
sake of plundering.  It is my contention throughout this work that political and cultural 
motives played a large role in the determining of legitimacy of contemporary events, 
while historians exhibited similar bias regarding past events.  Furthermore, this 
perception of legitimacy had more influence on the assessment of piracy or banditry than 
the conduct or severity of any actual events.  That is, the act of raiding did not determine 
piracy so much as the understanding whether the raiders had a right to engage in such 
acts.   
The characters in my title, “Pirates, bandits, mercenaries, and politicians” might, 
at first, seem a strange admixture of figures.  For the first three categories, I argue that 
they had substantial overlap in the ancient world.  For the latter, I argue that political 
discussion of plundering and even invective is key to understanding relationship between 
the first three groups.  It is through politics and political machinations, after all, that any 
act of plundering was deemed to have been undertaken legitimately or illegitimately.  
Thus, this work also deals with early estimations of what acts were and were not 
permitted to groups of warriors either in war or outside of war.   
While these issues could be studied across a wide breadth of history, I choose to 
go into greater detail for approximately a 150-year period—the second and early first 
centuries BC. 
This work builds most obviously upon the recent works on piracy, banditry, and 
mercenaries.
1
  While each of these works provides a thorough and comprehensive 
description of the targeted group, each also, to some degree, sets the others aside.  I argue 
that these three categories were so fluid that it makes more sense to talk of a single 
‘freelance warrior’ character rather than distinguishing three separate groups with 
                                                 
1
 Those being the works of de Souza (1999), Grünewald (1999), and Trundle (2004) respectively. 
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overlap.  Moreover, these works, like many others, attempt to set aside the political 
invective to focus on ‘real’ bandits and pirates.  My study, I hope, serves a second 
purpose in bringing that invective back into examination to see what it reveals about 
these groups. 
In examining the secondary literature, the literatures for several subfields need to 
be consulted, as mercenaries, bandits, and pirates are generally studied individually rather 
than together.  Also useful are the studies on particular places, like Crete, Illyria, and 
Cilicia, which gained particular reputations for piracy.  On the freelancers as a whole, 
there have been few full-length studies to this point in time.  Concerning pirates, the key 
works are undoubtedly Philip de Souza’s 1999 Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World, the 
somewhat more dated works of H.A. Ormerod, Jules Sestier and Erich Ziebarth, and the 
more pointed study of Hartel Pohl: Die römische Politik und die Piraterie im östlichen 
Mittelmeer vom 3 bis zum 1 Jh. v. Chr .
2
  Concerning bandits, I rest most heavily upon 
the work of Thomas Grünewald’s Bandits in the Roman Empire, though Ramsay 
MacMullen’s Enemies of the Roman Order and Brent Shaw’s several articles on banditry 
and other liminal figures have been key to my understanding of bandit activity and 
invaluable for locating references to various bandit attacks and campaigns.
3
  I also draw 
upon E. J. Hobsbawm’s Bandits and Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels for comparative 
purposes: though Hobsbawm covers a much more recent period, the ideas are still 
relevant to this study, and more recent discussions of Roman banditry and piracy have 
definitely been affected by his study.
4
  The material on mercenaries comes predominantly 
from Trundle’s Greek Mercenaries from the Late Archaic Period to Alexander, along 
with earlier sources such as Griffith’s Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World and Parke’s 
Greek Mercenary Soldiers.  These works largely substantiate de Souza’s claim that there 
was sizeable overlap between the professions of mercenary and bandit.
5
  Some of the 
arguments I forward in this work have already been put forth (albeit for a much later 
                                                 
2
 Hence de Souza 1999, Ormerod 1924, Sestier 1890, Ziebarth 1929, and Pohl 1993.  
3
 Hence Grünewald 2004 (1999 for the original German), MacMullen 1966 and (inter alia) Shaw 1990, 
1993, 2000, and 2001. 
4
 Hence Hobsbawm 1985 and 1959. 
5
 Hence Trundle 2004, Griffith 1935 and Parke 1933.  See also Miller 1984. 
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period) by Janice Thomson in Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns.
6
  Additional works 
of particular interest are Anna Tarwacka’s Romans and Pirates: a Legal Perspective, 
Mary Beard’s The Roman Triumph, Jessica Clark’s Triumph in Defeat, and Miriam 
Pittenger’s Contested Triumphs, which each explore aspects of the legality and 
legitimacy of wars conducted against or triumphs celebrated over such groups declared 
illegitimate.
7
 
 
Language and Terminology 
As mentioned, I often encompass the groups of pirate, mercenary, bandit, and in 
some cases, auxiliary, under the term ‘freelancer’ or ‘at-large’ warrior.  This is because 
these people elect to make a living through violence and also retain control over who 
commands that violence.  Mercenaries and auxiliaries formally hand this control over to a 
state figure such as a king, magistrate, or one of their representatives.  While a regularly 
employed citizen soldier does this also, the different terms of control and, more 
importantly, their differing motivations, make a meaningful comparison both difficult to 
draw and problematic to use.  The bandit/pirate groups, unlike mercenaries, retain control 
over how and where their violence is employed.  Moreover, I argue there is considerable 
fluidity between these groups.  Unemployed mercenaries would readily engage in 
banditry while pirate groups were often willing to become mercenaries for the right price.  
Nevertheless, in the accounts of ancient authors, when they promote a term, I shall strive 
to provide the Latin or Greek forms, which are somewhat less fluid than the English 
terms, for the sake of clarity. 
I also provide the original language forms because the ancient sources use 
numerous different words to denote the freelancer and these words do not often map 
easily onto English counterparts.  The land/sea distinction so clear to English 
‘pirate/bandit’ (and even more obvious in the German ‘raüber/seeraüber’) is nowhere to 
be found in prevalent words such as praedo or leistes.
8
  Indeed, the three most common 
                                                 
6
 Hence Thomson 1994. 
7
 Hence Tarwacka 2009, Beard 2007, Clark 2014, and Pittenger 2008. 
8
 De Souza (1992, 1999), goes into great detail as to the valences of the vocabulary, especially the Greek 
vocabulary.  See also Grünewald 2004, esp. 1-6 and Trundle 2004, esp. 10-21. 
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Latin terms: latro, praedo, and pirata, may all be used for either land or sea, and while 
the first two terms are more often used for land activity, it is not an overwhelming 
tendency.  Moreover, both praedo and latro are used for ‘mercenary’, especially in earlier 
authors, such as Plautus.  Greek has a greater variety of terms, but the main two are 
leistes and peirates, which also can refer to land or sea operations. 
Evidence that the words are not bound to land or sea is found in the common use 
of clarifying vocabulary involving the sea when such a distinction is desired.  Thus 
Livy’s maritimos praedones (e.g. Per. 68.1), or Strabo’s τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν λῃστηρίων 
(11.2.12).
9
  While it is quite tempting to see peirates as simply ‘pirates’, it is clear that it 
cannot be so simple—De Souza showed that Polybius uses it to definitely mean ‘bandits’ 
at 4.3.8-9 but definitely ‘pirates’ at 21.12.10  It is probably safest to assume that when the 
land/sea distinction was important, the author would have clarified.  Given the frequency 
of such clarification, it is reasonable to infer that the words themselves tend to carry no 
such valence.  Though they denote plundering (leistes and praedo both come from a root 
meaning ‘booty’ or ‘spoils’ and peirates/pirata from a verb meaning ‘to make an attack’), 
I will argue that the terms denote the illegitimacy of the action.  The verb forms (e.g. 
leidzomai, peirao, populor) tend to be used for legitimate and illegitimate actions alike. 
Terms for mercenary freelancers often denote one of two things: their foreign 
extraction, or their dependence on pay.  Such terms as misthophoros, mercenarius or 
stipendarius indicate explicitly that they are paid troops while xenoi stresses their foreign 
origin.  Likewise, more famous mercenary groups such as ‘Tarentines’ or ‘Campanians’ 
might be used where ‘mercenary’ is meant, especially to denote a particular set of 
equipment.
11
  As mentioned above, the earliest uses of latro and praedo also appear to 
denote mercenary service. 
Different words are used side by side, implying a distinction among them.  For 
example, Cicero’s harangue against Piso includes: 
                                                 
9
 Livy, Per. 68; Strabo 11.2.12. Polybius uses a formulation similar to Strabo at 13.8.1: τοῖς Κρησὶ τῶν 
κατὰ θάλατταν λῃστειῶν. 
Another common circumlocution used is mare infestum accompanied by the relevant term. A few examples 
of this are Livy, Per. 128.1; Cicero, Att. 16.1; Augustine, De civ. D., 4.4. 
10
 De Souza 1992, 35-36. 
11
 For Tarentines, see Griffith 1935, 246-248. 
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qui latrones igitur, si quidem vos consules, qui praedones, qui hostes, qui proditores, qui 
tyranni nominabuntur? 
 
“If you two [Piso and Gabinius, the consuls of 58] will be called consuls, who, then, will 
be called bandits? Who, pirates? Who, enemies? Who, traitors? Who, tyrants?”12 
 
Obviously, Cicero argues that these two demean the office of consul.  This rhetoric is 
particularly interesting because the procession of the words is conceptually linked, 
praedones are like latrones and hostes, hostes like praedones and proditores, and so on.  
I would argue that this is meant to be understood full circle, with tyranni being 
conceptually linked to latrones in their lack of legitimacy.  Cicero’s placement of the 
terms allows the terms to be more readily applied to the pair he lambastes.  Livy’s 
maritime praedo almost always appears a raider with a known home town, seeming more 
like a privateer than a pirate.
13
  Those unidentified are either called latro or part of a 
‘piratic’ fleet.  Strabo appears to use leistes and peirates interchangeably, but Appian’s 
language in describing the Cilicians suggests a difference between peirates and leistes 
similar to Livy:
14
 
 
...καὶ ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν πειρατὰς καθῆκεν, οἳ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὀλίγοις σκάφεσι καὶ μικροῖς 
οἷα λῃσταὶ περιπλέοντες ἐλύπουν,... 
 
And he [sc. Mithridates] set up plunderers (peirates) upon the sea, who at first, were 
making a nuisance of themselves, sailing about in a few small skiffs, the kind pirates 
(leistes) use... 
 
Surely Appian’s description that the peiratai acted like leistai lent information to the 
reader.  Precisely what that information was is less clear.  The passage suggests that 
peirates described the activity of plundering more generally and neutrally, while leistes, 
referring to the commonplace freelance activity is a smaller-scale type of operation.
15
  
The passage also suggests that Mithridates may have intended to hide his involvement by 
having his raiders act like freelancers.  The jurist Pomponius describes latrones and 
                                                 
12
 Cicero, Pis. 24.1. 
13
 The praedones at are operating out of Syracuse, those at are in Macedonian employ, based in Chalcis. 
14
 Appian, Mith. 92.  For Strabo, see De Souza 1999, 8; Strabo 14.3.2. 
15
 The argument that peirates originally meant something like privateer or mercenary raider is problematic, 
though not at all without merit.  See Potter 1984, 231-235; de Souza1999, 5-7. 
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praedones as hostes who make war outside of a formal declaration.
16
  For Cyprian, there 
is a different distinction; the latro kills people before taking their belongings, while the 
praedo only takes the belongings.
17
 
Certain words are preferred by certain authors; Livy almost never uses pirata as a 
noun, preferring praedo, while Cassius Dio never uses peirates but prefers the unusual 
term katapontistes.
18
  The Greek novelists use peirates and leistes apparently 
interchangeably, but also use the term boukoloi (‘cowboys’) for the bandits of the 
Egyptian Delta.
19
  A shift in meaning over time is also detectable, such as the later lemma 
given for Livy: “...maritimos praedones, id est piratas...” (“maritime raiders, that is, 
pirates”) which suggests that pirata had become the standard word, displacing praedo, 
which was no longer used in that sense. 
Fur and klopos are not words generally associated with freelance warfare, only 
theft.  Notably, they tend to be used for nonviolent theft.  Such terms also feature in 
political rhetoric to villainize a character as illegitimate.  The reason to use a term like 
latro rather than fur is to emphasize the violent approach as well as the openness.  Thus 
one type of term meant to secretly embezzle some funds or take bribes, the other to 
openly seize goods by force.  Though no doubt subject to some of the same observations 
I make in this work, the vocabulary for non-violent theft will not come under particular 
scrutiny in this work. 
In providing the language used, I intend to arrive at a clearer understanding of 
how the terminology was deployed by the ancient historians.  The use of piratic 
vocabulary for the freelancer, its nuances, including an increasingly negative connotation, 
and its association primarily with illegitimate violence will be major themes of this work. 
 
Structure 
This study will be roughly, but not strictly, chronological.  Within each chapter, 
the material tends to be divided regionally.  Additionally, since the historians were so 
                                                 
16
 Dig. 50.16.118 cf Ulpian, Dig. 49.15.24. 
17
 Cyprian, De zelo et livore 7.130; see also Grünewald 2004, 20. 
18
 De Souza 1999, 10. 
19
 See De Souza 1999, 214-218 for a brief account of pirates in fiction.  Herdsmen generally were 
associated with theft and brigandage, see Grünewald 2004, 36. 
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often writing centuries after the fact, my last two chapters are primarily historiographical 
rather than historical and do not well fit a chronological format. 
The first and second chapters strive to provide the necessary background for the 
Hellenistic and Roman spheres, respectively.  At times, this becomes a whirlwind tour of 
dates, rulers, and alleged doings, and comes into sharper detail into the fourth and third 
centuries.  Here, the Sicilian cities and Hellenistic monarchs made substantial use of 
mercenaries from a variety of sources.  Along with this use of mercenaries came a variety 
of strategies for dealing with them, for they were already regarded as both untrustworthy 
and ominously powerful.  Of course, no description of Greek piracy would be complete 
without time expended on Crete, the legendary home of pirates, and Rhodes, the 
legendary bulwark against piracy, a dual fame that culminated in a Cretan War at the end 
of the third century.  On the Roman side, I begin with the Etruscan reputation for piracy.  
I then examine Livy’s depiction of early Rome and raids for plunder; evidence that the 
fundamental acts of the pirate (i.e. looting) were by no means dishonorable in themselves.  
Followed by an examination of Roman affairs at Antium and Illyria, it appears clear that 
the condemnation of piracy is a political convenience rather than a moral stance.  I then 
argue that the events of the Punic Wars (and the Mercenary War) cement the Roman 
identification of the latro with one of the Italian at-large warriors that took over places 
such as Messana, Rhegium, and Sardinia.  Furthermore, I argue that this archetype 
continues to define the latro until the rhetoric of the first century. 
Armed with this background, I spend the next three chapters identifying how the 
freelancer played an important (and misunderstood) part in the foreign policy of the first 
and second centuries.  Chapter 3 focuses on the second century, chapter 4 on much of the 
first, and chapter 5 on Pompey’s campaigns and political rhetoric.  In these chapters, I 
argue that redefining a group as illegitimate (i.e. as pirates or bandits) could pay political 
dividends, that Rome (and others) had alternate goals than merely eliminating the 
freelancer, and that larger states’ growing hunger for military manpower fundamentally 
affected the role of the freelancer. 
The third chapter lays out the details of the campaigns of the ‘small wars’ of the 
second century.  The major wars of Rome are not without interest, but it is the minor 
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campaigns around the edges that really display the role of the at-large warrior, for they 
occur in the locations from which the at-large warrior is drawn.  First, I discuss Rhodian 
and Roman intervention in Crete and Lycia, two areas where mobile bands of freelance 
professional fighters were readily found or recruited.  This intervention, I argue, is not 
bent on squashing such individuals, but principally on controlling them as a resource, 
though in the event of failure, destroying these groups was preferable to allowing them to 
serve enemies.  Then I shift to the Iberian Wars, where Romans fought constant small-
scale campaigns against the native Iberians and Celtiberians of the interior.  Here, ‘bandit 
terminology’ is used to describe ‘illegitimate’ tactics like guerrilla warfare.  The Roman 
portrayals drive perception of motives, but are more likely to be rooted in degree of 
success.  Thirdly, I examine the campaigns of Sardinia, Liguria, Dalmatia, and the 
Baleares, where a similar phenomenon takes place; campaigns over very small areas are 
waged, the defenders being dismissed as bandits/pirates, and the victorious Roman 
general gains a great quantity of loot.  This is further complicated by the question of 
potential triumph-hunting, to which I return in the seventh chapter.  Overall this chapter 
shows that the freelance warriors were reasonably effective at contending with the 
Romans, that the Romans sought to control and employ these warriors, and that the 
portrayals (by later Roman historians) of freelancers as bandits and/or mercenaries served 
a greater purpose than merely descriptive. 
The fourth chapter begins with the slave wars (including those of the second 
century), and the portrayal of these slaves in a manner similar, but not identical to, the at-
large warrior.  The campaigns of Cilicia also come into focus in this period; in Cilicia, a 
series of praetors, consuls and proconsuls were sent to deter piracy, expand the 
boundaries of Roman Cilicia and to serve as a buffer against Mithridates.  And year after 
year, the Cilicians are conquered and subjugated by the Romans, amassing a suspicious 
number of triumphs and requested triumphs in a short time period.  In the course of this 
discussion, I also discuss some legislation that affects Roman ability to act on perceived 
piracy.  I also discuss the Mithridatic wars in light of the competition between 
Mithridates and Rome over the ability to exploit the military potential of the Greek 
population.  Finally, I discuss the desultory Roman conquest of Crete, the portrayal of the 
9 
 
Cretans, the growth of the Cilician pirates and the decline of Delos and Rhodes.  In this 
section, I argue that Mithridates took many actions indistinguishable from those of earlier 
Hellenistic monarchs.  Concerning the slaves, I argue that the slave threats always 
provoked the Romans to look for exterior instigators.  I also argue throughout that the 
presence of the erstwhile at-large warrior in the campaign forces of the Roman armies is 
readily detectable.  The overall Roman goal (if the Romans could be said to have an 
overall goal) was to control these bodies of contingent manpower, not to destroy them. 
The fifth chapter, by contrast, focuses on Pompey, famed as the commander who 
put an end to piracy in the Roman World.  I begin with the campaign against Sertorius, 
combined with the historians’ desire to describe Sertorius as definitely non-Roman and 
an illegitimate bandit.  This is followed by the discussions of Mithridates and his hiring 
of pirates, Pompey’s command against the pirates and Mithridates, and his disagreements 
with Metellus.  Not only do I argue that Pompey’s famous resettlement had direct 
benefits to the general, I also argue that the reduction of piracy has far more to do with 
the elimination of markets than with the clemency of Pompey.  The ‘at-large warrior’ like 
the pirate has not disappeared, but taken up gladius and eagle.  I argue that the 
illegitimate warrior has been eliminated, not directly, but by offering an avenue to obtain 
legitimate status. 
In chapter 6 and 7, I tackle the idea of legitimacy in the period in question.  I 
think, by this point, I will have amply shown that the event or act itself, however 
dishonorable, does not really matter; the true issue at stake is the identity of the enactor.  
First, there appears to be a shift over time in what the Greeks and Romans deemed 
legitimate, while the historians, seeing a pattern of historical decline, do not acknowledge 
such a shift.  The frequent wars in Iberia, Illyria, and Liguria show a definite tendency for 
the Romans to reshape events to show how they were (naturally) in the right and their 
enemies in the wrong.  This is complicated by internal squabbles in Rome, for it was not 
uncommon to accuse a political enemy of trying to campaign against allies or other 
peoples protected by treaties with Rome.  To mitigate such claims, the Roman proconsuls 
and praetors could always claim to be operating against pirates/bandits.  While less 
praiseworthy than an enemy people, it was also safer.  This leads into two other aspects: 
10 
 
the reframing of certain peoples or cities as ‘innately criminal’, and the growing 
phenomenon of triumph-hunting.  I also argue that there is a philosophical divide 
between an inherently Greek tradition and a Roman tradition, principally Latin, but one 
that sometimes makes its way into the Greek imperial-era authors.  To be overly 
simplistic, the Roman tradition holds that pirates are pirates because they are old-
fashioned, uncivilized, or just plain bad, while the Greek holds that the root cause is 
poverty.  I then discuss the stereotypes of the freelancer in general and particularly the 
stereotypical treachery of the mercenary.  I argue that this stereotype is often rooted in 
perceptions of ethnicity.  As noted before, certain areas are ‘suspect’ for criminal activity 
and these areas tend to produce both pirates and mercenaries.  Thus, this depiction has a 
greater goal.  As the authors themselves tend to be products of a somewhat more rarefied 
class, their disdain for the freelancer is expected.  It is ultimately in the interest of the 
author to denigrate those professional fighters who are not intrinsically tied to a state.   
I end with a discussion of the Romans’ attempts to gain control of military 
manpower.  Overall, the freelancer rarely made up the majority of men under arms in any 
state or region.  They did, however, function as the most readily mobile of such forces.  
They were often also the most skilled forces.  This combination meant that states in 
competition for military manpower were largely struggling over the acquisition or 
retention of these forces.  The Roman solution to this problem was largely to give them a 
stake in the Roman system, which appears to have been effective. 
  
11 
 
Chapter One: The Greek Background. 
To go into the entire Greek background and history of piracy or banditry would 
require the better part of a full-length work.
20
  The nature of piracy and banditry in the 
Roman world, however, has clear antecedents in the Greek world, and it is the nature of 
those antecedents I wish to explore here.  I would argue that there was a long chain of 
events that continued uninterrupted into the Roman period.  In this ‘chain’, the methods 
employed by colonists, adventurers, and conquerors barely differed.  While leisteia has a 
fairly rich history in Homer and Herodotus, I would prefer to begin with events of greater 
historical certainty and also clearer and more immediate impact on the events of the 
Middle Republic.
21
  
In this first chapter, I cover the background in the Greek world leading up to the 
second century BC, concluding with the Rhodian-Cretan War at the turn of the century.  
By the nature of the sources, much evidence comes from Sicily, particularly in the work 
of Diodorus Siculus.  It is apparent that in the Classical and Hellenistic Greek world, 
bodies of at-large fighters played a significant role.  I would thus like to begin with the 
role of the misthophoros, especially in Sicily, but also later in the Hellenistic kingdoms.  
It should soon become apparent that the labeling of characters as misthophoroi or leistes 
is principally one of portrayal, not of individual actions.  Thus, while your own hirelings 
are mercenaries, others’ are merely bandits.  This is not an entirely unfair portrayal, as the 
at-large warriors could readily shift into the role of pirate or bandit if left unemployed.
22
  
Nevertheless there are additional motives for such portrayals, as will become clear. 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 For such, see de Souza 1992, 1999, Pohl 1993, Ormerod 1927 for piracy, Grünewald 2004 for banditry, 
though Grünewald spends far more time on the Roman background. 
21
 For a starting point, see Ormerod 1924, esp. 80-150; de Souza 1999 17-41, 2008 72-73.  For pre-trireme 
ship types and uses, see Casson 1971, 43-76.  Some scholars, as de Souza notes (21), believe a clear 
distinction can be drawn between war and piracy in Homer: see de Souza 1999, 21 n19, Bravo 1980, 
Nowag 1983, Jackson 1985 and 1993.  See Van Wees 1992, ch. 4 for a counterargument. 
The ancient authors were particularly apt to see piracy in the armies and navies of the past, so Thucydides, 
6.4.5, Herodotus, 1.66, 3.39; Polybius 3.22. 
22
 For some discussion on this tendency, see Trundle 2004, 23; McKechnie 1989. 
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The Mercenaries of Sicily 
In Sicily, by the sixth century BC, if not before, the Greek and Carthaginian cities 
relied substantially on professional at-large warriors—misthophoroi being the most 
common word for them
23—and as a result, the events of Sicily were shaped by the desires 
of these bands of warriors.  I suggest that their prominence is partially due to their 
experience and partially due to the relatively high ratio of mercenaries to citizen-soldiers 
in the Sicilian armies.
24
  These mercenaries might be Greeks, Italians (mainly 
Campanians) or Celts.
25
  During this period, the Sicilian cities constantly needed influxes 
of men and they attempted to get warriors to settle in their states and become citizens.
26
  
Thus, while mercenaries were frequently employed, the cities plainly desired to reduce 
the percentage of their forces that were freelancers rather than citizen-soldiers.  In their 
hunger for men, Sicilian tyrants, like the elder Dionysius, even distributed arms to would-
be soldiers.
27
  Despite this prominence in Sicily, however, mercenaries were far from 
inconsequential in the Aegean basin.  The mercenary became an important figure in the 
                                                 
23
 Misthophoros is a later word used by the Hellenistic and Roman-era historians, like Diodorus Siculus.  
Earlier words for mercenary include epikouros and xenos, though, like misthophoros, neither is exclusively 
‘mercenary’.  See Trundle 2004, 10-24 for discussion of the terminology and definition of mercenaries. 
24
 This general argument is made by Moggi (2006) as well.  Any direct assertions of numbers or 
proportions in the armies of Sicily, coming principally from asides in Diodorus, ought be taken with a grain 
or three of salt.  It does seem clear, however, that the historians recording these numbers saw them as being 
strange in comparison with standard proportions in the east.  Most scholarship on the accuracy of Diodorus 
focuses on comparisons between him and Xenophon or the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, see, for example, 
Gray1987.  For Greek mercenaries, see Trundle 2004.  Recent scholarship has been suggesting smaller 
discrepancy in proportion between eastern and western Greeks, but only due to a larger quantity of 
mercenaries employed in mainland Greece. 
See also Lomas 1993, 42-57, for a sense of the importance of mercenaries in 3
rd
-century Magna Graecia. 
25
 For evidence of sixth-century Celtic mercenaries in Sicily, see Rapin 2001, who argues for their presence 
from the existence of a sculpture of a shield.  For further evidence see de Ligt 2007 for a reinterpretation of 
a confusing inscription as Celtic rather than Italic.  For material support for the existence of Italian 
mercenaries at Acragas, see Tagliamonte 2002.  The best recent source for Sicilian mercenaries is Atti elimi 
V: Guerra e pace in Sicilia e nel Mediterraneo antico (VIII-III sec. a.C.), in particular, the articles by 
Moggi, Giallombardo, De Cesare, Péré-Noguès and Fantasia. 
26
 Polyaenus Strat. 1.27.3, Diodorus 11.72.3.  For citizenship grants to mercenaries, see Péré-Noguès 2004.  
By the Hellenistic period, they had competition from the Lagids, who were forever trying to get hoplites or 
phalangites to settle in Egypt as ‘military colonists’.  See Stefanou 2013 for a recent account of the 
recruitment of these cleruch-soldiers. 
Griffith 1935, 195, asserts that the Greeks simply were not present in sufficient numbers in Sicily to have 
such a large quantity of local mercenaries. 
See also Trundle 2004, 6, 44, 74, for the demand for mercenaries in Sicily. 
27
 See Trundle 2004, 126-127.  In this particular example, it is not clear whether these were would-be 
mercenaries or citizen soldiers.  See Diodorus 16.41-43 for multiple examples from the elder Dionysius; 
14.10.2 and 16.9.2 for the younger; and 16.6.5 and 16.10.1 for Dion.   
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Aegean in the Hellenistic period, but he had already been relevant in Sicily for 
centuries.
28
  As Trundle points out, before the Hellenistic Period, most hoplite 
mercenaries from mainland Greece were employed in either Sicily or Egypt.
29
 
Because of their numbers, the mercenary apparently played a greater role in Sicily 
than in the east.  This is certainly the case before the Hellenistic period, and possibly still 
true even then.  In Strategemata 5.1-15, Polyaenus details the accounts of various 
generals of this earlier period, but in these accounts, the mercenaries frequently play a 
prominent role.  Such examples for dealing with mercenary forces underline their 
importance for the general.  For example, the elder Dionysius of Syracuse, at the turn of 
the fifth/fourth century, has many dealings with mercenaries that show their influence on 
his policies.
30
  Dionysius is at the mercy of his own mercenaries at 5.2.1 and 5.2.11 and 
seeks to deprive his mercenaries of their pay in 5.2.11, while at 5.2.17, Dionysius tricked 
the Carthaginians into releasing their Greek mercenaries, who were giving him trouble.  
The younger Dionysius also had to deal with a mercenary mutiny caused by lack of 
funds.
31
  Similar accounts are given by Diodorus, most notably with Timoleon.
32
  
Agathocles also had to calm two mutinies, one in Africa in 309 and another, roughly a 
decade later, in Italy.  In Syracuse, Thrasybulus attempted to raise a mercenary force able 
to outmatch the citizen soldiery.
33
  These mercenaries are clearly not merely a 
supplement, but a sizable force, sometimes even the majority of the force.   
The mercenaries in Sicily are sometimes so powerful that they need to be dealt 
with by tricks.  While the individual stratagems employed differed (and, accordingly, 
became worthy of individual notice by Polyaenus), in bulk they point to a recurrent issue: 
the mercenary force was strong enough to be a threat to the employer.  Thus Hippocrates, 
                                                 
28
 This refers to the mercenary ‘explosion’ of the fourth century: see Miller1984, 154; Trundle 2004, 7, 36. 
29
 Trundle 2004, 52. 
30
 Other sources also assert his reliance on mercenaries, e.g. Diodorus 13.94-96, 109-114, 14.7-8, 41-96. 
31
 See Westlake 1994, 697, this tradition comes through Plutarch’s life of Dion.  Dion’s Peloponnesian 
mercenaries also soon faced pay in arrears (Westlake, 699-700) and in 356, Syracuse refused to pay them 
but offered citizenship as recompense (which they accepted).  Again, see Péré-Noguès 2004 for other 
examples of citizenship grants in Sicily.   
32
 See Diodorus 16.73, where Timoleon orders his mercenaries to pillage because he wouldn’t otherwise 
have the money to pay him.  This story is also in Plutarch (Tim. 24).  Cf. Diodorus 16.78-79, Plutarch Tim. 
30. 
33
 Diodorus 11.68. 
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after using the Ergetini (a native Sicel people) to win several campaigns, stranded them in 
the field and had them massacred when vulnerable.
34
  Hippocrates’s reliance on 
mercenaries is revealed after the brutality with which he suppressed cities like Zancle (a 
city initially founded as a pirate base and itself a source of freelance manpower).
35
  For, 
having employed such brutality with his mercenaries, he was unable to recruit men from 
those cities.  Other cities in Sicily found themselves having to pay off these at-large 
warriors at great cost. 
In addition to being veterans and professionals, able to ignore the agricultural 
season that limited the activities of citizen-based forces, mercenaries were also generally 
specialists.  The hoplite was from mainland Greece, often the Peloponnese, the archer 
from Crete, the slinger from Rhodes, the peltast from Illyria or Thrace, the cavalry from 
Southern Italy.
36
  Thus, a commander desiring a balanced force would usually end up 
with a multi-ethnic band.  Ionian Greeks are perhaps the least commonly mentioned, 
though the Athenian evidence suggests that Ionians may have readily enlisted in naval 
forces rather than land forces.
37
  While it is apparent that many kings and tyrants had 
difficulty in finding the money to pay their troops, their pay was not particularly high, 
ranging from about 2 obols to 2 drachmae per diem.
38
  The propensity of mercenaries in 
Sicily to accept land grants in lieu of payment suggests that in many cases, the mercenary 
life was perceived by the mercenary as a transitory position rather than a career. 
                                                 
34
 Polyaenus, Strat. 5.6.  Diodorus (14.72.3 and 14.78-79) tells similar stories about Dionysius.  
35
 See Dunbabin 1948, 404-405.  Essentially, Dunbabin argues that he treated his conquests so ruthlessly 
that he could not count on them for troops, which became especially problematic when he needed to build 
and recruit a fleet at Zancle.  For the initial settlement of Zancle as pirate base (by settlers from Cyme) see 
Thucydides, 6.4.5; Graham 1982, 108-109.  For a discussion of Hippocrates and his campaigns, see Asheri 
1988, 759-766. 
36
 It should be noted that Thracian and Tarentine, though initially designators of origin, soon became 
designators of accoutrement instead. See Best 1969, 126 ff. for the Thracian; see also Trundle 2004, 29-31, 
47; Griffith 1935, 250.  
37
 See Trundle 2004, 53. 
38
 See Parke 1933, 231-233, Trundle 2004, 63-64, 91.  Wages are complicated, as they may or may not 
include the grain allowance (often 2 obols-worth/day for infantry) in the wage and such is not usually 
mentioned.  Xenophon (Eq. mag. 1.19) advises budgeting forty talents for a force of perhaps 1000 cavalry 
(9.3)—240 drachmae/year.  The only direct mention of 2 drachmas a day outside of Persia is in the 
Aristophanes play Acharnians .  The rate of pay of Phaÿllus and the Phocians (Diodorus 16.36.1), however, 
was said to be double ‘normal’ and so, might have also been 2 drachmas/day. 
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In examining the role of the freelancer in Sicily, sources like Polyaenus are 
inherently flawed for my purpose in that they tend to show specific events from the point 
of view, not of any particular state, but of a leader whose actions were later deemed 
noteworthy.  Thus Polyaenus, in his Strategemata, is interested in how one might get 
around the problem that the mercenaries could present.  We always must face a priori 
assumptions by the historians about the mercenaries when talking about them.
39
  So, 
while Polyaenus is interested in avoiding the intrinsic problem of treachery, Xenophon is 
concerned about using mercenaries while avoiding citizen resentment, and Polybius 
voices various concerns about maintaining a suitably strong citizenry.
40
   
Freelance warriors, such as pirates and mercenaries, possessed a reputation for 
treachery.  The historians are full of judgments not only about mercenaries, but also about 
the treatment of mercenaries.  The best examples of this distrust come from a later period 
and from mainland Greece.  Nicon, a pirate of Pherae, after being captured by the 
Messenians (probably in the late fifth century), gave them possession of Pherae in 
exchange for his life.
41
  Polyaenus approves of Lycus dismissing the pirate Andron (~300 
BC) and Polybius criticizes the Epirotes for hiring Galatians (~230 BC).
42
  For a Sicilian 
example, the Syracusans did not trust Gelon’s former mercenaries and revoked the 
citizenship they had earlier granted them.
43
   
Despite this impression that mercenaries were ready turncoats, most evidence we 
have of mercenaries does not bear out that suspicion terribly well.  For example, we have 
the story of Hierocles, a mercenary general in the service of Heracleides, designated as 
master of Athens by Demetrius.  Hierocles pretended to change sides in order to draw the 
                                                 
39
 See below, ch. 7(189ff.) for a fuller recounting of historians’ perceptions of mercenaries. 
40
 For Xenophon, see Eq. mag. 9.3, Hier. 8.10, 10.3.  See Polybius 1.65, 4.74, 6.52 for some more 
prescriptive statements about mercenaries. 
41
 Polyaenus Strat. 2.35.  This Nicon may be (and is sometimes identified as) the same Nicon that Publius 
Servilius Vatia brought back to Rome for his Isaurian triumph ~74 (Cicero, Verr. 2.5.79), in which case it 
belongs to a later period, but in this section, the vast majority of the episodes are from the fourth and fifth 
centuries, and this particular Nicon is said to be a native of Pherae, not a Cilician, so I think the Cilician 
identification is incorrect. 
42
 Polyaenus, Strat. 5.19 for Lycus and Andron, Polybius 2.5.4, 2.7.12 for Epirus. This type of portrayal by 
the historian will be further discussed later, in ch. 7, see 197ff.. 
43
 Diodorus 11.72. This event prompted another civil war in Syracuse. 
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Athenian generals into a trap.
44
  Cratesipolis found herself unable to corrupt the 
mercenaries holding Acrocorinth.
45
  Other mercenaries noted as providing faithful service 
include Leosthenes, the aforementioned Ergetini, and Satyrus’s mercenary general 
Meniscus.
46
  Ischolaus the Spartan, when trying to resist an Athenian siege, is even said 
to have positioned a mercenary on guard with every sentry, precisely because they were 
more trustworthy than the civil forces.
47
  In Sicily, a mixed example comes from the First 
Punic war, where the mercenary commanders’ plans to surrender Lilybaeum is betrayed 
to Himilco by another mercenary.
48
 Machiavelli’s notes on the role of the mercenary may 
ring familiar here: no tyrant can hold power by a mercenary army alone, but a mixed 
force of mercenaries and auxiliaries is best.
49
  Even if these impressions of freelancers 
were not common in Sicily, the historians, all writing substantially later, would have been 
affected. 
Even the mutinies themselves do not serve as the best examples of mercenary 
treachery.  In Sicily, mercenaries were necessary, but also hard to maintain.
50
  The 
inability to pay expensive mercenaries, as noted already, frequently led to arrears of pay 
or rations and mercenary mutinies.  When successful, these mutinies often resulted in 
looting the countryside to support themselves.  This was common for both east and west, 
but the fact that the Sicilians and Carthaginians used such a high proportion of 
mercenaries relative to the citizen complement (often over half) made it far more likely 
                                                 
44
 Polyaenus, Strat. 5.17.1.  
45
 Polyaenus, Strat. 8.58. 
46
 See Cary 1951, 6-8; see Diodorus 18.9-13 for Leosthenes, as well as the surviving fragments of 
Hyperides Epit., (the episode in Plutarch, Dem. 27.1 may refer to the same or a different Leosthenes); see 
Diodorus 20.23 for Meniscus (Satyrus was one of three sons involved in a civil war over the Bosphoran 
kingdom). 
Leosthenes, though, like the mercenaries of Herippidas (Xenophon, Ages. 2.10), had actually returned to 
serve his homeland, and may prove a poor example for this reason. 
47
 Polyaenus, Strat. 2.22.4. 
48
 Polybius, 1.43.  Polybius tells us also that the mercenary in question, Alexon, had been such a 
‘whistleblower’ before, in Agrigentum. 
49
 See Machiavelli, Prince, cc.12-13.  This, of course, is rooted in Xenophon’s Hiero, speaking specifically 
about the role of the mercenary in Sicily.  See, for example, Hier. 4.11, 5.3, 8.9-10, and 10 passim, esp. 6-7.  
The need for balance in the force comes also comes from Xenophon, from Eq. mag. 9.3-7, but see also Oec. 
4.6. 
50
 See, again, Machiavelli, Prince, cc.12-13.  See Xenophon, Hier. 4.11 for the difficulty in cost and 8.10 
for the necessity. 
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that such efforts would succeed in the west.
51
  Thus we see mercenaries being bribed with 
loot, but also taking over towns, not simply looting them.  These events at least partially 
created the treacherous reputation of freelancers.  If the freelancers are fighting only for 
pay, then we should expect them to revolt or mutiny when not paid.  This results in a 
double standard, where mercenaries, while perceived as less trustworthy than their 
employers, are actually held more accountable.  While texts on generalship praise the 
commander who pays the troops and forestalls mutinies, mutinies are never considered 
acceptable.
52
  In some cases, the general even elects to attack the mercenaries rather than 
pay them. 
When the Sicilian tyrants were not murdering their recently employed 
mercenaries, they were seeking other ways to buy them off, principally land taken from 
the defeated enemy.  Xenophon, in the Hiero, details a few other options, most notably 
robbing temples, but the most obvious effect was a constant state of war, whereby the 
mercenaries might support themselves.
53
  Thus, one might suspect that the greatest 
prevalence of non-payment or massacres of mercenaries would come at the end of a 
failed campaign.  And so this appears to be exactly what we see in instances where the 
eastern, Hellenistic monarchs resort to betrayal of their mercenaries rather than payment 
of them.  Xenophon asserts paying the mercenaries is the most important task for a 
tyrant.
54
  The Sicilian examples of cash problems serve as a forerunner of the Hellenistic 
ones.  In one case, the elder Dionysius thus pays one band of mercenaries with the city of 
Leontini and surrounding land.
55
  In another, in 356, the Syracusans offered Dion’s 
                                                 
51
 For mercenary proportions, see Trundle 2004, 6, 44; Griffith 1933 194-195.   Plutarch, Tim., 1.25.  
Diodorus makes the Syracusan force for both elder and younger Dionysus generally around half 
mercenaries, a percentage exceeded earlier by Gelon and later by Agathokles.  Diodorus, Appian and 
Polybius agree that the Carthaginians relied almost entirely on mercenaries for their heavy infantry.  For 
comparison, in mainland Greece, mercenaries might be up to a third of the force (e.g. one-third for Nabis in 
195, perhaps one tenth for third century Athens (Griffith 1933, 85)  The eastern exception is Rhodes, who 
sent an army largely composed of Cretan mercenaries to retake their Anatolian possessions from Philip in 
197. 
52
 The most extensive judgments are probably Polybius (e.g. 1.65ff (the Mercenary War) 11.25-28 (the 
mutiny at Sucro).  Polybius (11.28) does, however, relate Scipio’s hypothetical counterexample: at Sucro, 
Scipio supposedly said that mercenary troops may potentially be forgiven for a mutiny, but not citizens. 
53
 Xenophon, Hier. 4.11. 
54
 See Hier. 4.9, 6.11 for examples. 
55
 Diodorus 14.78. 
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mercenaries citizenship at the termination of their contract.
56
  The Greek use of land or 
citizenship to pay off veteran mercenaries mirrors the later Roman offer of land to 
discharged veterans and the offers of citizenship made in the late republic.
57
   
Mercenaries were drawn from all quarters and all classes, though Greeks were the 
most sought-after. Demographic pressures in mainland Greece led to a steady influx of 
Greek manpower to Southern Italy and Sicily, so fresh waves of mercenaries were 
generally available.
58
  The most common explanation is that the population of mainland 
Greece was outgrowing its agricultural potential and had to leave, particularly from rough 
places like Arcadia and inland Aetolia.  Furthermore, there was something more of a 
demand to put the mercenary forces in the field once they had been contracted.  Such 
economic pressures no doubt led adventurers like Pyrrhus to seek out wars by which to 
pay and maintain their standing forces.  By ~310 BC, (and probably earlier), however, the 
influx of mainland Greek mercenaries into the west had dried up, and the Syracusans 
could not compete with the Ptolemies and Seleucids for hiring bonuses.
59
  This led the 
Syracusans, like Agathokles, to draw a greater concentration of troops from Italy and 
northwestern Greece, such as the Campanians who would cause so much trouble in the 
third century.  They seem to have replaced their forces quickly and that fact suggests that 
these bands of freelance warriors were available before Italian records record them. 
In Sicily, thus, the norm was to have an army with high proportions of 
professional soldiers who looked at soldiering as a career rather than an occasional 
obligation.  Since these individuals were so numerous, they had especial importance, 
                                                 
56
 Westlake 1994, 700-701.  See Nepos, Di. 7. 
57
 See Balsdon 1979, 82-86.  In similar fashion, we see Caesar attempting to bribe Sicily away from 
Pompey with an offer of Latin or Roman citizenship, and Octavian later retracting the offer. Balsdon, 84; 
Cicero, Att. 14.12.1; Brunt 1971, 239-241. 
58
 For demographic discussions, see Parke 1933, 14, 20, 228-229; Miller 1984; Trundle 2004, 54-63; 
Hansen 2006.  See McKechnie 1989 for numbers of Greeks living or working abroad while still identifying 
with the mother city.  Griffith (1935) notes the Arcadian as the stereotypical mercenary, following 
Xenophon (An.6.2.10 Hell. 1.23). 
For examples of recruiting in mainland Greece, see Diodorus 14.44, 14.58, 14.62 (Dionysius the Elder)  
Lomas (1993, 110, 210n55) also notes the role of both Peloponnesian and Italiot mercenaries in the second 
century, only dropping off after the Peloponnesian wars. 
59
 See also Griffith1935, 260, who suggests that in the third century, Taenarum and some of the other 
recruiting grounds of Greece stopped possessing that function.See Stefanou 2013 for the Ptolemies’ efforts 
in hiring mercenaries and recruiting cleruch-soldiers. 
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politically as well as militarily.  Despite offers of citizenship in some states, this was also 
a potential (and unwelcome) political bloc in states that went that route.  This social 
dynamic would continue into the third century, and the shift in the source of soldiers, 
from Greece to Italy, would set the stage for that century.  In Sicily, bands of at-large 
fighters could readily become influential forces. 
 
Piracy in the East 
If mercenaries were dominant in the west, they were merely common in the east.  
It was rare indeed for a mercenary force to be strong enough to outright oppose one of the 
Hellenistic monarchs.  Nevertheless, for this period, we see that mustering the funds to 
pay the soldiers, native conscript and foreign mercenary alike, was a major concern for 
the kings.
60
  Even if the mercenaries could not directly threaten these monarchs, losing an 
experienced force at the wrong time could be very detrimental.  An additional factor, 
however, is the ubiquity of pirates in the east and their role in the wars of the Hellenistic 
kings. 
In the Eastern Mediterranean, pirates, particularly Illyrian or Cretan pirates, 
served as auxiliary naval forces during the Successor Wars.  As mercenaries, they limited 
their plundering to the one side unless they received a better offer.  Though regarded as 
unreliable, they saved the Hellenistic monarchs the expense of expanding or maintaining 
a large fleet or of training sailors.  Both groups also contributed mercenaries for 
terrestrial forces as well.
61
  When unemployed, these mercenaries would simply resume 
piracy.  Isocrates calls these men homeless wanderers, though it is evident that many of 
these men did claim homelands.
62
   
Since the freelancers, whether pirates or mercenaries, could readily dwell in 
various city-states, not forced to hide in the ‘pirate lairs’ of romance, rooting out such 
bands was impractical.  Nevertheless, this does not stop modern authors from advocating 
                                                 
60
 See Austin 1986, 464-465 for some evidence. 
61
 For Illyrians, see Wilkes 1992, 108, 168 for armies, 110 for navies.  For Cretans see Spyridakis 1977 and 
1992, 55-82. See Griffith 1935 8-15, 104-105 for both groups.  
62
 Isocrates, 4.167, 5.96, 120-121, Ep. 9.9.  See also Trundle 2004, 104-167, esp. 111-115. Some 
explanation for the orator’s claim can come from the propensity of exiled aristocrats to take up mercenary 
service (See Trundle 2004, 70-72).  Such men would fit that category, but surely cannot be the substance of 
the complaint Isocrates makes. 
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for such pirate-hunting.  Cary, for example, blames the Hellenistic monarchs for not 
replacing the thalassocracy of Athens with their own and rather being ‘in collusion with 
the corsairs.”63  Griffith notes that while the foreign mercenaries of Sicily did cause a stir 
upon being let go and quickly turned to brigandage, the mercenaries in mainland Greece 
caused no such disorder in the seventh and sixth centuries.
64
 Griffith argues further that 
this indicates that the eastern tyrants’ mercenaries were simply locals serving on a pay 
basis and, for the most part, that they were part of the citizenry.  While this may be true to 
an extent, the difference lies more within the relative proportions.   
Certain places, such as Taenarum in the Peloponnese and some of the Cretan 
cities, served as ports-of-call for unemployed mercenaries.  The quantities of men 
recruited from Taenarum especially shows that these were more than could simply be 
found in the nearby region.
65
  Whether the danger be storms or pirates, the sea south of 
Capes Taenarum and Malea were widely regarded as exceedingly dangerous.
66
  This 
formed a natural chokepoint for the east-west trade. 
There is earlier evidence for mercenaries in the east.  According to Xenophon, in 
the Corinthian War (395-387), several leaders, including Iphicrates, hired leistai.
67
  Not 
all criticism for plundering, however, is levelled at these.  Accusations of leaders acting 
like pirates were commonplace. Aegina in particular is blamed for piratical attacks.
68
  
Alexander of Pherae was so described in both Diodorus and Xenophon, but his actions do 
not seem different from others of his time.
69
  Either employing bandit plunderers or 
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 Cary 1951, 242.  To argue this, one must first accept the assertion that the Athenian ‘thalassocracy’ 
actually did functionally eliminate piracy, an assertion I do not accept.  See de Souza 1999, 26-30 for an 
argument against it;  Austin 1994, 559-560 for Athenian actions against piracy. 
64
 Griffith 1935, 237, citing the evidence of Diodorus 11.72-76.  There is no positive evidence for Ionian 
mercenaries serving in mainland Greece, but there is a little of Carian mercenaries.  Griffith guesses this 
might have something to do with the class biases of the historians.  From the very little evidence, it appears 
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 Griffith 1935, 260; Diodorus 18.19.1, 20.104, 29.57.5, 29.60.1. 
66
 Ormerod 1924, 19ff , esp. 22  The island of Cythera off the southern coast of the Peloponnese may have 
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acting as bandit plunderers appears to be received negatively, and this negative portrayal 
seems grounded not in the act, but rather in the motive behind the act.  Pillaging as a 
strategic principle was better than pillaging as a financial one. 
Several episodes come down to us where the pirate captains would switch sides, 
but despite the negative portrayal, the majority of mercenary and pirate bands appear to 
have stayed loyal under normal circumstances.  It is noteworthy that a number of the 
difficulties with mercenaries occur when the commander comes into financial difficulties: 
so Eumenes of Pergamum had to make a series of concessions to his mercenaries in 
255.
70
  Earlier, the Athenian Timotheus was forced to allow his mercenaries to plunder 
Samos in 366.
71
  Diodorus ascribes the initial successes of the Cypriot Evagoras against 
Persia to his willingness to pay his mercenaries and the Persians’ failure to support their 
own.
72
  Diodorus also records the Campanians in Sicily threatening to switch sides unless 
the commander came up with the pay (which was in arrears).
73
  The Oeconomica, in its 
suggestions for avoiding fiscal difficulties appears to precisely address the problem of 
failing to pay mercenaries.
74
  By the evidence I have collected here, it appears that the 
episodes in which commanders attempt to cheat their mercenaries significantly 
outnumber those where the mercenaries turn coats without a provocation such as lack of 
pay or rations.  And yet, the generals did not gain the same sort of negative reputation. 
The evidence for the common employment of mercenaries and pirates as 
mercenaries is abundant.  When Lysimachus deployed Lycus to take Ephesus from 
Demetrius, he did so through the services of the pirate captain (ἀρχιπειράτης) Andron, 
whom Demetrius had been paying to harass Lysimachus.
75
  Another such pirate captain, 
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Ameinias served with Antigonus Gonatus and led Illyrian and Aetolian pirates in taking 
Cassandreia.
76
  Another case comes from ~274, when Ptolemy II Philadelphus hired a 
pirate fleet to assist in subjugating Magas, his older half-brother.
77
  This same fleet also 
appears to have served Ptolemy well in operations off the coast of Coele-Syria.  In yet 
another episode, Demetrius Poliorcetes, in an effort to properly blockade Rhodes, hired a 
pirate fleet to intercept relief shipments from Egypt, a task which the pirates failed 
miserably to achieve.
78
  We see Cretan leistai both serving and fighting the Ptolemies.
79
  
Foreign mercenaries assisted Zielas of Bithynia to the throne in 240.
80
  The Eleans 
employed Aetolian pirates in 218.
81
  Aratus utilized the services of Xenophilus, one of 
the local ‘robber-leaders’ (Ξενοφίλου τῶν ἀρχικλώπων).82  Antiochus the Great hired a 
pirate captain, Nicander, in 190, who helped him take Samos and successfully engaged 
the Rhodian fleet.
83
  Throughout the Hellenistic period, pirates appear with great 
regularity as mercenaries in the naval campaigns (and sometimes in the land campaigns 
as well).  There appears to have been no shortage of rulers willing to hire pirates, nor of 
pirates willing to fight in wars rather than independent raids.  This prevalence leads me to 
suggest that these figures were mercenaries first, pirates second. 
Our sources describing this period show far more examples of pirates hiring out 
as mercenaries than acting as independents.
84
  Naturally, our sources were more 
interested in warfare than in piracy, and any independent band was likely to be labeled as 
a pirate band.
85
  Nevertheless, I am not aware of any recorded examples of pirates 
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refusing to serve as military auxiliaries when so approached.  This is strongly suggestive 
that the eastern pirates were bands of freelance fighters who preferred regular military 
service and saw banditry/piracy as a fallback career.  It is only suggestive, however, 
because there is no obvious reason to routinely record such failures to enlist mercenary 
bands.  It additionally suggests that the mercenary role was a more lucrative (or more 
stable) one.  Furthermore, and most importantly, these examples show that, with a 
possible exception for the Rhodians, pirates in the Greek world were seen as a military 
resource, not a threat to the state.  Individual bands might overstep and invite retribution, 
but the existence of such fringe auxiliaries was at least tolerated. 
 
Galatian Mercenaries: A New Manpower Source 
Though not named ‘pirates’ per se, the Galatian plunderers met with a similar 
Hellenistic solution: “If you can’t beat them, buy them.”  The Celts/Gauls/Galatians led 
by Brennus (and perhaps earlier by Cambaules) came out of Pannonia and into 
Macedonia and history in 280; they reached Thrace in 279.
86
  In previous years, Celtic 
mercenaries had already been in evidence, especially at Ancona, where Celtic 
mercenaries were frequently enlisted for battles in Italy, though in at least one instance 
(367), they were brought across the Adriatic.
87
  Galatian mercenaries of questionable 
loyalty began appearing in Hellenistic armies already by the 270s.  On the European 
mainland, for example, Gonatas soon employed his erstwhile enemies.  After several 
skirmishes with these Gauls in Thrace, Gonatas took some of the defeated warriors into 
his service, most probably around 277 or 276, for they appear in his siege at Cassandreia 
in 276 and 275. Furthermore, the first band of Galatians to enter Asia Minor were 
themselves mercenaries, hired by Nicomedes of Bithynia to end a civil war against his 
younger brother.
88
  Being discharged and freelance again (by 277), the Galatians went 
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merrily on their way into Seleucid territory, living off their plundering.  Though they 
made some significant headway into Central Anatolia before being stopped by Antiochus, 
they then readily signed on as mercenaries, which undoubtedly slowed their ability to 
expand and take territory in their own right.  According to Cary, these Galatian 
mercenaries were not even particularly effective as additions to the army; their appeal 
was rather their low cost, which Cary asserts drove Gonatas to hire Galatians over the 
better disciplined Greeks.
89
  I would prefer to argue that it was not the monetary cost that 
served as the principal driving feature, but rather the cost of time.  The Galatians, even if 
undisciplined, were both available and experienced. 
These Galatians were soon found throughout the Hellenistic world.  Ptolemy 
Philadelphus dealt with his own Galatians during the first Syrian War (~274-272).  Beset 
on two fronts, he hired a corps of 4,000 Galatians to deal with the Cyrene revolt.  
According to Pausanias, they were plotting to take Egypt by force, so Ptolemy stranded 
them on an island in the Nile without supplies.  The use of Galatian mercenaries in Egypt 
so early is a little surprising, and it may be that Ptolemy found some Galatians not ready 
to quit fighting Antiochus in 275.
90
  In the Third Syrian War, the Galatians serving in 
Antioch in 246 were bribed to kidnap and murder the infant son of Berenice, a rival for 
the new king, Seleucus II.  Antiochus Hierax also hired Gauls to fight against Seleucus, 
and defeated him in 239, whereupon his mercenaries sought to be recognized as allies 
(and legitimate holders of Galatia) rather than mercenaries.  These mercenaries were 
refused recognition, paid off, and sent to plunder Pergamum, where Attalus defeated 
them in 227.
91
 In turn, Attalus I of Pergamum utilized Galatians (from the Thracian side) 
from 220-218 to reconquer the cities taken by Achaeus for Seleucus III in the previous 
two years.
92
  The Galatians’ willingness to fight on any side and the monarchs’ 
willingness to hire the Galatians are striking.  This incongruous impression is probably 
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due to an illusory Greek assumption that the Galatians were a single entity rather than a 
trio of tribes with four tetrarchs each.
93
 
Polybius also records the Gauls/Galatians serving Greek interests.  He depicts 
Cavarus, the king of Tylis, serving the Byzantines well but also being corrupted by 
Sostratus of Chalcedon.
94
  Aside from serving as another Polybian reminder of the 
untrustworthiness of mercenaries, this shows that the Galatian rulers were not, 
apparently, displeased to see their men serve other countries, and might even serve as 
something of an agent.  In this, at least, the Galatians acted somewhat like the Cretans. 
Throughout the third century, then, these Galatian fighters were rarely seen as part 
of a state in their own right.  They were considered treacherous, but nevertheless 
frequently sought out for mercenary service, though the Hellenistic monarchs did 
whatever they could to get rid of them as soon as they were no longer needed.  This 
confluence indicates that the leaders in the Eastern Mediterranean region were 
simultaneously desperate for money and manpower.  On the Galatian side, the acts of the 
Galatians indicate that many of the Galatians were professional warriors, and that the end 
of a war, at least to some, meant unemployment rather than peace.  While the Greek 
authors’ tendency to not differentiate between groups of Galatians causes some problems, 
the evidence shows additional bands of European Celts migrating to join their brethren in 
Asia Minor.  The demand for Galatian manpower was greater than the first wave of 
Galatians could provide.
95
  Their ready acceptance of foreign offers may indicate that 
their own rulers had to compete with their neighbors for the Galatian manpower pool.  It 
should be noted, however, that the Greeks were rarely concerned with differentiating 
between different groups of Celts and without a tribal marker, not all ‘Galatians’ need 
have been Galatians.  Lastly, it seems as though encouraging citizens to serve abroad as 
freelancers was also a method by which a state might maintain experience within its 
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forces without needing to pay a standing army; this issue will become relevant again in 
discussions of the second century.
96
 
 
Rhodes and Crete 
Rhodes had long had a reputation as a stalwart defender against piracy, and for 
even longer, Crete had had a reputation as a homeland of pirates.  The Cretan tales stretch 
back to the Odyssey, where Odysseus claimed a Cretan origin to bolster his tale of piracy 
in Egypt.
97
  The Rhodians, by contrast, “carried on an unrelenting war against pirates 
while pursuing a course of studied neutrality.”98  As such, when the Rhodians appear as 
actors in the Hellenistic conflicts, they are almost always a secondary figure, and 
sometimes they appear as mercenaries rather than acting in service to Rhodes.  Like 
Carthage and some of the other Ionian states, the Rhodians saw the navy as the principal 
service, and employed many mercenaries themselves.  The Rhodians were, however, 
generally the enemy of pirates, though we might also wonder if the enemies of the 
Rhodians began to be seen as piratical because of this reputation.  While other states are 
sometimes said to have attempted to suppress piracy or claimed to be doing so (e.g. 
Athens, the Bosporan Kingdom, Macedon, Byzantium, Egypt), only the Rhodians seem 
to have any substantial evidence for backing that claim up.
99
  But even when scholars 
question the role of other ‘thalassocratic’ states as having any sort of anti-pirate policy, 
the Rhodians feature as the exception by which other states are compared.
100
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Both Rhodes and Crete played an important part in the wars of the Diadochi.  
Much has been made of the Hellenistic monarchs’ need to access the mercenary infantry 
of the Aegean basin.
101
  Less has been made of their use of the Rhodian and Cretan 
skirmishers and sailors by which they maintained that access. 
Generally allied with Egypt, whence the great grain ships came on the way to the 
Aegean, the Rhodians fought off a siege of their city by Demetrius in 305.
102
  The 
resulting agreement at the end of the conflict was that the Rhodians would be allies with 
the Antigonids against all enemies except the Lagids.  Still, Rhodian citizens appear in 
other Hellenistic armies, and so we find Theodotas, a mercenary general in service to 
Antiochus in 275.
103
  Despite the exemption in the earlier agreement with Demetrius, the 
Rhodian Agathostratus helped Antiochus defeat the Egyptian force and retake Ephesus in 
259.
104
  Additionally, he held Ephesus against Ptolemy’s Athenian mercenaries/allies 
under Chremonides.
105
  In some cases the Rhodians appear to be simply mercenaries, in 
others, they appear to be state actors. 
The Rhodians treated their navy as the principal service, and devised smaller 
ships ideally suited for the pursuit of pirates.  The most compelling evidence for the 
Rhodian anti-pirate activity in this time period is in Lycurgus’s speech against Leocrates, 
in which it is revealed that the Rhodians had begun sending escort ships with their 
merchantmen to ward off pirates or raiders.
106
  Such an action clearly indicates that these 
ships were in danger, though the source of the threat may be somewhat ambiguous (or 
multiple sources were perceived).  Strabo, Polybius and Diodorus agree that the Rhodians 
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expended military resources to protect all shipping, not just their own.
107
  There exists 
also a monument erected in honor of three brothers who died fighting against pirates.
108
  
These pirates are not Cretans or Lycians (the most frequently appearing Rhodian foes), 
however, but Tyrrhenians.  We may question the overall anti-pirate reputation of the 
Rhodians, but it was a reputation they did have in antiquity, and thus important to this 
study. 
Like the Rhodians, the Cretans frequently appear as mercenaries, but unlike the 
Rhodians, the Cretans possessed a negative reputation as pirates.
109
  Cretan mercenaries 
appear as early as the Archaic Period.
110
  Brulé collected twenty-six examples of Cretan 
maritime raids, but cautions that only three of them are clearly examples of piracy.
111
  
According to Spyridakis, the Cretans were supplying a plurality, if not a majority, of 
Greek mercenaries, and those mercenaries frequently held high posts.
112
  I suggest that 
the Cretan reputation as pirates and the Rhodian reputation as pirate-hunters were both 
swelled by the frequency of conflicts between the two islands.
113
  When the Cretans 
appear as mercenaries, the historians, like Polybius and Diodorus, often considered them 
especially untrustworthy.  Certain Cretans stand out as stereotypes, like the treacherous 
Cretan of Diodorus 37.18, who scoffs at the ideas of loyalty and citizenship and values 
only money.
114
 At 31.45, Diodorus names the Cretans ‘acting with customary 
faithlessness’.  The most well-known of Cretan mercenaries are possibly those hired by 
various Peloponnesian states (particularly by Nabis) at the end of the third century.
115
 
The Cretans appear as specialists, usually mountaineers and archers, and appear 
principally in Rhodian and Seleucid armies.  In 213, Antiochus III used Cretans to take 
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Sardis, which Cary finds reminiscent of the story in Herodotus (1.84).
116
  These Cretans 
also appear in a 209 action in Hyrcania.
117
 In 147, the young Seleucid pretender 
Demetrius (the future Demetrius II) landed in Cilician territory with a group of Cretans 
under a certain Lasthenes; they remained loyal to Demetrius but their brutal repression of 
Antioch led to his eventual expulsion from Antioch.
118
  The Cretans develop a particular 
reputation for faithlessness and treachery and in accounts of mercenaries turning 
treacherous, it is not surprising to see Cretan presence as a common theme.  Like the 
Galatians of the previous section, this may be a form of ‘othering’: the Cretans are not 
really Greeks and so cannot be trusted in the same ways. 
To understand the importance of mercenaries and pirates in the warfare of the 
period, however, it is crucial to examine the Rhodian-Cretan War (205-200).
119
 At the 
end of the third century, Philip V of Macedon saw an opportunity to crush Rhodes, the 
longtime ally of the Ptolemies.  To do this, he enlisted the aid of both pirates and regular 
troops from Aetolia, Sparta, Crete, and Acarnania to bolster his naval forces.
120
  In 205, 
the Rhodians and the Cretan cities were fighting small-scale skirmishes over the actions 
of certain Cretan pirates.
121
  Rhodes, in both Diodorus and in the account of Perlman or 
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Brulé, was interceding based on a wrong done to others, not directly to Rhodes.  As 
president of the Cretans’ League, Philip had reason to intercede as well.  The Aetolian 
Dicaearchus was sent incognito with a fleet of 20 ships to plunder, not Rhodes or the 
Rhodian Peraea, but the Cyclades.
122
  Berthold’s position is that this was principally a 
method for Philip to raise money for building a fleet and hiring mercenaries, not a 
campaign against Rhodes.  Not until 202 did Philip put to sea to confront Rhodes, and 
when he did, he brought 150 lembi as support.
123
 The results are not clear other than a 
Rhodian victory, but no peace treaty survives in Polybius, Diodorus, or the inscriptions 
on the islands.  Polybius, returning to this war in 15.21-24, is mostly concerned with the 
fate of Cius, a city of Bithynia.  Philip’s involvement with the war seems to have been 
largely an excuse to make war on the allies of Rhodes, not to fight Rhodes itself. 
The conclusion of peace between Rhodes and Macedon did not necessitate peace 
between their allies.  The Cretan cities of Gortyn and Knossus, on opposite sides in the 
Rhodes/Macedon conflict, either remained at war or soon returned to war.
124
  As a direct 
outcome of the war, the Cretans of Hierapytna and Olous had to submit to Rhodian 
control and give over control of their surplus manpower as well.  This may also have 
been the case with Chersonesos.
125
  While neither city was required to furnish more than 
two hundred troops to Rhodes, Rhodes essentially gained a monopoly over mercenary 
recruitment in eastern Crete.
126
  These mercenaries might well have included the Cretan 
                                                                                                                                                 
These skirmishes may or may not be equated with an Hierapytnan attack on Kos. See Perlman 1999, 133.  
The relevant inscription is SIG3 567, an inscription on Kalymnos and SIG3 568 and 569 are, notably, 
inscriptions honoring Diokles and Theukles as defenders of Kos during the Cretan War.    
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 See Berthold 1984, 109; Polybius, 18.54.8 ff.; Diodorus 28.1.1; Holleaux 1938 IV 124-145.  It is 
additionally noteworthy that a fleet of twenty warships could be potentially perceived as a pirate fleet.  This 
reveals either the scale of pirate activity at the time—not at all limited to single ships—or the flexibility of 
the term. 
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 Berthold 1984, 113.  These lembi certainly need not all have been pirates, but some of them certainly 
were. 
124
 See Errington 1969 for this war, in which Philopoemen may have played some part. 
125
 See Perlman 1999, 134-137.  Only Hierapytna is known to be one of the involved Cretan cities.  The 
cities of Gortyn, Olous, Chersonesos, and Eleutherna are suspected to have played a role.   
126
 This interpretation rests somewhat tentatively on the assumption that the missing fragments of the 
treaties at Olous and Chersonesos mirror the Hierapytnan treaty in the same way that the surviving 
fragments do.  The treaties in question are IC III.iii.3A (Hierapytna), SEG xxiii.547 (Olous), and SEG 
xli.768 (Chersonesos).  See also Chaniotis 1991, 258-260 for an analysis of these inscriptions.   
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archers that Rhodes supplied to Rome during the Third Macedonian War.
127
  This was 
doubly important for Rhodes, as Rhodes filled its navy from its citizenry, but was 
dependent upon mercenaries for offensive land operations.
128
  It should also be noted that 
the cities of Crete, like Taenarum in the Peloponnese and Aspendus in Asia Minor, also 
served as recruiting-grounds for non-local mercenaries, so the overall gain was somewhat 
greater than just the local manpower.
129
  Similar rights appear to have been granted to 
Attalus of Pergamum by the Cretan city of Aptara.
130
  In this case however, it is unclear 
(and unlikely) that these rights were exclusive.  Instead, it seems more likely that these 
places, serving as sources of manpower, curtailed recruiting rights to a select few in 
exchange for other favors.  For the sake of comparison, another similar situation occurred 
at the end of the War of Antiochus, where by the terms of the Treaty of Apamea, 
Antiochus was disallowed from hiring the Cretan archers or heavy Greek infantry from 
the Aegean or indeed, from his former territory.  Not only was he denied his home 
recruiting grounds, he was denied access to his favored sources of foreign mercenaries.  
Even part of Cilicia fell into this category.
131
 
Thus Rhodes and Crete have several similarities and a pronounced difference.  
Both readily served as sources of manpower in foreign wars.  The Cretans, however, 
were at least reputed to turn this ‘at-large’ manpower to other ends when mercenary 
service was not available.
132
  Rhodes, by contrast, apparently put forth significant effort 
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 For some discussion of the treaty, see Griffith 257-258.  For the treaty itself, see SEG 39-966, Perlman 
1999, 135; for Cretan provenance in the Third Macedonian War see Livy 43.7, where the Romans demand 
the Cretan cities recall its citizens serving with Perseus.  The Roman claim makes far more sense in light of 
the Rhodian treaty. See also Spyridakis 1977 for the Hierapytnan treaty’s role in providing both 
mercenaries and non-mercenaries. 
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 So Reger 1999, 90, cf 97n53, Griffith 1935, 90-93. 
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 Cary 1951, 235, for mercenary grounds, see Griffith 1935, 259 ff.  The evidence for Crete and 
Taenarum are far stronger than that for Aspendus, which has very circumstantial evidence.  For Taenarum 
as a place to discharge mercenaries, see Diodorus 18.21. 
130
 Griffith 1935, 258. 
131
 The terms of the treaty are recorded by Polybius (21.42) and Livy (38.38).  As Polybius 21.24.10-15 
would indicate, some of the cities of Cilicia, notably Soli, were of a questionable status, but Cilicia as a 
whole was to remain as part of Syria.  Livy’s version definitely excludes any part of ‘Rough Cilicia’ as part 
of Cilicia still subject to Syria.  As will be discussed later, however, the very concept of Cilicia and of 
where Cilicia’s borders were were very ambiguous concepts until the Principate.  
132
 contra Brulé 1978, 181, who argues that Cretan activities do not fall into the ‘marine-mercenary’ 
category (using the Aetolians as his model for that category). 
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to control the activity of at-large warriors and of pirates.  The correlation suggests that 
these two categories tended to overlap substantially in their composition. 
 
The ‘At-Large Warrior’ 
The activities of Rhodes and of Antiochus reveals a type of military recruiting 
that should not be surprising.  Procuring mercenaries from allied territory was a long-
standing custom.
133
  Providing access to these manpower pools could be a gift.  Thus 
Chandragupta’s elephants-for-Greeks trade with Seleucus around 304, Pisistratus’s 
Argive alliance, and other leaders’ gaining the ability to recruit Peloponnesian 
mercenaries by means of friendly relations with Sparta all fall in the same basic 
category.
134
  Likewise, positive relations with the rulers of Galatia and Tylis increased the 
likelihood of acquiring Celtic mercenaries.  The freedom to recruit in certain territories 
(or its prohibition) continues to be a feature of foreign policy in the Aegean for centuries 
afterwards. 
The very sense that the at-large warrior was fundamentally homeless or had no 
homeland falls apart here, because these deals could not have worked unless the friendly 
power had some sort of home-court influence over the manpower.  In the case of 
Seleucus, perhaps, there was a monopoly on Greek services, but in the other cases, some 
non-financial reason must be in play.  Without a non-financial reason, these states would 
be relatively powerless to enforce their control over recruitments.  An ancient soldier 
might turn freelance because of an economic ‘push’ (e.g. poverty, loss of a farm, sudden 
unemployment) or because of an economic ‘pull’ (daily pay, chance of booty).  
Aristocrats might well hire out as captains or as commanders.  While these individuals 
might have entirely different motivations, they are frequently lumped together.
135
  The 
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 Griffith 1935, 254-255. 
134
 Cary 1951, 66-67, Griffith 1935, 255.  For the Spartans specifically, see Diodorus 14.44 and 14.24 
where Dionysius and Philomelus play upon their Spartan connections to gain mercenaries.  At 19.60, 
Diodorus records Antigonus requesting permission from Sparta to recruit mercenaries.  In 201, the Aetolian 
League took measures to stop a Ptolemaic agent from recruiting too many of their citizens. (Cary 1951, 
232; Griffith 1935, 258; Livy 31.43) 
135
 For some motivations of Greek mercenaries, see Trundle 2004, 43-44.  For an ancient example of each, 
see Diodorus 14.34.3 for the Messenian exiles seeking mercenary service and 16.30.1 for Philomelus 
offering a high rate of pay to attract mercenaries. 
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Greek states were often encouraging of men going to fight abroad as freelancers, so long 
as they maintained ultimate control over the freelancers and access to them. 
Indeed, there is much evidence to suggest that mercenaries retained citizenship at 
home when fighting abroad. In Athens, for example, certain Athenian mercenaries had 
property in Athens that could be confiscated in the event that they refused to obey 
Athens’s recall.  So also the Athenians successfully recalled Chabrias and sent out 
Iphicrates when the two bands of Athenian mercenaries were to clash in what was 
essentially a Persian civil war.
136
  See also, for example, the Athenian decree two decades 
later, prohibiting mercenary service against Euboea.
137
  In the earlier-mentioned episode 
of Antiochus and Achaeus (~214-213), the Cretans Bolis and Cambylus were kinsmen 
but also fellow-citizens (συγγενῆ and πολίτην).138  Few mercenaries were famous enough 
to leave behind much record.
139
  Overall, however, we see a common occurrence: a state 
that does not object to citizens serving for pay in foreign wars so long as they don’t 
oppose the state’s interest.  In none of these events, so far as we know, did the citizen 
disobey or the state try to prosecute anyone for mercenary service. The state is not trying 
to rid itself of freelancers, but rather keep them as citizens, just as other states offered 
citizenship to freelancers to entice them to move there.  Indeed, such activity increased 
the military experience of the citizenry, especially the mercenary commanders, and was 
even used as evidence of experience by aristocrats seeking political gain at home.
140
 
As we see by the existence of recruiting-centers at places like Taenarum, 
Aspendus and Hierapytna, the transient bands of at-large warriors existed in sufficient 
quantities to have towns partially dependent on the trade of these warriors between 
jobs.
141
  It is impossible that someone could recruit five thousand mercenaries at 
                                                 
136
 The event is in 379 and 378.  See Diodorus 15.29.  The passage becomes confusing because these two 
figures also attain Athenian political office and so are sometimes acting as Athenian generals, but also 
sometimes as freelancers. 
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 Tod GHI 2.154; see Toogood 1997 for discussion; these are also noted by Trundle (2004, 34, 107). 
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 Polybius 8.15.4.  Polybius, naturally enough, reverses the sentiment and stresses their relationship.  I, 
however, want to stress that these Cretan mercenaries do receive a term like πολίτην from even a hostile 
source like Polybius. 
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 For one exception, the fourth century Athenian Astyphilos, see Rosivach 2005, 195-204. 
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 Trundle 2004, 77-79, 147-159.  Some examples from Athens, Sparta, and Corinth include Iphicrates, 
Charidemus, Conon, Agesilaus, Lycon,Chares, Timotheus, Phocion, Apollodorus, and Timoleon. 
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 See Griffith 1935, 259 ff. for mercenary recruiting grounds.   
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Taenarum unless this was a known place for mercenaries to congregate.  It is not 
surprising that these places existed, as cities like Antioch, Rhodes, and Athens would no 
doubt prefer to keep such bands out of their city proper, yet still want to know where they 
could be found.  Like early versions of Port Royale or Tortuga, such cities probably 
attracted this trade by a lack of regulations.  Unfortunately, information is lacking to 
make this more than a speculation (and in the case of 17
th
 century Port Royal, the pirates 
apparently caused the lack of regulations by moving in, outnumbering and outvoting the 
non-pirate locals—an issue that mirrors Syracusan fears of enfranchised mercenaries). 
In closing this chapter, I hope this background has demonstrated several basic 
features.  First, that the line between colonist, mercenary, bandit and pirate was always a 
fuzzy line, and especially fuzzy in the West.  Second, that military leaders were 
frequently accused of acting like brigands or pirates, even when their operations appear to 
have been fairly standard.  Third, that freelance warriors were regularly employed from 
the fourth and fifth century onward, not changing what they did so much as where they 
did it.  Fourth, mercenaries and employers of mercenaries were held to different 
standards regarding mercenary employment and conduct toward the other.  Fifth, these 
groups of men of somewhat ambiguous status essentially formed pools of manpower 
employed by Western Greek tyrants and Hellenistic kings which were tolerated, at least 
in part, because of their ability to provide this service.  It is my hope that these 
observations will usefully serve as a backdrop for the next chapters. 
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Chapter Two: The Italian Background: Etruria and the Early 
Republic 
 
The background of the freelancer in Italy before the second century rests on less 
material than we have for the Greek World.  This chapter attempts to describe the effects 
of plundering on events in the Italian peninsula down through the Second Punic War, as 
well as possible.  Here I will be repeating as little material from Magna Graecia as 
possible.  As in the previous chapter, the motive here is less to examine piratical acts than 
portrayals of acts as being piratical.  I argue that the descriptions of such acts contribute 
substantially to understanding how the Romans acted towards piracy specifically, and 
freelance warriors generally, in the following centuries.  To this end, large-scale 
discussions of the historians’ judgments, especially diachronic judgments, have largely 
been excluded from this narrative and are addressed later.  Furthermore, some early 
events fall more into the category of representation than true history and are likewise held 
aside.  Some such events include the early Greek colonization of Italy and the Greek 
portrayal of Etruscans at Alalia. 
In addressing this background, there is substantial ambiguity as to both the 
identities of the freelancers and the rationales for opposition to them.  The nomenclature 
used is not always consistent, details given are often sparse, and our historians throw 
contemporary disputes into the debate halls of their ancestors.  In short, all the evidence 
of this chapter needs to be taken with a shaker of salt.  Overall, the material provided in 
this chapter provides greater certainty as to Roman opinions about freelancers in the Late 
Republic than it does opinions in the Early/Middle Republic or even the actual activities 
of that group. 
I begin this chapter with a discussion of the Etruscan reputation for piracy, 
followed by variance in depictions of Roman plundering in Livy, Diodorus and Polybius.  
After this, I discuss the fourth-century piracy at Antium and Roman actions in 
suppressing it.  The Illyrians also had a long-standing reputation for piracy, but in this 
chapter, I focus on the stories of Teuta and Rome’s first campaigns in Illyria.  The role of 
Campanian mercenaries is highlighted by the example of the Mamertines.  After 
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discussing the Mamertines, I discuss the roles of plundering and of mercenaries in the 
Punic Wars and finish off the chapter with an account of Carthage’s Mercenary War.  
Through these examples, I hope to show how the Roman attitude towards freelancers in 
the second century is rooted in third century experiences while also revealing that the 
historians used the actions of freelancers to justify earlier wars—even when an alternate 
justification already existed. 
 
Etruscan Pirates with Latin names. 
Italian warfare in the early years was firmly associated with raids for booty in a 
manner not entirely dissimilar from the Homeric heroes—a tradition that also reaches 
back into the Etruscan period.  An Etruscan 
sarcophagus of Perugia, depicting a successful 
raid, serves as one of the earliest examples.
142
  
An eighth-century cenotaph at Pisa appears to 
depict a seafaring lord wielding a trident, and 
the suggestion that he was a ‘pirate lord’ who 
died at sea or abroad seems not too far-
fetched.
143
  The raiding was a widespread 
phenomenon and this readily led to bands of 
fighters that could be recruited by outsiders, 
like the Sicilian tyrants.  In these examples of 
raiding, plunder, not ransom, seems to have 
been the object, though that would change 
later. 
 
It should come as a surprise to no one that the Etruscans/Rasna/Etrusci/Tyrrhenoi were 
considered pirates by the Greeks.
144
  The most famous story, of course, is that of the 
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 See Haynes 2000, 186-187 for this as an aspect of Etruscan culture. 
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 Haynes 2000, 33.  For specifics of the Pisan excavations, see Bruni 1998, 1993. 
144
 Concerning the question of Etruscan/Tyrrhenian piracy, the best sources are S. C. Bakhuizen 1988 and 
M. Giuffrida Ientile 1983, but see also de Souza 1999, 51-53, 202-203; Ridgway 1988, esp. 635-637.  
Greek accusations of Tyrrhenian piracy began by the sixth century.  Bakhuizen argues the Tyrrhenians 
Figure 1: Dionysus and the Pirates  
Exekias krater, 6
th
 century black figure , currently 
at the Staatliche Antikensammlungen, Munich, 
ABV 146, 21 
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young Dionysus being kidnapped by pirates and turning the pirates into dolphins, found 
in HH 7.
145
  This story appears with some frequency on pottery (see figure 1), and also in 
mosaic (see figure 2).  The Rhodians supposedly carried on an ongoing campaign against 
the Tyrrhenians in the Ionian and Cretan Sea, and the accumulated wealth of the spoils 
from their victories was apparently quite impressive to Aelius Aristeides, visiting Rhodes 
some five hundred years later.
146
  Strabo tells us that the Tyrrhenians were the greatest of 
the pirates, even greater than the Cretans and Cilicians.
147
  It did not remain a solely 
Greek opinion: Cicero, perhaps drawing on the accounts of Polybius or Posidonius, tells 
us that the Etruscans and the Phoenicians were the first to take to sea, one for trade, one 
for piracy.
148
   
Scholars have also equated Etruscans with the Pelasgians on Lemnos, who were 
supposedly pirates as well.
149
  The fame 
of Tyrrhenians as pirates is such that it 
was even deemed noteworthy by several 
authors that the city of Caere did not 
engage in piracy.
150
  Regardless of the 
validity of such a reputation, the 
existence of that reputation had definite 
effects.
151
  The reputation for piracy 
made the Etruscans untrustworthy and 
                                                                                                                                                 
were the first to blame for piracy about which there was a lack of information, but does accept the events as 
being fundamentally piratical.  
Diodorus (5.40), however, notes the Etruscans as masters of the sea, but mentions nothing of piracy here. 
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 Interestingly (as noted by Harari 1988, 40-41), in the hymn, Dionysus is always a clean-shaven lad, but 
the archaic pottery depictions always have him as a bearded adult. 
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 [Aristeides], Orat. 25.4. (Rhodiakos, also found as Orat. 43, Jebb 539ff. however.)  The following 
oration, also concerning the Rhodians, also connects the Tyrrhenians with piracy. (Orat. 44 Jebb 570) 
147
 Strabo 10.4.9: μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς Τυρρηνούς, οἳ μάλιστα ἐδῄωσαν τὴν καθ’ ἡμᾶς θάλατταν... 
148
 Cicero, Rep. 2.9.  The Phoenicians are the ‘non-piratical’ group here. 
149
 The various arguments for and against this could probably fill a chapter all their own.  See Bispham 
2012, 237-238, Haynes 2000, 1-2. Bakhuizen 1988, 28-29 Herodotus 1.57-58, Thucydides 4.109 
150
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. Rom. 1.11, Diodorus, 5.40. Strabo 5.2.3.  See Bispham 2012, 237, 
n.39. 
151
 Bakhuizen 1988, 30-31 argues that the tales of Tyrrhenian piracy chiefly illustrate the Greeks’ fear of 
the unknown. 
Figure 2: Dionysus and the Pirates—part of the third-
centuryAD North African mosaic ‘The Neptune Mosaic’ 
(from Dougga),  currently in the Bardo National Museum 
in Tunis 
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automatically the ‘wrongdoers’ in conflicts with the Greeks.  In this way, the reputation 
was self-reinforcing. 
Strabo identifies the Etruscans as pirates (5.2.2), and furthermore, he identifies the 
cause of that piracy as disorder.
152
  According to Strabo, these Etruscan pirates are not 
working as a cog in a state-operated system of plundering, but instead working as 
individuals in the absence of an organized state.  This is, then, definitely a depiction of 
freelance raiding, not state raiding.  It is entirely likely that Etruscan and Greek trade did 
not begin peacefully, but that approaching Greeks were seen as hostile and driven off 
when possible.
153
  Such cases of excluding the Greeks could easily lead to accusations of 
piracy.  Still later, Greeks and Etruscans must have carried on both trade and piracy 
concurrently.
154
  The famous reputation for piracy of the Etruscans was no great boon for 
the Italians.  Twice in the fifth century, and once in the fourth, the Syracusans sent a 
raiding force to Etruria, ostensibly a punitive force on account of Etruscan piracy.
155
  
Modern scholars have assessed this as nothing less than Syracusan piracy against 
Etruscan territory.
156
 
The Etruscan reputation for piracy is doubly important as that reputation may 
have applied to more than simply the Etruscans.  Many of the recorded Tyrrhenian pirates 
had decidedly Latinate names.  This has two implications: first, that the term Tyrrhenian, 
to the Greeks, encompassed more groups than simply the Etruscans; and second, that the 
Tyrrhenian reputation for piracy may have been exacerbated by the activities of other 
Italian peoples.  One such example of a Latin-named pirate comes from Diodorus, who 
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 Strabo’s attestation of the cause, however, is driven by his understanding of the root causes of piracy. 
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 Haynes 2000, 51-52. 
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 Haynes 2000, 63. 
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 One in 474, once in 453 (Diodorus 11.51), and a third time in 384 (Diodorus 15.14, Strabo 5.2.8), when 
they sacked Pyrgi.  Haynes 2000, 262, implies that the reason was more likely to gain economic advantage 
over Corsica, Sardinia and Elba.   
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 Notably, Scullard 1990, in comparing the attack on Pyrgi to the Greek fleet mentioned at Livy 7.25 
(discussed in detail below). Strabo’s account indicates that the expedition was actually to Corsica and the 
attack on Pyrgi was simply an attack en route.  Dell 19667 follows the argument the Dionysius was 
retaliating against piracy, while Bridgman 2003, 49 argues that this expedition was principally for 
plundering.  See also Wonder 2012 for discussions of the Italiot League and its responses to attempts at 
raiding or conquest.   
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says that Timoleon executed a pirate named Postumius.
157
  Another figure, Mamercus, 
who had been ruling Catana as tyrant, was executed as a leistes.
158
  The Athenians posted 
an Adriatic fort in 325 to ward off ‘Tyrrhenian’ pirates.159  It is, however, unlikely that 
the Etruscans were raiding the southern Adriatic by this time.  I believe we can fairly 
suspect that the Greek term ‘Tyrrhenian’ really means ‘non-Greek Italian’, not 
‘Etruscan’.160  
If we accept this, it has ramifications for the Athenian outpost, the forts placed in 
Apulia against Apulian piracy during the reign of Dionysius II around 30 years earlier, 
and the anti-Tyrrhenian Attic speeches of the late 4
th
 century.
161
  In essence, it is 
extremely difficult to separate different bands of early Italian raiders from each other in 
the Greek sources.  Furthermore, there is no evidence that there was any attempt to do so.  
It becomes both convenient and conventional for the ancient historians to ascribe any acts 
of piracy in the Tyrrhenian or Adriatic Seas to Etruscans, not other Italians.  The sudden 
absence of ‘Etruscan’ piracy in the third century probably indicates not an unrecorded 
Roman/Greek success in suppressing Etruscan pirates (while ignoring Illyrian and Cretan 
piracy), but rather the Greek sources beginning to disambiguate between the peoples of 
Italy and using different terms for them.  
The issues over identity and control illustrate one thing clearly.  The reaction of 
the Greek world to Tyrrhenian piracy was that of states trying to deal with unaffiliated 
bands.  I find no records of attempts to buy protection or immunity, attempts to pressure 
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 Diodorus. 16.82.3.  See also De Souza (1999) 50-51, Bispham 2012, 236, who both note that the Greek 
Postomion never appears as a Greek name (as opposed to a transliterated Roman) until the imperial period.  
The event occurred either in 339/338 (dating by Athenian archon Lysimachides) or 342 (consulship of Q. 
Servilius Ahala and C. Marcius Rutilus, cf Broughton 1951 (MRR I), 133) 
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 Plutarch, Tim., 34: οὐ μὴν ἔτυχέ γε ταύτης τῆς τελευτῆς,[an attempt at suicide] ἀλλ' ἔτι ζῶν ἀπαχθεὶς 
ἥνπερ οἱ λῃσταὶ δίκην ἔδωκε.  Cf. Tim., 13.1; Diodorus 16.69.4; Polyaenus, Strat. 5.12.2.  This Mamercus 
was probably a Campanian, though the name is well attested among Latins as well, and even some 
Etruscans.  The elder Dionysius had given Catana to the Campanians seventy years earlier (Diodorus 
14.15.3). 
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 de Souza 1999, 41; IG II
2
.1629 (= IG II
3
.1370), ll.217-233.  Other than this inscription, this colony is 
unknown (though Harpocration tells us that Hypereides had a speech concerning this colony) and the 
location cannot be pinpointed better than the inscription’s  [περὶ] τῆς εἰς τὸν Ἀδρίαν [ἀποι]κίας (ll.176-177) 
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 This is also argued by Ormerod 1924, 129; de Souza 1999, 41, 51-53.  Additional evidence de Souza 
musters includes [Aristeides] 25.4(see note 146 above); IG XI.2.148, l.173; Strabo, 5.3.5; and Livy 8.14. 
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 For Syracusan forts, see Diodorus, 16.5.3.  The expedition is also briefly mentioned by Plutarch (Dio. 
26.1).  The orators Deinarchos and Hypereides both had speeches (now lost) against the Tyrrhenians, see de 
Souza 1999, 51, Ormerod 1924, 128-129. 
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the rulers or any other measure suggesting that the Greeks thought negotiation was an 
option here.  These other tactics were all tactics used with Cretans or Illyrians.  
Moreover, at least at an early date, the Greeks (at least Eastern Greeks) appear to 
distinguish little between non-Greek Italian peoples. 
 
The Early Romans:  Raiding for Booty  
The Romans, in their historians, thought little of bandits, yet drawing a distinction 
between warfare and brigandage is not as easy as it would seem.  In discussing the 
Homeric model, Van Wees argued for a sharp distinction between the warfare of 
freebooters and that of ‘heroes’, but like de Souza, I do not find his distinctions 
compelling.
162
  For one difficult aspect, consider the Roman preoccupation with booty 
and loot.
163
  For this, our chief evidence for the Roman opinion is found in Livy’s 
account.  Livy frequently depicts the early Roman campaigns as being focused on, even 
motivated by, loot, and in these accounts, he provides a level of detail that must come 
from his sources, as it is minute enough to be above notice in Livy’s own period (a point 
Livy makes himself at 10.30).  Furthermore, it is not information often preserved by 
Greek sources.  Polybius frequently notes the presence of looting or ravaging, but not, 
generally, detailed accounts on what was taken.
164
  Diodorus Siculus, a frequently-
voluble near-contemporary of Livy, also rarely recounts quantities in line with what is 
observed in Livy.
165
  With such a lenient view on wartime plundering, it is strange to see 
such a stern line on what we might call the freelance counterpart. 
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 Van Wees 1992, 207 ff., de Souza 1992, 56-57.  In essence, the argument is that warfare can be 
undertaken for monetary gain or for status.  Since plunder, however, brings both of those things, the two an 
inextricably intertwined. 
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 There are a variety of terms, but the most common are praeda in Latin and leia in Greek. 
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 The most noticeable place where Polybius discusses booty is concerning the fall of Syracuse (9.10), 
where he indicates that loot should be restrained to resources (i.e. gold and silver), and not to include art.  
Polybius is clearly critical of the Romans’ looting of Syracuse.  Other mentions of booty (leian) are like 
that of 2.26.5, where he simply describes it as a massive amount (tosautes leias).  This is not infrequent, but 
any level of detail is quite rare.  For the importance of booty to the Romans, see 10.15-17.  He implies that 
he discussed it earlier, but there is only the briefest mention of booty at 6.31.13 
The accounts of Dionysius of Halicarnassus resemble Polybius more in this way.  Accounts of plunder are 
frequently attested, but rarely detailed. i.e 10.21.4-6. 
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 See, for example, 12.64-65—where the event of plundering is described for both Greeks and Romans, 
but the proceeds are not. 
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The comparison of Livy with Polybius initially suggests that Polybius is 
interested in plundering in wartime as a strategic goal: denying resources to ones enemies 
while keeping them for one’s own side.  The annalistic tradition that Livy preserves, on 
the other hand, records them for reasons either prestigious or economic.
166
  In the one 
hand, they follow records of the booty collected because the booty list stands as an 
attestation of the greatness of the victory.  In other cases, the booty is recorded because it 
stands as the funding source for public works such as manubial monuments or the road 
and aqueduct systems.
167
  Ziolkowski argues that Livy methodically noted every temple 
vowed.
168
  These sources may even include records of the booty carried in the triumphs 
(such as a dedicatory inscription).  This attention to plunder notably appears in the early 
books of Livy, but also reappears in his accounts of the Hannibalic War.  For example, in 
the early books, plunder is a motive for campaign strategy.
169
  During the Hannibalic 
War, we are presented with some discrepancies in level of detail: in one place Livy might 
go into great detail, but in another, barely mention it.
170
  Livy generally does not criticize 
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 A few instances where it is obvious that Livy is dealing with multiple earlier Roman accounts are 
26.49.1-6, where he cites several other authorities who vary on items from troop numbers to booty quantity; 
25.39.11-17, where he drops the names of Quadrigarius, Acilius, Antias, and Piso in quick succession, and 
28.46.14; where the motive and destination of the 80 Carthaginian ships captured off Sardinia are in 
dispute. 
167
 For manubial temples and their placement, see Ziolkowski 1992 passim, Cornell 1990, 405-408.  See 
also Harris 1985, 60. 
168
 Ziolkowski 1992,14-15.  By this guiding principle, all known Republican temples not mentioned in the 
extant portion of Livy belong to the periods of the missing sections. 
169
 In 5.15, the consular tribunes are said to limit themselves to raids and to have made themselves wealthy.  
In 7.16, the Roman consul is portrayed as encouraging his troops desire for plunder.  In 8.19, the consul 
Plautius is fully engaged in looting and plundering the fields of the enemy.  In 8.36, the Roman army 
advances ‘where it might find plunder’. 
One inscription noting captured booty is CIL 1.25, commemorating Duilius’s victory in the First Punic War 
(260). 
See also Harris 1985, 54-57 for the importance of plundering as motive in this period. 
170
 One example is Livy 26.40. 13: ...ceteros praedamque vendidit...with little to no mention of what the 
praedam exactly was.  Compare to the detail given in 26.47.5-9: captus et apparatus ingens belli: 
catapultae maximae formae centum viginti, minores ducentae octoginta una, ballistae maiores viginti tres, 
minores quinquaginta duae, scorpionum maiorum minorumque et armorum telorumque ingens numerus, 
signa militaria septuaginta quattuor. et auri argentique relata ad imperatorem magna vis: paterae aureae 
fuerunt ducentae septuaginta sex, librae ferme omnes pondo; argenti infecti signatique decem et octo milia 
et trecenta pondo, vasorum argenteorum magnus numerus. haec omnia C. Flaminio quaestori adpensa 
adnumerataque sunt; tritici quadringenta milia modium, hordei ducenta septuaginta. naves onerariae 
sexaginta tres in portu expugnatae captaeque, quaedam cum suis oneribus, frumento, armis, aere praeterea 
ferroque et linteis et sparto et navali alia materia ad classem aedificandam... 
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Roman looting, and the criticisms that do appear are far more often about the division of 
booty than the propriety of its acquisition.
171
  And the precise division is frequently 
recorded as well.
172
  The division of the booty was, of course, important to the soldiers, 
who were eager for the financial rewards. 
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of booty for the Roman military 
machine.  Appian tells us that the Romans could hire troops without pay other than the 
promise of booty (e.g. Massinissa, though there were obviously other concerns there).
173
  
Arrangements like this allow Livy to place the ‘first hiring of mercenaries by Romans’ in 
213.
174
  The booty was important to the Roman troops as well, and Scipio once 
disciplined a troop by depriving it of its leian.
175
  Livy also finds it noteworthy to record 
an event where the Roman soldiers were too angry to care about booty (41.4).  
Commanders had much authority over where to store the troops’ plunder, how to 
transport it, when to sell it, etc.
176
  They could be censured by senate or public for 
returning too little (or too much) to the state treasury.
177
  Accumulating large quantities of 
booty was standard practice.
178
  The Greek custom, by contrast, apparently involved less 
pillaging and more ransoming.
179
  Thus, we see a system that operates by fundamentally 
different rules than Greek systems. 
                                                                                                                                                 
I suspect the difference in detail comes from Livy’s sources, not overt decisions made by Livy about which 
is important and which is not.  A few other examples of lists are found at 34.52, 36.40 37.46. 
For a clear example of Livy using sources, he cites Antias for his numbers several times (e.g. 36.38, 45.40, 
45.43). 
171
 See, for example, Livy 45.35 where the soldiers resent Paulus for the lack of booty realized (by the 
common soldier) from Epirus and Macedon. 
172
 A couple of examples: see Livy 33.23, 33.37, 36.40, 39.7 45.43 for both a list of the spoil and the 
division. See 45.34 for the division alone. 
173
 Appian, Pun. 12. 
174
 Livy, 24.48, referring to Scipio’s enlistment of the Celtiberians. 
175
 Appian, Pun. 15. 
176
 For various matters involving plunder as motive and the disposition of plunder, see Frank 1932, 
Shatzman 1972, Hopkins 1978, Harris 1985, Howarth 1999, and  Feig Vishnia 2002 . 
177
 See Shatzman 1972, 189-197 for twelve cases where the division of the booty was challenged or said to 
be challenged. 
178
 See, for example, a fragment of Quadrigarius, preserved in Gellius: Romani multis armis et magno 
commeatu praedaque ingenti copiamur (F21 Cornell v.II 508-509= Gellius 17.2.9).  See Shatzman 1972 
for some discussion on what, precisely, praeda might mean in this context instead of other words like 
manubiae or pecunium. 
179
 Compare Polybius 9.42.5-8, where ransom is explicitly a customary activity (and nearly refused by the 
Romans) to Livy 26.24, where the alliance with the Aetolians contains provisions for booty divisions, but 
no mention of ransoms, and Livy 22.61, 25.6, where ransom offers are refused.  See also Livy 9.4-11, 
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This booty could, naturally, be turned to several purposes.  The most natural role 
was to reward the soldiers, but the state was due a significant portion.  As for Roman 
infrastructure, large projects, such as temples, roads, and especially aqueducts, were 
commonly financed by war booty.  A general would often vow a temple, which was 
financed out of his share of the spoils.
180
  Notably, this was the purpose the loot of the 
Samnite Wars was turned to, providing most the financing for the Anio Vetus and the 
Aqua Appia.
181
  Thus regular looting functioned as a source of funding for the Roman 
state.  This would continue to hold true through the second century, as well, where the 
Carthaginian indemnities were used for the expansion of the aqueduct system.
182
 
It is important to see that although the Romans would repeatedly speak against 
piracy later, the acts of raiding and looting themselves were by no means shameful.  
Early Roman campaigns were largely motivated by plunder: the presence or absence of 
plunder altered where troops went, how long they stayed in a place, and even whether 
they engaged the enemy.
183
  Even if plunder later, during the campaigns of the middle 
republic, became less of a concern for the commanders, Roman troops were still largely 
motivated by plunder.  Despite occasional Greek disapproval of plundering for its own 
                                                                                                                                                 
22.57-61, 26.35 for Roman arguments and thoughts about ransoming.  Livy (34.50) also indicates that the 
Carthaginians had kept many unransomed Roman captives as slaves.  Despite opposition, we see the 
Romans and Italians ransoming captives at 23.19 (where Livy implies Hannibal had hitherto been unwilling 
to ransom captives contra 22.56).  Nevertheless, this is always the Carthaginians offering to ransom back 
captives, and the Romans do not do this. Barring 25.23.9, where the request comes from the Greeks, 26.50, 
where the request comes from the Iberians, 30.43, where it comes from the Carthaginians.  In these cases, 
the Romans generally request favors or gratitude, and refuse money (similar accounts happen under 
Hannibal (e.g. 22.7, 22.58) and after the Punic Wars (e.g. 31.40, 45.42)).  This may be peculiar to the Punic 
Wars: see 10.31, 10.46, 32.17 for examples of the Romans accepting money as ransoms, and 5.48 (cf. 
6.14), 10.16 for the Romans agreeing to pay a ransom.  Manlius (Livy 38.47) implies that ransoms are 
customary.  Livy also records ‘false ransoms’ where the Romans endeavor to regain the ransom money, 
most notably the attack on the Gauls: see especially 9.11, 5.48-5.51, 34.5. For some more typical 
Hellenistic ransom-accounts see Livy 32.22, 33.38, 44.23, Polybius 2.6, 27.40.  
180
 See Ziolkowski 1992, esp. 235-261. 
181
 See Drummond 1990, 132; Cornell 1990, 405.  Frank 1932 may also be of interest here, though this 
evidence is from the second century. 
In addition to these structures, Livy records 8 temples being built either from the city’s share of the booty 
or from the manubiae of the general. 
182
 Boren 1958, 893, for example mentions this in the context of its lack becoming a problem during ‘the 
long peace’ of the second century. 
183
 See Harris 1985, 54-58 for a discussion of arguments regarding the role of plunder as motive. 
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sake, the Latin-writing historians do not so disapprove.
184
  In Greek eyes, plundering may 
be seen as part of the Roman makeup, and so, Dionysius of Halicarnassus notes 
plundering among the activities of the earlier Romans.
185
  To establish a non-hypocritical 
Roman rationale for why piracy was unacceptable and Roman looting was laudable will 
require some additional effort.  The act and the method cannot be the main issue; but this 
evidence alone does not answer what the ‘main issue’ might be.  I suggest there are two 
solutions to this inconsistency: first, the Roman objection to piracy has been ‘retrojected’ 
by later historians trying to make the Romans of the Early and Middle Republic more 
similar to their counterparts in the Hellenistic world, and second, the permission to 
plunder is seen as a prerogative of the state, not the individual.  Both of these will 
become clear in the following sections. 
 
Antium and Italian piracy 
In Antium in particular, Latin (or Volscian) piracy appears to have been 
influential.  Strabo’s account (5.3.5) suggests that the Antiates were initially allowed to 
practice piracy (by the Romans), but were forced to stop sometime after 300.  Regardless 
of which Hellenistic monarchs we have in Strabo’s account (quoted below), this would 
appear to be the first time the Romans acted to reduce piracy and also the first time that 
the Greeks tried to deal with Italian piracy through diplomacy.  And furthermore, it 
appears uncontroversial that Rome’s colonization of Antium ~338 had no intent to stop 
Antiate piracy.  The Roman historical tradition would represent these events at Antium as 
being anti-piratical, but I think the evidence does not bear that out.
186
  The agreement to 
stop Antiate piracy only came upon an Eastern request.   
                                                 
184
 This Greek attitude itself may be more a factor of being representatives of a people so plundered.  The 
Greek evidence does not exactly show signs of restraint in plundering.  See Champion 2000, 428 for the 
Greeks being alienated by the Roman style of warfare, see Eckstein 1976, 131ff. for the general harshness 
of Roman war. 
Temple-plundering meets with particular disapproval (e.g. Diodorus 14.17.11, 14.63.1, 23.1.2, Xenophon, 
Hell. 7.4.32)  The Romans would later also disapprove of temple-plundering (e.g. Florus, 3.5.7). 
185
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus 1.10.2.  ζῆν δὲ ἀπὸ λῃστείας καὶ νομῆς “...and to live off of plundering and 
grazing [animals].” 
186
 In addition to Strabo’s account, Antium’s piracy is also represented at Livy 8.14; Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, Ant. Rom. 7.37.3, 9.56.5, 9.60.3. 
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Strabo, in the context of describing the cities of the western seaboard, presents us 
with information that Bispham rightly notes, is “harder to fit within customary colonial 
parameters than what we have been considering to date.”187  Let us examine Strabo 5.3.5: 
 
καὶ πρότερον δὲ ναῦς ἐκέκτηντο καὶ ἐκοινώνουν τῶν λῃστηρίων τοῖς Τυρρηνοῖς, καίπερ 
ἤδη Ῥωμαίοις ὑπακούοντες. διόπερ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος πρότερον ἐγκαλῶν ἐπέστειλε, καὶ 
Δημήτριος ὕστερον, τοὺς ἁλόντας τῶν λῃστῶν ἀναπέμπων τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, χαρίζεσθαι 
μὲν αὐτοῖς ἔφη τὰ σώματα διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας συγγένειαν, οὐκ ἀξιοῦν δὲ τοὺς 
αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας στρατηγεῖν τε ἅμα τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ λῃστήρια ἐκπέμπειν, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ 
ἀγορᾷ Διοσκούρων ἱερὸν ἱδρυσαμένους τιμᾶν οὓς πάντες σωτῆρας ὀνομάζουσιν, εἰς δὲ 
τὴν Ἑλλάδα πέμπειν τὴν ἐκείνων πατρίδα τοὺς λεηλατήσοντας. ἔπαυσαν δ᾽ αὐτοὺς 
Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιτηδεύσεως 
 
“And earlier they built ships and joined together with the Tyrrhenians in piracy, although 
they were already subject to Rome. And thus, first Alexander and then later Demetrius, 
when sending back the captured pirates to the Romans first said he would return the 
bodies to them on account of their kinship (syngeneia) to the Greeks but then also [said] 
that it was not right for these men to both rule all Italy and to send out pirate-raids and 
[similarly,] for those who in their forum honor the temple of the Dioscuroi, who all men 
name saviors, and then [also] to send plunderers to Greece, the homeland of these.  And 
the Romans stopped them [the Antiates] from practicing this.”  
 
In this passage, we have several items of interest.  The use of αὐτοὺς indicates that Strabo 
perceived the Ῥωμαῖοι as a different group from the pirates but ἀναπέμπων indicates that 
the Greek kings believed they were the same group; that they were returning the pirates 
to their point of origin.  Even if the Antiates were perceived as subjects rather than 
Romans, their actions nevertheless reflected upon the Romans.  The expected reward for 
the Greeks’ safe return of the pirates was cessation of piracy.  The rationale behind the 
request implies that a concern for plunder is a feature of smaller states and also that Rome 
appears to be acting as a friend in one way and as an enemy in another. 
 The dating of the event is in question, and tied to the identity of the Demetrius in 
the passage.  If Demetrius I Poliorcetes, that would put the event in the early third 
century, before the war with Pyrrhus, but if Demetrius II, then the late third century, after 
the first Punic War.
188
  I would argue that, based on the earlier equation of Latins and 
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 Bispham 2012, 235.  Bispham (234-235) is thinking here about the usual expectations of Staatsrecht: 
that the colony flourishes as a citizen colony and the initial character and indigenous population wither 
away to be replaced by Romans.  The suggestions he argues against (e.g. Galsterer 1976, Salmon 1969, 
Scullard 1989) are thus attempts ‘to impose some tidiness’ (234). 
188
 Demetrius I ruled 294-288, Demetrius II 239-229.  The campaigns of Pyrrhus were 281-275. 
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Etruscans, and the mention of ‘to rule all Italy’, a post-Pyrrhus date is preferable, and the 
later Demetrius is thus more likely.  ‘Alexander’ is suspect in general, especially if 
identified with ‘the Great’ but Alexander II of Epirus, the heir of Pyrrhus, predates 
Demetrius II by a similar amount and was quite likely to be concerned with any ongoing 
hostilities.
189
  While this would suggest a later date for the piracy by some fifty years, I 
find this unproblematic, especially considering Roman attitudes towards Italian 
mercenaries elsewhere in the late third century.
190
  Regardless of identification, however, 
the passage illustrates a shift regarding freelance raiding in/from Italy. 
Overall, the passage reveals three things: first, the Hellenistic kings are capturing 
and returning these pirates to Rome, second, the piracy is seen as inappropriate, not 
intrinsically so, but rather, as being out of keeping with their other activities; and third, 
that the Greeks consider the Antiate pirates to be Roman and the Romans do not, though 
they accept their return.  If Rome claimed a monopoly on legitimate warfare, it also, of 
necessity, bore the responsibility for ensuring its citizens and subjects stayed in line.  The 
Greeks blame the Romans, and the Romans accept responsibility. 
 This Volscian piracy is also noted at a much earlier date, definitely by the mid-
fifth century: the Antiates had captured certain Sicilian ambassadors and were making it 
difficult for the Romans to get grain from the south.
191
  Furthermore, Bispham argues that 
the phrasing of Livy 8.14.8 (where the Roman colony is set up) suggests that Volscian 
piracy had operated out of Antium for some time: et Antium nova colonia missa, cum eo 
ut Antiatibus permitteretur, si et ipsi adscribi coloni vellent; naves inde longae abactae 
interdictumque mari Antiati populo est et civitas data.
192
 For the Antiates to be 
forbidden the sea, yet given citizenship implies strongly that the activities of the Antiates 
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 Bispham (2012, 239-240), fairly reasonably, pins it to the elder, more famous, Demetrius and tentatively 
accepts Alexander the Great.  Dell (1967, 335) says ‘surely Alexander the Molossian’. 
190
 For Roman support of Campanian mercenaries, see 52f. and 66f.below  
191
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. Rom. 7.37.3, cf. Livy 2.34.4.  According to Dionysius, this was the 
consulship of Marcus Minucius Augurinus and Aulus Sempronius Atratinus, but Livy puts it partially in 
that year and partially in the preceding one.  See also Dionysius of Halicarnassus 9.56.5-6, 9.60.3; Livy 
2.62-65; Bispham 2012, 228-229. The Volscian raids on Latin territory (Dionysius of Halicarnassus 8.12.2-
5, 8.16.4-20.3, 8.36.2) may also be of interest.  
192
 “And a new colony was sent to Antium, while it was allowed to the Antiates to join with them, if they 
wished to be enrolled as colonists. Regarding the Antiate people, their warships were taken away, the sea 
forbidden them, and citizenship given to them. 
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by sea (like the capture of the Sicilians) had caused problems for the Romans, yet were 
not activities that the Romans themselves disliked.  Furthermore, Livy’s use of abigo 
implies that the Romans had further use for these ships. 
The colonization of Antium might be seen as a Roman naval base serving to 
counter piracy.  One such example might be the mid-fourth century plundering carried 
out by Greeks against Antium and the shores of the Tiber River (Livy 7.25.3-4):  
 
annus multis uariisque motibus fuit insignis: Galli ex Albanis montibus, quia hiemis uim 
pati nequiuerant, per campos maritimaque loca uagi populabantur; mare infestum 
classibus Graecorum erat oraque litoris Antiatis Laurensque tractus et Tiberis ostia, ut 
praedones maritimi cum terrestribus congressi ancipiti semel proelio decertarint 
dubiique discesserint in castra Galli, Graeci retro ad naues, uictos se an uictores 
putarent. 
 
The year [349] was notable for many and diverse disturbances.  The Gauls [descended] 
from the Alban hills because they had been unable to endure the force of the winter, and 
wandering through the plains and the coastal areas, they were plundering [these areas];  
the sea was infested with fleets of Greeks, as were the Laurentine lands and the Antiate 
shore and the mouths of the Tiber; to such an extent that when the sea-borne praedones 
encountered their terrestrial counterparts, they fought with them once, in a fluctuating 
battle.  Doubtful, the Gauls retreated back into their camp, the Greeks back to their ships, 
and they were both wondering whether they were the winners or the losers.   
 
This episode shows two examples of raiding Roman territory that would make such an 
outpost at Antium make sense.  The express removal of ships from Antium, however, 
suggests that the Romans were more concerned with matters closer to home.
193
  And far 
from the Romans readily repulsing both groups (as often suggested), it seems plain that 
the Romans were initially unable to handle these forces and this recorded incident 
weakened both, which no doubt gave the Romans the opportunity to reclaim their 
territory through the events recorded by Livy in 7.26.  Moreover, Livy also voices his 
suspicions that the Greeks were Syracusans.
194
  That is, this was a state operation, not the 
act of freelancers acting independently.  Without ships, Antium must have failed 
completely as a defense against future Greek raids. 
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 See Bispham 2012, 231.  The removal of the Antiate ships is in Livy, 8.14 (see above). 
194
 So noted, Livy 7.26.14. 
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Alternatively, the state colony at Antium may have been designed to control any 
‘piratic tendencies’ of the Volscians.195  Yet, in the mid-fourth century, the Volscian 
Antiate community seems to have been definitively displaced, and the makeup of the 
citizenry there changed.
196
  Yet the raiding continues, as indicated in Strabo’s passage.  
This suggests that Roman control of Antiate piracy did not necessitate Roman cession of 
Antiate piracy, but only assurances that they would avoid friendly targets).  Another 
example is provided by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, where the Romans asked the 
Aequians whether the Antiate plunderers were acting with state approval or on their 
own.
197
  And with that, the agreement in Strabo’s passage does not necessarily indicate 
stopping the Antiates from acts of piracy, but instead, stopping the Antiates from acts of 
piracy against the Greeks within the sphere of the kings mentioned.  If I am correct in 
surmising an Epirote/Molossian Alexander rather than Macedonian, that sphere would 
easily encompass Syracuse and Tarentum, where we know such conflicts and raids to 
have existed.   
Lastly, by suppressing the means of the Antiates to raid or defend themselves 
against Greek raids, the Romans may have made the Volscians more dependent on Rome.  
By controlling Antium, the Romans prevented their own territory from being raided by 
Antium.  But from an outside perspective, for all intents and purposes, the Romans 
appear to have taken up where the Antiates left off.  This displays not a suppression of 
piracy but a state subsumption and control of these piratical naval forces. 
These mid-fourth century Greek and Latin raids might be either state-supported or 
freelance.  Both sides may refer to their own raids as retaliatory in nature.  And, as if a 
feud, they may both be correct in that reference, at least for the Sicilians and the Antiates, 
who appear to have a century-long-history of attacking each other.  Nor are these the only 
example of Greek pirates attacking Italy; earlier, Livy records a praiseworthy pirate who 
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 See Bispham 2012, 230, for discussion.  See also Galsterer 1976, Salmon 1969, for other arguments 
about the degree of ‘control’ Rome desired. 
196
 A large number of Latin and Hernicans moved into Antium. Not many Antiates appear to have taken the 
Roman offer (in Livy 8.14, above) and instead left to join the Aequians.  See Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 
Ant. Rom. 9.59.1-2. See also Bispham 2012 passim, but especially 242-243. 
197
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. Rom. 9.60.  Here, the Antiates who did not take the Roman offer 
continued to engage in piracy against the Latins.   
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refrains from piracy: a Lipari islander with the Greek name Timasitheus.
198
  A similar 
state of affairs can be said to have existed on a more local level in Magna Graecia. 
Now, Rome’s own campaigns, as seen in Livy, display significant time and 
attention devoted to booty-raids, plunder, and protection of that plunder.  In examining 
just two examples of fourth century piracy, it is clear that Latin piracy is supportable 
from the evidence.  Once again, it is clear that Roman objections in this period are not to 
piracy per se, but, rather, to complications arising from piracy.  As a comparison to Teuta 
and to the Mamertines in the following century, the example of Antium stands as a 
contrast. 
 
Teuta and Illyria 
The issue of the state’s control of violence and of its freelancers emerges again 
when the Romans began to have more direct dealings with Illyria.  The Illyrians had 
widespread fame as pirates in the Greek world, but less so in the Roman sphere.  Polybius 
records them as pirates who were eternally attacking Italian merchants.
199
  Nevertheless, 
Adriatic piracy was probably exaggerated.
200
  Herodotus tells us that the Phocaeans were 
the first Greeks to enter the Adriatic, but our data before the fifth century is limited.
201
  It 
is hard to say much of certainty of Illyria before Roman contact.  For the Greeks and 
Romans, Illyria was more of a place where people (i.e. mercenaries) came from than one 
where people went.  In Dalmatia, for example, only two indisputably Greek settlements 
were founded: Issa and Pharos, though Cnidian settlement on Korčula is probable.202   
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 Livy, 5.28.  The Timasitheus episode is important because of how Livy portrays pirates.  See below, ch. 
9 for further details.  The event is also mentioned at Diodorus 14.93.3, Plutarch, Cam. 8.8. 
Diodorus (5.9) also refers to long-time ongoing piracy between Lipari and Etruria 
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 Polybius, 2.8.1. 
200
 So argued by Dell 1967; Wilkes 1992, 226.  
201
 Herodotus, 1.163.1; Graham 1982, 130; Braccesi 1977, 63ff.; Morel 1975.  Wilkes (1992, 110) notes 
that the Corinthians were, in fact, the first, in the eighth century. 
202
 Kirigin 2006, 17.  Kirigin notes that this lack may have more to do with the lack of Croatian excavations 
than an absence of Greek presence.  See also Gaffney et al. 2006, 93; who in turn cites Kirigin 1996, 2004; 
Cambi et al. 2002 for further reports of the spread of Greek material in Illyria.  On ‘Black Corcyra’ and 
Cnidos, see Graham, 130; Beaumont 1936, 173ff.  
Further south, Greek settlement was more common, e.g. Corcyra and Epidamnum. 
See also Wilkes 1992 109-110 for Greek settlement. 
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Diodorus records two Illyrian raids on Epirus in 393/2 and in 384/5, and in the 
second instance were said to have been paid to do so by Dionysius (the elder) of 
Syracuse.
203
  As early as 360, Diodorus attributes pirates raiding the entire Adriatic to the 
extent of making it unnavigable.
204
 Modern sources describe the pirates as Etruscan,
205
 in 
keeping with the overall Greek sense of ‘Tyrrhenian pirates’, but Diodorus (16.5.3) 
merely calls them ‘the barbarians living next to the sea’ (οἱ τὴν παραθαλάττιον οἰκοῦντες 
βάρβαροι), a phrase which could apply to Illyrians easily as well as Etruscans.  The 
Liburnians acting as pirates is recorded by Thucydides in the Archaic Period.
206
  The 
reports of Illyrians are mostly reports of freelance warrior bands or companies entering 
the Aegean either as pirates or mercenaries.  Such reports have dubious merit in assessing 
the people as a whole.  The Illyrian role as a source of mercenaries for Greece and 
Macedon has already been noted above, but chiefly we see, in the Greek sources, a 
widespread association of the Illyrians with piracy whenever they appear.
207
  When 
unknown or Italian pirates appear, they are Tyrrhenian; when Illyrians appear, they are 
pirates unless they are specifically otherwise employed. 
Of Roman encounters with Illyrians, the most prominent story is probably that of 
Teuta.  The Illyrian king Agron died in 230, leaving his widow, Queen Teuta, as the 
regent for his son, Pinnes.  Under Teuta, the Illyrians were extremely successful in their 
plundering, including sacking Phoenice in Epirus.  Generally, Illyrians engaging in 
plundering and raiding simply seems to be an expectation.  In the case of Teuta, however, 
the Romans explicitly assert that she has the power to stop the Illyrians from raiding.
208
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In the famous story of Polybius (2.8ff), the Roman ambassadors ask her to stop the 
Illyrians from attacking Roman ships, and she responds that she will not be the cause of 
any public harm to Rome, but that it is also not the custom for the kings of Illyria to 
hinder their citizenry in their activities at sea.  The Roman ambassador Coruncanius was 
apparently so outraged that he upbraided the queen and informed her that the Romans too 
had a custom: to publicly publish the doers of private wrongs.  According to Polybius, 
this so outraged Teuta that she had him murdered before he could return to Rome.  Dio’s 
account has her murder the Romans and then claim that it was pirates. 
While the historical value of this story is debatable, the story indicates a change in 
the Roman sense of what violence could be legitimately undertaken.  The piracy later, 
both in the ancient historians and in secondary scholarship, becomes the most important 
feature.  But all three major accounts (Polybius, Appian, and Dio) indicate that the real 
cause of the war was not the siege of Issa, nor any piratical depredations of the Illyrians, 
but rather the death of the ambassador Coruncanius in 229 BC.
209
  The elimination of 
piracy, however, becomes something of a credit to the Romans at no additional cost and 
had great propaganda value.
210
  Nevertheless, it is not the original cause of the war.
211
   
It is impossible to examine this instance without comparison with Strabo’s 
account of Demetrius returning the pirates to Rome (see above), where the positions are 
reversed, and the kings of Macedon (or Epirus) command the Romans to control their 
citizens or subjects.  In both cases, there are express claims as to who has authority and 
control over the pirates.  In Strabo, the Romans accept that they have this authority and 
control the piracy at the Greek request.  In Polybius, Teuta denies that she has the 
authority and says that she cannot comply with the Roman request.  In essence, she has 
disavowed any Illyrian pirates the Romans catch.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Dio 12.49 and Zonaras 8.19, (which attempt to combine the other two), Florus 2.5, Orosius 4.13.2, 
Eutropius 13.4. 
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210
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We might expect this explanation to function.  The Romans do not, however, 
accept it with any grace.  It is possible to harmonize the episodes by saying that there is 
no choice when it comes to legitimate violence: the state has a monopoly on violence and 
bears the responsibility for any violence committed by its citizens.  In this framework, the 
notion that a state might see its citizens’ right to raid and pillage as inviolable, as Teuta 
does, simply does not work.
212
  If it did, then we would expect the Romans to accept this 
disavowal.  The Romans thus force the Illyrians to function by the Roman (and 
Hellenistic Greek) understanding.  Indeed, the Roman expedition to Illyria might even 
have had the request of Demetrius in mind. 
Despite the Illyrians’ subsequent defeat by the Romans, the terms imposed seem 
to do little to curb piracy.  They exacted a monetary penalty, forbade Teuta to sail beyond 
a certain distance with a fleet of any size (thus reasserting the assumption that any 
Illyrian raiding was state-sanctioned) and limited the royal ability to exert control over 
the Illyrians.
213
  If Teuta’s story reflected reality, this imposition does nothing to stop 
individuals from undertaking piracy, and actively prevents Teuta from having the ability 
to stop those individuals.  This is evidence that despite later historians’ writing about 
Illyrian piracy, curbing that piracy was either not an actual concern of the Senate or not 
something the Senate had any idea how to address.  Even though Polybius says the 
Greeks had been delivered from this ‘enemy of all’ (κοινοὺς ἐχθροὺς), this can only have 
been the case if the Illyrian state in fact did have a monopoly on piratical actions.   
Thus we are left with a Roman state imposing its own mores on another in 
dictating foreign affairs.  This need not be taken as a state action, but as individuals 
having little conception that another culture would not necessarily think the same as the 
Romans in such matters.  If the Senate had an overall strategic goal regarding the 
Illyrians, they may, in fact, have wanted to eliminate the ability of an Illyrian monarch 
being able to harness the potential of the at-large warriors of Illyria and nearby regions.
214
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Indeed, what power there was being concentrated in their (somewhat dubious) ally, 
Demetrius of Pharos, it could be argued that Roman power abroad was increased.  More 
likely, however, the goal may have been principally to increase the prestige of Rome (and 
her commanders). 
In sum, the piracy is a pretext for a Roman campaign, as it may have been with 
Antium.
215
  Eliminating piracy is not, in itself, a goal of the third-century Roman state as 
a whole.  Instead, the Romans were concerned with prestige and increased state control 
both of manpower and violence—all of which were gained successfully through this 
campaign.  It is indeed rather difficult to say that a claim of eliminating piracy was 
effective politically at the time of the campaign, though it clearly was by the time Livy 
and Appian were writing.  The entire piracy episode, a good and famous story, must have 
been either a sideline to the whole affair or even a later invention. 
Teuta’s story was not the only third century Roman involvement in Illyria, and 
again, the later examples involve plundering and state control (or lack thereof) of the 
freelancers.  A few years later, a parallel situation occurs involving Istria.
216
  Again, it 
seems improbable that there was any significant Roman trade in the north Adriatic and 
also improbable that some instances of piracy by themselves would provoke the Romans 
into a campaign.  Harris argues that the campaigns of 221 and 220 cannot be explained 
by defensive thinking alone.
217
  Like the Illyrians to their south and the Gauls to their 
west, the Histri must have provided a pool of flexible manpower to various southern 
neighbors.  Given the scarcity of the evidence, it may be useful to speculate.  The 
Romans, as with Illyria, were not interested in annexation, but they were interested in 
control.  The coastal campaigns in 221 and inland in 220, even if they brought no 
territory to Rome, gained Rome plunder and reduced the ability of the Histri to throw in 
with either their Gallic or Illyrian neighbors.   
                                                 
215
 Those these two examples may be the first Roman examples, there are numerous Greek examples of 
claims of piracy as cause of war: see Diodorus 15.14 for one early example: Dionysius’s 384 sack of Pyrgi. 
216
 The sources for this are Eutropius 3.7 and Appian, Ill. 8, but see also Livy Per. 20.12-13, Dio 
12.20/Zonaras 8.20, and Orosius 4.13.16, which mention little beside the war.  The piracy noted in Livy 
10.2.4 is much earlier but still potentially interesting. 
217
 Harris 1985, 199-200.  This opinion is opposing those of Cassola 1962 and Dell 1970, who are both 
convinced that piracy was the cause of war here. 
54 
 
Control of Illyria was, according to Wilkes, ultimately established by Roman 
roadbuilding.
218
  For the most part, the Romans were content to leave Illyrians in charge 
of Illyrians.  The principal desire, I argue, was the ability to access Illyrian military 
manpower and to exclude Rome’s foes from such access.  The Illyrians were an 
important source of manpower for the Hellenistic monarchs and especially for the 
Macedonian kings.
219
  Indeed, gaining control of this territory (and its potential recruits) 
was the principal goal of Macedon in the Second Punic War.   
 
Recognizing a state: the Mamertines 
Thus far, the freelancers have been a resource to be acquired or at least denied to 
enemies.  But at times, the at-large warriors sought to form states. The Romans’ dealing 
with these nascent mercenary-states reveals a rather pragmatic lack of concern about the 
niceties of warfare and diplomacy and a desire to strengthen the state that the later 
historians were hard pressed to defend.  As noted in the previous chapter, Campanian and 
other Italian mercenaries frequently hired on in Sicilian (both Greek and Carthaginian) 
armies.  The Campanians, in particular, if dismissed or unpaid, simply took cities and 
ruled them.  These groups have been noted at Rhegium, Catana, and Entella, but the most 
famous example is the group that took Messana: the Mamertines. 
The Mamertines were Italian mercenaries hired by Agathocles to fight Carthage.  
Sometime after his death in 289, they took Messana over (at the time, a possession of 
Carthage) and they were among the states who called Pyrrhus to Sicily (though Pyrrhus 
decided to side with Syracuse and the Mamertines allied with Carthage against him).
220
  
They also “practiced piracy” to such an extent that Hiero of Syracuse campaigned against 
them.
221
  I want to use this episode to serve as an example of how mercenaries turned to 
banditry as well as an example of how they were treated as a legitimate state by Carthage 
and Rome (though arguably not recognized as such by Syracuse).  In Cary’s eyes, the 
Mamertines joined the ranks of the Hellenistic ‘robber-states’ of Tylis, Galatia and 
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Aetolia.
222
  Cary’s term is unusual.  By it, he appears to indicate that these are instances 
where at-large groups of warriors set themselves up in power and manage to hold onto it.  
Additionally, said states then serve as agents of sorts for its populace.  Beyond 
‘delegitimizing’ the state, Cary’s term suggests that the state was only able to support 
itself through robbery.  Grünewald has recently argued that the acts of the Mamertines at 
Messana and of similar groups in southern Italy prompted the shift in meaning of latro 
from ‘mercenary’ to ‘bandit’.223  A band of Timoleon’s ex-mercenaries had earlier done 
something similar, crossing into Italy and taking over a small town in Bruttium before the 
Bruttians joined forces and expelled them.
224
  The Mamertines were thus doing nothing 
unusual in Sicily but were merely the most successful of these groups.   
The last stage of the Greek-Punic Wars can be broken into two parts, the 
expedition of Agathocles (which is sometimes called the Third Sicilian War) (~315-307) 
and the Sicilian campaign of Pyrrhus (279-278).  During this period, it appears that 
except for the cities of Lilybaeum and Syracuse, every other part of the island had been 
controlled by one side or the other.  Between 307 and 279, nearly all Sicily was, at least 
in name, a possession or tributary of Carthage.  The Mamertines should fall into this 
category, but the nature of their relations to Carthage and Syracuse before 264 is 
uncertain.  As the events of 264 provoked the first Punic War, they are described in a 
number of authors, from Polybius to Zonaras.
225
 
The Mamertines seized Messana in or around 289.
226
  An alternate tradition, 
preserved in the Bellum Carthaginense of Alfius, indicates they were invited in by the 
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Messenians, while Zonaras (8.8) indicates that Messana was actually a Campanian 
colony.
227
  They then raided the coastlines and exacted tribute (ἐφορολόγουν) from the 
local communities.
228
  The Mamertines allied themselves with a similar band of 
Campanians in Rhegium.
229
  Campanian soldiers also sacked the city of Caulonia.
230
  
When Hiero marched against them, he allowed his own mercenaries to bear the brunt of 
the fighting with the Mamertines, while he retreated back to Syracuse.
231
  Upon his 
return, he recruited a new band of mercenaries and eventually retook the field and 
inflicted a defeat upon them.
232
  According to Diodorus, the Mamertines held onto the 
city only through the intervention of the Carthaginians, yet by the accounts of both 
Diodorus and Polybius, the Mamertines soon ejected their Carthaginian guests.
233
 
The Mamertines were thus a band of mercenaries who lost employment and 
gained a city (regardless of their method of acquisition).  Yet Carthage apparently made 
no attempt to recover it from them, and even formed some sort of alliance with them in 
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the 270s.
234
  When they appealed for Carthaginian assistance around 265, it seems as 
though Carthage’s immediate response indicated not an opportunistic expansion, but a 
more obligatory defense.  Despite the lack of any positive evidence, it would seem 
reasonable that the Mamertines had been paying some form of tribute to Carthage 
already, by which they maintained an otherwise independent status.
235
  This would 
account for other sources’ indication that the Mamertine embassy was actually an appeal 
for relief from Carthage, not Hiero.
236
 
Regardless, the Romans recognized the Mamertines as the legitimate holders of 
Messana, and whether by force of arms or by dint of payment, the Carthaginians did as 
well.  In retaking Rhegium, the Romans made a treaty with the Mamertines to preclude 
them from reinforcing Rhegium.
237
  There may have been other ties as well, but it is clear 
that the two principal powers of the western Mediterranean accepted that the Mamertines 
were more than revolted mercenaries and bandits.  This is not a first example; several 
eastern cities (Pergamum, Iasos, and Theangela) had earlier come to terms with 
mercenary bands with treaties resembling those with states and in Sicily, the cities of 
Entella and Catana had earlier suffered the same fate as Messana.
238
  Indeed, the 
Mamertines had exercised some limited control over some fifty-odd villages and towns in 
northern Sicily.
239
  They minted coins, and continued to do so after subordination to 
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Rome, presumably from Messana.
240
  Plutarch also indicates that several Sicilian cities 
were paying tribute to Messana.
241
 
We might compare this situation to the recent events in Rhegium, where the 
Romans had, by 270, forcefully put down a group of Campanians that had, like the 
Mamertines, seized control of Rhegium from the Greeks under similar circumstances.
242
  
Polybius (1.8) tells us that these had established an alliance with the Mamertines.  This 
contrast creates a question that has long baffled Roman historians:  Why did the Romans 
deem the Campanian mercenaries of Rhegium illegitimate and the Campanian 
mercenaries of Messana legitimate?
243
  Was this rooted in a misunderstood act of 
morality or was it sheer opportunism?  If perceived kinship played a role, how was the 
kinship different or interpreted differently for the two groups?
244
  Through Polybius, we 
possess some records of the debate, but they are necessarily shaped by his own views.
245
  
If legitimacy is a key factor, we might also question the legitimacy of the Syracusan 
tyrants.  What made Agathocles a legitimate holder of Syracuse beyond wedding his 
daughter to the king of Epirus?  In short, these civil wars and sudden takeovers were, and 
had been, part of the Sicilian political landscape. 
I would argue that in such a situation, the fundamental ‘moral objections’ 
originate from the later historians.  Eckstein rightly notes that the Roman objection to 
helping the ‘outlaw state’ and the comparison to Rhegium is likely made by Polybius and 
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may originate with Philinus.
246
  This gets repeated as a way of defending Rome.
247
  The 
argument over morality is almost certainly a later interpolation and an attempt to ‘tidy’ 
Roman history.  I argue that the Romans were concerned with control of the territory and 
manpower, but not particularly with immediate control.  Thus, in the Rhegian example, 
the Romans had two groups of subjects fighting, and had nothing to gain by allowing the 
soldiers to keep Rhegium.  Since the Mamertines did not take Messana from Rome or a 
Roman ally, no such problem is raised.  Simply put: rather than the Roman decision over 
Messana being anomalous and the Rhegium example the standard, I argue that the 
Roman decision to intervene at Messana is more typical of third-century practice, and it 
is the ouster of the Campanians from Rhegium that needs explanation. 
Beyond the implications for a revised understanding of third-century policy, the 
Mamertines’ occupation has one additional ramification.  The freelancer, if seen as 
illegitimate, provided an ideal target for someone seeking legitimacy.  While the 
Carthaginians and Romans apparently accepted Mamertine control of northeastern Sicily, 
Syracuse had not.  Hiero had made alliances within the city of Syracuse, but his 
legitimacy as tyrant rose directly from his defeat of the Mamertines.
248
 Thus, with both 
the Syracusan tyrants and the Mamertines, legitimate rule was often determined by force 
of arms.  In both cases, that force of arms was a product of the at-large warrior, himself 
an ‘illegitimate’ figure. 
 
Piracy and Plundering in the Punic Wars 
As a comparison to the actions of at-large bands in the third century, I now 
present the acts of plundering in the Punic Wars.  Of course, the battles of the Punic Wars 
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are enacted between powers beyond the scope of this project.  The Carthaginians, 
however, also made substantial use of mercenary forces in each of their wars, and the 
portrayal of these, especially in revolts, is also important.  It is clear that certain treaties 
were designed to avoid piratic depredations and plundering both by land and sea was 
practiced as a strategy in both the first and the second war.  While the use of mercenaries 
was not an attractive prospect to the Romans, it is also clear that mobilizing available 
military manpower was a major concern.  Of course, the Mamertines, the cause of the 
first war, are important for our understanding of freelancers.  I have already discussed 
these.  The Mercenary War, that is, the major revolt in Carthage at the end of the First 
Punic War, is very important for the depiction of mercenaries, but I hold discussion of 
that event to follow the combined discussion of the Punic Wars in order to draw clearer 
comparisons for the actions of freelancers within those wars. 
Before the Mamertine incident, Rome and Carthage had fairly civil, even friendly 
relations.  Many commentators have seen the treaty stipulations of the 509 and 348 
treaties between Rome and Carthage as mediating potential disputes of piratic raids, 
similar to practices of asylia and isopoliteia in the Greek world.
249
  By this reasoning, 
non-Roman Italy was open for the Carthaginians to raid, but Carthage could keep no 
territory there. Such an agreement would surely be useful to both sides in limiting the 
power of Tarentum and Syracuse.  Again, this serves as evidence that the Romans had 
little objection to piracy as a concept; rather, their concern was as to how they and their 
territory could remain safe.  While plundering raids were profitable, the unpopularity of 
being plundered in return had grown, and such events were to be avoided through formal 
agreements. 
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 For the dating and content of the treaties given by Polybius, quite the can of worms, there have been 
many things written.  The editors of the CAH list no less than thirty-seven books and articles addressing the 
topic. (CAH VII.ii, 1990 768-769).  Since then, notably Eckstein 2010, Serrati 2006, Palmer 1997, Forsythe 
2005. 
The treaties themselves are given by Polybius,  
The authors in the CAH appear to agree on this point of the treaties: see Cornell 1990b, 323; Scullard 1990, 
520ff. 
For asylia and isopoliteia as limiting piracy, see de Souza 1999, 62, 69, 71; Perlman 1999, 150; 
Papazarkadas and Thonemann 2008, 82-83.  For isopoliteia more generally, see Gawantka 1975 for 
seventy-some examples of this state. 
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With the advent of war, of course, those non-aggression agreements disappeared.  
In both the first and second Punic War, there are accounts of Carthaginian ships raiding 
the coastlines capturing locals to press into slavery or to ransom.
250
  While the naval 
skirmishes and plundered coastlines are generally overlooked in favor of the set-piece 
land-battles (by both ancients and moderns), there is ample evidence of their existence.  
In 248 and 247, Carthalo and Hamilcar both raided Southern Italy, while a Roman fleet 
attempted a raid near Hippo Diarrhytus.
251
 Livy only records one instance of Roman 
supplies being interrupted by Carthaginian raiders in the Second Punic War.
252
  A 
Carthaginian fleet had also been sent to raid Sicily and Italy.
253
  Such raiding in Africa 
was happening as well: Servilius Geminus, in 216, took Sardinian and Corsican hostages 
and proceeded to raid the African coast (where he was soundly driven off); Titus 
Otacilius, one of the principal Roman fleet commanders of the Second Punic War, led a 
raid on the Carthaginian countryside in 215, and further raids were made in 210, 208, and 
207.
 254
.   
Roman comedy provides contemporary evidence for this phenomenon.  In several 
of the plays, a character has been separated from his/her family by captivity in either 
piracy or war.  In Plautus’s Poenulus, for example, the most direct parallel, three 
Carthaginian children have been kidnapped and sold into slavery in western Greece.  
Though fictional, and no doubt based upon an earlier Greek original, the play was staged 
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 At Livy 34.50, he indicates that there were many Roman slaves in Carthage who were enslaved during 
the Punic War when the ransom was not met.  Given the terms of the 201 treaty (Livy 30.37), by which all 
prisoners were to be returned to Rome, that implies these slaves were not former soldiers.  Livy tells us his 
source is Polybius. 
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 Scullard 1990, 564. 
252
 22.11.6, though there is also a failed attempt to do so at 26.39 and he also records a Sardinian raid at 
27.6.13-14 and an attempted Sardinian raid at 23.34 
253
 Livy, 21.49.  The force given was 20 quinquiremes and 1000 soldiers and reports of a second force with 
35 ships.  Livy later reports Carthaginian raiding around Vibo, apparently from a third squadron. (21.51)  
Further Carthaginian raiding occurs at 22.56 (around Syracuse). 
254
 Livy, 22.31 for Geminus, 23.41 for Otacilius (also 24.8 and 24.44); 27.5, 27.29, and 28.5 for the later 
ones. 
For the career of Otacilius, see Broughton 1951, (MRR I) pp. 244, 250, 256, 258n5, 259, 264, 269, 274, 
always as praetor/propraetor.  Despite his consular candidature being blocked twice for incompetence (Livy 
24.8, 26.22) he retained his position as fleet commander. 
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during the Second Punic War and must have echoed contemporary events.
255
  Here too, 
we should also consider the playwright Terence, a Carthaginian slave who was probably 
descended from a captive taken in the 2
nd
 Punic War.
256
   
Unsurprisingly, Hannibal’s image marks him as something of a greedy plunderer 
and a leader of the same.  For example, Livy attributes the march into Picenum as chosen 
on the grounds that there would be much to steal there (i.e. praeda).
257
  Yet, why should 
we expect any commander of the Hellenistic Period to do otherwise, when looting was 
the principal means of maintaining an army in the field?  Nevertheless, Hannibal is 
marked as greedy (avidus).  Likewise, Livy has the Samnite delegation to Hannibal 
complain that the Roman armies are roaming their homeland like brigands (latronum 
modo percursant).
258
 
The pillaging during war can be seen as retaliatory in some ways.  Like the 
Sicilians and Antiates of century earlier, retaliation could be a form of defense.  There is 
more evidence of this from the Roman side, but in the Second Punic War, several fleets 
on a mission to ravage the African countryside turned aside to chase after Carthaginian 
fleets off Sicily, Sardinia, or Italy.
259
  But the pillaging was also an end in itself, as 
Polybius mentions regarding the first Punic War.
260
 
If at any point in the Punic Wars, either side would have attempted to hire 
additional ships or crews for military service, the most likely time to do so would have 
been the last battle of the First Punic War: the Battle of the Aegates.  At the time, both 
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 On Punic piracy as a motivating factor in Roman-Punic relations, see Serrati 2006, 119.  For Punic 
piracy in general, see Ameling 1993, 127-134. 
256
 See Suetonius, vita Ter. 1-2 = Fenestella, F11 Cornell (v.II, 946-947). See Cornell v III for commentary 
on the life of Terence.  For more on the problems of the life of Terence, see Duckworth 1952. 
257
 Livy 22.9.2-5:  ...in agrum Picenum avertit iter non copia solum omnis. generis frugum abundantem sed 
refertum praeda, quam effuse avidi atque egentes rapiebant. ibi per dies aliquot stativa habita, 
refectusque miles hibernis itineribus ac palustri via proelioque magis ad eventum secundo quam levi aut 
facili adfectus. ubi satis quietis datum praeda ac populationibus magis quam otio aut requie 
gaudentibus... 
258
 Livy, 23.42.  This passage is discussed in more detail in chapter 7. 
259
 The clearest example is Livy, 21.49-51: Sempronius was given Africa as a province but spent his time 
chasing (fairly successfully) Carthaginian fleets.  As a general strategic principle, see Livy 23.43, where 
Hannibal voices this strategy. 
Livy 24.8 indicates specifically that both raiding and preventing raiding were part of the fleet commanders’ 
duties. 
260
 Polybius 1.11.2, 1.20.1, 1.49.5.  See also Harris 1985, 63, 185-186, especially n.3, where he details 
where Polybius is drawing upon Fabius Pictor’s accounts of booty. 
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sides were scraping the bottom of the barrel in terms of ships, men, material, etc.  The 
archaeological remains of the site continue to indicate trends in favor of that line of 
reasoning.  The ships at Marsala show signs of having been retrofitted and the Egadi rams 
collected by the ongoing survey project are abnormally small, potentially indicating 
significantly smaller ships.
261
  These, while certainly not conclusive, may indicate that 
either one or both sides employed pirate mercenaries in the last phases of the war. 
Both sides made use of liminal groups.  One episode is striking: in 210, Livy 
reports that the Romans captured a force of four thousand men at Agathyrna which they 
wanted neither to kill or to release.  Laevinus (the consul) instead brought them to Italy 
and put them in the employ of Rhegium who had apparently been looking for just such a 
force: et Reginis usui futuri erant ad populandum Bruttium agrum adsuetam latrociniis 
quaerentibus manum.
262
  We could tie this into the famous manpower shortages of the 
Second Punic War, but this is still a baffling example.
263
  In particular, the fact that 
Rhegium trusted Rome to provide it with a garrison after the events of the 270s is little 
short of astounding.  The Roman ally (the Rhegians) and the Carthaginian ally (the 
Bruttians) are fighting each other, presumably each with the greater power’s blessing, but 
there also appears to be little oversight of the campaign by these greater powers.
264
  Rome 
is acting as a sort of agent for this band of men, which though paralleled by Tylis or the 
Galatians, has no Roman parallel of which I am aware.  The following year, Rome asks 
this garrison to attack the Bruttians.
265
   
Obviously, the Carthaginians continued to employ large numbers of mercenaries, 
and their first action to strengthen Sicily was to enlist mercenaries.
266
  Carthage had hired 
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 The papers of William Murray and Jeffrey Royal, presented at the 2014 APA, suggest such.  See also 
the earlier survey reports at http://rpmnautical.org/sicilian.html (last accessed 2/10/2015)  
262
 The episode is Livy 26.40.16-18, also noted at Polybius 9.10-11.  “And these men were to be of use to 
the Rhegians, [who were] seeking a band used to banditry (latrocinium) for the devastation of the Bruttian 
lands.  Despite Eckstein’s assertion (1987, 182) these Agathyrnans do appear again (Livy 27.11). 
263
 The most famous passage concerning the manpower shortage is probably Livy, 27.9. 
264
 According to Livy (24.1-3), Hanno, the Carthaginian commander was actively sitting this one out, 
hoping that Rhegium and especially Croton would ally with him in exchange for safety from the Bruttians, 
as Locri had already done. 
265
 Livy, 27.11. 
266
 Polybius, 1.17.3-5 
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Iberians for their earlier wars in Sicily, as well.
267
  Again, these groups, (e.g. Iberians, 
Ligurians, and Baleares) are typical groups providing mercenary service and presumably 
provide manpower pools.  Accounts of expeditions to these lands to enlist more 
mercenaries are abundant.
268
  Livy indicates that the hiring of 20,000 Celtiberians in 213 
represents the first example of Romans hiring mercenaries.
269
  Eckstein suggests that the 
Scipios’ decision to enlist mercenaries here is indicative of the trust (or lack thereof) they 
had in their Iberian allies.
270
  In 206, their Iberian mercenaries revolted because of lack of 
pay.
271
  The Romans chastised them severely but did, notably, pay up.  Livy gives Scipio 
(the future Africanus) a speech in which he compares the mercenaries’ (and Romans’) 
seizure of Sucro and secession to the Romans at Rhegium, the Mamertines at Messana, 
and the Campanians at Capua (taking the city from the nominal Etruscan rulers). He does 
this to censure them, suggesting the latter groups had decided to live there permanently, 
which made their actions more excusable than the Romans’ and Celtiberians’. 
The revolts of mercenaries make their importance clear.  Mercenary revolts were 
common: besides the Sucro example, the most notable were in 248 in Sicily, 240 near 
Carthage, 212 in Syracuse.  In each case, however, the cause of the revolt was lack of 
pay: a conspicuous similarity.  Attempts at bribing a paid-up mercenary force do not 
appear to succeed.  This has parallels with early campaigns: in the Second Sicilian War, 
the Campanians threatened to switch sides unless the Carthaginians provided the 
promised rations.
272
  A failure to pay the at-large warriors could lead to very problematic 
situations. 
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 E.g. Diodorus, 13.44, 54.  (412 BC) As 13.55.6-8 and 13.88 shows, they also had Campanians in their 
service. 
268
 A (very) few examples: Livy 23.13 (Iberians/Celtiberians), 27.20 (Baleares) 28.46 (Baleares, Ligurians, 
Gauls) 30.21 (Iberians).  This is likewise noted in Appian, e.g. Hisp. 24, 28  
269
 Livy 24.48.  The Massiliots, in sending a force to the Romans to help, had sent them a band of Gallic 
mercenaries (Polybius 3.41.9) 
270
 Eckstein 1987, 206 (cf. 218-219).  Some sources for the presence of these mercenaries: Polybius 10.6.2, 
10.7.1; Livy 25.32.3, 25.33.1, 25.33.7-8. 
271
 Livy 28.25.  It is unclear whether these Iberians are the same Iberians, but it seems likely that, at least in 
part, they are. 
272
 Diodorus, 13.88.2. 
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In the Second Punic War, the availability of manpower reached new lows.
273
  
After Cannae, the Romans considered capitulating because of their losses, and not much 
later, several of their allies claimed they could not make up their quota.   On the 
Carthaginian side, the Roman decision to not invade Africa directly early in the Second 
Punic War resulted, whether intentionally or unintentionally, in the Romans methodically 
detaching Carthaginian allies and isolating the manpower pools the Carthaginians drew 
upon for their mercenaries.  They besieged the cities of Liguria and Magna Graecia, 
forced the Iberians and Baleares to switch sides or become neutral and even encouraged 
the Macedonians to bow out early.
274
  Mercenaries were often specialists, and one of the 
strengths of the Carthaginian system was that it could field an army composed of Balearic 
slingers, Numidian horse, Iberian javelineers, Gallic and Greek heavy infantry, and 
African elephants.  While seemingly hodge-podge, these were all groups that were 
specialized in a particular style, giving the Carthaginians a sort of tactical flexibility.  
With most of these groups of contingent manpower unavailable, however, Hannibal, at 
the last stage of the war was forced to rely on local reinforcements.  The resulting 
situation was that the only remaining strength he could play to was a frontal elephant 
assault. 
I have already argued that piracy was a lower priority for third-century Romans 
than the later historians would have us believe.  More examples of this appear for the 
Punic Wars.  In both 202 and 149, the Romans are said to upbraid the Carthaginians for 
committing piracy during wartime, asserting that this action was against the customs of 
war.  In the first example, the Romans demand a substantial set of reparations for pre-war 
or wartime piracy that are above and beyond the peace treaty concessions.
275
  This piracy 
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 See Livy 22.61f.  For manpower, see Brunt 1971, 61-90, 269-277.  For the second Punic War more 
generally, see Hoyos2010, 193-219, for the impact of Cannae see Goldsworthy 2000, ch. 8. 
274
 This was not entirely effective.  Notably, the Romans send an envoy to protest when the Macedonians 
send Hannibal 4000 mercenary infantry in 202 (Livy 30.26). 
275
 Livy 30.37-38, also mentioned in Scipio’s speech 30.31.  The armistice in question was that of the 
previous year (see Livy 30.16 and 30.24-26), and it is unclear that the armistice was meant to extend 
beyond Africa: meanwhile action was still underway in Liguria and the Romans captured a Carthaginian 
recruiter with substantial funds.  The eventual price laid on the cargos and crews captured was put at 
25,000 pounds of silver.  Judging by the ransoms suggested at Livy 22.52 and 23.19, (and assuming a value 
of 72 denarii to the pound, other values e.g. 84, 100, have been advanced) this should be a value equivalent 
to the ransom of 5000-9000 men, quite a large undertaking for such a short period of time.  These 
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(of ~300 supply transports) is explicitly referring to state-approved warfare, and has 
nothing to do with controlling at-large warriors as was the case with Teuta.  Moreover, 
one of the Roman offers is to cease raiding (populandi) Carthaginian territory, implying a 
double standard.  This is a strange argument, and it is significant that it is brought to bear 
at times of Carthaginian weakness (and not, apparently, ever in pre-war negotiations).  It 
is possible, I argue, that this does not represent an early tradition, but rather moralizing 
interjections by Livy and Polybius.  It is also possible, though, that the while the practice 
of piratical acts was an ubiquitous part of warfare, it was also an unpopular one and that 
meant that such an accusation was fruitful even if unfair or even hypocritical.  The 
treaties made before the First Punic War, however, suggest that piracy was a valid 
peacetime activity in the absence of a treaty agreement forbidding it.  The accounts in 
Livy and Appian suggest that state-sponsored piracy was, in itself, an act of war.  This 
appears to be the historians placing first-century sensibilities into third-century events.  
The apparent inconsistency can be resolved by a change in the Roman understanding of 
fides that the later tradition did not pick up on. 
 
The Mercenary War 
The tendency of mercenaries to turn brigand upon abandonment or non-payment 
by the hiring power should be clear.  The most famous example may be Alexander’s 
command that his subjects should dismiss their mercenaries, which Diodorus describes as 
causing Asia to be overrun by plundering mercenaries.
276
  A number of Hellenistic 
monarchs were forced to campaign against their own troops and in some cases, the 
soldiers were killed simply out of hand.  In other instances, the employer was forced to 
                                                                                                                                                 
reparations are briefly mentioned by Polybius (15.18.3) but no value attached.  Appian (Pun. 25, 54) 
mentions the event but puts it as prior to the armistice (31). 
For 149, see Appian, Pun. 86, where Sardinia becomes the indemnity for piracy, despite an apparent lack of 
treaty explicitly forbidding it. 
276
 Diodorus 17.111.1.  ἐκ τοιαύτης τινὸς αἰτίας. τοῦ βασιλέως προστάξαντος τοῖς σατράπαις ἅπασιν 
ἀπομίσθους ποιῆσαι τοὺς μισθοφόρους καὶ τούτων τὸ πρόσταγμα συντελεσάντων πολλοὶ τῆς στρατείας 
ἀπολελυμένοι ξένοι διέτρεχον καθ᾽ ὅλην τὴν Ἀσίαν πλανώμενοι καὶ τὰς ἀναγκαίας τροφὰς ἐκ τῶν 
προνομῶν ποριζόμενοι. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πανταχόθεν διῆραν ἐπὶ Ταίναρον τῆς Λακωνικῆς.  “And this was the 
cause: since the king [Alexander] issued a command to his satraps to dismiss [lit. ‘stop paying’] their 
mercenaries, and since they obeyed him, the released mercenaries, wandering about, looted all of Asia and 
carried off their necessary sustenance from their foraging.  And after this, they traveled from everywhere to 
Taenarum in Laconia. 
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make substantial concessions.  While we see this several times in the Punic Wars, in no 
instance is that situation more explicit and widespread than in the Mercenary War, 
following Carthage’s refusal to pay its mercenaries for services rendered in the First 
Punic War.
277
  From approximately 241-237, this war raged in Africa, and Polybius 
termed it the best example of a rule-less war, where no quarter was given on either 
side.
278
 
Unfortunately, little record survives of this war.  For ancient sources we have 
principally the summary of Polybius (1.65-88), but also Diodorus Siculus (25.1-10), who 
follows the account of Polybius.  Appian makes a brief mention of it in his Punic Wars 
(5) and Dio/Zonaras likewise encapsulates it in about a sentence (Zonaras 8.16).  The war 
is largely absent from the surviving bits of the Livian tradition.
279
   
The very notion of a negotiation-free war is fairly unusual.  While Polybius 
implies that the mercenaries govern themselves rather like a democracy, the 
Carthaginians treat them instead as criminals.  I argue that understanding the conflict in 
this way is helpful to understanding the unusual nature of its conduct.  The mercenaries 
assemble the trappings of a state, down to minting and taxation.  In this, the mercenaries 
seem to be setting up a nascent state, and act as the Mamertines had half a century earlier, 
and as the leaders of the Servile Wars would a century later. 
Second, the ethnicities of the mercenaries are noted by Polybius, partly to 
emphasize their variety.  The Carthaginians evidently recruited from a wide area.
280
  As 
we should expect, there were a large number of Iberians, Libyans, and half-Greeks, but 
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 Some sources assert that the mercenaries were cheated of their pay, while others assert that the 
mercenaries made exorbitant demands: Diodorus states (25.2) that the mercenaries were cheated.  Polybius 
is more equivocal, saying (1.66.5-6) that Carthage hoped to not pay them in full, but also (1.66.11-12, 
1.67.6-9) that the mercenaries kept inventing new charges due them. 
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 Polybius 1.65.6.  This is the famous ‘truceless war’ λεγόμενον ἄσπονδον πόλεμον, which I think rather 
fails to fully encompass the lack of negotiations between sides.  According to Polybius (1.88.7), the war 
lasted three years and four months, but he is a little vague as to precisely when the war began. Livy (21.2) 
claims ‘for five years’; Diodorus (25.6) claims four years and four months. 
279
 For a basic outline of the events, Scullard 1990, 566-569 may be useful. 
280
 This is intentional on the part of the Carthaginians.  Typical practice, as seen in the above section, was 
for the employer to seek out mercenaries in their homelands or certain cities and pay for their transit to 
where they were needed.   
68 
 
Polybius notes Ligurians, Celts, and Baleares as well.
281
  For relatively small areas, 
Ligurians and Baleares will continue to feature prominently both in the narrative and as 
recruiting grounds for mercenaries in general.
282
 
Outside mercenaries had always been a fundamental part of Carthaginian armies, 
which would consist of a very small band of citizen hoplites and ‘heavy’ cavalry and 
large numbers of ‘native’ mercenaries/auxiliaries.283  Cato’s comment on mercenaries is 
almost certainly about Carthage, and possibly about this war in particular.
284
  As in the 
earlier revolt in 248, and the mercenary revolts I mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
problem began with arrears of pay.  More precisely, the problem began when the 
mercenaries were transshipped to Carthage for payment, but under the leadership of 
Gesco, the Carthaginians kept putting them off until they had collected in large 
numbers.
285
  Despite Polybius’s description of the war as lacking negotiation, 
negotiations went on for some time.
286
  One of the first things Polybius reports the 
Carthaginians doing in response to the crisis, however, is hiring mercenaries.
287
  The 
irony is obvious. 
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 This apparently trivial note is interesting because it specifies that the Celts and Baleares are not Iberians 
in Polybius’s account (1.67.7) and apparently spoke different languages. “ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ μὲν Ἴβηρες, οἱ δὲ 
Κελτοί, τινὲς δὲ Λιγυστῖνοι καὶ Βαλιαρεῖς, οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ μιξέλληνες, ὧν οἱ πλείους αὐτόμολοι καὶ δοῦλοι” 
(There were Iberians, and Celts, and some Ligurians and Balaeres, and no few were halves [i.e. half-
Greeks], and they were mostly deserters and slaves.)  Nor is this unique to Polybius—see Diodorus 16.73 
and 25.2 for a similar assortment of ethnicities.  Herodotus 7.165, in describing the Carthaginian force at 
Himera, likewise describes an assortment of ethnicities in Carthaginian employ. 
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 See below, chapter 3 for the depictions of the Ligurians and Baleares. 
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 So described by G. Ch. Picard 1994, 368. 
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 Cato F81 Cornell (=79 Peter, ap. Gell. 5.21.17, Non. 87M).  Compluriens eorum milites mercennarii 
inter se multi alteri alteros in castris occidere, compluriens multi simul ad hostis transfugere, compluriens 
in imperatorem impetum facere.  (The enemies’ soldiers are mercenaries; very often they fight amongst 
themselves and they pillage their own camps, very often they go over to the enemy, very often they launch 
an attack on their own general.)  The context for the preserved quote is the usage of compluriens.  See 
Cornell 2013 III, 129 for commentary.  Alternatively, the passage may be an excerpt from a Roman 
general’s speech, in which case, the Carthaginian identification is still likely (but might also refer to the 
southern Greeks or even Pyrrhus).  
285
 So Polybius 1.66.1-5. 
286
 The ‘truceless war’ properly is proleptically looking forward to Polybius 1.81, where the mercenaries 
refuse to ever deal with the Carthaginians again. 
287
 1.73.1. 
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When the mercenaries also rebelled in Sardinia (~239), they attached themselves 
to Rome rather than Carthage.
288
  This event must have been accompanied by some 
serious debate in Rome, for they initially refused the mercenary request, only to accept it 
the following year.  The Romans forced the Carthaginians to back down under the threat 
of another war.  Yet the Sardinians did not enter the Roman fold altogether peacefully.  
Fairly soon thereafter, the Romans sent armies to Sardinia, and in 235 and 234, triumphs 
were celebrated over the Sardinians.  One might guess Italian mercenaries to have been 
present in the island’s garrison force, and when they turned to ask for Roman aid, they 
did not have the support of the local population, though they controlled the local 
strongholds.
289
  The relative silence of the historians on the issue may be a tacit 
affirmation of Polybius’s criticism: that the Romans acted ‘contrary to all justice’ (παρὰ 
πάντα τὰ δίκαια).290  The Roman rationale given by Polybius (3.28.3) complains of 
Carthaginian piracy in the last few years.
291
 
These mercenary revolts led to an altogether curious set of circumstances where 
the foreign policy of great powers was in part dictated by the actions of otherwise 
unaffiliated bands of warriors.  The question then to ask is whether these freelance bands 
were, in fact, independent and unaffiliated.  One might wonder why the Romans chose to 
affiliate themselves with turncoat mercenaries or why such mercenaries would flee to 
Italy.  Given that men did not typically lose their citizenship by travelling abroad, we 
might well wonder how many of these mercenaries held a form of Roman or Latin 
citizenship already.
292
  This was probably the case for the mercenaries in Sardinia—their 
flight to Italy suggests a prior Italian connection.  Such a circumstance could be one 
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 Polybius 1.88.8-12, but see also 1.79.1-7, where the mercenaries expel the Carthaginians but are in turn 
expelled by the native Sardinians.  Of the authors of the Livian tradition, only Orosius 4.12 appears to note 
this event, and he puts the blame squarely on Carthage. 
289
 Polybius 1.79.3-6, 1.88.8-12 describes the foreign mercenary force being ousted by the natives and 
seeking Roman aid.  From Polybius, it can be deduced that the mercenaries were neither Carthaginians nor 
Sardinians, but otherwise no names or nationalities are mentioned. 
290
 Polybius (2.23, 2.27) gives no account or judgment of the activities of the armies sent to Sardinia, 
merely mentions their departure or return. The critique is found at 3.27-28 in a comparison of the first 
treaty and the amended treaty.   
291
 Also mentioned by Appian, Pun. 5. 
292
 In later Roman law, being captured practicing piracy would result in the loss of citizen rights.  I would 
argue that at this early date, such a rule, if existing at all, applied only to those caught practicing piracy on 
Romans. 
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possible rationale for accepting an overthrown state.  Instead of accepting the embassy 
from an unknown party, they would instead be accepting the unsanctioned fait accompli 
of one of their citizens or allies’ citizens.  
Polybius claimed that the Roman seizure of Sardinia was a contravention of 
justice. Even if true for the second century, it is not clear at all that it must have been 
such by third-century Roman practice.  Roman foreign policy (such as it was), especially 
towards freelancers, took a significant shift in the third century, as seen in the examples 
of Illyria and Antium.  In particular, the evidence suggests that the Romans were moving 
from a stance of “peacetime raiding being permitted unless a treaty existed” to 
“peacetime raiding not being permitted” and that they while they were in the process of 
accepting Hellenistic codes of war, it was a process, and if they were going to do it, 
everyone else had to also.   
Mercenary service in Italy probably changed with the Punic Wars.  While the 
conclusion of the First Punic War was no doubt a great relief to most Romans, it must 
have left some Roman or Italian soldiers at loose ends.  The end of a war often produces 
mercenaries in quantity from unemployed veterans.  That some might choose a 
Carthaginian paymaster should not be too surprising.  Appian also tells us that the 
Romans expressly forbade their citizens from mercenary service, but relaxed that rule for 
Carthage.
293
  This rule suggests the Romans were cautious about releasing military 
manpower from their control and also explains the lack of mercenary activity observed.  
The sources do have a conspicuous absence of episodes of Romans or their allies 
serving as mercenaries after the third century (though Italian mercenaries—particularly 
Campanian—in Sicily and South Italy had been fairly common).  A very few first-
century examples exist: for example, a certain P. Sittius appears as a mercenary leader in 
Mauretania, Sertorius appears to have considered such a career, and some Pompeian 
veterans signed up as mercenaries in Egypt.
294
  In each of these cases, the mercenaries 
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 For Sittius, see Dio, 43.3.1, see also Brunt 1971, 164-165.  For Sertorius, see below, chapter 5.  For the 
last, see Caesar, B Civ. 3.110, Brunt 1971, 219-220. 
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appear to be unable, through the machinations of first-century politics, to be part of the 
Roman army proper, making them more like exiles than regular contingent manpower.  
No such lack exists for Sparta, Athens or Thebes, states similarly frequently at war.  
Indeed, while those states used mercenary service to keep up soldiers’ experience, the 
lack of military experience in the ranks would prove to be a problem in the second 
century.  While there appear no examples for Italian mercenary service the late third and 
second centuries, that absence is predictable.  In the first place, the Roman method of 
acquiring auxiliaries allowed them to fill the role typically filled by mercenary 
specialists.  In not needing a pool of such troops to be available, it was beneficial for the 
Romans to not allow such troops to be available to anyone.  The absence of such 
mercenary episodes for Italian soldiers, I suspect, also indicates the relatively low esteem 
in which mercenaries were held in this period, partially because of the actions of men like 
the Mamertines and the mercenaries of the Mercenary War.  The Greeks, by contrast, 
even if they little trusted mercenaries, nevertheless held them in higher opinion than the 
Romans.
295
 
As I argued in the previous chapter, however, since terms like leistes and praedo 
were typically that of the writer, not the actor, we should expect that the Roman sources 
do not so portray Romans.  Examples of Roman mercenaries or bandits in the early 
republic will thus be ‘hidden’ in plain sight by the records.  Mercenary revolts, as at 
Capua, Sardinia, Rhegium, and Messana, did meet with success, at least for some years, 
even decades, and others, like the agreements made with Eumenes, indicate that the 
freelance bands of mercenaries could have enough power to negotiate as equals with 
states and monarchs.  Certain Syracusan tyrants, like Hiero or Agathocles, could be 
arguably seen as mercenary captains made legitimate.  It would be a mistake to believe 
Scipio’s claim that such mutinies are automatically doomed to failure.296  With that in 
mind, it should be considered that the mercenaries of Carthage’s Mercenary War might 
                                                                                                                                                 
The ‘stipendiarii’ in Africa (CIL 1.2513), who honor a Quintus Numerius Rufus may be Africans or 
Italians.  We can guess a date of ~60 BC (see Broughton 1951 (MRR II), 184) for the event, but it could 
well refer to a father or grandfather instead. 
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of mercenary skill and experience.  No Latin sources do. 
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have won and established themselves as a state, and the evidence from Messana, Capua, 
Tylis, and others suggest that they would have been treated so, in the nature of third-
century Realpolitik.  Given the length of the conflict, however, it is almost surprising that 
they were not already so treated. 
 
Conclusions 
The events of the fourth and third century do not paint as clear a picture of the 
Roman concept of banditry as we might like.  The at-large warrior largely continued to 
prosper, though we might suspect his heyday, as in the Greek World, was largely over.  
The authors, particularly Livy, suggest the opposite, that the freelancer only began seeing 
service at the end of the third century.  Their own words, however, belie those 
impressions.  The freelancer was to be found much earlier, and even if the terms of 
service were different, the use of contingent manpower was very similar. 
Roman warfare was not, in itself, dissimilar to brigandage.  Campaigns, ravaging, 
and looting all had a direct economic incentive for both the troops and the generals.  This 
conclusion should come as no real revelation.  Livy directly (2.21.1, 2.26.1) indicates as 
much, though he tries to restrict it to earlier periods.  I do, however, want to raise the 
issue of plundering as Roman motivation in order to keep it in mind through the 
following episodes.  This motive is in no way absent from the campaigns of the first and 
second centuries, though it may be well argued that this motive progressively diminished 
over time.
297
 
One prominent realization I would like to promote is the idea that in the second 
century, the latro or the praedo carried the image of these at-large warriors like the 
Mamertines of Rhegium and Messana.  These were professional and capable warriors, 
but not legitimate in the actions they undertook.  The preference to never describe the 
Romans themselves as mercenaries was not because of a disdain for fighting for wealth 
(which was quite laudable) but to avoid any guilt by association with the ‘illegitimate’ 
activities of the Italian mercenaries of Sardinia, Rhegium and Messana. 
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Lastly, the evidence shows that the Romans did not, at least before the second 
century, have any real interest in combatting or eliminating piracy for moral reasons (or 
any other).  In this, it was far simpler to gain local immunity.  Piracy could be a pretext 
for a campaign, and was readily accepted as a justification, at least in the Greek world.  
Despite later historians’ avers to the contrary, Italians appear to have engaged in varieties 
of freelance warfare for many years.  Additionally, those Romans in a position to be 
harmed by piracy were also less likely to be in a position to do anything about it.  Roman 
actions against pirates (or ‘pirates’) would be far more pragmatic, and have far more to 
do with controlling that pool of manpower or with normalizing relations with another 
power.  The absence of descriptions of Romans as pirates is at least partially rooted in the 
preponderance of Roman or pro-Roman sources. 
In later centuries, ‘acting against piracy’ became a magical, unassailable 
justification, and even if other justifications existed, an accusation of piracy would be 
used as well.  Accordingly, we see accusations of piracy in each of the Punic Wars and 
the seizure of Sardinia, as well as the later promotion of piracy to the main reason for the 
1
st
 Illyrian War.  The rhetoric of anti-pirate activity was more beneficial for Rome, both 
internationally and domestically, than the (notoriously difficult) act of preventing such 
plundering.  Thus, Roman actions against freelance plundering were (and would continue 
to be) actions meant to fulfill a particular goal rather than evidence that piracy was 
something to be prevented in the first place 
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Chapter Three: The Small Wars of the Second Century 
In this section, I hope to focus on some of the cases in which the roles of 
conqueror and conquered are problematic, not to mention the role of pirates and what 
piracy these groups may have committed.  An analysis of the historians’ accounts of the 
campaigns of this section will follow in chapter 6.  In this chapter, however, I wish to 
provide a clear chronological referent for that later chapter.  To begin, it seems clear that 
the distinction between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ plundering corresponds very 
strongly with the distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ antagonists.  In other 
words, ‘(un)civilized’ behavior is a greater predictor of pirate-vocabulary than 
‘(il)legitimate’ behavior.  Therefore, I present some examples from wars between 
Romans and barbarians where this distinction could be observed in action.   
There should be four categories then: plundering deemed acceptable conducted by 
a civilized force, plundering deemed unacceptable conducted by a civilized force, 
plundering deemed acceptable conducted by an uncivilized force, and plundering deemed 
unacceptable conducted by an uncivilized force.  Obviously, defining these terms is not 
without its own set of perils, but I think we can set that aside for the moment.  In 
approaching these situations, my inclination is to suspect that the presumed ‘civilization 
level’ of the party in question plays a greater role than the sense of ‘acceptable behavior’. 
The second century was different from the third and fourth in that different 
entities were more clearly defined in our sources.  Terms like Roman, Etruscan, and 
Italian were probably different, and the evidence given in geographers like Strabo and 
Mela shows a substantial desire to separate groups into subgroups rather than combine 
into ‘supergroups’.  This tendency being shared across the geographers might well 
indicate that this type of (re-)identification comes from their sources, not as something 
imposed by the author. 
As for the chronology of this section, I have attempted to confine this chapter to 
the second century, beginning with the aftermath of the Rhodian-Cretan War of ~205-200 
and ending at the height of Marius’s power.  Here, I stop a few years shy of the century 
boundary because the events of the very end of the second century (the Second Servile 
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War and the first Roman campaign in Cilicia) have more in common with the other 
events of the first century than the second.  I also argue that Marius’s decision to enlist 
the proletarii reveals a Roman manpower crisis that is relevant to the understanding of 
the role of the at-large warrior and furthermore, a notable change in the social dynamic of 
the Roman world.  I explain this further in chapter 4. 
 
Rhodes, Lycia, Delos, and Crete 
I mentioned the role of Rhodes in the third century, ending with the (First) 
Rhodian-Cretan War, in a previous chapter.
298
  In this war, piracy was a significant 
factor, both as cause of the war and as practice during the war.
299
  The Rhodian-Cretan 
War itself soon bled into the Second Macedonian War (~200-197) and the scope was 
significantly expanded.  Indeed, the outcome of this Cretan War is something not 
discussed separately from the larger war in the sources.
300
  The principal Rhodian 
objectives were first, expulsion of the Macedonians from the Peraea and second, cession 
of the wartime piracy, objectives which, with Roman aid, were eventually achieved.
301
  
The Cretan cities of Gortyn (a Macedonian ally) and Knossus (a Rhodian ally) remained 
at war for some time, however, though they were at peace by 189.  The Second 
Macedonian War made the Rhodians into the hegemon of the Island (Nesiotic) League, 
and then the War of Antiochus a decade later gave the Rhodians control of Lycia. 
Thus in 189, Rhodes had arguably reached the pinnacle of its power, as leader of 
the Island League, possessor of a Peraea now larger than the island itself, and treaties of 
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alliance and obligation with at least four Cretan cities.
302
  Furthermore, Rhodes had a 
well-known (and by the second century, well-established) reputation for having an 
extremely skilled fleet and as being hostile to pirates.  The second feature is particularly 
interesting for this study, but the first is still relevant, both for Rhodian anti-pirate activity 
and serving as a training ground for Rhodian freelancers. 
Rhodes was now in an ironic situation—being both a supplier of freelance 
warriors and a famed persecutor of those who fell back into the favored backup 
occupation of freelance warriors.  Unsurprisingly, this led to Rhodian mercenaries being 
regarded as more reliable than their counterparts from Achaea, Crete, or Aetolia.  
Rhodian mercenaries, particularly generals, appear serving the Ptolemies, the Persians, 
and the Seleucids, but are described positively, while Cretans, like Lasthenes, who is said 
to have suppressed Antioch brutally under Demetrius, are described negatively.
303
  We 
are told that these are contemporary reputations by the historians, but their own biases (or 
those of other writers) may have contributed to these accounts.  In any case, the historic 
Cretan-Rhodian hostilities made these reputations as ‘pirate’ and ‘anti-pirate’ mutually-
reinforcing.  
Lycia, now, appears to have held a reputation as a pirate-haven in previous years.  
The Rhodians and the Lycians had a hostile history, and the embassy to Romans at 
Apamea in 189, as recorded by Polybius, expresses fear that domination by Rhodes 
would be punishment.
304
  Though the Romans ignored them at this point, the Senate later 
informed the Rhodians in 178 that Lycia was an ally, not a subject and ultimately (in 167) 
that Lycia would be a subject of Rome.
305
  Over this relatively short period, the Lycians 
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revolted and were brutally suppressed by Rhodes, so the Lycians’ initial fear that they 
would be punished seems apt.  It is possible either that the Lycian reputation for piracy 
functioned as a driver of the conflicts between Rhodians and Lycians at this time or that 
the conflicts between Lycia and this foremost of anti-pirate states had created a reputation 
for piracy on the part of the Lycians.
306
  In either case, Rome’s siding with Lycia should 
be noted. 
The removal of Lycia from Rhodian control is mentioned in Sulla’s speech to the 
Ephesians at the end of the First Mithridatic War.
307
  There, Sulla emphasizes the 
Rhodian relationship to Lycia: οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ προστάταις εἶναι—not as subjects, 
but clients.  This was not, apparently, the Rhodian understanding.  The point of the 
speech, however, is to stress Rome’s retaliation against those who betray her and Rome’s 
intrinsic fairness. 
In 166, the Romans handed Delos over to Athens, with the stipulation that Delos 
be a free port (i.e. charge no harbor taxes); Athens was, however, allowed to profit from 
Delos in other ways.  Rhodes had served as a slave market for years, and Delos soon 
picked up that role.  One might wonder how the Rhodians sold slaves, many of which 
were commonly believed to have been kidnapped by pirates.  There have recently been a 
number of attempts to show either that piracy was not a principal source of slaves or at 
least, that most slaves were not victims of pirate raids.
308
  I find the second argument 
more convincing than the first (the nuance being that pirates might ‘legitimately’ buy 
slaves with booty, then sell the slaves in a marketplace like Rhodes or Delos).
309
  New 
Comedy presents a wealth of examples of such slaves, with a compelling implication that 
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306
 For Lycian-Rhodian relations in general, see Bresson 1999. 
307
 Appian, Mith. 62. 
308
 Hopkins 1978, (for example 112ff), argues by omission that piracy/kidnapping were irrelevant sources 
of slaves. Andreau and Descat (2011) assert piracy/banditry was a source, but following Veyne 1991, 475, 
and Harris 1999, 62-75, also that abandonment was far and away the principal source.  See also Bradley 
1989, 22.   
309
 It is often overlooked that almost all pirate groups always engage in regular trade at some point.  In the 
Hellenistic Period, it is plain to see that many pirate bands were out for a quick ransom, not a prolonged 
trade in slaves.  See de Souza 1999, 60-65 for the slave trade and 65-69 for ransom.  Here, de Souza points 
out numerous inscriptions that assert piracy as a source of slaves (e.g. IG XI.4.1054A, IG XII.7.386, IG 
XII.3.328). 
78 
 
this mirrored reality.
310
  Rauh (1999) presents a potential explanation for this dispute, by 
which the pirates sold slaves to wine merchants along the southern Asia Minor shore, and 
these merchants then resold the slaves in Rhodes (and later, Delos).
311
  Such trades are 
also mentioned by Diodorus 5.26.3.  What makes this trade of particular interest to Rauh, 
however, is the indication that the wine trade with the east did not drop off as the Cilician 
pirates grew stronger.
312
  That is, the wine traders either had sufficient potential gains to 
run the risks of capture by pirates or they had some measure of immunity from them.  If 
Rauh’s speculation is correct (as I believe it is), there was an established body of 
middlemen who dealt with the pirates, had some form of immunity from them, and who 
did business in Delos. 
Though this establishment of Delos was not a campaign against Rhodes per se, 
Strabo informs us that the strength of the Rhodian navy collapsed in the middle of the 
second century, after quashing piracy in the Aegean.
313
  Because of Rome’s sudden 
hostility at the end of the Third Macedonian War (168), the freeing of Lycia (167), and 
the establishment of Delos as a free port (166), Rhodes soon dwindled and piracy 
flourished, especially after Delos had become a great slave market.
314
  The navy of 
Rhodes had been financed through its harbor taxes and thus it relied on heavy traffic to 
maintain its navy.  Rhodian harbor taxes had amounted to a large amount—around 140 
talents a year—and more than the tribute due Rhodes from the part of the Peraea recently 
stripped away by Rome.  With an income less than half of that of five years prior, the 
Rhodians had no choice but to downsize their fleet. 
The decline of Rhodes, however, may have had other causes besides the purely 
economic.  Despite weakening from the loss of harbor taxes, in 155, Rhodes embarked on 
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another Cretan war, again because of piracy originating from that island.
315
  Berthold 
notes that this war went poorly for the Rhodians, perhaps because of their smaller fleet, 
perhaps because of a more unified Crete, or perhaps because of a lack of sufficient land 
forces to take the Cretan cities.
316
  The island of Siphnos, a long-time Rhodian ally was 
overrun in 154, either by Cretan pirates or the Cretan league.
317
 Additionally, it is unclear 
that Rhodes still led the Island League, and may have engaged in this war by itself.
318
  It 
is, however, likely that a defeat in this war caused (or aggravated) the collapse of 
Rhodian naval power.  The Cretans’ better outcome in this war is always attributed to 
Rhodian diminishment, never Cretan growth.
319
  While this attribution is probably rooted 
in a lack of evidence concerning the Cretan economy one way or the other, it also shows 
a historic pro-Rhodian bias.   
Regardless of cause, Rhodian naval power declined, and piracy (or acts 
considered piracy) flourished.  Rather than take the place of Rhodes as sea-police in the 
second half of the second century, the Rhodians, Ptolemies and Seleucids allowed or 
even actively encouraged piracy so long as it was directed against others.
320
  In was in 
this environment that Tryphon came to power over the pirates of Cilicia.
321
  The Romans 
would not get involved with Cilician piracy until the very end of the second century, 
when they had been involved in Asia for some time.  Strabo tells us that the Romans 
initially were unwilling to act   As the Cilicians had little reputation as pirates before this 
time, it is possible that such activity had its origin in the treaty of Apamea, which 
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displaced the pirates of Lycia and made Antiochus less able to hire some of the Cilicians, 
since the terms of the treaty forbade him to hire mercenaries from north of the Taurus. 
Crete was, of course, weakened in the aftermath of the Rhodian-Cretan War, with 
probably at least two cities bound to Rhodes in alliance.  Crete’s role as a source for 
mercenaries is somewhat subdued in the second century, though we do see Cretan archers 
appearing in the armies of Rome, Macedon and Syria.  Strabo tells us:
322
 
 
οὗτος διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἐμπειρίαν ξενολογεῖν ἀποδειχθεὶς πολὺς ἦν ἔν τε τῇ 
Ἑλλάδι καὶ τῇ Θρᾴκῃ, πολὺς δὲ καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τῆς Κρήτης ἰοῦσιν, οὔπω τὴν νῆσον 
ἐχόντων Ῥωμαίων, συχνοῦ δὲ ὄντος ἐν αὐτῇ τοῦ μισθοφορικοῦ καὶ στρατιωτικοῦ 
πλήθους, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὰ λῃστήρια πληροῦσθαι συνέβαινεν. 
 
He [Dorylaüs] because of his experience in military matters, was appointed to hire 
foreign mercenaries, and he often visited not only Greece and Thrace, but also the 
mercenaries of Crete, that is, back before the Romans had possession of the island, and 
while the number of mercenaries in the island, from whom the pirate-bands were 
generally recruited also, was [still] large. 
 
So here Strabo explicitly tells us that the Cretan pirates came from the same pool as the 
Cretan mercenaries.  The pirates and mercenaries are the same people with different 
employment.  This episode may shed some light on a different instance.  
Earlier, in 189, the Roman Q. Fabius Labeo sailed against Crete, ostensibly to free 
the Italian slaves on the island.  He appears to have succeeded and he celebrated a naval 
triumph, though that triumph was, strictly speaking, over Antiochus.
323
  This is a 
perplexing issue, as at least nominally, the Cretan cities were neutral in that conflict.  
Nevertheless, Labeo appears to have done this and it is reported without quibble by Livy.  
The slaves in question may well have been Roman (or ally) soldiers captured during the 
War of Antiochus and sold to pay the Cretan mercenaries.
324
  Crete’s reputation as a 
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pirate haven, however, remained after this campaign, and indeed, in the second century, 
Crete was regarded as the prime haven for pirates (Illyria’s reputation having shifted 
since the 230’s and Cilicia’s not grown until the 130’s).325  This is, notably, a reputation, 
and it is difficult to see the second century events that fostered a continuation of this 
reputation, save the ‘Second Cretan War’ (155-153) which again is complicated by the 
role of Rhodes.
326
 
I suggest that the Cretan reputation in the second and third centuries was 
fundamentally an effect of Crete’s involvement in supplying freelancers to Rome’s 
enemies—Macedon and the Seleucids, further complicated by a rather negative portrayal 
by Polybius.  Polybius attacks the Cretans thoroughly; in book six, he utterly dismisses 
any theory that Crete had a laudable government; and in book four he is dismissive of 
Cretan military abilities save in laying ambushes.
327
  It is also worth noting here that the 
Cretan cities had a system of treaties with various Greek states agreeing to refrain from 
piratical raiding.
328
  In this context, Cretan raiding looks more like a form of privateering 
than outright piracy. 
During the third century, Rhodes retained its anti-pirate reputation, while Crete 
and Lycia’s piratical reputation grew.  Delos grew to supplant Rhodes as the principal 
slave market.
329
  In the latter half of the second century, many slaves did come to Rome 
by way of the Aegean and, rightly or wrongly, many of them were seen as the products of 
piracy. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
his mercenaries 1 drachma a day, a rate that appears to be standard across quite a period of time. For more 
evidence, see chapter 1, n. 38. 
325
 See Brulé 1978, Perlman 1999 on this. 
326
 See Brulé 1978, 118 for the growth of the Cretan reputation. 
327
 For book six, see Polybius, 6.47.  Walbank 1972, 152, following Meyer 1899, i.218n1, well makes the 
case that Polybius is arguing against the praise of Ephorus (Strabo 10.4.6ff (476-484), FGH 70 F 148).  
Concerning the Cretan constitution, see Aristotle, Pol. 1264; Willets 1982.  For book four, see Polybius 
4.8.11, Perlman 1999, 138. 
328
 Some records survive (e.g. IG II
2
 1130, a second-century Athenian-Cretan (probably Kydonia) 
agreement to leave Attica alone.)  For this use of isopoliteia and asylia in Crete, (see above, ch. 2) de Souza 
1999, 69; Perlman 1999, 150, Papazarkadas and Thonemann 2008, 82-83.  For isopoliteia more generally, 
see Gawantka 1975 for seventy-some examples of this state. 
329
 For slave markets generally, see Andreau and Descat 2011, 63-64. 
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The Iberian Campaigns  
I do not wish to delve into the minutiae of the numerous wars in the Iberian 
Peninsula, but rather to highlight some of the chronology and history to serve as a 
backdrop for further exploration.  The language used in these accounts is key to 
understanding the situation.  In reading several accounts, those of: Livy, Appian, Strabo, 
Orosius, Florus, Valerius Maximus, Polybius, and Dio, the usage of piratic vocabulary 
like leistes or latrocinia are only occasionally applied to Iberians, but never to Romans in 
Iberia, even when the authors assert that the Romans were behaving badly.  Even Galba 
and Lucullus, probably the worst offenders, are perfidi and act παρανομία, but do not 
practice banditry.330   
The Iberian campaigns were a legacy of the Second Punic War.
331
   In essence, 
the Romans were trying to fill the vacuum left by the Barcids in Spain, and this meant 
constant campaigning in Celtiberia and Lusitania, where neither the Barcids nor the 
Scipios had yet brought those groups under control.  Appian accuses the Carthaginians of 
having plundered (ἐπόρθουν) Spain before the Roman arrival.332  Florus even tells us that 
the Carthaginians were directly the cause of the wars in Iberia (2.17).  
For some indication of military activity in Spain at the beginning of the second 
century, the Fasti Triumphales record a series of triumphs: 
196/5, Gnaeus Cornelius Blasio, an ovation over the Celtiberi 
195/4 Marcus Helvius, proconsul, an ovation over the Celtiberi 
195/4 Quintus Minucius Q.f.L.n. Thermus, proconsul 
194/3 Marcus Porcius M.f. Cato, proconsul 
191/0 Marcus Fulvius M.f.Ser.n. Nobilior, proconsul, an ovation 
178/7 Lucius Postumius A.f.A.n Albinus, proconsul, from Lusitania and Spain 
175/4 M. Titinius [...]M.n.Curvus, proconsul 
174/3 Appius Claudius C.f.Ap.n. Centho, proconsul, an ovation  
                                                 
330
 Παρανομία is elsewhere a term applied to bandit figures, however.  One such might be the 1st century 
Derbene ‘bandit-tyrant’ Antipater.  Strabo names him a leistes (12.1.4) ‘Syme refers to him as a ‘robber-
prince’ and likewise Cleon the robber-chief (referring to Strabo, 12.8.8-9) Syme1939, 309-312, 328-329,  
331
 For accounts on this period of Spain, see Curchin 1991; Richardson 1986 and 1996; Harris 1989, 118-
142, Clark 2014, 94-133 and 147-171. 
332
 Appian, Hisp. 3. 
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To this list we could add Scipio’s purported triumph of 206 and the contentious ovatio of 
Lentulus in 200.
333
  Indeed, many of the commanders in Iberia between Scipio and Blasio 
requested triumphs and were denied.
334
  Part of the problem was that Scipio’s conquest 
was ill-defined and the goals of the early campaigns were similarly ill-defined (and, in 
Richardson’s opinion, principally designed to keep Carthage out).335  The borders for the 
new provinciae were not defined until 197 (the consulship of Cethegus and Rufus), also 
the same year the praetors were increased from four to six.
336
  Despite this decision to 
define the borders in Rome, it does not instantly follow that those borders suddenly 
materialized in Iberia. 
So, overall, in this period, the Iberians seem like a normal military threat, and a 
strong one at that.  There is, however, a degree of uncertainty about affairs in Iberia that 
suggest later revisions.  The Fasti Triumphales’ identification of all commanders as 
‘proconsul’ does not quite follow Livy, who describes them inconsistently as pro 
praetore and pro consule.
337
  The period from 194 to 154 was one of virtually continuous 
war, and “the military role of the proconsuls was by far the most important part of their 
activity during these years”.338  This military activity, however, is generally accepted to 
be at Roman initiative, not Iberian.
339
  Still, the language in the representation of Roman 
and Iberian actions in this period is very illuminating. 
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 Richardson 1986, 70; Polybius 11.33.7; Appian, Hisp. 38.  But Valerius Maximus claims (2.8.5) that 
Scipio did not triumph and this is used as a criticism of triumph-hunters: ...ut P. Scipioni ob reciperatas 
Hispanias, M. Marcello ob captas Syracusas triumphus non decerneretur...  Scipio may (as Scullard 1951 
suggests, 75) have celebrated a triumph on the Alban mount instead of gaining the formal triumph in the 
city. 
334
 Richardson 1986, 70-71.  Blasio’s was also contentious.  See Beard 2007, 205-211, who notes that Livy 
‘vividly recreated’ senatorial debates about whether triumphs should or should not be celebrated.  Clark 
2014, argues (e.g.108-115) that triumphs were supposed to signify a closed situation and thus successive 
commanders had difficulty in winning triumphs if someone had already celebrated one. 
335
 See Richardson 1986, 64-75 for the period in question and 104-109 about the difficulties in being 
awarded a triumph in general. 
336
 Livy 32.27-28 for both instances. For the somewhat unusual politics here, see Brennan 2000, 154-181, 
esp. 168-169. 
337
 Richardson 1986, 76. 
338
 Richardson 1986, 123.  Note, however, Clark 2014, 107, n.42, who argues that instead of continual 
endemic warfare (the position of Richardson), the situation was rather one of recurring outbreaks of war, 
probably rooted in the earlier events and Rome’s behavior. 
339
 Harris 1989, 126, indicates that it would difficult to contest the view that the pressure came from the 
Roman side, at least before 174.   
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First off, the hiring of mercenaries and their relative trustworthiness were 
important factors in the Iberian wars.  A tribe under attack would hire mercenary warriors 
from neighboring tribes and the Roman commanders would attempt to bribe them.  For 
example, when Manlius was faced with the Turdetani hiring northern Celtiberian 
mercenaries, he offered to pay the Celtiberians double to switch sides.
340
  Cato, too, 
serving in Citerior, hired a Celtiberian force for 200 talents.
341
  These stories indicate that 
the Romans hired mercenaries from time to time, but they also serve to strengthen the 
historians’ assumptions about mercenaries being untrustworthy.  Despite language like 
‘purchasing an alliance’ being preferred to ‘hiring mercenaries’, Plutarch has quoted Cato 
arguing that the mercenaries might all die in the battle and not need to be paid. 
At least one of these campaigns was against ‘brigands’.  Cato, consul in 195, later 
besieged the city of Vergium (or Bergium), which Livy describes as a receptaculum 
praedonum, whence the praedones made raids against the peaceful fields of the province.  
Here, Cato restores control of the city to the princeps Vergestanus, though not without 
enslaving the bulk of the citizenry.
342
  Here the Roman forces are making determinations 
of foreign legitimacy, that is, they are choosing one side as the legitimate owners and 
dismissing the other as brigands.  If we compare this event to those at Rhegium or 
Messana of the previous chapter, it is difficult to tell which city provides a better model 
for Vergium. 
The 180s are missing from the Fasti Triumphales, but there was little difference.  
In just that decade in Iberia, there were four additional triumphs and three governors were 
killed.
343
  The Celtiberian and Lusitanian raids of 186, 183, and 181 should be regarded 
with suspicion as they serve so neatly as a pretext for a retaliatory campaign.
344
  Not until 
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 Livy 34.19.  The Latin here is mercede ‘for a price’ and duplex stipendium ‘a doubled wage’.  
Richardson 1986, 87, argues that this is similar to Manlius’s earlier actions in the previous year’s 
campaigning.  Livy, overall, appears to approve of Manlius, and says nothing truly for or against this 
proposal.  The years described here are 196-195. 
341
 Plutarch, Cat. Maj. 10.2.  Plutarch also suggests that this was at least partially the reason for Cato’s 
successful campaign.  See also Richardson 1986, 88. 
342
 Livy 34.21.  See Clark 2014, 100-108, for an in-depth assessment of Cato’s actions in Citerior. 
The Vergium/Bergium distinction is simply two names for the same place used by different authors.  
‘Vergestanus’, in turn, is probably an ethnic descriptor (like ‘Romanus’) misinterpreted as a name. 
343
 Livy 39.20-23 and 30-32.   See also Richardson 1986, 98-102 and Curchin 1991, 32. 
344
 Harris 1989 (126) does so regard them. 
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the commands of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and L. Postumius Albinus did the tide shift 
back in Rome’s favor.  Despite their (poorly-documented) military successes, it was 
Gracchus’s successes in administration that paved the way for a peace that lasted into the 
150s.
345
 
Some authors, like Polybius, deemed the Lusitanian war and the later Celtiberian 
war as revolts, though serious ones, while others, like Appian, deem it a normal war 
between two states.
346
  The difference of course, is rooted in a disagreement over 
authority. It is unclear, however, that these groups had been hitherto anything more than 
tributaries.  The two (connected) wars, lasting from 155-133 were an attempt of the 
peoples of northern and western Iberia to assert their independence from Rome.  The 
Lusitani, led by Viriathus, were enough of a threat to cause the Romans to change their 
calendar, and hastily send a consul with 30,000 men to Segeda.
347
  Despite their 
surrendering to M. Claudius Marcellus (twice), the Senate refused peace and sent Galba 
and Lucullus to govern the two Iberian provinces.
348
  Up until 151, the campaign had 
been fought in a traditional manner.  Beginning with Lucullus and Galba, however the 
Romans conducted a brutal campaign fully utilizing every form of treachery and the 
Lusitani conducted a guerrilla campaign in response.
349
 
Already, I have suggested that campaigns in Iberia had been justified by reports of 
raiding.  Usually these Iberians are portrayed as a regular military foe.  Elsewhere, 
however, the peoples of northern and western Iberia are dismissed as guerillas and 
bandits.  For an example, see the portrayal of Viriathus, in Orosius 5.4: 
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 Curchin 1991, 32-33, Richardson 1986, 112-123, Appian Hisp. 43-44.  Gracchus was praetor in 180 and 
consul in 177 and 163.  See Broughton 1951 (MRR I) 388, 393, 395-398, 440, 442-443. 
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 Polybius 35.1.1: the latter is the famous ‘war of fire’ (πύρινος πόλεμος).  Curchin (1991) echoes the 
sentiment (33-39) and repeatedly uses the terms ‘revolt’, ‘rebellious’, ‘the rebels’.  Appian instead names 
it: ὁ Οὐριάτθου πόλεμος (Hisp. 69). 
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 The shift from March to January happened at the beginning of 153 to accommodate the consuls getting 
into the field in time for the campaign (Curchin 1991, 34).  The consul in question is M. Fulvius Nobilior. 
348
 The division was Hispania Citerior and Ulterior until Augustus, when Ulterior became split into Baetica 
and Lusitania and Citerior was renamed Tarraconensis (though still frequently referred to as Hispania 
Citerior: see Pliny the Elder, who uses both terms in book 3 of the natural History; cf. Curchin 1991, 57, 
who asserts that Ptolemy preferred the term Tarraconensis, but local magistrates preferred Citerior in their 
inscriptions. 
349
 Details may be found in Curchin 1991, 33-39; Clark 2014, 151-159; or Richardson 1986, 126-132. 
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Viriatus in Hispania genere Lusitanus, homo pastoralis et latro, primum infestando uias 
deinde uastando prouincias postremo exercitus praetorum et consulum Romanorum 
uincendo fugando subigendo maximo terrori Romanis omnibus fuit. siquidem Hiberum et 
Tagum, maxima et diuersissimorum locorum flumina, late transgredienti et peruaganti C. 
Vecilius praetor occurrit: qui continuo caeso usque ad internecionem paene omni 
exercitu suo uix ipse praetor cum paucis fuga lapsus euasit.
350
  
“Viriathus, a Lusitanian by birth but a shepherd and robber by calling, infested the roads 
and devastated the provinces. He also defeated, routed, and subdued armies commanded 
by Roman praetors and consuls. As a result the Romans became greatly terrified. Then 
Viriathus encountered the praetor Gaius Vetilius as the latter was passing through and 
roaming over the broad territories of the Ebro and Tagus, rivers that were very large and 
widely separated from each other. He defeated the army of Vetilius and slaughtered its 
soldiers almost to a man; the praetor himself barely managed to slip away and escape 
with a few followers.” 
Orosius sets the exploits of Viriathus as ~606-620 AUC, (146-132 BC) and 
conspicuously sets Viriathus up as a forerunner for Sertorius.  In this work, Viriathus 
simply stands defiant against Rome for 14 years, defeating several armies, and is only 
defeated by assassins induced by the Romans to kill him, yet in turn, not rewarded by the 
Romans.  Diodorus Siculus notably uses Viriathus as an exemplar of simple virtue.
351
  
Nevertheless he is also named ‘leistarchos’ and said to have gained fame both in fighting 
leistes and in leading them.
352
  The mix of positive and negative virtues made Viriathus a 
conspicuous archetype for the so-called ‘noble brigand’. 
The episodes of plundering the Vaccaei, Intercatians, and the area around 
Palantia, make Lucullus seem more the brigand than Viriathus.
353
  And Appian, probably 
following Polybius, indeed characterizes Galba and Lucullus as villains and perjurers.
354
  
                                                 
350
 Orosius is not alone.  Cf. Dio’s and Florus’s similar description: (Dio, 22, fr. 73.1-4) ὅτι Οὐιρίαθος ἀνὴρ 
Λυσιτανός, ἀφανέστατος μὲν γένος ὥς γέ τισι δοκεῖ ὤν, περιβοητότατα δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι χρησάμενος, 
λῃστής τε γέγονεν ἐκ ποιμένος, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ στρατηγός. 
(Florus 2.17.15) Ceterum Lusitanos Viriatus erexit, vir calliditatis acerrimae. Qui ex venatore latro, ex 
latrone subito dux atque imperator. 
Velleius mentions him only in passing, but names him dux latronum. (2.1.3), likewise Frontinus’s ex 
latrone dux Celtiberorum (Str. 2.5.7) 
351
 Diodorus 33.7.  Two stories of the wedding of Viriathus are preserved, but both emphasize his virtue 
despite a lack of formal education.  See also Spann 1987, 2 for a comparison with Sertorius. 
352
 Diodorus 33.1.5 for the first, 33.1.2 for the second. 
353
 See Appian, Hisp. 51-55 for Lucullus’s earlier raids and 58-60 for the later ones and Galba’s. 
354
 Appian, Hisp. 61.  The Lusitani escaped their παρανόμησις and παρανομία. Orosius (4.21) asserts that 
Galba’s act of treachery created the greatest disturbance of Spain. quae res postea uniuersae Hispaniae 
propter Romanorum perfidiam causa maximi tumultus fuit. 
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But Galba and Lucullus, though villainous, are not latrones or leistes, though one would 
be hard pressed to tell otherwise from their actions.  Reasonably, the Iberians refuse to 
treat with Lucullus instead of Scipio, in effect, recognizing the legitimacy of one Roman 
but not the other.
355
  Furthermore, Appian (who has clearly chosen sides by this point), 
when he describes Viriathus’s plundering of Carpetania (Hisp. 64), describes Viriathus 
being (relatively) fair, rather than outright plundering: 
 
ὁ δ᾽ Οὐρίατθος τὴν χώραν ἀδεῶς περιιών ᾔτει τοὺς κεκτημένους τιμὴν τοῦ ἐπικειμένου 
καρποῦ, καὶ παρ᾽ ὧν μὴ λάβοι διέφθειρεν. 
“And Viriathus, traveling around the land (Carpetania) fearlessly, demanded of the 
growers a prize for the growing harvest and he utterly destroyed the crops of those who 
would not give.”356 
This is unusual behavior for one termed a latro or leistes.  We see similar behavior at 
Livy 22.31, where the consul Gnaeus Servilius Geminus demanded ten talents from 
Cercina to not plunder them.  It is behavior one could easily see as meant to force the 
farmers to choose sides in the war.  Ascribing brigandage to Viriathus appears to rest 
more upon method than deed.  This is, I argue, standard practice for describing Iberian 
forces. 
Appian (Hisp. 68) describes the commanders Curius and Apuleius as δύο 
λῄσταρχοι and describes a third ‘bandit chief’, Connoba, captured by Fabius Maximus 
Aemilianus.  The only λείαν Appian mentions them taking is the λείαν which the Roman 
generals had already accumulated in their camps.
357
  Appian’s portrayal almost leaves us 
with a portrait of the bandits performing all the soldiering and the soldiers performing all 
the banditry.  There is no direct mention in these accounts of the bandit captains raiding 
the settlements—it is merely implied, since that is what bandits do. 
                                                                                                                                                 
While Appian may (see Bucher 2000) have been pessimistic about the republic to pander to the 
contemporary emperors, here he is probably following Polybius or possibly Poseidonius, but not Livy (see 
Richardson 1986, 194-195).  Appian’s account does not mesh with Livy Per. 47 or Orosius here 
355
 See Clark 2014, 155.  The event is in Appian, Hisp. 53. 
356
 ἀδεῶς has two meanings: either ‘fearlessly’ or ‘without want’, both of which could apply to Viriathus 
here (though I think it almost certain that the former is correct). 
357
 This holds true for the λείαν in the Lusitanian War as well (Hisp. 56-57): even when it is in Lusitani 
hands, it is a recovery of the booty. See also Hisp. 65 and 68 for the booty in the ‘Viriathic war’. 
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Emulating Viriathus (according to Appian (Hisp. 71): ζήλῳ), ‘λῃστήρια’ or 
‘bandit gangs’ started robbing Lusitania.  When Sextus Junius Brutus was sent against 
them, he refused to fight or campaign with the guerrilla tactics they were using, but 
instead began to sack the nearby towns to draw them out or at least to provide his army 
with πολὺ κέρδος.  Appian never asserts that these λῃστήρια were aligned with Viriathus, 
but only ascribes to them the same time, place, and modus operandi.
358
  Strabo (3.3.5-6) 
ascribes raids to the Lusitani generally, where despite their natural resources they turn to 
banditry for subsistence.
359
  This sort of ethnographic detail simply confirms the Roman 
attitudes. 
In the final defeat of the Lusitani, after the assassination of Viriathus, the Roman 
general Caepio took their arms, but distributed land to them, ἵνα μὴ λῃστεύοιεν ἐξ 
ἀπορίας ‘so that they would not take up banditry from poverty’.360  Here we get a new 
sense of banditry: its fundamental cause is ἀπορία.361 This sentiment is voiced repeatedly 
by Appian, and λῃστήρια continue to be important after the close of the Viriathic war.  In 
98, another tribe in Spain was supposedly living by means of banditry (ἐλῄστευον δ᾽ ἐξ 
ἀπορίας οὗτοι) and there, the same solution was proposed, but the commander proposing 
it only did so as a ruse to get in and conduct a massacre.
362
 
Banditry has been called an ‘endemic problem in Spain’.363  The year after his 
praetorship, Gaius Marius suppressed a bandit outbreak in Ulterior in 114.  In the 
following years L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi was killed, while Servius Sulpicius Galba and 
Quintus Servilius Caepio lived to deal with the Lusitanian revolt, Caepio finally 
                                                 
358
 Appian, Hisp. 73.  The section 71-73 is portrayed as a short digression from the war and seems to have 
the side purpose of establishing the relative mercy and restraint of Brutus.   
359
 ὅμως οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀφέντες βίον ἐν λῃστηρίοις διετέλουν  Strabo also obliquely 
mentions this at 3.4.15. 
360
 Appian, Hisp. 75. 
361
 Some form of λῃστεύω appears with ἐξ ἀπορίας several times in Appian.  Besides these two examples, it 
also appears in Pun. 5 (The Carthaginians during the Mercenary War) and Pun. 25 (Carthage under siege 
by Africanus). 
362
 Appian, Hisp. 100, for the event.  The commander here was one Titus Didius, who had as a subordinate 
Q. Sertorius.  This episode will be discussed again in ch. 5. 
363
 Curchin 1991, 41. 
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triumphing in 107.
 364
  How do we differentiate this endemic banditry from the guerrillas 
and rebels of these campaigns?  I argue that we cannot and should not.  In a sense, the 
difference on the Iberian end is motive, but the difference in the Roman portrayal is 
closer to ‘degree of success’. 
So in Iberia, from 196-107, we have an inconsistent array of stories, but after the 
two-decade ‘Gracchan peace’ of the 170s and 160s, we see a consistent portrayal of 
Iberian antagonists as guerrillas, bandits, and rebels, irrespective of their status prior to 
the campaigns in question.  It is sometimes argued that the earlier campaigns resulted in 
no true extension of Roman rule over the defeated people.
365
  The fundamental socio-
economic factors that created the at-large warrior remained unchanged.  It was not 
necessary for de facto control in Iberia to change, even if various Roman commanders 
might lay claim to such a change in their bids for triumphs.
366
  Victory in Spain could be 
determined by redefining goals and positions
367
 
To return to the framework presented at the beginning of this chapter, the Iberians 
were considered an uncivilized force and the Romans a civilized force.  We see 
plundering conducted by both sides, and we also see this plundering described as 
acceptable or unacceptable.  The banditry, however is only the unacceptable plunderings 
of uncivilized bands of warriors, like the Lusitani.  The most banditlike word used for 
Lucullus and Galba, however, is paranomia.  The Iberians, by contrast, form bandit-
gangs and are led by bandit-captains.  The use of leistes-vocabulary for Viriathus and 
other Iberians, I argue, is a rhetorical attempt to convey both that their actions were 
unacceptable and that they held what power they did illegitimately.   
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 See Broughton 1951 (MRR I), 538 (Frugi) 540, 544 (Galba) 546, 549, 552 (Caepio). 
 These two, Galba and Caepio, are the sons of the Galba and Caepio mentioned above with Viriathus.  The 
younger Galba was tried under the Mamilian law as a supporter of Jugurtha. (Cicero, Brut. 127) 
365
 E.g. Curchin 1991, 40-41. 
366
 The maxim expressing the need for extending the empire is contained in Valerius Maximus (2.8.4), but 
see Richardson 1986, 109 for an argument against this. 
367
 See Clark 2014, 94-115, 130-133, in particular, 133—“every defeat incurred by Roman forces during 
this time can be placed within a narrative of overarching victory.” 
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Liguria and Sardinia.   
The campaigns of Liguria and Sardinia are generally appended to other 
campaigns.  It is difficult to talk about these campaigns for the simple reason that next to 
nothing is known about them.
368
  Despite its acquisition ten years earlier and consuls 
being sent there earlier, it is first in 227 that a commander was assigned to Sardinia as a 
provincia.
369
  Liguria, however, had been a constant provincia in the first half of the 
second century, originating with reports of piracy from Liguria and Corsica in the 230s, 
but there was a complete absence of military activity there between Opimius’s 154 
campaign and that of M. Fulvius Flaccus in 125.
370
  Strabo, however, tells us that a war 
of eighty years was necessary to wrest enough territory from the Ligurians for a road 
through their lands.  Some have considered this war to proceed through the middle of the 
second century, but I prefer to date this with the campaign of Lentulus on one end and 
with Marcus Marcellus against the Apuani on the other.  The list of triumphs below, 
compiled from the Fasti Triumphales, should give some indication of activity in this 
period.
371
   
Table 1: Triumphs in Liguria and Sardinia 
236/5   P. Cornelius L.f. Ti.n. Lentulus, consul, the Ligurians,  
235/4   T. Manlius T.f. T.n. Torquatus, consul, the Sardinians,  
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 As Salmon 1988 says simply in his description of the Ligurians: “little is known about the Ligures” and 
this applies for any period. Such sources as there are are summarized pp. 715-719.  See also Harris 1989, 
115-118. 
369
 Richardson 1986, 8-9.  Cf. Solinus 5.1:  “utraque insula in Romanum arbitratum redacta iisdem 
temporibus facta provincia est cum eodem anno Sardiniam M. Valerius, alteram C. Flaminius praetor 
sortiti sint.”  This is also the year in which the praetors were increased to four from two. Livy, Per. 20. 
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 Polybius 33.10 for Opimius and Livy Per. 60 for Flaccus.  Richardson 1986, 136 n.45 notes in addition 
that Sp. Postumius Albinus may have had some activity of unknown scope in the area in 148. 
See Staveley 1990, 432 for Ligurian/Corsican piracy. 
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 Hall 1898 suggests such a war began after the Second Punic War and continued down to the 120s.  
Harris1985, 225-227 does not directly address the issue, but his dates suggest a break between the 150s and 
120s. 
The preposition used may also be of interest. Generally, the Fasti Triumphales uses de with the peoples 
used, but occasionally uses ex with the province assigned (here, Sardinia).  I have left the ‘from’ in to 
indicate when ex was used.  
Due to breaks in the Fasti, at least three and probably more are omitted from the 180s. Broughton 1951 
(MRR I), 361-388 notes the commanders L. Baebius Dives, P. Iunius Brutus, M. Valerius Messalla, M. 
Aemilius Lepidus, C. Flaminius, Sp. Postumius Albinus, Q. Marcius Philippus, Ap. Claudius Pulcher, M. 
Sempronius Tuditanus, P. Claudius Pulcher, L. Porcius Licinus, M. Claudius Marcellus, Q. Fabius Labeo, 
Cn. Baebius Tamphilus, L. Aemilius Paullus, P. Cornelius Cethegus, M. Baebius Tamphilus, A. Postumius 
Albinus, C. Calpurnius Piso, and Q. Fulvius Flaccus in Liguria, with L. Aemilius Paullus, P. Cornelius 
Cethegus, and M. Baebius Tamphilus celebrating triumphs in that period. 
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234/3   Sp. Carvilius Sp.f. C.n. Maximus, consul, the Sardinians,  
233/2   Q. Fabius Q.f. Q.n. Maximus Verrucosus, consul, the Ligurians,  
233/2   M'. Pomponius M'.f. M'.n. Matho, consul, the Sardinians,  
223/2   P. Furius Sp.f. M.n. Philus, consul, the Gauls and Ligurians,  
197/6   Q. Minucius C.f. C.n. Rufus, consul, the G[auls and the Ligurians, on the] 
Alban Mount,
372
  
[at least four triumphs not extant] 
177/6   C. Claudius [Ap.f. P.n.] Pulcher, consul, the Istri and Ligurians.  
175/4   Ti. Sempronius P.f. Ti.n. Gracchus, proconsul, from Sardinia,  
175/4   M. Aemilius M.f. M.n. Lepidus, consul,   the Ligurians,
373
  
175/4   P. Mucius Q.f. P.n. Scaevola, consul, the Ligurians,  
166/5   M. Claudius M.f. M.n. Marcellus, consul, the Contrubian Gauls, Ligurians 
and Eleates,  
166/5   C. Sulpicius C.f. C.n. Galus, consul, the Ligurian Ta[...]rni,  
158/7   M. Fulvius M.f. M.n. Nobilior, proconsul, the Ligurian Eleates, 
155/4   M. Claudius M.f. M.n. Marcellus, consul, the ______ and Apuani  
123   M. Fulvius M.f. Q.n. Flaccus, proconsul, the Ligurians, Vocontii and 
Salluvii  
122   C. Sextius C.f. C.n. Calvinus, proconsul, the Ligurians, Vocontii and 
Salluvii  
122   L. Aurelius L.f. L.n. Orestes, proconsul, from Sardinia,  
117   Q. Marcius Q.f. Q.n. Rex, proconsul, the Ligurian Styni,  
111   M. Caecilius Q.f. Q.n. Metellus, proconsul, from Sardinia,  
 
Even just limiting ourselves to the second century campaigns, we can see that 
multiple triumphs are being celebrated for each conflict and furthermore, that the 
Ligurian and Sardinian conflicts tend to coincide.  I argue that this is not by chance, but 
that for some reason, conflicts in the one area could and would ‘spill over’ into the other.  
Moreover, the Ligurians and Sardinians also defeated Roman armies repeatedly, such as 
the forces of Marcius Phillipus in 186 and Petillius Spurinus in 176. 
Little can be discovered about these campaigns directly, but reference is more 
often made to these campaigns in accounts of other campaigns.  For example, Strabo’s 
account of the Balearic campaign of 123 suggests that the Baleares were being punished 
for piracy committed by Sardinians and Ligurians.
374
  Like the Iberian situation, Liguria 
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 The appending of ‘Alban Mount’ here probably implies that he celebrated a triumph or ovation with 
popular support, but without formal senatorial approval. 
373
 As noted above, Lepidus also campaigned in Liguria in 187. 
374
 Strabo 3.5.1. 
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and Sardinia were inheritances from the First and Second Punic Wars that took many 
years to bring under control.
375
  And like the Balearics, both were traditional recruiting 
grounds for mercenaries.
376
  The role of Liguria as a recruiting ground has been 
suspected, but Ligurian individuals keep appearing in the sources.
377
  When discussing 
mercenaries recruited, Polybius, Diodorus, and Dio all note the Ligurians and Baleares as 
separate from groups like the Celts, Iberians, and Gauls.
378
 
The Ligurians served as a source of freelance warriors.  The Ligurian campaigns 
often seem rooted in requests made by Rome’s ally, Massilia.  The Massiliots asked the 
Romans to drive off a Ligurian attack in 181 and in 154.
379
  Thus, this area may be less of 
a triumph-hunting locale than others.  Yet the portrayal of the Ligurians as bandits is 
striking, and Roman campaigns occurred throughout the 180s, often with both consuls 
being sent to Liguria. 
Florus, when talking of the Ligurians of the third century says:  
 
Liguras, imis Alpium iugis adhaerentis inter Varum et Magram flumen inplicitosque 
dumis silvestribus, maior aliquanto labor erat invenire quam vincere. Tuti locis et fuga, 
durum atque velox genus, ex occasione latrocinia magis quam bella faciebant.   
 
It was a greater task to find than to conquer the Ligurians, who were clinging to the foot 
of the Alps between the Varus and Magra rivers, and obscured by woods and bushes.  
Safe in their position and refuges, they, a hard and quick race, were making bandit raids 
out of opportunity, rather than wars. 
 
Here, the Ligurians ‘made bandit raids rather than wars’. Florus’s perception of banditry 
seems tied to the development of cities.  Rather than urbes or oppida, the Ligurians here 
have latebras.
380
  One might well ask if this portrayal was typical.  Livy’s description of 
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 Many of the Ligurians had served as mercenaries in Carthaginian armies in past years, and like their 
Gallic neighbors, sided with Carthage against Rome. 
376
 Florus 2.17-18. 
377
 For example, Chilver (1938) says “since Liguria was not populous in the Augustan age any more than it 
was a good recruiting ground.” The evidence for Liguria as a recruiting ground comes principally from the 
numbers of Ligurian mercenaries and auxiliaries found elsewhere.  One might potentially reconcile the 
sides through presuming that the Ligurians who took up freelance military service had already been 
displaced, and so, while ethnically Ligurian, they were not, in fact, in Liguria. 
378
 Some of this is noted in Scullard 1990, 495. 
379
 See Benedict 1942, 39.  The ancient referent is Livy, 40.18, who indicates that piracy was a problem in 
181 in both Liguria and Histria.  Plutarch (Aem. 6.2) also mentions the 181 campaign of Aemilius Paullus. 
380
 Florus, 2.3.4-5.  
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the Ligurians in 182 has much the same flavor:  in Liguribus nihil postea gestum. 
recesserant primum in devios saltus, deinde dimisso exercitu passim in vicos castellaque 
sua dilapsi sunt.
381
 
The Second Punic War arrested campaigns against the Ligurians, but such 
campaigns resumed in the second century.  Of particular threat were the Apuani and the 
Ingauni, who prevented traffic to the northwest by land and sea respectively.  The Ingauni 
were defeated and made a treaty in 181 and the Apuani were defeated in 180 and forcibly 
deported to Samnium.
382
  Additional campaigns in 187, 179, and 177 also deported 
Ligurians out of the foothills (saltus) and onto the plain (campus). The most detailed 
campaign, that of Claudius, is narrated in Livy.
383
   
These actions largely appear to be ones of establishing control, with an emphasis 
on controlling the people, not the land.  The deportation and resettlement is a method of 
separating the people, and those resettled are particularly apt to be at loose ends and so, 
available to serve as mercenaries.  It should not be discounted, however, that, for many 
years, the cause of brigandage for individuals had been seen to be poverty and that of an 
entire tribe to be one of overpopulation.  The resettlement, in theory, would have had the 
benefit of granting both benefits: a ready auxiliary force and a reduction in the 
overpopulation of Liguria. 
Of principal interest, however, are the campaigns of the 120s.  There appears to 
be a resurgence after several peaceful decades, though this might be a symptom of 
Polybius’s ‘long peace’, in which the Romans had to find testing grounds in order to have 
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 Livy, 40.17.6.   “Among the Ligurians, nothing [no war] was waged after that.  They had retreated first 
into out-of-the-way thickets, then, after the army was dismissed, they scattered themselves into their home 
villages and castles.” 
382
  The Ligurians also defeated a Roman army under Q. Marcius Rex in 186.  For an account principally of 
Ligurian manpower and secondarily of the second century campaigns, see Brunt 1971, 187-190.  On the 
Apuani, it is noteworthy that a triumph was celebrated over the Apuani in 155; it is unclear whether those 
were another branch of the Apuani or if the original set of Apuani eventually returned.  
383
 This is the campaign ending at 41.14, not the one at Livy 41.16-19.  It may be noteworthy that Livy 
records the number of fallen Ligurians (in the second episode) as precisely enough to qualify for a triumph.  
Brunt 1971 (187-188) has some doubts that the land could have supported as many men as the Romans 
claimed to defeat in Liguria. 
For more on the Ligurian deportations, see Gabba, 1989, 202, and in addition to the above Livy passage: 
Livy 40.38, 40.41, 42.22. 
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a well-trained fighting force.
384
  Less charitably, the lack of major campaigns could have 
led to commanders seeking out wars either for triumphs or for monetary gain.
385
  
Furthermore, as will be discussed in the next section, the Roman campaigns in Liguria 
and Sardinia may have affected matters further west.  In the later campaigns, it seems 
likely that another request from Massilia may have caused the situation.  Specifically, a 
request for help regarding a border skirmish was sent to Rome in 125. 
The evidence seems to suggest some form of alliance between the Ligurians and 
the Sardinians.  But it would appear an alliance that transcends tribal affiliations and 
boundaries and so, would also appear highly problematic.  I find it more likely that the 
coincidence is caused by some mobile bands of warriors changing territories, but the 
Roman commanders are less able to change territories and march armies into another 
Roman’s province.  In other words, the multiple campaigns are often single campaigns 
against a foe that moves out of the imperium of one Roman leader and into that of 
another.  The same mobility that makes them suspect makes repeated campaigns 
necessary. 
 
Balearic Campaign. 
Moving from a series of campaigns to a more isolated incident, I would like to 
examine the invasion of the Balearics, which was conducted in 123.  Metellus took ships 
and soldiers from Nearer Spain, sailed to the Balearics (also called the Gymnasiae), 
defeated the islanders, founded two cities with 3000 veterans and distributed land to 
them.  The avowed reason for this campaign was piracy practiced by the islanders, given 
in Orosius, Strabo, and Florus, but Strabo gives us reason to doubt this was the reality.  
Specifically, Strabo asserts (3.5.1):  
 
κακούργων δέ τινων ὀλίγων κοινωνίας συστησαμένων πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πελάγεσι 
λῃστάς, διεβλήθησαν ἅπαντες, καὶ διέβη Μέτελλος ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ὁ Βαλιαρικὸς 
προσαγορευθείς, ὅστις καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἔκτισε. διὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιβουλευόμενοι, 
καίπερ εἰρηναῖοι ὄντες 
 
                                                 
384
 Polybius 32.13, referring to the Dalmatian campaign in the 150s under Figulus.  The link with Liguria is 
mine. 
385
 Also suggested by Harris 1985, 225-227. 
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“Through a certain few bad individuals, those having come together with the pirates in 
those seas, they all were discredited, and Metellus Balearicus set forth against them. He 
was the one who built the cities. But there were always plotters against them because of 
the arete of the country, though peaceful, they are nevertheless said to be great slingers” 
The phrase διὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιβουλευόμενοι, is perhaps problematic.  The 
Baleares have people (unspecified) plotting against them for their arete. Now, arete may, 
of course, mean ‘quality land’,386 but I think it quite impossible to divorce it from its 
principal sense.  In invoking their arete, Strabo may be additionally implying the 
Baleares were honorable and brave people, a good stock of folk that would not normally 
be guilty of the crimes they were accused of.  Strabo emphasizes the arete of the land at 
the opening of this passage also, and in the following section (3.5.2) Strabo asserts the 
land has eukarpia.
387
  The rationale for Strabo’s insistence on the productiveness of the 
land is to show that piracy is unlikely.  Elsewhere, Strabo wants to assert that piracy is a 
product of poverty.
388
  So, establishing a lack of poverty is a useful step in establishing a 
lack of piracy.  A common explanation for the invasion is that the Balearics secured some 
sort of strategic military position.
389
  Strabo exhibits widespread doubt about the 
motivation of the campaign. 
In interpreting Strabo’s passage, the καίπερ εἰρηναῖοι is problematic, as it is 
unclear whether it applies to the previous or following clause.  Should their peacefulness 
cause us to expect them not to be great slingers or to expect others not to plot against 
them?  I believe it makes so much sense with each that we could actually take it twice, 
going with each clause.  While this would be grammatically unusual with καίπερ, the 
manuscript tradition for Strabo is not the best, and we can quite logically expect a 
duplicated clause to have been deleted.
390
 
Strabo and Florus are the main sources for this campaign, but we can prove the 
campaign’s date externally through a few other sources.  First, the Fasti Triumphales 
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 LSJ definition 2b, cf. Herodotus 4.198, Thucydides 1.2. 
387
 διὰ δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῶν τόπων and πρὸς δὲ τῇ εὐκαρπίᾳ τῆς γῆς, respectively. 
388
 First at Strabo 1.3.2.  This sentiment is echoed by Appian, Hisp. 100: ἐλῄστευον δ᾽ ἐξ ἀπορίας οὗτοι. 
389
 E.g. Scullard 1982, 43, Ormerod 1924, 166.  See also Morgan 1969, 224, who argues against this 
assumption.  
390
 Or, perhaps more likely, an entire line to have been skipped.  This section in particular has some 
marginalia incorporated into the text later in the passage, concerning one of the materials the Baleares 
constructed their slings from. 
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preserves most of two lines
391
 describing his triumph, and places it between that of L. 
Aurelius Orestes for Sardinia and that of Q. Fabius Maximus over the Allobroges.  This 
places the triumph around 121 fairly securely.  We also have mentions of the campaign in 
the Periochae of Livy and in Orosius.
392
  The first gives us the second tribuneship of 
Gaius Gracchus (123) as one bookend and the founding of Aquae Sextiae (modern Aix-
en-Provence, also probably in 123) as the other.  Orosius simply states the year as 627 
AUC.
393
 
This confirms the campaign and time frame, but for the colonizing, we must look 
to Pliny the Elder and Pomponius Mela.  First, we have some confusion about the islands 
themselves.
394
  Pliny (3.5/3.11) describes the geography of the Balearics and names two 
towns. He also, like Strabo, asserts that the Balearics consist of two islands.
395
  
Presuming he means the modern Minorca and Majorca, that leaves Ibiza and Formentera 
out.  Both Pliny and Strabo (unlike Livy) divide them into two groups, naming the other 
the Pityussae.  Considering that Phoenician/Carthaginian settlement centered on those 
two western-most islands, particularly Ibiza,
396
 this might serve as an explanation for the 
lack of references to Carthaginians and Phoenicians in some of the accounts.  The 
Romans may have seen the Pityussae as old Carthaginian territory, already bound to 
Rome, but the Balearic Islands as new, barbarian, territory.  Like Pliny and Strabo, Mela 
refers to two islands.  He says simply: Castella sunt in minoribus Iamno et Mago, in 
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 Q. Caecilius Q. f. Q. n. Metellus A.{b Urbe Condita} DCX[...] Baliaric. Procos. De Baliarib.{us} pr. 
n{on. (month)} 
392
 Per.60.9: Praeterea res a Q. Metello cos. adversus Baleares gestas continet, quos Graeci Gymnesios 
appellant, quia aestatem nudi exigunt. 
“It contains the actions carried out by the consul Q. [Caecilius] Metellus against the Baleares, whom the 
Greeks call Gymnasioi, since they go about naked in the summer.” 
Orosius 5.13.1:  Isdem temporibus Metellus Baleares insulas bello peruagatus edomuit et piraticam 
infestationem quae ab isdem tunc exoriebatur, plurima incolarum caede conpressit. 
“At the same time, the well-known Metellus subdued the Balearic Isles by war and suppressed the pirate 
infestation which had arisen there by a great slaughter of the inhabitants.” 
393
 The year is actually given in Orosius 5.12.1, and confirmed with ‘during the consulship of L. Caecilius 
Metellus and Q. Titius Flamininus’, the consuls of 123. 
627 is actually 127 BC, but Orosius is regularly off by 3 or 4 years, as he counts from 750. 
394
 See Map 3 for the Balearics. 
395
 Livy considers all four islands to be the Balearics (eg. 22.10) and explicitly in regards to Ebusus/Ibiza. 
396
 Diodorus 5.16.3 puts the date of such a colony at ~654 BC (160 years after Carthage: ὁ δ᾽ ἀποικισμὸς 
αὐτῆς γέγονεν ὕστερον ἔτεσιν ἑκατὸν ἑξήκοντα τῆς κατὰ τὴν Καρχηδόνα κτίσεως ). 
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maioribus Palma et Pollentia coloniae.
397
  Here, he names the two cities of the smaller 
isle, Minorca, then the two of the larger, Majorca.  In the surrounding section, Mela takes 
care to point out cities settled by others:  “The area was settled by barbarians, save for 
where Aleria and Mariana were founded” (praeterquam ubi Aleria et Mariana coloniae 
sunt a barbaris colitur, 2.107) and “Caralis and Sulci, the oldest of cities (urbium 
antiquissimae Caralis et Sulci, 2.108).
398
  Yet no such comment is made here, where at 
least Mago and Ebusus are known to have been Phoenician/Carthaginian foundations.
399
  
As for quantity, the number of three thousand for the Roman settlers comes from Strabo: 
εἰσήγαγε δὲ ἐποίκους τρισχιλίους τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἰβηρίας Ῥωμαίων.400  For comparison, 
Diodorus gives the total (contemporary) population of the two islands as 30,000.
401
 
As further evidence of the colonization, we can also note the commonplace 
nomen of Caecilius among local magistrates during the Principate, like Q. Caecilius Q. f. 
Vel. Catullus of Pollentia or Q. Caecilius Q. f. Labeo of Mago.
402
  Given that Roman 
citizens would have had their own nomina already, the prevalence of this nomen might 
suggest that the native population took the name of Metellus (so suggested by Curchin 
1990, 218).  Since Metellus brought his colonists from Spain, however, not from Italy, it 
is perhaps plausible that that wave of Caecilii are rooted in those Iberian settlers who may 
have had a closer connection with the Metelli in the first place.
403
  It is noted that 
Caecilius is the ninth most commonly attested nomen in all of Iberia, but the 
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 Mela, 2.109.  “On the smaller island are the fortified settlements Iamno and Mago, on the larger, the 
colonies Palma and Pollentia” 
398
 See also 2.98-99 (Crete), 2.83 (Baetica). 
399
 Though not particularly relevant to the argument here, those interested in the extent of Carthage’s 
commercial presence in the Balearics might examine Barceló 1988. 
400
 Strabo, 3.5.1: “and he led in 3,000 colonists of the Romans out of Iberia” 
401
 Diodorus, 5.17. 
402
 For Q. Caecilius Catullus (#828 Curchin 1990), see CIL II 3696 and p 962 =ILER 6371 =Veny Corpus 
25, cf Curchin 1990, 218; Knapp 2011, 132. 
For Labeo (#796 Curchin 1990), see CIL II 3708 and p963 =ILER 1384 = Veny Corpus 128, cf. Curchin 
1990, 215. 
For other examples from the Balearics see Curchin 1990 187 (Bocchoris), 204 (Ebusus), 208 (Guiuntum), 
215 (Mago), 218 Palma and Pollentia) and 232 (city unknown).  Also CIL II.3659-3724, especially 3676-
3680, 3695-3696, 3708, 3714-3715, 3717-3718. 
403
 Despite an utter lack of non-circumstantial evidence, it seems reasonable that Metellus had been 
governor of Hispania Citerior for some time prior to the Balearic campaign.  This view is held by Curchin 
1991 (40). 
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concentration in the Balearics is considerably higher.
404
 The implication of nomina is that 
the conqueror of a given territory would frequently establish clients or even grant 
citizenship to certain individuals.  He might also take possession of some land upon 
which he put slaves who might later become freedmen.  We should thus expect that a fair 
number of the colonists would have adopted the nomen of Caecilius.  Their lack on the 
Pityussae suggests that Metellus did not conquer those islands. 
So, in sum, the dates and events of the campaign bear out, but it is more difficult 
to confirm the pretext given for the war.  The Latin sources are fairly unanimous in 
ascribing piracy as the root cause.  Strabo does not deny that piracy was the avowed 
reason for the war, but clearly doubts that it was the principal reason.  The Baleares, as 
they appear elsewhere, did constitute mobile bands of warriors.  Balearic slingers and 
sailors are frequently attested as participants in Carthage’s wars in Sicily and with 
Rome.
405
  The expectation of unemployed warriors to turn pirate when they could not 
turn mercenary is not unreasonable. 
Another solution was proposed by M. Gwyn Morgan, accepting Strabo’s account, 
in which the pirates were real, but not native to the islands.
406
 In dealing with pirates from 
the east, they condemned themselves, and furthermore, the Romans were encouraged to 
wage war by the Massiliots, the presumed ἐπιβουλευόμενοι of the above Strabo passage.  
Noting that both Florus and Orosius talk of an outbreak of piracy, rather than a continual 
ongoing problem (as the Illyrians and Cilicians would be described) it is perhaps 
reasonable to assume that the pirates are newcomers.
407
  It would be logical that the 
governor of Hispania Citerior would engage nearby pirates disrupting his province, but 
there are no indications of such raids in the years before 123.  It would also be logical 
that Metellus might attempt to grant land to Roman veterans to weaken the support of 
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 Curchin 1990, 94-95, 218.  The rank of #9 is made by Knapp 1978, 213, and accepted by Curchin.  The 
Pithyussae, it should be noted, display no such concentration of this nomen, though here Cornelius is rather 
common (and we may well note that Livy (22.20) has the Balearic tribes seek peace with Rome in the wake 
of the expedition of Gnaeus Scipio in 217). 
405
 For a couple of examples: a Balearic force defeated a Syracusan one under Agathocles in 311 (Meister 
1984, 393), in the second Punic War, Balearic rowers enlisted with Mago (in 206) . 
406
 Morgan 1969. 
407
 Morgan 1969, 223. 
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Gracchus in Rome.
408
  Morgan is fairly convinced that the decision to act in 123 was 
prompted by the Massiliots, just as they prompted the war in 125 in Transalpine Gaul.
409
  
The issue that further complicates this scenario is related to the above discussion 
of Liguria and Sardinia.  The sailors the Baleares were trading with may have been not 
pirates, but rebels or refugees.  (Or pirates as well as rebels and refugees, for that matter)  
Diodorus says in passing (5.17.3) that the islanders were frequent victims of pirates, 
rather than perpetrators of piracy. Noting the ongoing campaigns in Sardinia and 
Transalpine Gaul, Morgan suggests that the combatants were also the same in this 
conflict, Ligurians and Sardinians who hoped to continue resistance with a new base.  
The expedition under Metellus would then be part of a larger command to assist in those 
conflicts, which would more thoroughly warrant the size of the force he had brought to 
the islands.  Unfortunately, Livy’s accounts of the pertinent campaigns are lost.  Rome, 
however, had numerous campaigns in Sardinia, and at Livy 41.12 (when Sempronius was 
in Sardinia ~177), we see: Balarorum magna auxilia Iliensibus venerant.  Now, it would 
be a bit of a jump to associate these Balari with the Baleares, and indeed, we can find this 
as a name for a group of Corsicans.
410
  It is a curious coincidence, however, and one 
might well wonder if the two are connected or even if Livy misrecorded the name.  A 
history of linkage between Sardinia and the Gymnasiae would make the suggestion of 
refugees operating as pirates more palatable.  
Morgan’s account does not quite rely on Strasburger’s arguments for which parts 
of Strabo are most indebted to Posidonius, but is well aided by it.
411
  Posidonius, as an 
author, was quite interested in piracy and a firm believer that the character of the land 
shaped the character of the people.
412
  This sense of the character of the land and the 
character of the people do not appear to be unique at all, as I will explain further both 
later in this chapter and in chapter 7.  
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 Morgan 1969, 226. 
409
 And if some of the pirates were from Transalpine Gaul originally, sudden attacks on Massilia would be 
quite expected.  
410
 They are noted also in Sallust, Hist. F.2.9 (McGushin), where ‘some say’ they were Spanish mercenaries 
in service to Carthage and others that they were refugees from the Balearics. 
411
 Strasburger 1965. 
412
 Strasburger 1965, 49-50; Morgan 1969, 221.  Posidonius’s emphasis on piracy seems tangentially tied to 
his praise of Rhodes for suppressing it and blame on Rome for weakening Rhodes. 
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Dalmatian campaigns  
The Dalmatian campaigns’ evidence may be even sparser than that for the above 
campaigns.  Nevertheless, though sparse, the historical record up until the mid-second 
century is fairly consistent.  Polybius (and others) consistently characterize the Illyrians 
as pirates, and Wilkes, in the relevant volume of the History of the Provinces of the 
Roman Empire, asserts that the Liburni Illyrians were principally famous for their piracy 
and the comparative sexual freedom of their women.
413
  While Polybius notes Illyrian 
piracy, earlier Greek reports (e.g. Thucydides 4.125.1, Pseudo-Scymnus 422), merely 
depict them as fierce fighters and a hospitable people.   
Nevertheless, later authors continue the description of Illyrians as pirates in every 
period.  Aristotle’s assertion that brigandage is a productive occupation may have shaped 
the way for authors to use this ethnographic detail in describing various tribes.
414
  The 
Delmatae in particular are considered prone to banditry (in latrocinia promptissimi) by 
Florus (2.25.10).  Appian, in the Civil Wars, briefly relates a history of 
Dyrrhachium/Epidamnus where he names the Liburni pirates (οἳ τὰ περίοικα νηυσὶ 
ταχείαις ἐληίζοντο) from their arrival on the scene.415  These claims of piracy are 
exaggerated and generally abstract characterizations rather than pinned to specific events.  
Though there are numerous authors that assert that certain tribes lived by brigandage or 
piracy, that has a better claim as a cultural phenomenon than an economic one.  Wilkes 
notes that the Greeks resort to such labels when confronted with this strange society.
416
   
Small campaigns in the Illyria/Pannonia/Dalmatia region were not uncommon in 
the second century.  The Istrians of northern Illyria assisted the Aetolians and the 
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 Polybius 2.3.2, 2.8.1. 
Wilkes 1969, 186-187.  Wilkes goes on to link the two, e.g. “The comparative sexual freedom enjoyed by 
the women was part of the life of a community organized for piracy.” (187)  The Greek links of the 
Illyrians to piracy have been mentioned before in the previous chapter.  Most of these links are in the 
abstract, not referring to specific incidents.  
See also Wilkes 1969, 177 n.1 for pirate fame. 
For discussions of the potential impact of piracy on the Illyrian economy, see Royal 2012, 438, 441, 
Horden and Purcell 2000, 387-388.   
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 Aristotle, Pol. 1.8.  Perhaps of still greater relevance and impact is Thucydides’s description of the 
Aetolians and Acarnanians (1.5-6), who practice banditry for their livelihoods, which he uses as evidence 
that this is how things used to be in the rest of Greece as well. 
415
 Appian, B Civ. 2.39 cf. Dio 41.49.  See Cabanes 1993, 9ff. for a compilation of the historians’ 
foundation stories of Dyrrhachium and Apollonia. 
416
 Wilkes 1992, 110. 
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Romans sent a punitive raid.  Similarly, during the war with Perseus, the Illyrians, under 
Genthius, threw in with the Macedonians, and were roundly defeated by Lucius Anicius 
Gallus at Scodra in 168.
417
  Anicius would celebrate a triumph for this in 167/166.  Livy, 
discussing this side campaign in some detail, twice observes plundering as a method 
employed by Genthius
418
 and suggests that money is the only way to sway ‘the 
impoverished barbarian’ (barbarus inops, 43.20).  From there, the campaigns crept 
northward.  Whether driven by insults or by lack of action, Figulus defeated the Delmatae 
in 156.
419
  Triumphs over the Illyrians were celebrated in 155/154 by Publius Scipio 
Nasica (against the Delmatae) and in 129 by Gaius Sempronius Tuditanus (against the 
Iapydes).  Another campaign was launched against the coastal Ardiaei and Plerai in 135, 
who lived between the Delmatae and Scodrenses, under the consul Flaccus.
420
 
Illyrian plundering likely featured as the understood motivation for the 156 
campaign, as well as the 135 campaign.  Polybius, however, claims that the motivation 
for the campaigns of 156-155 was a desire to train the army.
421
  Tuditanus benefitted 
from being out of Rome, and no historian records a given pretext.
422
  As mentioned, the 
Dalmatians were previously defeated by Figulus in 156.  And triumphs were celebrated in 
155/154 by a Publius Scipio Nasica and 129 by Gaius Sempronius Tuditanus.  This gives 
us the background for the Dalmatian campaign of 118, the last campaign in Illyria before 
the civil wars of the first century. 
The Dalmatian campaign of 118, like the Balearic campaign, was also conducted 
by a Metellus.
 423
  Appian accuses this Metellus of triumph-hunting.  According to 
Appian, the campaign contained little more than camping in Dalmatia and staying with 
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 Livy, 44.31.  Here, it may be worth noting that Genthius’s Illyrians comprise only the territories just to 
the north of Epirus, and not the Dalmatians as well. 
418
 42.26 (a compliant from Issa) 44.30 (a fleet of lembi sent to harass the territory of Dyrrhachium).  He 
also mentions some earlier Illyrian plundering under Genthius at 40.42. 
419
 Polybius 32.23 gives several potential ‘real’ reasons for the campaign, but asserts that the public reason 
was the insults to the Roman ambassadors.  This corresponds well to the variety of reasons for the 
campaign against Teuta in the previous century, where again, the explicit reason was the death of an 
ambassador. 
420
 See Wilkes 1969, 29-32; Appian, Hisp. 10; and Livy, Per. 56. 
421
 Wilkes 1969, 36.  The Polybius reference is 32.13. 
422
 Wilkes 1969, 36. 
423
 See Broughton 1951 (MRR I), 525-529 (for the years 119-117). 
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friends.
424
 The Fasti Triumphales do mention his triumph (as proconsul, probably in 
117).  This Metellus, as consul, waged war against the (inland) Segestani in 119.
425
  
Nevertheless, he celebrated a triumph over the Delmatae, a coastal Illyrian people.  
According to Appian, however:
426
  
 
χρόνῳ δ᾽ ὕστερον Καικίλιος Μέτελλος ὑπατεύων οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦσι τοῖς Δαλμάταις 
ἐψηφίσατο πολεμεῖν ἐπιθυμίᾳ θριάμβου, καὶ δεχομένων αὐτὸν ἐκείνων ὡς φίλον 
διεχείμασε παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐν Σαλώνῃ πόλει, καὶ ἐς Ῥώμην ἐπανῆλθε καὶ ἐθριάμβευσεν. 
“Later, Caecilius Metellus resolved to go to war against the Dalmatians, although they 
had been guilty of no offense, because of his desire for a triumph. And they received him 
as a friend and he stayed through the winter among them at the town of Salona, and then 
he returned to Rome and triumphed.” 
Though this is normally taken as happening in 119, the same year as the action against 
the Segestani, since the Fasti Triumphales give his title as proconsul and Appian a little 
earlier writes: ἐοίκασι δὲ καὶ Σεγεστανοὶ Λευκίῳ Κόττᾳ καὶ Μετέλλῳ, ἀμφότεροι δ᾽ οὐ 
πολὺ ὕστερον ἀποστῆναι,427 the action against the Segestani thus appears to be in the year 
of his consulship.  I thus present a short timeline of:  
 
119—Cotta and Metellus are consuls and assigned a campaign against the 
Segestani 
118—Metellus assigned as governor of Dalmatia as proconsul 
117—Metellus continues as proconsul and celebrates triumph over Delmatae. 
 
Following this, it seems as though there may have been some irregularity concerning the 
triumph, which I will address in greater detail later (in chapter 6).  Such an instance 
would accord well with Appian’s accusation that Metellus was ‘triumph-hunting’.  Now 
the Delmatae, a coastal people, would be more likely to garner accusations of piracy than 
the Segestani.  Those accusations do not appear to surface here.  It is certainly not 
                                                 
424
 Appian, Hisp. 11.  Wilkes 1969, 34, argues that Appian was hostile to the Metelli. 
425
 See Map 2: Illyria and Epirus, page v. 
426
 No year is given in Appian. The text of Livy (Per. 62) is of no help: L. Caecilius Metellus Dalmatas 
subegit.  But the event does appear after the triumph of Marcius Rex, who was consul in 118.  The Fasti 
Triumphales lists a date for neither, but puts the triumph of Delmaticus first in the chronology.  Eutropius 
(4.23) puts the triumph in the consulship of M. Porcius Cato and Q. Marcius Rex (118- 636 AUC by 
Broughton 1951) which he calls 633 AUC.   
427
 Appian, Ill. 10: The Segestani seemed [subjugated] by Lucius Cotta and Metellus, but both [Segestani 
and Iapydes] revolted not much later. 
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unusual for there to be several campaigns in quick succession in the same area.  Such 
events do, however, cast some doubt on the commanders’ all-too-frequent claims of 
decisive and lasting victories.  This switch of the target’s name may also indicate an 
initial loss to an Illyrian group, swept under the rug by rebranding.
428
 
It is difficult to make this argument ex nihilo, but modern scholars have not noted 
a preponderance of commanders’ nomina as nomina of Illyrians similar to what can be 
observed for the Balearics.  The relative abundance of tria nomina at Dyrrhachium 
includes common Roman names, but does not include a wealth of Cornelii, Caecilii, or 
Sempronii which would display an enfranchisement similar to Iberia’s.429  From the 
nomina, it appears that the Roman cultural advance in Illyria was not as rapid as it was in 
Iberia and may also indicate that Roman commanders, despite their Illyrian campaigns, 
had little lasting influence in Illyria.  Illyrian piracy, like Iberian raiding, could serve as a 
useful pretext and cover for retaliations or simply Roman counter-raiding in search of 
wealth or glory.  Moreover, Roman perceptions of piracy in the Balearics and in Illyria 
appear to be fundamentally different.  While the modern historian tends to think of 
control of territory, the ancient commander thought instead of controlling funds and 
people.  That control took far longer to achieve in Illyria than it did in Iberia. 
 
Conclusions 
Taken together, the material suggests: 1) while dates, leaders and areas are stated 
rather plainly, the particulars of the campaigns are largely interpretations by the 
historians, whether ancient or modern. This conclusion should surprise no one.  2) The 
second century was a time when the appropriateness of a campaign began to be 
questioned.
430
  The rationales for campaigns begin to be recorded in greater detail.  3) 
The pretexts of campaigns frequently did not reveal the rationale or motivations behind 
them.  Moreover, claims of piracy or brigandage by the enemy are common even when 
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 See Clark 2014, 174 for the suggestion of a hidden defeat. 
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 For some evidence of Illyrian names, see Cabanes (ed.) 1993 passim, but particularly Anamali 1993, 
114-116. 
430
 This suggests an interesting corollary that sheds light upon the ancient historians’ assertion that Rome 
reached its apex during the Punic Wars or some time after (Polybius pins it to 216 BC, others 146).  By 
Rome starting to examine the motivations of campaigns in the second century, it found more corruption 
than before it started looking.  
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other justifications exist.  4) A campaign against bandits or pirates was extremely 
defensible, even if there was less glory to be won.  Claims of piracy served as insurance 
against political charges of wrongdoing.  5) Certain groups on the Roman margins 
became intrinsically linked with the practice of banditry/piracy.  I do not mention this to 
argue that such acts did not occur, but to argue that this reputation made these groups 
almost incapable of ‘legitimate’ action in Roman perception, despite the relative 
similarity in Roman and non-Roman actions.  This also served to encourage further 
Roman aggression. 
In the second century, there is a clear continuation of general trends of the third.  
In the East, bands of fighters were seen as potential pools of manpower too valuable to 
eliminate outright, even if they must be occasionally dealt with.  Even with Rhodes, the 
foremost of pirate-hunting states, the goal was chiefly to adduce that manpower to one’s 
own state rather than to eliminate it entirely.  In the West, however, those fighters 
deemed pirates or bandits have a ‘state’ and a definite allegiance.  These same areas, 
however, also tended to be prime candidates for mercenary-recruiting grounds.  This 
could either represent the ready shift between mercenary and bandit that is well noted in 
the East, or, if that propensity was noted by the Romans, could easily lead to the 
westerners acquiring the same associations regardless of actions. 
At this point, I would like to turn to the first century.  Rather than picking an 
arbitrary date for the cutoff, I have decided to use Marius’s rise to power as the most 
appropriate point of transition.  This is because Marius’s military reforms, particularly 
those permitting the recruitment of an essentially mercenary army (rather than a conscript 
one) had significant repercussions on the availability of the fighters of ambiguous 
allegiance that are the subject of this work.
431
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 See Brunt 1971, 82-83 for some effects of the enrollment of the proletarii. 
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Chapter Four: The Small Wars of the First Century 
This chapter focuses on the same types of situations as the previous.  In the 
aftermath of the servile wars of the second century, the ‘at-large’ warrior took up an even 
more prominent role in the international dynamic. Furthermore, I propose the nature of 
foreign affairs and the role of the freelance warrior was changed dramatically by the 
Marian reform.  Specifically the provision to enlist the proletarii on a regular basis rather 
than as a temporary measure had the effect of changing Rome’s army from a conscript 
force to a paid force.  This in turn meant that various employment issues changed 
dramatically both for the individual and for the state.
432
  The Roman proletarii may not 
have been a principal source of manpower to the mobile bands of at-large warriors, but a 
member of the proletarii who wanted to be a warrior had little choice but to join these 
bands.  And for the unmarried career soldier, there was little point in owning property 
one never saw.  An altogether different type of contingent manpower—slaves—also had 
become a numerous force in the Roman sphere in the second century.  As the evidence of 
the servile wars shows, the route from slave to freelance warrior and vice versa was 
neither a particularly difficult nor uncommon one.  Yet, in recruiting auxiliaries, Romans 
are careful to exclude fugitive slaves and accuse others of their hiring. 
While Hopkins argued that the change to enroll the proletarii was merely the 
public confirmation of an ongoing trend, I suggest that for my purposes, the public 
confirmation is most important.
433
  Up until then, the warrior band, whether operating 
legitimately or illegitimately, had been playing in what amounts to a ‘manpower market’.  
Some states had sufficient manpower on their own; others sought to keep another pool on 
retainer.  In essence, Hopkins and Brunt examine the issue from a labor-buyers’ 
perspective: the Roman Army could (and did) relax restrictions to make up shortfalls.  In 
other words, the labor market is still a closed one.  But if examined from a labor-
suppliers’ perspective, where the warrior or warrior band seeks to sell its services, then 
the decision to enlist the proletarii opens the labor market publicly.  Thus the proletarii 
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 These issues are thoroughly discussed in Brunt 1971 and Hopkins 1978. 
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 See Hopkins1978, 30-31, 36, and esp. 31n40.  Brunt 1971, 82-83 and 402-408 are probably the passages 
Hopkins is responding to here. 
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always now have the option to enlist in the Roman army, not just in times of state 
emergencies.  The state army and the mobile bands of ‘freelancers’ are now in 
competition for the same individuals.  From the state’s perspective, little has changed.  
For the poor, ‘freelance’ fighter, however, the power dynamic and the market have 
thoroughly shifted.  Lastly, as a natural result, the legitimacy of the freelancer who 
chooses not to be state-employed drops, as then such freelance warriors are seen as 
intrinsically opposed to the state’s military, rather than excluded by it.   
The first century is also marked by an increasing interest in legislating external 
activities—or, at least, by records of these legislative acts surviving.  By the end of the 
second century, legislation passed had more to do with asserting who was in charge on 
each front; the lex Cornelia de provinciis ordinandis (81) and the lex Sempronia de 
provinciis consularibus (123), for example ensured that the voters would know where the 
elected officials would be heading.
434
  In addition to appointing individuals as governors 
or ambassadors, the Roman people passed legislation that also decreed some content 
which ambassadors were bound to deliver (such as the lex de provinciis praetoriis).  The 
second century is filled with innumerable examples of generals or legates who came to an 
agreement with a foreign people only to have that agreement nullified back in Rome.  
While this is generally cast as the Senate being insufficiently aware of the matters on the 
ground, one cannot ignore the possibility that some in Rome thought too much power 
was being put into the hands of the magistrates afield.  This, if true, would be a reverse of 
a trend of the third century, which required more authority to be placed in the hands of 
commanders who would be far away for an extended time.
435
 
In this chapter, I discuss four types of events: Roman internal conflicts with slaves 
and civil wars; their external conflicts with Cilicia, Cretans, and pirates; the repeated 
association of these smaller wars with Mithridates; and legislation that began to be passed 
either as a way of dealing with the piracy or as a way of dealing with the Romans’ own 
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 Corncerning this Sullan law, see Pina Polo 2011, especially ch. 12: “The supposed lex Cornelia de 
provinciis ordinandis and the presence of consuls in Rome in the post-Sullan period” pp. 225-248.  For a 
succinct summation of these two laws (or of what they are supposed to have said), see Ramsay 1863, 191.  
Williamson 2005, 494, also lists it in her list of ‘reliable’ laws. 
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 See Eckstein 1986, esp. 319-324, for this trend explicated in detail. 
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leadership.  Through these, I hope to show two things, first, that the ‘freelancer’ 
continued to be an important factor in warfare, second, that the ‘identities’ and ‘roles’ 
portrayed played a role in creating and promoting conflicts. Many of the items herein 
have echoes from the previous chapters.  The line between ‘pirate’ and ‘mercenary’ was 
still fluid; certain regions (e.g. Cilicia, Crete, and Illyria) still had piratic reputations.  The 
Rhodians persisted in their anti-pirate activities, the First Servile War had two great 
echoes in the first century, and Roman ambassadors continued to dictate foreign policy to 
eastern rulers. 
 
The Cilicians and the Expedition of Marcus Antonius Orator 
Marcus Antonius (Orator) was assigned Cilicia and the pirates in 102, presumably 
as a praetor with proconsular powers.
436
  Indeed, Antonius would celebrate a triumph for 
a victory over them (late in December 100).
437
  It is altogether unclear, however, how 
effective his campaign actually was.  Aside from brief remarks in Livy and Julius 
Obsequens, we have little to go on.
438
  They have Antonius entering Cilicia in 102, 
though I would tentatively argue that Antonius was actually acting in response to some 
Cilician action happening in the previous year.
439
  Afterwards, however, the borders of 
Cilicia were poorly defined and poorly understood, the Syrian kings still claimed 
possession of it, and the Cilician pirates were still around and causing trouble.  If we are 
to see his campaign as having been effective, then we must also presume some non-
obvious goals.  And if we are to see it as a specifically anti-pirate campaign, it is also the 
first such Roman campaign we know of.
440
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 So Broughton 1951, (MRR I) 568, 572, 576).  There is some difficulty in the dating, part of which comes 
from a certain Gaius Norbanus who accompanied Antonius as quaestor (possibly to avoid his legal troubles 
in Rome (see Broughton 565-566)) 
437
 We can date this triumph, oddly enough, by references in Cicero’s Pro Rabirio and in Appian (B Civ. 
1.32-33), which show that Antonius was just approaching (or possibly waiting outside) the city on 
December 10th (the first day of the tribunate)  See Broughton 1946 for a full argument. 
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 Livy, Per. 68.1; Obsequens, 44; ILLRP 1.342; de Souza 1999, 103.  The epitomator of Livy says in 
Ciliciam praedones persecutus est.  For one comparison of the usage, see Cicero, Fam. 12.15.7:  classem 
fugientem persecuti sumus usque Sidam (We pursued the fugitive fleet all the way to Side) 
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 I base this argument on the usages of the verb persecutus est with an accusative Ciliciam rather than an 
ablative. See below, 112. 
440
 While this motivation has been argued for Rome’s earlier actions against Antium or Teuta’s Illyrians, I 
find these arguments unconvincing (see chapter 2 above, 43-52 for my arguments). 
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Now, Cilicia was not historically a major interest for Rome.  The Greeks had 
settled there much later than in other parts of Anatolia.
441
  The rulers of Cilician states 
generally stayed out of Roman and Aegean affairs, though there might be occasional 
conflicts with Lycia and Rhodes, both Roman allies.  Strabo (14.5.2) tells us that the 
Romans had avoided Cilicia during Tryphon’s rise to power (roughly 142-138), saying 
both that the Romans saw it as a Seleucid problem and that they had more problems 
closer to home.  According to Strabo, Diodotus Tryphon was responsible for organizing a 
band of sea-raiders, though whether he did this through uniting such existing bands in 
Anatolia, encouraging his supporters to take up piracy, or some combination thereof is 
rather unclear.
442
  The Roman interest in Cilicia begins far later.  Some try to explain the 
lack of such a Roman interest to an effective anti-pirate campaign by Rhodes, Lycia and 
other Greek allies of Rome, but Strabo is probably nearer the mark.
443
 
Between the death of Tryphon and the campaign of Antonius, we know little 
about these Cilicians he supposedly organized.  Secondary scholarship has long supposed 
that they, operating nearly exclusively in the Eastern Mediterranean, supplied (either 
firsthand, or more commonly, through middlemen) the great slave markets of Rhodes and 
Delos.  One might fairly wonder if Rhodes or another Greek city had called upon Roman 
aid against Cilicia, but the absence of any such association or request is notable.  Nor 
would we have to rely on the histories of that period alone.  In the civil wars, when 
Pompey, Caesar, and Antony were hopping from city to city and calling upon the past 
favors of Rome, one would expect such a landmark event to be referenced.
444
  In any 
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 For Greek settlement in Cilicia, see Graham 1982, 92-93 for the Archaic Period (in which there was next 
to none) and Mellink 1988 for later periods.  See Appendix 1 for a detailed discussion of Cilicia and its 
boundaries. 
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 Sources for Tryphon are relatively few.  The principal ancient references are Strabo, Diodorus and 
Josephus, but they can be listed as follows: Athenaeus 8.333 (=Poseidonius F29); Diodorus 33.3, 33.4a , 
33.28, 33.28a; Frontinus, Str. 13.2; Jerome Chron. 159.4-160.4; Josephus AJ 13.131-284 passim, 20.239, 
BJ 1.49-51, Justin, Epit. 36.1, 38.9, 39.1; Livy Per. 52.13, 55.11, Epit. 55; 1 Maccabees 11:39-40, 54-56; 
12:39-49; 13:1-24; 15:10-14, 25, 37; Orosius 5.4.17; Strabo 16.2.10,19; 14.5.2.  Of these, only Strabo 
preserves a connection to the Cilician pirates, though.  Nevertheless, even if the cause of the organization 
were not Tryphon, the time is approximately correct. (see below, ch.6, for more on Tryphon and his 
representation) 
443
 E.g. Ramsay 1928, Sherwin-White 1976.  As noted in the previous chapter, Rhodes was dwindling as a 
naval power and the quantities of slaves passing through the Aegean was increasing. 
444
 We might expect such an argument to be advanced at Dio 47.33-34.  
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instance where past favors are mentioned, it is always Rhodes contributing ships to a 
Roman force. 
One might ask where Antonius was headed to take command.  By chance, we 
have an inscription from Greece which indicates he was headed to the Pamphylian city of 
Side.
445
  Despite falling within the new Pergamene borders, Side had been mostly an 
independent city since the end of the Syrian War, but would prove to be a main port for 
the Cilicians later in the first century.  The possibility of Side being the destination 
becomes a stronger possibility when it is noted that it became the starting point for the 
later highway constructed by Isauricus from Side to Iconium.
446
  That Servilius Vatia 
Isauricus used it as a staging point is not proof that Antonius did, but it is suggestive that 
it might have been so used and, more to the point, that it was seen as an important 
Cilician site.  It is generally supposed that Antonius would have had to use Asia as a base 
of operations, but this is not a necessity, as Rhodian and Lycian allies could no doubt 
serve easily as well.  De Souza also notes (1999, 105) that it was odd for a proconsul to 
leave ahead of his forces, but this can be explained if he was gathering his forces from 
various places, predominantly outside of Italy.
447
  Indeed, if the accounts of local 
recruiting during the Mithridatic Wars can be any guide, we might expect Antonius to 
have been reliant on a relatively small core force from Rome, supplemented by Rhodians 
and Lycians.  One Rhodian inscription does suggest that at least one Rhodian was present 
and under Antonius’s orders.448  
The result was a short, victorious campaign in which the Roman acquired a 
province of Cilicia, the particulars of which are completely unknown.  It is perhaps not 
unreasonable to suspect that the leading orator of the day could convince people that his 
expedition was a great success even if the real situation was more modest.  So, there 
                                                                                                                                                 
For other states, like Massilia, we have several references to calls for aid (Polybius 33.8-10; Livy 40.18, 
Per. 60.2) which are invoked later by Pompey (Caesar, B Civ. 1.32).   
To not invoke such past favors is unusual. 
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 De Souza 1999, 105; Ormerod 1924, 208n.4; the inscription is CIL 1
2
.2662 (= ILLRP 1.342), published 
in Taylor &West 1928.  Others (such as Sherwin-White 1976, 4) attribute this expedition to the Antonius 
who held the command in 74 (see below, 138, for this Antonius). 
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 Sherwin-White 1994, 233. 
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 Broughton 1946 prefers to explain it as Antonius already having won the sea battle and this represents a 
wintering of the commander apart from the troops already in Anatolia. 
448
 IGRRP 4.1116.  Similarly, a Byzantine contingent to this campaign is referenced in Tac. Ann. 12.62. 
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remains a good deal of uncertainty and disagreement about what actually happened 
around the turn of the century.  What prompted Roman action at this time?  How was the 
campaign managed and from where?  What was the triumph for?  Where were Cilicia’s 
borders?  I think these questions cannot be answered with certainty, but given a few more 
details, a picture of some probable possibilities will emerge. 
 
The First and Second Servile Wars 
The Servile Wars contribute a new perspective on the ideas of legitimate power, 
on surplus or at-large manpower, and on portrayal of others as pirates.  Moreover, the 
Second Servile War suggests some answers for the questions raised by the campaign of 
Antonius.  Firstly, the slaves are described as robbers and brigands repeatedly.  The 
portrayal of these slaves has a certain similarity to the portrayal of pirates in the previous 
chapter.  Unsurprisingly, the slaves’ nascent states were considered illegitimate and terms 
of negotiation with slaves were sharply limited.  Association with fugitive slaves became 
and continued to be damning: the fear-mongering accusation of arming slaves was later 
leveled at Catiline and Sextus.
449
  Overall, the Romans reacted to these conflicts in a 
manner notably different from ‘external’ conflicts.450 
The First Servile War, sometimes styled revolt, is generally dated to 135-132.
451
 
Ancient authors, even Florus, are consistent in naming these actions wars (bella), while 
modern authors prefer to term them revolts, perhaps subconsciously agreeing with 
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 Despite the accusations, Catiline does not appear to have accepted fugitive slaves, but Sextus appears to 
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 The Servile Wars have a notable bibliography of their own, most significantly, as we might expect, on 
Spartacus.  For a beginning, Morton 2012, Urbainczyk 2008, Shaw 2001, and Bradley 1989 should suffice.  
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 Though it can be somewhat ambiguously dated to ~141 by the fragments of Diodorus, who places it 60 
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ascribed before 135, which also has ancient attestation, Jerome (Chron. 161.2). For the end of the war, we 
know the consul Rupilius, who ended the war, held the consulship in 132.   
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Florus’s sentiment that a bellum with slaves is disgraceful, perhaps rooted in privileging 
control of territory over control of people.
452
 
The beginnings are ascribed to banditry: in 34.2.2, Diodorus tells us that miserly 
masters gave their shepherd-slaves no food, forcing them to support themselves ἀπὸ 
λῃστείας.453  Overall, the ancient authors strongly imply that the slaves were provoked 
into violence by mistreatment.
454
  The slaves were led by a certain Eunus, a fire-breathing 
juggler, who named himself Antiochus and his followers Syrians.
455
  He soon combined 
forces with a Cilician named Cleon, who became his primary general.  This Cleon is 
continually referred to as a latro or leistes.
456
  It has been argued from this that the 
reputation of Cilicians as bandits was already widespread by this time.
457
  The wide 
association of a Kilix with a bandit, however, is probably rooted in the author.  And while 
we can readily perceive that in regards to Appian, it is less certain that this reputation had 
so preceded them.
458
  And the Romans were happy to identify the slaves’ actions as 
latrocinia.
459
 
The Sicilian slaves overcame the armies sent against them while similar revolts 
were squashed in Italy and Greece.  The consul Rupilius engaged them ruthlessly, with 
mass executions that were only called off when the slaves had been defeated and were 
still badly needed for agricultural work.  At the end of the war, they are not slaves or 
Syrians, but bandits.
460
 While they are still led, however, we see ὁ τῶν ἀποστατῶν 
βασιλεὺς (the king of the rebels), referring to Eunus.  They are rebels when organized, 
bandits when disorganized. 
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 So Florus 3.19.1, 3.19.8, and 3.20.1. 
453
 See also 34.2.27, where the same sentiment is expressed.  This fragment is from the Excerpts of 
Constantine, not Photius, so they are probably actually referring to the same passage.   
454
 Besides Diodorus, the accounts of Appian (B Civ. 1.9.36), Posidonius, and Athenaeus (Posidonius, Kidd 
F59/Jacoby F7 = Athenaeus 12.542b) relate a similar tradition.  This fault of the slave-owners is notably 
absent in the Livian tradition—see Orosius 5.6-9, Florus 3.19, Obsequens 27. 
455
 Diodorus, 34.2.24. 
456
 E.g. Diodorus 32.2.43: τῷ λῃστρικῷ βίῳ,  
457
 Grünewald 2004, 60. 
458
 For example, Appian (Mith. 92-93) goes on at length about the evils of the Cilicians. 
459
 Florus 3.19.8, reliquias latronum cf. Strabo 6.2.6 (referring to Eunus)  ἐπὶ λῃστείαςValerius Maximus 
6.9.8, acerbissimoque praedonum ac fugitivorum bello.   
For an example from the second war, see Dio (F104) 93.4. 
460
 Diodorus 34.2.23 ἐντεῦθεν Ῥουπίλιος ἐπιτρέχων ὅλην τὴν Σικελίαν ἅμα λογάσιν ὀλίγοις θᾶττον ἤπερ τις 
ἤλπισε παντὸς αὐτὴν ἠλευθέρωσε λῃστηρίου. 
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The Second Servile War began about thirty years later.  In form, it was much the 
same; Shaw calls it a ‘carbon copy’ of the first.461  Perhaps some of the slaves of Sicily 
expected to be freed in the wake of the Roman resolution to free those who had been 
wrongfully enslaved, the lex de plagiariis.
462
  The majority of the slaves who rose in 
revolt were, apparently, born free.
463
  As it was for the first war, our main source is 
Diodorus Siculus (36.1-11).  As noted by Shaw, however, our two sources for Diodorus 
36 give somewhat differing accounts.
464
  We can supplement these accounts with 
information from Athenaeus, Florus, Cicero and Cassius Dio.
465
 These sources all focus 
on the leaders: Manius Aquillius and Athenion.
466
 
Diodorus’s account(s), however, speaks of two slave leaders, not one.  As in the 
previous war, in Diodorus, the slaves’ leader was a Syrian, and the army’s commander 
was a Cilician.  Salvius is not mentioned in most of the other accounts, and is only named 
in Diodorus.
467
  In a nutshell, Salvius and Athenion came to power independently, 
Salvius in the central plains and Athenion on the western coast.  Rather than coming to 
blows, they agreed to work together, and Salvius was the overall leader until his death 
fighting Lucullus.  Then Athenion rallied the slave remnants, was ignored by the praetor 
Servilius and, finally, was killed by Aquillius. 
Throughout this, the slaves are not usually directly described as brigands or as 
robbers by Diodorus, but they are acting παρανομία, against custom.  It is not a positive 
description.  Their acts of taking are not characterized as latrocinia or as leisteia (acts of 
brigandage or piracy) but rather ἁρπαγὴ (simply ‘snatching’).  Florus uses the verbs 
vastare and diripere, ‘to lay waste’ and ‘to plunder’, both fairly negative, but neither of 
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 Shaw 2001, 107. 
462
 Diodorus 36.3.2, Dio 27 (F93). 
463
 Green 1961, 24. 
464
 Shaw 2001, 108-120.  The sources are Photius, Bibliotheca 386-390 and the Excerpts of Constantine, 
3,208, 314, 390. 
465
 Athenaeus, 6.272.d-f, Florus 3.19.9-12 Cassius Dio, 27, F101, F104 [93.1-4], Cicero, Verr. 2.2.136, 
2.3.66, 2.3.125, 2.5.7, 2.5.8; Leg agr. 2.83; Flac. 39.98.  All of these are presented in translation in Shaw, 
120-127.  Additionally, Appian (Mith. 59) compares Fimbria’s slave (or possibly Fimbria himself) to 
Athenion ‘who was once king of the slaves in Sicily’. 
466
 Diodorus and Florus get Aquillius’s name wrong, however.  Diodorus calls him Gaius and Florus calls 
him Titus. 
467
 He is named in both of Diodorus’s accounts.  Athenaeus notes the Syrian and the Cilician, but does not 
name the Syrian as Salvius.  Athenaeus is probably reading Diodorus, though. 
113 
 
which has particular piratic connotations.
468
  While the terminology is functionally 
similar, I suggest that the depictions of the slaves’ thefts and lootings are rooted in 
Diodorus’s belief that the slaves were mistreated and provoked.  With this a priori 
motive at hand, Diodorus chooses different vocabulary to illustrate this as a misfortune 
the Romans brought upon themselves.  Diodorus and Athenaeus both use the story of 
Damophilus of Enna in particular to illustrate the dangers inherent in ill-treating slaves.  
Moreover, as Green argues, the slaves are apparently objecting to slavery on a personal 
level, not on an overall ethical level.
469
 
In both wars, we may note the slaves are said to have assembled part (or all) of 
the pieces for a state: armies, generals, elections, monarchs, minted coins, etc.
470
  But, 
like the Carthaginians’ mercenaries a century earlier, they largely failed to get 
recognition from others, with the possible exception of some Cilician states.  Both 
conflicts suffer from a sort of diminution in the sources that seek to definitively discredit 
the losers.  The slaves also exhibit the potential fluidity from slave to soldier. 
On the other hand, these slave wars, while they acquire a general reputation 
similar to those held of campaigns against bandits, they do not collect the same 
vocabulary and terminology.  They may steal, but they do not pirate.  Nor, save in the 
aftermath of defeat, do they hide and skirmish.  The slaves, though compared to bandits, 
have some striking differences.  They do, however, share some features with at-large 
warriors seeking an independent state like the Mamertines or the Carthaginian 
mercenaries.  They seek the legitimacy they are not granted. 
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 Though Caesar (B. Civ. 3.112) does say diripere more praedonum (to plunder in the manner of 
praedones) at one point. 
469
 As Green 1961, 24, puts it: men who had nothing against slavery as an institution, but objected violently 
to being enslaved themselves. 
470
 In particular, see Diodorus’s description (36.7) of the founding of Triokala by Tryphon. 
 For coinage, see Shaw2001, 84; Green 1961, 16, both citing Robinson 1920, 175 ff. for the coinage 
images. 
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Connections of the Second Servile War, the Cilician pirates, and Antonius 
The assumed names by the slave leaders in the Second Servile War raise a curious 
question. As noted, the Syrian Salvius named himself King Tryphon.
471
  Tryphon is not a 
common name.  As the previous slave leader had named himself Antiochus, the clearest 
referent is Diodotus Tryphon, a Seleucid pretender who had died some 30 years earlier.  
Salvius cannot have been pretending to be the Cilician king.  He must have chosen the 
name as a way of invoking the past.  This raises an intriguing question: Why does Salvius 
invoke Tryphon, of all people?  If Cilician pirates were the source of the slaves put to 
work in Sicily, Tryphon would be the last figure one would expect to be invoked.  In 104, 
two years before the first Roman campaign in Cilicia, what are any Cilicians doing in 
Sicily, for that matter?  
The solution, I suspect, comes from Strabo (14.5.2).  In the same passage in 
which he mentions Tryphon, he indicates that it was principally the Syrians being sold 
into slavery, while the Rhodians, Egyptians, Cypriots, and Romans stood by and let it 
happen.  Thus at the end of the second century, two waves of Syrians and Cilicians hit the 
slave markets, first captives from the civil war that ended with the death of Diodotus 
Tryphon, and second, those captured by pirates operating like Tryphon’s organization in 
the absence of higher authority (supplemented by captives in further civil wars).  
According to Strabo, this weakened Cilicia and Syria enough for the Armenians to come 
in and conquer them, though they left the sea in Cilician hands (i.e. made no attempt to 
control the pirates).
472
  The role of the pirates (rather than armies) in capturing the slaves 
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 For a brief description of the relations between pirates and slaves see Scullard 1982, 56, Bradley 1989, 
22. For Cilicians, Rauh 2003, 169-201, for the Servile Wars, see Shaw 2001, Urbainczyk 2008, Bradley 
1989.  The reference to Tryphon as the name of the slaves’ leader is only in the Excerpts source of 
Diodorus 36.1-11. 
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 Strabo 14.5.2: τοῦτο δὲ συμβὰν τῆς μὲν χώρας ἐποίησε κυρίους Παρθυαίους, οἳ τὰ πέραν τοῦ Εὐφράτου 
κατέσχον, τὸ τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ Ἀρμενίους, οἳ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς τοῦ Ταύρου προσέλαβον μέχρι καὶ Φοινίκης, 
καὶ τοὺς βασιλέας κατέλυσαν εἰς δύναμιν καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτῶν σύμπαν, τὴν δὲ θάλατταν τοῖς Κίλιξι 
παρέδωκαν. εἶτ᾽ αὐξηθέντας ἠναγκάσθησαν καταλύειν Ῥωμαῖοι πολέμῳ καὶ μετὰ στρατιᾶς οὓς αὐξομένους 
οὐκ ἐκώλυσαν. ὀλιγωρίαν μὲν οὖν αὐτῶν χαλεπὸν καταγνῶναι: πρὸς ἑτέροις δὲ ὄντες τοῖς ἐγγυτέρω καὶ 
κατὰ χεῖρα μᾶλλον οὐχ οἷοί τε ἦσαν τὰ ἀπωτέρω σκοπεῖν.  
“And this made lords of some of their lands, the Parthians, they held the lands on the edge of the Euphrates 
and also the Armenians, who took the lands beyond the Taurus up to and including Phoenicia, and 
eliminated the kingship and its power and its line as well, but they (the Parthians and the Armenians) left 
the sea to the Cilicians.  And, by war and with an army, the Romans had to destroy these people (the 
Cilicians), having grown in power, though they did not hinder their growing. It is difficult to hold the 
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cannot be readily downplayed, as the Hellenistic East was far more concerned with 
ransom or keeping the slaves rather than selling them openly and at once.
473
  Thus, such 
selling of slaves was at private initiative rather than state initiative.  The potential overlap 
between pirate and mercenary further muddies the waters.  Finally, the Romans had 
refrained from large-scale campaigns for several years, so the Sicilian latifundia perhaps 
had fewer options for slave-provenance.  
The resulting supposition, and rather a house-of-cards one, is that the backbone of 
the slave armies of the Second Servile War had a Syrian/Cilician origin.  Even if they 
were not the most numerous slaves, they were the most likely source of slaves with a 
military background, and thus, more likely to rise to prominent positions in the rebellion.  
Eunus, the slave leader of the First Servile War, similarly had a Cilician commander: 
Cleon, and he also named his followers as Syrians.
474
  When Salvius invokes Tryphon, he 
is not simply picking a regal name from thin air, but invoking past loyalties of the war 
captives.  Again, the slaves in Sicily were largely born free.  Nothing in the sources 
mention Cilician pirates in connection with these slaves, positively or negatively (though 
a connection is mentioned in the third war, that of Spartacus).
475
  Nor should we assume, 
even if Romans saw Cilicians as pirates, that other Cilicians thought the same way.  I 
suggest that the slaves either were in contact or trying to come into contact with Cilicians, 
perhaps for aid, perhaps for transport to the mainland, and the Roman discovery of this 
led the Romans to send Antonius to Cilicia to head this off.  Naturally, any Cilician 
involvement with the slaves, whether by public or private initiative, would be seen as 
piracy. 
So, to return to Cilicia and the campaign of Antonius, it is also not improbable 
that the involvement of Cilicians at a high level in the first two slave wars substantially 
                                                                                                                                                 
Romans at fault for this, for being more consumed by other matters nearer and at hand, they did not pay 
attention to those farther away.” 
473
 See Andreau/Descat 2011, 54-56, where they argue that slavery was generally at this time a secondary 
consideration to ransom.  It had not always been so. 
474
 Diodorus 34.2.24.  The sense in Diodorus, I believe, is that the king named all his supporters to be 
Syrians, the same way he renamed himself Antiochus.  I think it more likely, however, that he was simply 
calling them Syrians because they were Syrians and Diodorus misunderstood. 
475
 Though the Cilician connection to Spartacus has entered the modern imagination, it is only recorded 
once, in Plutarch’s Crassus (8-11). 
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affected Roman attitudes toward Cilicia.  So too the naming of Tryphon invoked a 
Cilician identity.  The Cilicians may thus have seemed as big a threat as the Sicilians.  
We hear nothing in the sources saying that the Cilician pirates had offered any services to 
the Sicilian rebels.  Nevertheless, it fits with the sparse evidence.  Diverting resources 
into a new war during a serious war is odd (and the Servile War lasted until ~100).  
Diverting military resources into a second theater of something seen as the same war is 
not.  Now, the Romans were certainly not shy about fighting in different places 
simultaneously, but the historians show that additional conflicts during an ongoing war 
were generally thrust upon them, not initiated in Rome.
476
  Moreover, it is argued that the 
conflicts with the Cimbri and with Jugurtha prevented direct Roman intervention in 
Paphlagonia in 107 and 101.
477
 
The triumph Antonius celebrated was, therefore, probably not a grand triumph 
over Cilicia, but over a potential alliance with the slaves and Cilicians that threatened to 
expand the war.  His achievement was thus seen as greater than his individual conquests 
in Cilicia.  His close association with Manlius Aquillius, who succeeded where others 
had failed, could only support him.  Furthermore, triumphs against a foreign power were 
always more reputable than against a domestic threat.
478
  Even if it were seen as a support 
of the defeat of the slaves, and killing or capturing any fugitives, displaying Cilician 
prisoners simply made a better show.  Too much cannot be read into the triumph, 
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 Of course, it is also in the historians’ interest to argue this.  When the Romans act otherwise, it is an 
exception to the rule. 
Appian (B Civ. 1.111) indicates that the Romans were distracted by many campaigns but nevertheless 
decided to send a force to reinforce Metellus and Pompey in Spain (roughly 74 or 73). 
A further counterargument might be found in Livy 22.33, in which the Senate threatens Pineus of Illyria 
with war, Livy states: adeo, etsi bellum ingens in cervicibus erat, nullius usquam terrarum rei cura 
Romanos, ne longinqua quidem, effugiebat.  “So, although there was a great war already on their necks, 
none of their concerns of other lands were escaping the Romans, not even those far away.”  This sort of 
moral impulse and example by Livy is naturally suspect. 
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 See Madsen 2009, 194-195.  In this, neither Sicily nor Cilicia is mentioned, though these surely drew 
Roman attention as well. 
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 Aulus Gellius (NA 5.6.21-23) tells us that the ovation, the ‘lesser triumph’ was reserved for lesser 
enemies like slaves, bandits, or pirates.  Beard 2007 notes (63) that this does not seem to match the 
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get ovationes, defeaters of pirates do seem to get triumphs (e.g. 100, 74, 61).  I suspect that Gellius’s 
statement is strongly influenced by Crassus refusing to triumph over Spartacus (so described as refusing a 
triumph in Plutarch (Crass. 11, cf. Pomp. 21.4, Comp. Nic. et Crass. 3.2; Appian, B Civ. 1.14.121)) and 
celebrating an ovatio instead.  This is the example given by Gellius (NA 6.5.23), but Gellius portrays it as 
Crassus seeking a triumph-like ovation. 
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however.  As in the case of Delmaticus, the triumph’s relation to the outcome of battles is 
not necessarily a strict one.
479
 
Furthermore, the precise phrasing of Per 68.1 is a little unusual.  M. Antonius 
praetor in Ciliciam maritimos praedones persecutus est.  Presuming the epitomator is 
copying Livy’s language exactly, I have a pair of observations.  First, by this use of the 
accusative, Antony is depicted chasing the pirates into Cilicia, which implies that he (or 
someone else) had already been contending with them outside of Cilicia, and might even 
refer to some occurrence of the previous book.
480
  This might simply refer to a naval 
battle off Cilicia, but also potentially refers to a ‘provoking’ activity elsewhere.  When 
combined with the Corinth inscription, that provocation might be seen to be west of 
Corinth.
481
  Second, Livy uses the term praedo rather than latro or pirata.  Elsewhere in 
Livy, the term praedo is used rather broadly, but generally of a group with a known 
homeland: as such, it is usually translated as something more like ‘privateers’ or ‘raiding 
party’.482  This could be indicative that the action undertaken by Antonius was due to a 
specific act, not the general activity, of piracy.  This would then be a measure of 
retaliation, not of policing.  Taken with the material above, I argue that the encounter of 
Cilicians was either seen or portrayed by Antonius as an attempt to interfere with the war 
in Sicily. 
The argument laid out here is very tenuous and rests upon few points of positive 
evidence.  But if we were to posit that the Romans now had a fear of enemies escaping 
into other lands to cause future trouble and/or a fear of enemies calling in foreign powers 
to assist them, we would expect that this would be documented in some form of public 
letter or communicated to foreign allies in some way.  I shall now point out some 
additional evidence to argue that further supports my argument that this precise thing did, 
in fact, happen. 
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 For Delmaticus, see above ch. 3 for the event and below ch. 7 for the issue of triumph hunting. 
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 Sherwin-White 1976, 4 also stresses the into aspect. 
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 See n.445 above.  In the inscription, Antonius leaves the Roman fleet at Corinth under the command of 
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The lex de provinciis praetoriis—Ineffective Measure or Effective Warning? 
The lex de provinciis praetoriis, also known as the lex de piratis persequendis, is 
an interesting bit of legislation, one which I believe fills the function of that ‘additional 
evidence’.  It is known from two Greek inscriptions, one at Delphi, one at Cnidos.  The 
latter was discovered only in 1970, and it fills in many of the gaps that stymied earlier 
commentators.
483
  At a very early stage, the Delphi copy was even thought to perhaps be 
a copy of the lex Gabinia.  Nevertheless, the law remains fragmentary and many sections 
are ambiguous. 
Though its newer name (given by Ferrary) describes its overall role better, the 
aspect that gave it the older name is perhaps more relevant to my discussion here.  The 
law involves some decrees on jurisdictional boundaries and may provide a useful 
precedent for the Gabinian law in 67.  Before getting into detail, it is important to first 
note that while some of the rules for governorships had been determined by this time, 
most of those rules most familiar to the modern historian (e.g. some of those in Valerius 
Maximus 2.8, Sulla’s Lex Cornelia de provinciis ordinandis) had not yet been passed.484 
This law (hereafter the LdPP) was passed probably in 101/100 BC (the consulship 
of Gaius Marius and Lucius Valerius Flaccus).  As a plebescite, not a senatusconsultum, 
it probably belongs amidst the populist legislation of Saturninus.
485
  Among its 
provisions, the LDPP asserts that Rome’s allies must close their harbors to pirates, 
implies that a governor’s jurisdiction can overlap into a neighboring province provided 
that the magistrate in question is pursuing pirates, and establishes, for the first time, 
Cilicia and Lycaonia as Roman possessions.
486
 It does not necessarily follow from this 
that they were organized as provinciae, and indeed, Lycaonia was attached to Asia.  The 
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 The pre-1970 scholarship is substantial, most notably ranging from 1897 to 1929.  The sources are 
thoroughly summarized in Crawford 1996.  Of the pre-1970 scholarship, see in particular Jones 1926, and 
the responses by de Sanctis 1927 and Carcopino 1929. For those sources including the Cnidos copy, see 
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 Lintott 1976, 71-72; Tarwacka 2009, 42. 
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 See Map 4 for some of the details of Asia Minor. 
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attachment of Lycaonia to Asia, however, implies that Cilicia was not.  The Cilicia 
described here appears to be part of what we now think of as Pamphylia, not Cilicia 
proper.
487
 
The LdPP was passed per saturam, and it can be difficult to ascertain how linked 
the different provisions are to one another.  Satura was a commonplace feature of 
second-century legislation, in which various measures were passed as a slate rather than 
individually.
488
  The positive assertions of the law are the most fragmentary, and those 
assertions have to be somewhat surmised from the negative assertions and qualifications 
which follow.
489
  It contains instructions for the governors of Asia and Macedonia and 
other instructions for the consuls, reinforces and qualifies a Lex Porcia, attaches 
Lycaonia to Asia and the Chersonese to Macedonia, asserts that the law must be 
published, and ends with an elaborate fine for magistrates in contravention of this law.  
Since the entirety of the law was passed together, some parts may have been inapplicable 
to the city in which it was posted, but had to be nonetheless posted (though variations in 
the two surviving versions lend little support there).  There is no need to try to bend every 
provision to have local relevance. 
The Greek text (rather than Latin) might indicate a particular local interest, were it 
not for the law’s own demands that the law be published throughout Asia.  Additionally, 
it is theorized (e.g. Crawford) that the writers were native Latin speakers with an 
insufficient command of Greek rather than the reverse (as suggested by Ferrary 1977).  In 
any case, the Greek corresponds imperfectly to Latin legal language, with certain stock 
phrases being translated oddly.
490
 
So what can the LdPP tell us?  The law articulates Rome’s stance against piracy 
and does so propagandistically.  Besides designating Cilicia as a praetorian province and 
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instructing the governors of Asia and Macedonia to assist the governor, the LdPP 
instructs the consuls to send representatives to Syria, Egypt, Cyrene, Cyprus and Rhodes 
to secure cooperation with the law and bar their harbors to pirates.  This also serves as an 
example of Rome’s attempts to legislate diplomacy.491 
It is arguable that this decree is an attempt to legitimate the Roman claim to 
Cilicia following the less-than-stellar successes of Marcus Antonius in the previous 
year.
492
  Under this interpretation, by passing this law, and taking it to the neighboring 
monarchs, the Romans would essentially be insisting that they recognize Rome’s claim to 
the territory in the absence of a clear victory in the previous year’s Cilician campaign.  
Because these are the first mentions of Cilicia and Lycaonia as Roman, there is some 
confusion about the control of the interior. 
 
Table 2  States receiving (or not receiving) the letters indicated in the LdPP 
(Assuming a year of 100 BC) 
Recipients     Non-recipients  
The Rhodian Republic   Mithridates VI (Pontus) 
Ptolemy Apion (Cyrene)   Mithridates II (Parthia) 
Ptolemy Alexander (Egypt)   Mithridates I (Commagene) 
Ptolemy Soter Lathyros (Cyprus)  Artavasdes (Armenia) 
Antiochus Grypus (Syria (north))  Nicomedes III (Bithynia) 
Antiochus Cyzicenus (Syria (south))  Ariarathes VIII (Cappadocia) 
      Bakru (Osroene) 
 
The list of recipients and non-recipients does not argue well for this interpretation 
(see the above table).  Despite breaks in the inscriptions, we appear to have the full list of 
states that would be sent messages.
493
  Grypus still claimed Cilicia, at least some portion, 
but we would have expected that Ariarathes should have still held Lycaonia, which the 
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 This might then be a sign of distrusting the legates, or perhaps, trying to harmonize the legates’ 
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Romans gave his grandfather.  It is specified that the letters were to be sent to the Roman 
allies, but at minimum, Cappadocia and Bithynia should have been considered allies.  
The obvious distinction between recipients and non-recipients is whether the state in 
question possessed an eastern Mediterranean port where pirates could go, suggesting a 
greater relevance for those pirates in the understanding of the document. 
The degree to which these letters may be propaganda may also alter our sense of 
them.  Since around ~300, the Romans had publicly taken a stance against piracy.  Here, 
however, Rome seeks to impose this stance upon her allies and would-be allies.  In 
compelling an anti-piracy coalition of eastern allies, it was apparently ineffective—but 
was that actually the purpose?
494
 
As mentioned before, the definition of a pirate is not without some confusion.  For 
Rome, the pirates are whoever Rome says they are.  Thus the seemingly simple and 
straightforward request to not harbor or support pirates could easily be interpreted in the 
future as a demand to provide asylum to no one fighting against Rome.  It must be noted 
that Rome had just conquered some portion of Cilicia and would surely describe any and 
all remaining resistance as latrocinia.  Secondly, as noted several times before, pirates 
were frequently employed as naval auxiliaries by the Greek states of the Eastern 
Mediterranean, and true compliance with the Roman request would potentially weaken 
them. 
Neither Ptolemaic Egypt nor Seleucid Syria was in any position to contest Roman 
claims, as both were embroiled in a civil war at the time.
495
  It is also reasonably clear 
that although Rome claimed Cilicia, that did not entail a claim on all Cilicia.  The 
boundaries of Cilicia were especially ambiguous.
496
  The text refers to Rhodes, Asia, 
Pamphylia, Lycaonia and Cilicia.  It does not mention Pisidia and one might suspect that 
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in the terms of this law any portions of Pisidia under Roman control were considered part 
of the others.
497
 
My contention that the foreign policy implications are significant rests upon the 
uncertain assumption that the orders concerning the administration of Cilicia and 
concerning the harboring of pirates are connected.  In other words, I accept the common 
presumption that Cilicia’s new administration was set up to deter and even eradicate 
piracy.  But that need not have been the principal purpose.  Instead, that purpose could 
simply have been to give Marius a command explicitly able to overrule his Macedonian 
and Asian colleagues and to put him in a good position to react to political changes to his 
north.  Diodorus (37.12) remarks that Marius was looking for a command against 
Mithridates at the time.  There is no explicit mention of him in such a position, but as 
Crawford 1996 observes, “at no point is anyone who has to take action in the future 
named, even when his identity may be known”.498  Marius is the clearest example: he is 
mentioned as a past consul or in dating the year, but not when future actions are being 
decreed.  On the face of it, the piracy seems pretty important.  Nevertheless, I offer an 
additional caveat.  I would question which groups the Romans were attempting to brand 
‘pirates’.  I principally suggest that the remnants of any defeated army, those who did not 
surrender and become pacati, automatically became considered ‘pirates/bandits’ and 
preventing bands of these warriors from becoming a more substantial threat was a 
principal goal.  Since a Roman victory often included seizing the enemy war chest and 
since Hellenistic armies generally included mercenary forces, we should expect unpaid 
freelancers to act suchly.  In essence, then, the Romans sought to stop refugees from 
becoming problems.  The LdPP seeks to stop ‘pirates’, but not the pirates usually 
envisioned.  This was not to eradicate the general practice of piracy, but to finish off the 
fugitive slaves and pirates they had been fighting before they could cause more trouble.  
Allowing such actors to escape was unacceptable. 
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Unfortunately, it remains to be seen what effects this decree had.  In chapter 1, I 
had noted the frequent support and employment of pirates by the Diadochi.  Despite 
various fluctuations, that support of pirates by Hellenistic kings continued into the first 
century BC.
499
  Thus, despite the Roman request/demand of 100, the kings either did not 
agree or did not interpret the situation the same way.  If interpreted broadly, the decree 
failed.  This may have fostered distrust between Rome and the East, if piracy were 
interpreted broadly, but if it instead referred specifically to Cilicians it may not have been 
ineffective and ignored.  Rather, if this aspect of the decree was understood to apply 
specifically to the Romans’ Cilician foes, it may have been quite effective in curtailing 
Cilician resistance. 
 
Cilicia from Sulla to Publius Servilius Isauricus 
Cilicia, after the campaign of Antonius, is little mentioned for the next decade. 
Sulla was governor in 92 (possibly 96).  Given Cilicia as a province, he was sent to check 
piracy, and his stopover in Cyrene en route may well have been related.
500
  (Cyrene had 
been bequeathed to Rome in 96, but the Romans didn’t get around to putting anyone in 
charge there until 74, see below).  Most of Sulla’s activity there, however, should be 
dated later.  Publius Servilius Vatia, as praetor, held an unknown province in 90 and that 
province may have been Cilicia, but that is pure speculation. 
Despite multiple Roman campaigns, the Cilician ‘pirates’ remained an 
unanswered problem.  First in 102 and later in 92, some actions (of somewhat unknown 
effect) were taken.  In 85 or 84, Sulla left Murena in charge in Asia, with the instructions 
to amass a fleet to fight pirates.
501
  Whether this is the same or a different fleet as that to 
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be assembled by L. Licinius Lucullus in 87 and 86 is unclear.
502
  Similarly the use of this 
fleet and its fate are unmentioned, though Lucullus’s fleet, composed of Rhodians, 
Phoenicians, Cypriots and Paphlagonians finally arrived in Sulla’s hands in 85.503 
In 78, another expedition was sent forth under the proconsul Publius Servilius 
Vatia.  The best account comes from Florus:  
 
Florus 3.6.1-5:
504
 
Interim cum populus Romanus per diversa terrarum districtus est, Cilices invaserant 
maria sublatisque commerciis, rupto foedere generis humani, sic maria bello quasi 
tempestate praecluserant. Audaciam perditis furiosisque latronibus dabat inquieta 
Mithridaticis proeliis Asia, dum sub alieni belli tumultu exterique regis invidia inpune 
grassantur. Ac primum duce Isidoro contenti proximo mari Cretam inter atque Cyrenas 
et Achaiam sinumque Maleum, quod ab spoliis aureum ipsi vocavere, latrocinabantur. 
Missusque in eos Publius Servilius, quamvis leves et fugaces myoparonas gravi et Martia 
classe turbaret, non incruenta victoria superat. Sed nec mari summovisse contentus, 
validissimas urbes eorum et diutina praeda abundantes, Phaselim et Olympum evertit 
Isaurosque ipsam arcem Ciliciae, unde conscius sibi magni laboris Isaurici cognomen 
adamavit. 
In the meantime, while the Roman people were scattered through the diverse places of 
the world, the Cilicians had invaded the seas and by attacking merchants and by a 
breached custom of humankind, closed off the seas by war just as if by a storm.
505
  The 
unrest caused by the battles of Mithridates in Asia was giving boldness to destroyed men 
and mad bandits, who, under the cover of the confusion of a foreign war and the hatred 
toward a foreign king, were advancing with impunity.  And first, with Isidorus as leader, 
they were content to engage in banditry in the neighboring sea, between Crete and 
Cyrene and Achaea and Cape Malea, which they called ‘golden’ from their spoils.  And 
Publius Servilius was sent against them, and while he pitted a warlike fleet of heavy ships 
against their light and fast myoparones, he won a not-bloodless victory.  But he was not 
content to have expelled them from the sea he overthrew their strongest cities, made 
wealthy by plunder: Phaselis, Olympus, and Isauri, the fortress of Cilicia itself, whence 
he claimed the cognomen Isauricus, conscious of his own great work. 
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So the campaign of Servilius appears to be much more of a true campaign against the 
Cilicians than the earlier ones. P. Servilius Vatia was a grandson of Metellus 
Macedonicus, and, as mentioned, had already been praetor in 90, and possibly also in 
Cilicia, after Sulla, though possibly in Sardinia instead.
506
  He was given command in 
Cilicia in 78, but would continue to hold it through 74.  Appian reports that Murena had 
also tried and failed to suppress the Cilicians.
507
 
Again, this is linked, though not directly, to Mithridates.  Though Mithridates did 
not intend to do so, he was providing cover to the pirates.  We can understand this 
playing out in two ways: first, Mithridates is the bigger threat and hence the ‘pirates’ are 
simply being ignored; second, the various attacks leave ambiguous remnants that leave 
the victims uncertain of which force committed the attack.  Nor do these options have to 
be exclusive.  Even without direct support, Mithridates provides indirect support. 
In Cilicia, Servilius opposed a local dynast, Zeniketes, who dwelt on Mount 
Olympus in what Strabo termed a peiraterion.
508
  This figure is probably not to be 
equated with the Isidorus of the Florus passage or the Lysias of Athenaeus.
509
  Instead, 
these are three different local rulers.  The previous interest in Cilicia in the 90s appears to 
have been principally one of containing Mithridates.  There is no statement anywhere that 
Zeniketes was in the employ of Mithridates, but Grünewald suggests (and I agree) that 
the early focus of Isauricus on Zeniketes was because of such an arrangement or because 
of the fear of such an arrangement.  Even in these 5 years, Cilicia was not brought under 
control, at least not in entirety.
510
  Instead, Isauricus’s operations were probably mainly in 
Lycaonia.  With this understanding, Isauricus may have been working not north and east 
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out of Side, but south out of Iconium; not clearing the seas of pirates, but solidifying a 
land-route into Cappadocia for future use for both troops and supply.
511
 
Indeed, in our sources, we hear little of the naval campaign by Isauricus, and 
Florus simply tells us that he defeated smaller ships with bigger ones and that it was not 
an easy fight.  He is sometimes praised for having the foresight to eliminate piracy by 
eliminating the pirate bases.
512
  But clearly he was ineffective at eliminating large-scale 
piracy, as throughout his command, the threat of pirates increased and at increasing 
distances from Cilicia.  Indeed, Appian asserts that he was ineffective in dealing with the 
pirates.
513
  If his intent, however, was principally the protection of Rhodes and Lycia and 
then to clear a path northeast from Lycia toward Cappadocia, then this campaign was far 
more of a success.  Moreover, these acts strengthened Rome and weakened Pontus ahead 
of a future conflict between the two.  All that needs to occur, then, is a redefining of the 
campaign’s goals, whether that is a modern redefining of what the goals were intended to 
be initially or an ancient retroactive redefinition of goals to claim a victory. 
Outside of Cilicia, there are additional attributions of piracy, often to individuals, 
presumably to discredit them.  During the Social War/Marsic War, a few individuals are 
so described by Diodorus.  First is Agamemnon, a Cilician freed from prison by the 
Picentines, who was experienced in piracy (λῃστείας δὲ πολλὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχων), and 
employed these skills against the Romans.
514
  Such a story denigrates the methods of the 
Picentines.  Secondly, he relates a short story of a Cretan mercenary who offers to serve 
as a sort of double agent, reinforcing the image of the mercenary.
515
  The Cretan scoffs at 
an offer of Roman citizenship as reward and agrees to help for a thousand drachmae.  
This story is too neat to be trustworthy, especially since Roman citizenship was one of 
the causes of the war.  It serves as an ironic twist to have the Romans offer citizenship to 
outsiders to fight against those fighting for Roman citizenship.  More importantly (for 
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this project, anyway), the story serves to show how the freelancer was regarded as 
untrustworthy and uninterested in things of ‘true importance’. 
At the same time as the Isaurian campaign under Servilius Vatia (77), Dalmatia 
and Salonae were reduced again by Gnaeus Cosconius.
516
  The rationale for this 
campaign was related to the Mediterranean-wide piracy of the 70s.  Like many episodes 
from Appian’s Illyrike, not many details are given.  Nevertheless, the reactions in the 70s 
show that the piracy that was appearing everywhere was believed to be originating in the 
stereotypical pirate havens of Illyria, Crete, and Cilicia.  Either piracy was erupting 
everywhere or the Romans had no real idea of where the pirates were or which pirates 
committed which acts. 
 
The Cilician governors and its Pernicious Piracy 
Throughout its history, Cilicia was closely linked to the province of Asia.  
Territories were swapped between the two and sometimes both provinces were given to a 
single governor.  Arguments of when Cilicia became a true province range from 102 to 
62.
517
  For some of these praetors and consuls, this was a province to govern, but for 
others, it was solely a field command.  Cilicia’s longtime role as a source for both 
contingent military manpower and for slaves dramatically affected Roman policy and 
attitudes toward Cilicia.  Though Cilicia gave its name to the most famous of pirate 
groups, Cilician piracy was principally a feature of the late second and early first 
centuries BC. 
Appian, in his account of Pompey’s pirate campaign, asserts that neither Isauricus 
nor Murena had been effective in their attempts to subjugate Cilicia.
518
  Appian, however, 
almost certainly has a specific definition for effectiveness: that piracy be eliminated.  It is 
perhaps excessive to claim that that goal was the same as those held by Murena and 
Vatia.  In both cases, it appears clear that their focus was on terrestrial sites and ones far 
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from the sea, at that.  Generals like Antonius Orator, Murena, and Vatia appear to be 
judged not wholly on the merits of what they did, but with hindsight’s appreciation of 
what they ought to have done. Unsurprisingly, the expectations and motivations of the 
governors shape how they governed. 
As discussed in Appendix 1, Cilicia referred to a large but ambiguous region, 
from the Bay of Pamphylia in the west to the Amanus range and the gulf of Issus in the 
east.
519
  But the Romans, as always, referred both to the part that was subject and the part 
to be subjected when they referred to it.  Thus, internally, the province had frequently-
changing boundaries, and probably changing conceptions of its location.
520
  An 
examination of the governors shows us a further detail: the gubernatorial office in Cilicia 
involved significant and regular armed conflict.  In addition, the Roman leaders thought 
they had achieved great things and requested triumphs (or, for the cynical, they wanted 
others to believe they had done great things and to award them triumphs). 
The following table should be instructive.
521
 
Table 3: Governors of Cilicia 
Name      Years Triumph Requested and Received? 
M. Antonius (Orator) pr. and propr.  102-100  yes  in 100 
L. Cornelius Sulla Felix  pr.  97-96 or 96-95
522
 
L. Gellius Poplicola?  proc.   93 
L. Cornelius Sulla Felix pr.   93-92
523
 
(P. Servilius Vatia  pr.)   90   yes?  In 88 
Q. Oppius  pr/propr   89?-88 
L. Licinius Murena  propr.   84   yes (for Mith) In 81 
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L. Cornelius Lentulus pr/procos  83-81 
Cn. Cornelius Dolabella,  proc.  80-79 
P Servilius Vatia  proc.   78-74   yes  yes 
(Lucius Octavius?)    74
524
 
L. Licinius Lucullus  proc.   74/73-69  yes (Mith) in 62 
Q. Marcius Rex  cos./proc.  68-66 -63?  yes  died 
Cn Pompeius Magnus cos/proc  66?-62
525
  yes (ex Asia) yes 
61? 
T. Ampius Balbus,  proc.   57-56
526
 
P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther  proc. 56-54   yes  in 51 
Ap. Claudius Pulcher  proc.   53-51   yes  no 
M. Tullius Cicero  proc.   51-50   yes  no 
C. Coelius Caldus  q./proqu.  50-49 
P. Sestius  proc.    49-48 
Q. Marcius Phillipus  proc.   47 
Q. Cornificius q. propr.   46 
L. Volcatius Tullus  propr?   45 
C. Sosius  proc. (+Syria)   38-35? 
I am currently unaware of any holder of the province of Cilicia between Antonius and 
Poplicola, unless we date Sulla’s praetorship to the earlier date, which could indicate (at 
least at first) that the LdPP did indicate Cilicia was a greater-than-average province that 
wasn’t to be put into the hands of just anyone.  Freeman suggests that the territory was 
left unattended between Antonius and Sulla.
527
  The gap in 91 could have been filled by 
C. Julius Caesar or L. Lucilius, the governors of Asia.  Other notable gaps occur between 
Oppius and Murena (probably representing Sulla’s control of both Asia and Cilicia when 
fighting Mithridates), and between Marcius Rex and Lentulus Spinther, where it is 
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evident that someone was generally in charge, but it is unclear who.  Cicero mentions the 
governor of Cilicia in 59, but does not name him
528
.  That Cilicia was the preferred 
province is evident from Balbus jockeying to get Cilicia instead of Asia. 
So, in these examples, we see repeated intentions of triumphing.  Even Cicero 
claimed the right to triumph for his action at Pindenissum.
529
  But even Cicero noted the 
obvious problem: mihi ad summam gloriam nihil desit, nisi nomen oppidi.  To triumph 
over a hitherto unknown town was unlikely.
530
  Even the claim that it served as a refuge 
for fugitive slaves strengthened the claim little.  Cicero replaced Appius Claudius 
Pulcher, but failed to take over three cohorts of his predecessor’s force.  Cicero reported 
that he didn’t even know where they were, though I think it likely that Claudius kept 
them with him as part of his own intent to triumph.
531
  Even for some of the others who 
did not request a triumph, we know substantial military activity to have taken place.  
Murena, for example, had a failed campaign against the Cilicians and Sulla apparently 
had orders to repress the Cilicians during his praetorship. 
Marcius Rex was presumably engaged in taking Armenian Cilicia away from 
Tigranes and Lentulus Spinther in enforcing that change of ownership.  This, however, is 
purely speculative.  Freeman notes that we have little idea of the extents of his 
(Marcius’s) exertions to win a triumph for himself.  He does not appear to have ever 
given up imperium before his death, however.
532
  Nevertheless, the sheer frequency of 
triumphs and requested triumphs in this period looks suspicious.  How can the modern 
reader understand the situation in Cilicia if it had to be conquered nine or ten times in 
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fifty years? By contrast, over the span of a century, only one triumph was celebrated by 
governors who held Asia alone.
533
 
One may well ask whether Cilicia was a particularly sought-after province.  Sulla 
appears to have tried to make it the most important eastern province.  Appius Claudius 
actively sought the Cilician command, as Cicero tells us in a 54 letter to Lentulus 
Spinther.
534
  Cicero vehemently did not want it.  Yet both sought, and failed to receive, a 
triumph for their actions there.  I will discuss the role of the triumph across the empire in 
chapter seven, but right now, it will suffice to suggest that the ambiguities of boundaries 
and control meant that Cilicia was a suitable place to pick a fight from which a triumph 
might be gained.  While Asia and Sicily might be more ripe for corruption, Cilicia’s 
‘active front’ status meant that not only did governors have greater chances for conflicts, 
governors who desired conflicts were more likely to seek Cilicia.  The reputation as the 
homeland of the pirates also loomed as a factor in triumphal decisions.  While it served to 
validate Roman aggression, it also potentially diminished the prestige gained. 
It is not surprising that a military commander might exploit the reputation of 
Cilician pirates for political gains, as the pirates continued to be a boogeyman in the 
Roman imagination.
535
  While not possessing the potential of a Mithridates or a Parthia, 
they also posed less danger and less ability to counter the accusations.  Cilicia appears to 
have been a prize province, and the triumphs, if not fraudulent, would represent a 
continually changing and growing province. 
The contingent manpower, while needing to be controlled, also served as an asset.  
Few Italian troops were sent to Cilicia; instead, large numbers of auxiliary troops were 
recruited.  This appears to have been the case for Servilius, in the Mithridatic Wars, and 
for Cicero’s siege alike.  The Romans do not appear to have had trouble in recruiting 
local troops for local campaigns in any of these events. 
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The Third Servile War 
The third of the Servile Wars, and the best known because of the figure of 
Spartacus, began in 73.  Their actions were mostly confined to southern Italy.  
Spartacus’s forces soundly defeated at least two praetorian armies and handed the consul 
Crassus a minor defeat before being defeated in 71.  The remnants scattered and were still 
being hunted down years later.  Appian tells us that Spartacus also rallied free men to his 
side by the profits of the slave army’s plunder.  That alone makes the Third Servile War 
worth discussing in a discussion of piracy. 
The allegations of Spartacus seeking an alliance with the Cilician pirates to 
transport his men are found, to the best of my knowledge, only in Plutarch’s Lives.  
There, Plutarch tells us that Spartacus intended to sail to Sicily and reinforce his troops 
from the local slave populations.
536
 Cicero alludes to this in speaking against Verres, 
insinuating that his efforts to defend Sicily were a mere pretext to further loot the 
province.
537
  A fragment of Sallust reinforces this belief.
538
  Nevertheless, these other 
sources do lend some credence to the belief that this could have happened, even though 
those fears never materialized.  Appian does not mention any such plan, but he does 
invoke Spartacus in relating Mithridates’s supposed plan to march into Italy, asserting 
that the Italian countryside might rise for Mithridates as it had against Rome in the Social 
War and more recently, in support of Spartacus.
539
 
The character of Spartacus has some similarities to those of Viriathus and 
Sertorius.
540
  Among other observations, Grünewald notes Florus’s description of the 
evolution of the individual as similar, but reversed: miles, desertor, latro, gladiator of 
Spartacus compared to the venator, latro dux, imperator of Viriathus.
541
  Spartacus joins 
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the ranks of those figures with a mixture of extreme positive and negative traits.  
Grünewald argues that this makes Spartacus fall into his category of the noble 
bandit/romantic brigand.
542
  Though initially compelling, I think this is a flawed 
argument.  Neither Spartacus nor Viriathus was a latro.  We are not seeing different ways 
of portraying latrones but rather different types of people being portrayed as latrones. 
The usage of latro in reference to Spartacus is generally not pinned upon him but 
upon the slave army.  Spartacus is limited by his resources, as he has difficulty 
controlling his men, who are more piratical.  For example in the fragments of Sallust, we 
see the slaves plundering (praedantibus), described as acting in the manner of soldiers 
(more militiae), an indication that they are not, and acting contrary to orders (contra 
praeceptum).
543
  Appian, however, does describe Spartacus as a bandit: τινας ἐλευθέρους 
ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ὑποδεχόμενος ἐλῄστευε τὰ ἐγγύς  ‘Having received certain free men, he 
plundered (eleisteue) the nearby lands”  This is explicitly an act of Spartacus, rather than 
his slave supporters.  The booty (kerde) he divided and used to attract additional 
followers likewise seems apt for a latro’s activity.  Even in Appian, however, the 
ambiguity remains as Appian also notes that ‘Varinius Glaber and Publius Valerius’ were 
defeated because they thought Spartacus’s band a mere leisterion—a bandit gang.544  
Indeed, Appian provides the core of Grünewald’s assertion that Spartacus was considered 
a latro.
545
  This disorganized force bears little similarity to the Sicilian servile revolts.  
The role of surplus manpower in the Third Servile War may be more significant.  
The key passage remains Appian’s Civil Wars 1.14.116: Since Spartacus divided the 
profits of his raids into equal shares, he soon attracted a large number of followers.  This 
profit motive is apparently a good one for the freelance fighter.  By contrast, he is 
opposed by a hastily raised citizen militia (οὐ πολιτικὴν στρατιὰν ἄγοντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσους ἐν 
σπουδῇ καὶ παρόδῳ συνέλεξαν).  Then (1.14.117) we see that Spartacus has attracted 
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some men: θεράποντες ἦσαν καὶ αὐτόμολοι καὶ σύγκλυδες (they were slaves, deserters, 
and flotsam).  These are not particularly the type one might want in one’s army.  Is this 
an accurate description, though?  Or is this a judgment upon the type of man who would 
join Spartacus?  Just as in the earlier servile wars, free people voluntarily sided with the 
slaves.  The Roman historical agenda requires that such people be regarded as 
illegitimate.  Association with fugitive slaves was even worse that association with 
pirates.  This could hardly be unknown to the populace, and so any who joined the forces 
of Spartacus must have had very little to lose.  Moreover, Spartacus refuses Roman 
deserters: αὐτομόλων τε πολλῶν αὐτῷ προσιόντων οὐδένα προσίετο.  Some may try to 
reconcile this by recognizing two types of αὐτόμολοι, one Roman, the other foreign 
auxiliaries, but it is a strange discrepancy to justify.  Furthermore, it recalls similar 
sentiments by other challengers to the Roman state, most notably Catiline.
546
  Appian, 
like Plutarch, shows Spartacus to be a fundamentally noble exemplar of Roman values, 
(unlike the people he led), and also that his Roman contemporaries scorn him.
547
  The 
mixture of lionizing Spartacus while discrediting his followers serves to explain how the 
slaves defeated the army while minimizing any sympathy for their cause. 
The at-large warriors change the depiction of the war in several ways.  First, 
Spartacus has the force of professional or experienced fighters, while the Romans are 
forced to oppose him with raw recruits.  The fairness of his booty allocations are also 
reminiscent of the earlier conflicts between army and general over spoils and suggests 
that fighting for Spartacus paid better than the Roman state (though siding with a slave 
revolt had obvious drawbacks).  The lack of control Spartacus has over his men 
contributes to their description as bandits, but so does the mercenary motivation.  Finally, 
the Roman deny any form of legitimacy to the slaves, and by extension to any free people 
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who voluntarily joined up with them.  While not surprising, this mirrors the treatment 
both in the earlier servile wars and in the pirate campaigns. 
 
The Mithridatic Wars (part one) 
Many other campaigns were linked to Mithridates.  He was said to court 
Spartacus, provide cover for Cilician pirates, hire Cilician and Cretan pirates, attempt to 
ally with Sertorius, vel sim.  Appian, notably, digresses into the Sertorius and Cilician 
pirate campaigns in his account of the Mithridatic Wars.  Such a decision shows Appian’s 
opinion on how closely these items are linked, especially given the usual geographic 
separation of the work.  Throughout the first century, links with Mithridates kept 
appearing in connection with any number of Roman enemies (or would-be enemies).  It 
might even seem that to be associated with Mithridates was more damaging than any 
accusation of piracy. 
Therefore, rather than give an account of the Mithridatic Wars, I want to 
enumerate the instances where bands of fighters at-large are attested.  In some cases, the 
ancient authors intrinsically link the Mithridatic wars to other events, and so I have 
striven to keep them separate.
548
 
In many ways the pirates did continue to be regarded as a foreign and independent 
force, not merely a Mithridatic extension.  In a standard text, Scullard remarks on the 
pirates as the scourge of the Eastern Mediterranean.
549
  Scullard’s take on the Roman 
problem of piracy is that it was an inherently military problem, as if the pirates were 
merely another state to be warred with and defeated.
550
  I consider this a strange view of 
piracy: as it implies either that the pirates, de facto as well as de jure, cannot ever be 
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subjects of Rome or, contrarily, that all pirates were from foreign lands and included no 
Romans. 
Given the predilection of various warrior bands, be they regarded as pirates, 
bandits, mercenaries or anything else, to serve as a surplus pool of manpower, especially 
in the East, the most prominent accusation is predictable.  The connection to Mithridates 
is one that is unsurprising: that Mithridates sought to supplement his naval forces through 
hiring the so-called pirates of Cilicia and Crete.  It is further suggested that these pirates 
were also to broker a deal between Mithridates and Sertorius ~77.
551
  The Isaurians who 
fought against Vatia likewise may have been willing to work for Mithridates.  This might 
imply that the wars in Cilicia, Crete, and Isauria were undertaken as much to weaken 
Mithridates as for the avowed reason. 
Prior to the first war with Rome, Mithridates had indeed hired some freelance 
forces, especially naval mercenaries, in his northern expansions, and undoubtedly had 
some in his employ at the war’s outbreak.552  But in the First Mithridatic War proper, the 
first note of the use of the ‘at-large fighter’ comes from the Roman side, not the Pontic.  
Mithridates moved in force against Quintus Oppius, who was defending the city of 
Laodicea with a force of cavalry and mercenary infantry (misthophoroi).  In Appian, the 
infantry are not explicitly made out to be locals, but the other Roman wings had been 
recruiting locals with little success, so it is a reasonable supposition.  Pompeius Trogus 
noted that the Roman armies here were not even mixed but simply ‘Asiatic’ (Asiano 
exercitu).
553
 In any case, Laodicea released the mercenaries and handed Oppius over to 
Mithridates.
554
  When Mithridates took Bithynian mercenaries captive, many of them 
switched sides.
555
  Mithridates also accused the Romans of acting like latrones.
556
 
Mithridates’s general Archelaus, in retreating from mainland Greece in 86, is said 
to ravage the coasts (τὰ παράλια πορθῶν) and to act more like a pirate than a warrior 
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(λῃστεύοντι μᾶλλον ἢ πολεμοῦντι ἐοικώς).557  But such judgments come only after the 
loss at Chaeronea.  Similarly, Archelaus is depicted hiding in a marsh (ἐν ἕλει τινὶ 
ἐκρύφθη) near Orchomenos after that battle.558  Without direct accusation of Archelaus or 
his acts, Appian portrays him as a mere bandit.  When discussing peace terms with Sulla, 
Appian even implies that Sulla attempted to get Archelaus to switch sides.
559
  Sulla 
dispatched Lucius Licinius Lucullus to find him a fleet, and Appian reports that when 
Lucullus returned over a year later, he had almost been captured by pirates multiple 
times.
560
 
Appian (Mith. 63) finishes his account of the First Mithridatic War directly 
accusing Mithridates of sponsoring piracy: 
 
τὰ μὲν δὴ χρήματα ὧδε τῷ Σύλλᾳ συνεκομίζετο, καὶ κακῶν ἄδην εἶχεν ἡ Ἀσία· ἐπέπλει 
δ’ αὐτὴν καὶ λῃστήρια πολύανδρα φανερῶς, στόλοις ἐοικότα μᾶλλον ἢ λῃσταῖς, 
Μιθριδάτου μὲν αὐτὰ πρώτου καθέντος ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν, ὅτε πάνθ’ ὡς οὐκ ἐς πολὺ 
καθέξων ἐλυμαίνετο, πλεονάσαντα δ’ ἐς τότε μάλιστα, καὶ οὐ τοῖς πλέουσι μόνοις ἀλλὰ 
καὶ λιμέσι καὶ χωρίοις καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπιχειροῦντα φανερῶς. Ἰασσός γέ τοι καὶ Σάμος καὶ 
Κλαζομεναὶ καὶ Σαμοθρᾴκη Σύλλα παρόντος ἐλήφθησαν, καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ἐσυλήθη τὸ 
Σαμοθρᾴκιον χιλίων ταλάντων κόσμον, ὡς ἐνομίζετο. 
And indeed the money was collected for Sulla (sc. the fine imposed upon the Ephesians) 
and Asia had its fill of evils: large robber-bands (leisteria)sailed about her openly, 
looking like fleets rather than pirates.  And as Mithridates first let these same bands fall 
on the sea, when he was plundering everything which he wasn’t holding for long, also, 
[these bands were] increasing greatly at that time, and they were not making attacks just 
on ships sailing alone, but also openly on harbors, towns, and cities.  Indeed, they sacked 
Iasos and Samos and Klazomenai and Samothrace (while Sulla was present), and the 
temple of Samothrace was stripped of ornaments valued at a thousand talents. 
The purpose is a little unclear.  Mithridates is said to have outfitted or supported these 
bands.  I think we can fairly suspect, however, that he did not cause them to come into 
                                                 
557
 Appian, Mith. 45.  See also Mayor 2010, 210. 
558
 Appian, Mith, 50. 
559
 Appian, Mith. 55.  Archelaus’s refusal implies that Sulla said something additional to that Appian 
recorded (54).  Given the amount of time spent emphasizing Sulla’s poverty in Greece, recording an 
attempt at bribery could only undermine the description. 
560
 Appian Mith. 56: κινδυνεύσας ὑπὸ λῃστῶν ἁλῶναι πολλάκις 
138 
 
being.  Again, Appian references them at the beginning of his description of Pompey’s 
pirate campaign.
561
  Deducing a motive for Mithridates is not simple here. 
This situation does fit, however, into the modus operandi of the at-large warrior 
band.  Deprived of employment under Mithridates, the unemployed simply reverted to 
pillaging independently.  Furthermore, Mithridates was forced to surrender his fleet, 
which had caused the Romans much trouble.  He was not forced to surrender the fleets of 
the pirates.  That meant that this force was still available for Mithridates to hire in the 
future, and may well have been augmented by ships or equipment previously held by 
Mithridates.  Such an assumption seems the logical way to read Appian’s statement.  
Furthermore, the repeated use of φανερῶς betrays a typical assumption about pirates, 
who act secretly or by tricks.  These leisteria, however, are powerful enough to take what 
they want through direct force.  It would also be excessive to see the pirates as mere 
underlings of Mithridates, as they are clearly operating independently at times.
562
 
This practice under Mithridates matches the practice of earlier Hellenistic kings.  I 
doubt Appian is trying to link Mithridates with Diodotus, the supporter of the Cilicians 
around 140.  More likely is a comparison to Philip V of Macedon and his support of 
Dikaiarchus.
563
  For an older example, Agathocles of Syracuse also gave ships to the 
Apulians on the condition that they harass his foes.
564
  With these as precedent, for 
Mithridates to give ships to the Cilicians would hardly be unusual.  And, at the outbreak 
of the third war, Mithridates did immediately hire a pirate fleet.  It seems likely that 
Mithridates found a loophole by which he could maintain a naval force when necessary 
while still obeying his agreement with Rome. 
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Additionally, these naval auxiliaries (the leisteria) were not available to Rome 
when Lucullus had been scrounging the eastern Mediterranean for ships in previous 
years.  This is not quite proof that they were in the employ of Mithridates, but combined 
with the absence of mentions of pirate attacks on Mithridates and the problems caused to 
Romans by pirates, it seems very likely that Mithridates had cornered the freelance naval 
market.  The sudden concern with piracy in the next twenty years no doubt has much to 
do with the increase in activity and in scale but also undoubtedly was affected by the 
desire to deny Mithridates a fleet.  The hiring of pirates is only mentioned in connection 
with the hiring monarch; when campaigns against pirates are discussed, the possibility of 
the pirates being employed is never mentioned.  I argue that rather than being an 
omission, the Romans regarded that employed pirates, ipso facto, were not pirates. 
The next consideration is what Mithridates thought of his hirelings.  While 
Mithridates certainly hired Cretans, a potential wider Pontic-Cretan alliance was also 
possible.  While one motive for the Romans’ war against the Cretan cities was the 
practice of piracy and the pirates’ use of the Cretan cities as a base, another potential 
motive was the alignment of the Cretans with Mithridates.
565
  These need not be 
exclusive motivations, but the historians disagree among themselves as to which was 
more important.  Not only was Mithridates hiring the Cretans, but he appears to have 
seen the Cretan cities as allies.  While the Cretans and Cilicians both occupy a sometimes 
ambiguous status as states or freelancers, Mithridates appears to have readily navigated 
this situation, hiring at-large warriors from these territories with the full approval of the 
local governments. 
Pontic involvement with Crete had a long history, beginning with Mithridates V, 
if not earlier.  Overall, Mithridates VI continued the philhellenism of his father.  By doing 
so, he improved the lot of his Greek subject cities and made it more likely for Greek 
cities to accept his recruiters.  Greeks could also hope to find government positions with 
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Mithridates.  His domestic officials and magistrates, at the higher levels, consisted of 
over 60% Greeks, but were perhaps 20% Greeks for the lower levels of administration 
and military command, though this discrepancy may be due to unequal survival of Pontic 
records.
566
  In recruiting Aegean mercenaries, Mithridates probably followed the lead of 
Prusias of Bithynia or of the Attalids, who had established treaties with Cretan cities that 
explicitly allowed recruiting of their citizens for service abroad.  Thus he not only gave 
favorable employment terms to Greeks, he also tried to follow Greek styling in offering 
that employment.  
Seeing a conflict with Rome looming, Mithridates apparently tried to form a 
Greek coalition (as he would later attempt to form an eastern coalition with Armenia and 
Parthia) against Rome.  Thus he sent missives to the Greek cities of Asia and Crete, along 
with Athens, and the Seleucids and the Ptolemies, as well.
567
  The latter two apparently 
stayed quiet.  In particular, Mithridates tried to enlist Syrian, Phoenician, and Egyptian 
sailors for his navy.
568
  Crete, however, responded to the overtures of Mithridates.  First, 
the Cretans simply allowed Mithridates to hire mercenaries, but later they also provided 
mercenaries (apparently partially at their own expense), and supported the pirates 
working for Mithridates.
569
  In return, Mithridates sent a fleet to support Crete against 
Rome.  In his supposed letter to the Parthians, Mithridates notes that he sent aid to the 
Cretans, who were under attack by Rome.   
Crete’s own piratic reputation is well-established.  Plutarch calls Crete a 
secondary source of pirates.
570
  Crete continued its earlier role as a source of mercenaries 
in the first century.
571
  Crete was, in all likelihood, the main source of auxiliary forces for 
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Pontus, at least in the early years.
572
  Following the early conquests of Mithridates, it is 
likely that more and more came from the Black Sea littoral.  Florus, however, mentions 
Crete not at all in his account of the Mithridatic War, even in the list of Greek states that 
supported Mithridates.  In his account of the Cretan War, he argues that that rationale was 
simply a pretext to plunder.
573
  During the third Mithridatic war, when the Romans were 
also at war with the Cretans, Mithridates sent ships to their aid.
574
  This appears to be 
referring to the conflict with Antonius, and Cotta and Triarius were waiting to attack the 
Mithridatic fleet on their return.   
Even after the initial assessment of ships, pirates are explicitly mentioned a few 
times as part of the forces of Mithridates.  Mithridates took a pirate ship (λῃστρικὸν 
μυοπάρωνα) to Heracleia.575  The Cilician ‘pirate captain’ Seleucus was also entrusted 
with the city of Sinope.
576
  We might even suggest that the coastal cities Lucullus avoided 
in the 80s were leagued with Mithridates.
577
  The pirate forces also seem to have been 
reasonably effective in the earlier campaigns, depriving Sulla of a fleet and hindering him 
in acquiring one (even if this may not have been at Mithridates’s behest).  The campaigns 
against Crete and Cilicia, as they drew off a source of naval manpower and expertise, 
likewise hindered the naval campaign of Mithridates, which seems to have been steadily 
in retreat.
578
  
In any case, engaging Mithridates also involved engaging the Cilicians.  Tröster 
accuses Ormerod of overstating the effectiveness of Lucullus against the pirates because 
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he did not “depriv[e] them of their retreat areas and supply bases.”579  This assumption 
rests overly heavily on the doctrine that destruction of the pirate bases was, in fact, the 
solution to piracy, without actually making the case for it.  Furthermore, it implies that 
fighting the pirates was indeed a principal goal of Lucullus, which is very doubtful.  
Lucullus was largely focused on the land campaign, leaving naval affairs in the hands of 
Cotta, Antonius and others.
580
 
The bands of at-large warriors were very influential in the Mithridatic wars, both 
in their actions and ideologically.  In the second war, Appian portrays Murena as a pirate, 
as he robs (ἐλεηλάτει) the temples of Asia.581  In the beginning of the third war (74), 
Appian has Mithridates state that the inability of the Romans to deal with the Cilician 
pirates proves their weakness.
582
  Eumachus, one of Mithridates’s generals, set about 
subjugating southern Anatolia until he was beaten by the Galatians (all still in 74, I 
believe).  The Galatians, long a source of freelance warriors, decisively turned against 
Mithridates.  In 73, according to Orosius, Mithridates tasked the pirate captain Seleucus 
to defend Sinope.
583
  In 69, Mancaeus suspected the Greek mercenaries of treachery and 
disarmed them.  The Greeks took refuge in a tower and betrayed Tigranocerta to the 
Romans through that tower.  In retreat from the Romans, Mithridates relies upon a band 
of mercenary horsemen (τισιν ἱππεῦσι μισθοφόροις).584  Combined with the Romans’ 
recruitment of large numbers of auxiliaries in Anatolia, the freelance warrior forms a 
crucial part of the Mithridatic Wars.  While historians, ancient and modern, focus on 
battles and great victories, it was Mithridates’s ability to rapidly recruit and outfit forces 
that kept him as a threat.  As a result, the Romans’ interruption of his access to contingent 
manpower in Cilicia, Crete and Galatia sharply limited his ability to act. 
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The Cretans, Antonius, and Metellus 
Turning to Crete, we observe that both Antonius and Metellus gained the 
agnomen ‘Creticus’, though in the former case, it seems to have been a form of mockery, 
not an official title.  Antonius ‘Creticus’ took the initial command, which turned into a 
disaster.
585
 After an abortive attempt at peace, Metellus took over this command after his 
colleague Hortensius turned it down.
586
  Renewed interest in the pirates may have been 
sparked by the famous capture of Caesar by pirates in 75 or 74, but it would seem that 
some preparations had already begun before that time.
587
  The Romans had encountered 
Cretan mercenaries in enemy forces many times throughout the previous centuries 
Relevant to Cretan affairs, I believe, is the strange situation of the annexation of 
Cyrene.  In 96, the king of Cyrene, Apion, a bastard son of Ptolemy VII, left the kingdom 
not to one of his Lagid kinsmen, but like the Pergamenes, to Rome.  Surprisingly, the 
Romans made no attempt to take advantage of this bequest until 74, when Bithynia was 
similarly bequeathed.  It has been implied that the rationale was part of a greater program 
to squash piracy, but it seems more likely that a grain shortage in Rome served as the 
impulse to see what could be gained.
588
  Even more likely is the prospect that Cyrene had 
the potential to serve as a backup Roman base in the Mithridatic Wars, especially if 
Rome was eyeing Crete already at that time, which was eventually attached 
administratively to Cyrene.
589
 
Florus, as I noted before, ties all the pirate campaigns together, in a system of 
‘one good, one bad’.  Thus, the Cretan campaign serves as a negative comparison to the 
positive campaign of Pompey.  The Cretan campaign, however, actually began earlier, 
and Florus accepts the rationale that the campaign was designed to punish the Cretans for 
any support they may have given to Mithridates.  Thus, the campaign must be understood 
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to begin with the infamous Antonius, who ‘brought more chains than weapons in his 
fleet’ and lost badly in his first encounter with the Cretans.590 
This first conflict was in 74, at least ostensibly.  Then, Antonius was given a 
command not entirely dissimilar to Pompey’s Gabinian command: the power of a 
provincial governor without any territorial limitations.
591
  The command was for two 
years: apparently one year in the west and one for the east, though this assumption is 
rooted almost entirely in the amount of time Antonius spent building up his fleet in 
Sicily; it is doubtful he reached Greece before 73 and actual combat with the Cretans 
would wait probably until 72.   
After some minor successes in skirmishes in the Ionian Sea, Antonius was 
roundly defeated by the Cretan fleet off Kydonia.  Sallust may hint at Antonius’s rule 
being worse than the pirates, at least in Sicily.
592
 Certainly Cicero uses him as a negative 
example to compare Verres to.
593
  Diodorus tells us that the Cretans made a peace treaty 
with Antonius.
594
  Ultimately, however, this treaty was not honored.  Antonius died 
before (while?) returning to Rome.
595
 
Diodorus tells us that the Cretans sought to make an alliance with Rome at this 
time, after the death of Antonius, but the motion was vetoed by Lentulus Spinther.  Then 
the Cretans were accused of being in league with the pirates and were ordered to turn all 
their ships over to Rome, surrender the admirals Lasthenes and Panares, and pay four 
thousand talents.
596
  The Cretans refused.  An Antonia is said to have been captured by 
pirates and ransomed to her father.  This may appear to be the daughter of Antonius 
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‘Creticus’ not the consul of 99.597  I am unconvinced by this argument, but it scarcely 
matters whether the young Marc Antony was forced to pay a large ransom for his aunt or 
for his sister.
598
  This abduction appears to have been between the 74 campaign and the 
68 one.  The Romans, now presuming the Cretans were in league with Mithridates, began 
a second campaign in 68, this time under the proconsul Metellus.
599
  Metellus appears to 
have landed an army without complication and we hear of only one naval battle, where 
the Cretans defeated Bassus off Hierapytna.
600
  Though it took him multiple years, 
Metellus eventually reduced the Cretan strongholds, including Kydonia, the bane of 
Antonius.  Metellus does not appear to have (or used, if he had) naval superiority and the 
sources indicate that he principally took the cities by storm.
601
  The 68 campaign, 
notably, did not confer upon Metellus the same lack of limitations as Antonius in 74 and 
Pompey in 67.  Metellus eventually triumphed and then returned to Crete to organize it as 
a Roman province.
602
 
During this time, however, the pirates, whoever they were, had not slowed, but 
instead increased their activity.  The Roman fleet at Ostia was reduced to ash on the 
water, praetors and lictors were captured on the Italian coast and at least one grain-ship 
was lost at sea, either to storms or pirates.  These activities do nothing to confirm or deny 
the complicity of the Cretans in these events.  They could equally be attacks of 
opportunity with the Roman fleet pinned down in Crete or they could be acts of warfare 
under the Cretans hoping to draw Roman attention away from the island.
603
  But it was 
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acts on this scale that made the Romans risk giving Pompey the extraordinary command 
via the Gabinian law, though even that was hotly contested. 
By this time it is clear that the Romans intended to stop piracy, whether as an end 
in and of itself, or (more likely in my opinion) because of the use foreign enemies had for 
them.  In the 70s, there were three lands that had a reputation for piracy: Crete, Cilicia, 
and Illyria, and all three were attacked within a span of 10 years.  Piracy had definite 
ethnic associations. 
 
Rhodes and Delos: the end of an era 
Rhodian events were less relevant in the first century to the ongoing shifts in 
freelance warfare.  After all, Rhodes had lost its hegemony and most of its ability to 
conduct foreign affairs.  Rhodes did, however, regain some of its former power through 
its association with Rome.  And it still retained a reputation as being hostile to pirates.  
Nevertheless, the Rhodians appear more as naval auxiliaries for Rome than as employers 
of mercenaries or chasers of pirates. 
Earlier I had discussed Massilia, and its ability to pull Rome into disputes with 
local Ligurians, Gauls, and perhaps even the Baleares.  The next question is whether 
Rhodes had that same ability and whether having such an anti-pirate state as a client had 
any effect on Roman actions against pirates in neighboring Cilicia and Crete.  It is 
certainly not implausible, and Rhodian vessels made a notable appearance in Pompey’s 
battle at Coracesium and also at Heraclea in the Third Mithridatic War.
604
  The Rhodian 
fleet, though diminished in numbers, was still extant.  Diodorus Siculus described them 
as far superior in skill to the Cappadocian ships.
605
  Similarly, the Rhodians would 
provide both Pompey and Caesar with ships and crews during the civil war.   
We might see this possibility, i.e. a Rhodian request for aid, as an alternative 
explanation for the beginning of Roman acts against Cilicia.  This is a popular 
explanation for why Rome suddenly became involved.  Yet using Massilia as a model is 
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flawed, as the Romans do not appear to have ever mentioned such a past benefit to 
Rhodes, a very normal part of foreign policy.  Considering the ship requisitions of the 
first century civil wars, the absence is a notable one.   
By contrast, the fortunes of Delos swung erratically in the early first century.  
Delos had flourished immediately upon its establishment as a free port in 166 and was a 
wealthy town (and increasingly Italian) at the turn of the century.
606
  During the first 
century, however, Delos was sacked once by Mithridates (in 88) and once by pirates (69) 
and never recovered.  The attacks on Delos had an effect on the slave trade, but that 
effect was more detrimental to the Romans’ finances than the pirates’.  As noted earlier, 
Delos was traditionally a clearinghouse for slaves, which was one of the principal 
economic targets for pirates.  While well-born individuals were more often ransomed by 
the first century, slaves could well be kidnapped and resold.  Delos had not, apparently, 
had much difficulty with pirates in the past, and so the attacks on Delos would appear to 
have a strategic motive rather than a profit motive.
607
  The role of Delos as slave market 
was taken over partially by Puteoli in Italy and partially by Rhodes.
608
  Strabo also tells 
us that the whole Lycian and Pamphylian coast served as slave markets.
609
  In addition to 
adding middlemen to the supply chain, the Roman end of the slave trade was disrupted by 
the death or displacement of the principal Roman and Italian merchants dealing in 
Aegean slaves.  The decentralizing of the Delos market was positive for Mithridates and 
a negative for Rome, but had little effect on the pirates, even if its creation had been a 
benefit for them. 
Rhodes harbored Italian and Roman refugees from Mithridates and appears to 
have slightly recovered economically, though it still had become more of a university city 
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than a trade powerhouse.
610
  While it regained some of the trade that had passed through 
Delos, it was far from replacing the earlier volume.  Sulla, notably, granted Rhodes its 
‘freedom’ upon the conclusion of the First Mithridatic War.611  
The growing preeminence of Rome, however, also meant that the trading 
exchanges in the Aegean were dwindling in importance compared to the growth of the 
Italian ports of Latium and Campania (Ostia, Puteoli, Paestum, Neapolis, Pompeii, vel. 
sim).  The big slave markets were no longer in the east but in the west instead (though a 
perhaps-surprising amount was simply handled by the merchants following various 
Roman armies about). 
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I argue that the Roman attempts to control at-large warriors and 
their mobile groups intensified and, furthermore, met with some considerable success.  
First, the enlistment of soldiers and extensions of citizenship made the army an option for 
those who otherwise might take up the life of a freelance warrior, limiting the mercenary 
activities of Italians such as the Mamertines and the potential emigration of warriors.  
This also increased the ability of generals to recruit locally.  Outside Italy, we see Roman 
armies in Anatolia engaging in local recruitment of auxiliaries and successfully acquiring 
large numbers of them.  Furthermore, the activities in Crete and Cilicia can be easily seen 
as efforts to deny these pools of contingent manpower to a foe, specifically Mithridates.  
This does not necessitate that this was the principal motivation for these actions, but this 
is a consequence of the first-century campaigns and the growth of the Roman military.  If 
an intentional consequence, it is a rationale rarely explored.  Even if unintentional, it is an 
effect worth noting. 
Concerning the slave wars, it seems apparent that the Romans tended to suspect 
exterior motivations or support in any uprising that met with success.  The existence of 
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these suspicions of fomenting rebellion caused the Romans to treat with the Cilicians and 
Mithridates differently than they otherwise might have.  Further credence is lent by the 
not infrequent accusations of encouraging slaves to revolt or accepting fugitive slaves 
against various figures of the civil wars.
612
  Cilicians, Cretans, and Illyrians were 
perceived as ‘natural’ pirates, while the pirates appear to have regarded themselves as 
actively at war with Rome.  In regarding these at-large bands as simply pirates, the 
Romans diminish what state identity they might have had.  In the following chapter, I 
will be backtracking over familiar ground to cover the Pompeian campaigns during this 
same period.  It is my hope that through this division, Pompey’s different methods and 
results will be clear.  The purpose of this division is to tease out which were the ‘natural’ 
outcomes in Rome, and which were the outcomes of an exceptional figure like Pompey. 
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Chapter Five: The Pompeian Campaigns and the Role of 
Pirates. 
 
In the previous chapter, I detailed the events of the first century.  During this time, 
however, the campaigns of Pompey possessed a different character than those of his 
contemporaries.  If this is not true, we are at least supposed to believe that it is.  The first 
century contemporaries of Pompey often fared less well in the historical record, 
particularly when compared directly.  In this period, Pompey accrued great glory from a 
number of accomplishments that might, strictly speaking, be better assigned to others 
(Crassus with Spartacus, Metellus in Crete or Lucullus in Anatolia, for example).  
Arguably, these events show there was greater glory to be had by finishing a campaign 
rather than beginning one.
613
  Furthermore, by landing the conflicts’ finishing blow, 
Pompey gave the impression of being able to wage a much quicker and more efficient 
campaign than his rivals. 
In this chapter, I present three basic arguments.  First, through campaigns against 
bandits, pirates, or those associated with pirates, Pompey established himself as most 
capable in dealing with such ambiguous forces.  Second, the Romans consistently 
portrayed their enemies as either illegitimate forces themselves or as supporters of such 
forces.  Third, considerable conflict existed among Roman elites as to how illegitimate 
forces were to be dealt with. 
 
Pompey and Sertorius 
Pompey first appears as a commander in Sulla’s forces.  Pompey accumulated 
substantial credit from his conduct against Sertorius, the famous Marian holdout against 
Sulla’s regime.  Not only did he gain the principal credit for this victory in Rome, in a 
way, the Sertorian campaign made Pompey’s reputation (or made it as something other 
than ‘the young butcher’ as he was known from serving in Sulla’s army)614 and also set 
the stage for his portrayal of later events.  Appian, at least, equates the import of his 
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success in the Sertorian campaign with that of the defeat of Mithridates.
615
  Pompey’s 
actual record against Sertorius in Spain was none too impressive, but he did eventually 
succeed there. 
For this study, Sertorius is particularly relevant because his campaign, tactics and 
portrayal strongly resemble that of the less well-known Viriathus of some seventy years 
before.
616
  Since so much more material about Sertorius survives, his depiction is 
especially useful for studying the portrayal of such figures.  Nevertheless, more material 
does not add up to much material.
617
  Sertorius did not fare well in the sources, both 
because of his actions in Spain and, more importantly, because of his earlier siding with 
Cinna and Marius.
618
  Sertorius was established as a Marian, and his reputation and rose 
and fell with Marius in the civil war.  The end result was that Sulla, the victor in Rome, 
despite predeceasing Sertorius, had the final say about Sertorius, though later, more pro-
Marian sources sought to rehabilitate him.
619
  By the time Pompey arrived in Spain, 
Sertorius was already established as infamous. 
Around 83, Sertorius claimed the title of proconsul of Hispania, having arrived 
there with a legion loyal to him.  He had been voted this province earlier, but his 
magistracy was revoked and the praetor already in Spain refused to surrender authority to 
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him upon arrival.
620
  His fluency in Celtic may have been a credit to him in winning over 
the Celtiberians, but there is no evidence he knew the non-Indo-European languages of 
the other inhabitants of the peninsula.
621
  He also had had previous military experience in 
Iberia starting in the early 90s.
622
  There Sertorius was present at the massacres of Castulo 
and Colenda, but his own policy in Iberia was very different.
623
  In any case, Sertorius 
drove the Sullan officials out (quite possibly without bloodshed) by 82. While (Sullan) 
Rome itself did not recognize his position, the people of Spain did, hesitantly at first, but 
more wholeheartedly following his victorious campaign in Mauretania and also his defeat 
of the praetor Fufidius upon his return in 80.
624
  Before 81, Sertorius had considered 
staying in Mauretania or leaving for the ‘Isles of the Blest’ and not returning to Spain, but 
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 We discover this talent of Sertorius’s not in the accounts of him in Iberia, but rather when Marius 
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st
 century Iberia, see Konrad 
1994, 46-47, 90-94, and 115-116. 
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 See Spann 1987, 18-20, Broughton 1952 (MRR II), 7-8. 
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 See Spann 1987, 19-20; Broughton 1952 (MRR II), 4, 7 for Didius; see Spann 1987, 20; Plutarch, Sert. 
6.4; for the difference in policy. 
624
 I suspect that an uncertain fragment of Sallust (McGushin 12) is referring to either this episode in 
Mauretania (Plutarch, Sertorius 9) or, less likely, the Ibiza episode (Sertorius 7).  The Sallust is as follows: 
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“He was bursting with rage and sorrow at losing such allies.  The soldiers fled from the ships [either] by 
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lost allies are either allies on the ships lost (for Ibiza) or the Cilician mercenaries quitting his cause (for 
Mauretania).  See Konrad 1994, 103-105 for some discussion on the storm after Ibiza. 
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eventually decided against it, based on the desires of his men.
625
  On his return, the 
Iberians found Sertorius both a more congenial option than the Sullans and a leader 
capable of winning victories.
626
   
The Iberians, particularly the Lusitani, rallied to Sertorius, to the extent that he 
trusted them more than the Roman loyalists who had followed him to Spain.  According 
to both Appian and Plutarch, he established a Celtiberian bodyguard and gave them more 
privileges than the Romans.  Plutarch also relates preferential treatment of the Romans, 
while such mentions of the Iberias in Appian are meant to show Sertorius as being a 
traitor to his own people.
627
  To a Roman audience, the Iberians still carried a negative 
connotation as barbarians and bandits.  Plutarch tells us that Sertorius converted the 
Iberians from a band of robbers into an army (ἀντὶ λῃστηρίου μεγάλου στρατὸν ἐποιεῖτο 
τὴν δύναμιν).628  In the same passage, Plutarch discusses how Sertorius makes the 
conversion, forcing them to fight with discipline and signals instead of like wild beasts.  
Thus in Plutarch, Sertorius civilizes the Iberians, but in Appian, the Iberians 
‘barbarianize’ Sertorius. 
During this time, Sertorius had continued to stand by his assertion that he was the 
legitimate representative of the Roman government, and Marian supporters continued to 
trickle in to Spain where they formed a government-in-exile—an act seen and portrayed 
by his detractors as the formation of a barbarian state, not a civil war contender.
629
  (This 
portrayal of Sertorius as barbarian, and a leader of Iberians, not Romans, was useful for 
the triumphal desires of Metellus and Pompey.)  Around 77, Sertorius was joined by 
Perperna, who brought him the rest of Lepidus’s force.630  Around this time, Sertorius 
also came to some agreement with Mithridates.  The agreement ostensibly recognized the 
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government of Sertorius as the ‘real Rome’ and the Sullan supporters as the rogues.  
According to Appian, Sertorius sent Mithridates three Roman advisors and agreed to 
surrender most of Roman Anatolia to Mithridates.
631
  But note also Plutarch, who 
indicates Sertorius refused to surrender Asia to Mithridates, even though he did not 
possess it (though his Senate-in-exile urged him to accept the deal).
632
  Thus the 
particulars of the deal are still unknown, but it involved the exchange of military advisors 
for gold and warships.  While the advisor Marcus Marius arrived in Pontus probably in 
76, the Pontic fleet did not arrive in Spain until 73.
633
  Nevertheless, in 76, with the 
Roman reinforcements from Perperna, the recent defeat of Metellus, and the alliance with 
Mithridates, Sertorius was at the height of his power in Spain.  His enemies in Italy did 
not have the luxury (as seemed likely a year earlier) of focusing entirely on him. 
Sertorius also made agreements with the infamous Cilicians.  Shortly after Sulla 
came to power, Sertorius embarked on a series of assaults on Mauretania.  Indeed, with 
Cilician aid, Sertorius took Ibiza in the Balearics, but was unable to hold it.
634
  Some 
have taken this event to be evidence of a widespread coalition between Sertorius, 
Mithridates, and the Cilician pirates.
635
  I find the fact that both Sertorius and Mithridates 
hired Cilicians no more compelling evidence of an alliance than the presence of Cretan 
archers in both Roman and Macedonian armies would be of one with Crete during the 
Macedonian Wars.
636
  Cilicians, as already noted, generally occupied an ambiguous 
status as to whether they were acting out of state interests or as freelancers seeking profit.  
Their association with Sertorius thrusts him into that same status. 
                                                 
631
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 Plutarch, Sert. 23-24. 
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Notably, Spann also takes the event to be an alliance with the Cilicians, though he 
leaves Mithridates out of it.
637
  Following de Souza, I take the evidence of Sertorius 9 to 
indicate that these Cilicians were mercenaries, who soon readily hired on against 
Sertorius in his campaign in Mauretania.
638
  While describing troops sent by a Cilician 
state as pirates would be well within Roman practice, the presence of Cilician troops here 
by no means necessitates an alliance with a Cilician state.  There is no compelling reason 
to see the ‘agreements’ as a Cilician alliance rather than a contract with a band of free-
lancers meant to bolster his forces against the inevitable Sullan counterattack.  The later 
Cilician refusal to go with Sertorius to the ‘Isles of the Blest’ because of their desire for 
money is also perfectly in line with mercenaries who may have been expecting loot.  
Furthermore, the Cilicians stopped working for Sertorius years before the embassy from 
Mithridates arrived to speak with Sertorius. 
Of course, any affiliation with sea-going non-Romans like the Cilicians was 
enough to tar Sertorius with the pirate brush, as de Souza points out.
639
  Added to 
associations with barbarians like the Iberians and the Libyans and agreements with 
Mithridates, Sertorius became a figure difficult for Plutarch and Sallust to salvage.  While 
he has been portrayed as a leader who ‘went over’ to the Lusitani, it makes more sense to 
view him as yet another civil war contender who happened to get the support of the 
Lusitani and other Iberians.
640
  Indeed, most civil war contenders also gained the support 
of Roman allies or client states.  The continued supportive role of his Roman soldiers, 
who agreed to command Lusitanian troops, is pertinent because it suggests that they also 
saw themselves as still Roman.  We should recall that Sertorius had previously suggested 
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 Plutarch, Sert. 9.1 ταῦθ᾽ ὁ Σερτώριος ἀκούσας ἔρωτα θαυμαστὸν ἔσχεν οἰκῆσαι τὰς νήσους καὶ ζῆν ἐν 
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 See Spann 1987, 59-61 for a similar description of Sertorius as a Roman leading auxiliaries. 
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leaving the Roman world for Mauretania or the ‘Isles of the Blest’ and was rebuffed by 
the soldiers. 
The depictions of Sertorius are most intriguing, not least because we have 
differing accounts in Appian’s Civil Wars and Plutarch’s Life of Sertorius.  On the face of 
Plutarch’s description, Sertorius was no pirate.  The depiction, however, puts him 
squarely in the camp of figures like Catiline: simultaneously noble and barbaric, 
superhuman and flawed.
641
  The figure Plutarch describes, and the one Metellus and 
Pompey were set to defeat, was not an utterly wicked reprobate, but a man of admirable 
training.
642
  Nonetheless this description, similar as it was to the characterization of 
figures including Catiline, Jugurtha, Spartacus and Viriathus, may still have given the 
sense of ‘brigand’ without saying as much.   
Appian does not give a character portrait of Sertorius in the early years, but does 
describe him as fighting γενναίως and in acting justly after sacking a city.643  
Nevertheless, Appian has no problem with taking sides here; he says the other Romans 
were angry at being called traitors (ἀπίστοι) when they were traitors on his account.644 
Later in the account of Sertorius, Appian describes him thus: 
 
ὁ δὲ Σερτώριος βλάπτοντος ἤδη θεοῦ τὸν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι πόνον ἑκὼν μεθίει, τὰ 
πολλὰ δ᾽ ἦν ἐπὶ τρυφῆς, γυναιξὶ καὶ κώμοις καὶ πότοις σχολάζων. ὅθεν ἡττᾶτο συνεχῶς. 
καὶ γεγένητο ὀργήν τε ἄκρος δι᾽ ὑπονοίας ποικίλας καὶ ὠμότατος ἐς κόλασιν καὶ ὑπόπτης 
ἐς ἅπαντας,  
 
But Sertorius now, because of some god-inflicted hindrance, readily left off the toil of his 
deeds, and he spent most of his time in luxury (he was, in most ways, given to luxury), 
spending his leisure time in parties, women, and drinking.  For this reason, he was 
worsted repeatedly.  And he began to grow angry because of various suspicions, most 
savage in punishments, and suspicious of everything... 
 
In this portrayal, by contrast to Plutarch’s, Sertorius is a wicked caricature, yet its 
preface implies this was a marked change from before.  It ends with an argument 
of morality, suggesting that his lapses made him deserve to lose ultimately. 
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After 77, Sertorius and Perperna were at first successful against Pompey and 
Metellus.  Sertorius defeated Metellus in 77 so decisively that Pompey was sent to aid 
him, and in 76 Sertorius routed Pompey’s relief force.  Shortly thereafter Pompey and 
Metellus were defeated again.  Metellus left for the south, leaving Pompey in the north, 
forcing Sertorius to split his forces.  Once split, Metellus consistently defeated Perperna 
while Pompey was defeated by Sertorius in the north.  But Sertorius was defeated at 
Segontia in 75, his fortunes declined through 74 and 73 and, in the winter of 73/72, he 
was assassinated by Perperna, who was then defeated by Pompey in 72.
645
  The Pontic 
fleet, apparently near Dianium in Spain, returned to Pontus, where it was destroyed off 
Tenedos. 
Regarding Sertorius, both friends and foes were said to paint the one-eyed general 
as a new Hannibal.
646
  In both cases, the comparison, emphasizing the skill of Sertorius, 
was politically useful.  On the authors’ side, these descriptions served to highlight or even 
overemphasize the import of Sertorius to Rome and Pontus.  But such comparisons may 
have been genuine, because such comparisons would bring personal benefit for Pompey 
and Mithridates.  Mithridates acquired quality Roman advisors while Pompey sought to 
erase the shame of his defeats through exaggerating the quality of his opponent.  And 
both Mithridates and Pompey had an obvious vested interest in getting Rome to send 
more troops to Spain and fewer to Pontus. 
The histories would work in Pompey’s favor here, portraying Sertorius either as a 
brigand himself or a traitor who allied himself with brigands, pirates, barbarians, and 
other hostes of Rome.  Additionally, they give  Pompey full credit for the defeating of 
such enemies, quite possibly as a retroactive magnification of Pompeius Magnus.  
Despite such negative portrayals of Sertorius, no account explicitly charges Sertorius 
with being a bandit or with committing treason.
647
  The closest is probably Appian’s use 
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of ἀπίστοι (see above), though Cicero’s implication that Verres would have been acting 
correctly to imprison Sertorians comes close.
648
 
 
The Mithridatic Wars and the Role of Freelancers. 
The wars of Rome against Mithridates also involved several groups of freelancers 
discussed earlier.  While the Romans did not necessarily try to cast Mithridates as an 
illegitimate monarch, they did attack his methods and suggested that he was intrinsically 
untrustworthy.  For my purposes, I focus on the dealings he had with ‘illegitimate’ forces, 
which would be described by the Romans as dealings with rebels, pirates, or bandits.  For 
the chronology of the period, please refer to the previous chapter which some of the 
material here is replicating.  Nevertheless, neither this nor that section is intended to serve 
as a guide to the Mithridatic Wars, only to highlight a few unusual episodes and to 
provide the context in which those events occurred.  The build-up of Mithridates as 
employing illegitimate forces for his own ends had far-reaching repercussions.  In 
particular, I believe that Pompey would later use his own reputation as a defeater of 
rebels and pirates, combined with the reputation of Mithridates as an ally and employer 
of rebels and pirates, established in the first two wars, to win the command over the latter 
portion of the third Mithridatic War.  It has been argued, most prominently by Gruen, that 
Pompey had planned to use a campaign against pirates thus to build a force to use against 
Mithridates while his allies worked for the ouster of Lucullus.
649
  While an appealing 
notion, I think this turn of events evokes less a conspiracy of planning and more an 
example of opportunism.  I return to this topic later in the chapter, after discussing the 
earlier Mithridatic material. 
First, it needs to be acknowledged that there was an overarching battle of 
portrayal and self-portrayal from the beginning of Roman and Pontic interactions.  
Mithridates sought to emphasize his Greekness to the Greeks and his Asian/Persian-ness 
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to his eastern subjects.
650
  At the same time the Romans sought to convince their Greek 
subjects and allies that Mithridates was more of a Persian bogeyman and less of a Greek 
protector.  For example, in her biography of Mithridates, Mayor indicates he may have 
had a fondness for the acinaces/sica, a weapon that she intimates may have assisted in 
Roman associations with banditry.
651
  While this probably did more to mark him as a 
barbarian from the East, the preference and association do contribute to the general desire 
to pose Mithridates as ‘other’.  Several other examples contribute to this ‘Asiaticizing’ of 
Mithridates.
652
  
Mithridates was accused of allying with several groups the Romans would have 
considered illegitimate.  He hired the Cilicians to augment his naval forces, the Cretans 
(also considered pirates) considered aligning with him, the Sertorian loyalists in Spain 
sent an advisor to him, and even the slaves under Spartacus (by way of the Cilician 
pirates) have been connected to Mithridates.  And some, perhaps all, of these accusations 
were probably true.  The historians portray these alliances as wrongdoings.  The question 
remains: what purpose did such portrayal serve?  Guilt by association went all the way 
around.  Association with Mithridates made Romans traitorous and association with 
‘bandits’ and ‘rebels’ made kings less legitimate.  Mithridates may well have returned 
fire; Sallust records Mithridates accusing the Romans of being pirates writ large and also 
of failing to prevent piracy in lands they controlled, clear assaults on the legitimacy of 
Roman rule.
653
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The Pontic kingdom appears to have had a long relationship with pirates, a 
connection which Mayor indicates several times.
654
  The employment of mercenaries and 
of pirates as mercenaries, the strongest part of her argument, is very likely and would be 
well-rooted in Hellenistic Greek practice.  Indeed, his father’s general, Dorylaus, was 
recruiting Cretans when the elder Mithridates died.
655
  The asserted role of Pontic ports as 
pirate booty-markets is not an illogical supposition but has relatively little evidence.
656
  
The clearest ancient link is Cicero, who infers Mithridates’s connection to pirates in the 
Pro Lege Manilia, hardly the least biased of sources.
657
  Nevertheless, despite the 
individual weaknesses of the arguments, the overall sense of Mithridates’s connection 
with the pirates is probably well-founded—they had a financial relationship where the 
Cretans (and perhaps Cilicians) routinely hired out to Mithridates to strengthen a naval 
force that he very much needed to conquer Colchis and Crimea.  Thus, “Mithridates 
could recruit Black Sea pirate sailors to join his legitimate navy for regular pay, and 
reward others to prey upon the rich ships of holdout states that declined to join his 
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coprosperity plan.”658  Whether this plan was real, this description aptly summarizes 
Mithridates’s probable relationship with the pirates. 
It would be easy to read too much into this, however.  It is unlikely that 
Mithridates would have granted a totally free hand to the pirates without some guarantees 
of Pontic immunity.
659
  Similarly he was unlikely to cede control of his operations to his 
sailors.  The solution is simple enough.  If we read pirates as being freelance warriors, 
when they accept employment with Mithridates, they, by that token, stop being pirates.  
Nevertheless, that does not make the historians who call them pirates wholly inaccurate. 
Thus, during his rule, Mithridates, as many Hellenistic monarchs before him, 
supplemented his navy with ‘at-large warriors’, these are generally called pirates in the 
sources, but Appian, at least, notes that they rejected the name.
660
  These at-large warriors 
were probably principally Cretans, but included Colchians and Cilicians as well.  
Mithridates had Galatian subjects, but may have supplemented them with mercenaries.
661
  
When not being directly employed by Mithridates, these seamen, probably including 
native Greeks and Pontics, returned to the ‘backup’ occupation of piracy.  This could well 
contribute to the array of nationalities of the ‘Cilician’ pirates as described by Appian.662  
Earlier, Mithridates had collected a large fleet and was forced to disband it.  This 
provides the obvious impetus for a sudden upswing of piracy in the late 80s and early 
70s; even those without prior piratic inclinations might engage in piracy as a reaction to 
sudden unemployment. 
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Now, the Third Mithridatic War began in 75, shortly after his agreement with 
Sertorius, and lasted until his death in 63.  It is a little unclear when precisely Marcus 
Marius was sent to Pontus, but certainly before the beginning of the war.  Though not 
usually perceived as such, this could be seen as Mithridates taking a side in the civil war 
(as he had grudgingly done with Sulla earlier) to ensure a friendly government or even to 
be granted territory by the victors (as had been the case for his Cappadocian relatives a 
generation earlier).  One might even fairly make the argument that Mithridates waited 
until the death of Sulla to make overtures to both sides of the civil war.  At the opening of 
this war, Mithridates may have had as many as 400 ships and an additional 100 light 
vessels.
663
  This represents a vast outlay of shipbuilding, especially given the virtual 
surrender of his navy in the first war.  Yet we hear that the Cilicians held a thousand 
ships and the Cretans had sufficient ships to fight off a Roman naval expedition, and this 
does not even include the camarai of the tribes of the eastern Black Sea.  A large portion 
of the crews of these ships were probably freelancers, and some of the ships were 
probably obtained from the same sources.  This could well include the triremes as well as 
the lighter ships.
664
  
There is a distinction between Lucullus and Pompey in the portrayal of 
Mithridates; Lucullus sought to downplay and even usurp Mithridates’s claim as 
protector of Greeks, and Pompey to show him as a leader of bandits, pirates, and Roman 
traitors.
665
  As de Souza puts it: “if Mithridates could be placed on the same level as 
pirates, it would be ample justification for Rome’s ultimate destruction of the Pontic 
king.”666  It was not simply an important portrayal for Roman purposes, however, but for 
Pompey’s especially.  Both Mithridates and Sertorius became intrinsically affiliated with 
the Cilicians and with Pompey’s defeat of the Cilicians, this gave Pompey the satisfaction 
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of tidily linking all three together.  To understand Pompey’s self-portrayal, then, we need 
to understand his relationship with his most famous campaign, that against the pirates. 
 
The Pirate War and the lex Gabinia 
The events culminating in the campaign against the pirates in 67 had a long 
history, and we see references to it scattered among events throughout the first century.
667
  
According to Plutarch, by the early sixties, the pirates possessed over a thousand ships 
and had sacked four hundred cities.
668
  By some accounts, the pirates’ locales seem to 
have been known: in the Life of Lucullus, Plutarch notes that when Lucullus was 
gathering a fleet for Sulla, he avoided the cities that engaged in unjust piracy.
669
  This 
could simply represent their reputation, but the account that he narrowly avoided capture 
and lost several ships to pirate attacks lends some credence to the claim.
670
 
The unusual piece of legislation known as the lex Gabinia gave extraordinary 
powers to Pompey, which Plutarch claimed was equivalent to a monarchy.
671
  It is often 
said, likely following Appian Mith 97, that this command was unparalleled in Roman 
history.
672
  Yet this unusual command did have precedent in form, as noted above, even if 
the extent and scope of this command was new.
673
  Antonius ‘Creticus’ was given such a 
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command against the pirates a few years before in 74-72, which ended rather poorly.  
Williamson states that the 102-100 command of Antonius also carried such provisions.
674
  
The LdPP, I would argue, also hints at a less well known precedent, perhaps one that 
never materialized.  In its descriptions of duties and powers, the law suggests the future 
governor has priority over the governors of Asia and Macedonia, and it is hinted that 
Marius might become that governor.  
Now, formally, other governors are not subordinated through this sweeping area 
of imperium.  In practice, though, the extraordinary imperium temporarily overrules the 
boundaries of the standard zones of imperium.  At least, such was Pompey’s argument 
when it came to Metellus in Crete.  It appears to be a conflict of authority not particularly 
anticipated by Gabinius or the other supporters of the legislation.  The question of 
whether Pompey’s imperium was maius or aequum remains a debate.675 
The Gabinian law was hotly contested at the time.
676
  Largely, the Senate was 
against it, but the people for it.  Famously, the consular Catulus asked to whom the power 
would devolve if Pompey were to die, and the people, rather than rethinking the proposal 
as he intended, responded that they would entrust it to him.
677
  The Senate and the 
tribunes were only able to delay the measure, and Pompey was duly given command for 
67. 
Enabled by the lex Gabinia, Pompey embarked on a whirlwind affair that emptied 
the treasury and ended in a complete victory at Coracesium.  The sources for the war are 
principally Dio, Plutarch, Appian, and Florus, while additional references to it may be 
found in Cicero.
678
   By Appian’s account (Mith. 91-96), the fighting at sea took eighty 
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days (forty in the west and forty in the east) followed by the showdown at Coracesium.  
This was a rapid success unimaginable before.  Thanks to Appian, we even know the 
subcommanders Pompey assigned to each region.
679
 
It is fair to say that the communis opinio of secondary scholarship, whatever the 
reason given for his success, is clear that succeed he did, and extremely well at that.
680
  
Nevertheless, it behooves us to examine the events rather closely.  If nothing else, they 
show a greater detail about the pirates of the first century than shown elsewhere. 
One may fairly question whether we should view the Cilicians as pirates en 
masse.
681
  It is unquestionable that the Gabinian law was meant to stop piracy.  But the 
very breadth of the domain extended to Pompey is indicative that while the Romans 
believed that the pirates were based in Cilicia, they were sufficiently uncertain of their 
location to give Pompey the right to go anywhere so long as he stopped the pirates.  The 
Romans equated the Cilicians with pirates and also assumed that the pirates troubling 
them were Cilician.  Were they right to do so?  I have already argued that for the latter 
question, Cretans or even Pontics were entirely plausible culprits.
682
  And as Rauh argues, 
the fleets may have been swelled by the addition of Greeks chafing under Roman rule, 
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precisely the sort of image Mithridates was keen to promote and the Romans to 
dampen.
683
   
Given that pirates could be indistinguishable from regular seafarers, it is unclear 
how Pompey’s subcommanders were to determine who the pirates were.  And given the 
massive enlistment of sailors and the collection of ships, it is far from inconceivable that 
certain pirate individuals would enlist in the pirate-hunting force.  Even if pirates simply 
decided to lie low, a mere forty days would not be too long to wait.  Pompey’s whirlwind 
campaign might then be seen as a warning rather than as an efficient method of 
destruction.  Additionally, since it seems very likely that Mithridates had hired a large 
number of Cretans and Cilicians, those individuals would almost certainly not have been 
swept up in Pompey’s net. 
The import of Pompey’s campaign struck a chord with other anti-pirate 
campaigns.  For example, Tröster argues that we should see the Roman elimination of 
piracy (meaning Pompey’s campaign) as akin to that of seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century Britain.
684
  Yet Roman and British professed interests were very different, even if 
they have some marked similarities in the global status quo.
685
  The role of the Romans in 
protecting trade is always a secondary or even incidental one.  Yet Pompey’s role was 
snatched up as laudable partially as a defense of the policies of other states and times.  
Since Pompey’s methods or rationales have been used to justify events of other periods, 
such comparisons to those periods must be made with caution.  That being said, in both 
cases piracy—both state-sponsored and freelance—did pose a threat to the state’s 
hegemony. 
The ancient sources largely ascribe to Pompey a complete elimination of piracy, 
and some go so far as to say that piracy never troubled Rome again, yet Pompey was 
                                                 
683
 See Rauh 2003, 192-194; Dio 36.20; Plutarch, Pomp. 24.  
684
 Tröster 2009, 19-20.  I might myself see connections between Pompey’s pirates and British engagement 
with the Barbary States (for example), but they would not be the same as Tröster’s.  Moreover, the 
motivations of James Stuart (one of the more impassioned anti-pirate figures) were altogether different 
from Pompey’s. 
685
 In both cases, the states embarked against piracy not long after a massive downgrading of multiple 
navies (and corresponding disbanding of the sailors).  This is usually seen as the navy having kept piracy in 
check, though we may fairly have some doubts as to where else those thousands of unemployed sailors 
went. 
167 
 
neither the first nor the last to claim such or have such claims ascribed to him.  The speed 
of his victory (~80 days) was astounding to everyone.  Strabo (10.4.9) says that the 
history of piracy is over with the destruction of the Cilicians.
686
  Piracy, however, 
reappeared in the Mediterranean almost immediately.
687
  The rhetoric praising Pompey 
overshadowed the reality of the situation—a notable accomplishment but hardly 
complete. 
Schulz indicates that Pompey may even have convinced pirates to switch sides 
beforehand, making his victory virtually assured.
688
  This is speculation, but a sound one, 
in my mind.  Pompey did empty the entire treasury.  The price of grain plummeted.  
Collusion with the pirates at some level seems obvious, given the clemency and even 
rewards granted the pirates.  We also have the evidence of Plutarch where he says that the 
pirates who surrendered led Pompey to those who had not.
689
  A number of authors have 
noted that Pompey finished his campaign too quickly to have actually raised the quantity 
of forces permitted under the law.  If, however, Pompey had alternate plans for the 
Roman treasury (such as hiring pirates into the fleet or bribing them to stop), then speedy 
action was a necessity to forestall the expenses in recruiting, transporting and paying the 
troops. 
Pompey was also said to have been initially ruthless to the pirates as an example, 
then merciful later.  While a credible course of action for the man once known as the 
‘Young Butcher’, it is difficult, however, to find examples of Pompey claiming this 
policy.
690
  The account of ruthlessness, if accepted, could easily be explained in two 
ways: first, by being directed at groups he had not negotiated with, and thus perhaps 
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avoiding too many accusations of being soft toward the pirates, and second, being the 
acts of subordinates who felt this the proper way of dealing with pirates.  Instead when 
Pompey’s policy is described, it is always as promoting clemency.691 
While his clemency is often lauded in later authors, it was not popular at the time. 
Criticism of Pompey’s clemency towards the pirates is seen in Plutarch, Cicero, and 
Velleius.
692
  Some felt that the pirates were rewarded rather than punished for their acts, 
while others believed that Pompey was impoverishing Roman veterans by denying them 
conquered lands.  According to Plutarch, he took no captives for his triumph, but released 
them all.  Plutarch puts the number of released pirates at ‘more than twenty thousand.’693  
This would represent quite a sum if sold as slaves and given to Pompey’s subordinates. 
We have relatively little knowledge of the Cilicians afterwards, but some of the 
pirates do resurface.  We see some in Crete with his legate Octavius (see below), Cicero 
discusses the settlers of Dyme engaging in piracy, the Cilician Tarcondimotus became a 
local Anatolian dynast loyal to Rome, and still other Cilicians appear decades later as 
generals in service to his son Sextus.
694
  Pompey’s war was clearly only a temporary fix 
of the situation. 
 
Pompey, Metellus, and Crete 
Pompey was given the extraordinary command against the pirates while Metellus 
was already engaged in reducing Crete.  As Crete is less than fifty miles wide, Pompey 
arguably had imperium over the entire province that had been already entrusted to 
Metellus.  Quintus Metellus was given Crete as a province ostensibly because of the 
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extant pirate problem, so in a way, the two had similar responsibilities.
695
  Ironically, 
Lasthenes, the Cretan leader was a native of Knossus, a long time Rhodian ally which 
had less of a piratic reputation than other Cretan cities.  As Crete had historically supplied 
mercenaries to Mithridates, this also had a direct effect on that campaign. 
Because of his reputation for clemency (and perhaps, by omission, Metellus’s 
reputation for being severe and uncompromising), the Cretans tried to surrender to 
Pompey rather than Metellus.  Now, at this time, Metellus Creticus and Pompey likely 
already had a strained relationship due to the interactions between Pompey and Q. 
Metellus Pius in Spain against Sertorius.
696
  This event more than strained their 
relationship, and according to Plutarch, Pompey’s troops even fought on behalf of the 
Cretans.
697
  Metellus and Pompey apparently wrote each other several letters arguing 
their sides.
698
  Pompey sent Lucius Octavius to negotiate with Metellus, and Sisenna, who 
held Greece, but was also seconded to Pompey, tried to intervene as well.
699
  In the end, 
Metellus did not allow the Cretans to surrender to Pompey but continued to take the last 
Cretan strongholds.
700
 
This attempt to surrender to Pompey would cause it to appear that Pompey could 
defeat Crete in just a few months, where it had taken Metellus three years.  Not only was 
this similar to his claim of wrapping up the pirate war in eighty days, but Pompey would 
later benefit similarly from Lucullus’s and Marcius’s efforts in Anatolia and had already 
acted similarly with Crassus against Spartacus and Metellus Pius in Spain against 
Sertorius. 
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Velleius tells us that Pompey coveted the glory of conquering Crete.
701
  Indeed, 
Velleius indicates that Lucullus and Metellus triumphed because of the unpopularity of 
Pompey with the people.
702
  This is surprising: only a few months earlier, Pompey gained 
unusual power because of his popularity with the people, and now, apparently, it had 
vanished.  By contrast, Plutarch instead indicates that Pompey’s motivation was merely 
to prevent Metellus from triumphing.
703
 
Metellus’s glory was indeed diminished despite his triumph, at least so claims 
Livy.
704
  Florus similarly claims that all Metellus got was a fancy new name.
705
  Perhaps 
not content with stealing the glory of Metellus, Pompey also apparently took pirate 
captives from Metellus to parade them in his triumph ex Asia.
706
   
The Cretan episode shows evidence of the Romans effectively detaching 
mercenary manpower from the ranks of Mithridates and generalizing pirate activity to the 
entire population.  The lack of naval activity, even in a siege role, suggests that Metellus 
had no supremacy at sea and may not ever have handed the Cretan League’s fleet a 
decisive defeat.  Moreover, for Pompey specifically, it shows that Pompey’s clemency 
towards the Cilicians was both effective as foreign policy and unpopular at home (at least 
at the time).   
 
The Lex Manilia and Pompey’s Acta 
After the pirate war, Pompey had further wars in the east.  The nature of his 
settling of the east and the role of the defeated pirates still looms over the narrative.  
Pompey’s actions were much aided by the victorious campaigns of Lucullus, who had 
decisively beaten both Mithridates and Tigranes in several battles already.  But Lucullus, 
as noted above, had enemies and difficulties of his own.  One legion mutinied in 68; L. 
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Quinctius in Rome and P. Clodius Pulcher in Asia spoke against him.  And when a 
subordinate lost most of an army to Mithridates, Lucullus was definitely out of favor.
707
 
The first obstacle was actually legislative.  No one had expected Pompey to meet 
with such success so soon, and he had been granted an extraordinary province.  The 
question was essentially whether to extend his command to include Mithridates or to 
recall him and grant him a triumph.  Thus the controversial Lex Manilia was put forth.
708
  
It handed control of even more resources, provinces and forces into Pompey’s hands and 
gave him the ability to prosecute the war in pretty much any way he wanted.  At this 
point in time, the war against Mithridates had largely been won by Lucullus.  Most of 
what remained to Pompey was to catch Mithridates and to deal with his Armenian ally 
Tigranes.  Piracy does not appear to have been a feature of the last part of this war, at 
least, not against the Romans.  Pompey’s successes against the pirates, however, formed 
an argument for giving this command to him.
709
 
Lucullus was none too pleased with this outcome, and despite an initially 
amicable meeting (at least on the surface), the two fell to disputes.  Plutarch tells us that 
Lucullus accused Pompey of being like a vulture, stealing glory from Crassus, Catulus, 
Metellus, and now himself.
710
  Lucullus had even begun the process of organizing the 
province.
711
  Pompey immediately began rescinding any agreement made by that 
commission.  As Broughton points out, there was no evidence that either the Gabinian or 
the Manilian law gave Pompey the legal authority to do this.
712
  As part of the agreements 
made by Pompey, Armenia ceded its recently-gained Mediterranean seaboard, much of 
which became part of Roman Cilicia.  Upon his return, he demanded that the Senate 
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ratify his organizational details of the past 6 years with a single vote, which was initially 
negative.
713
 
A problem frequently noted by historians is that of when, precisely, Pompey’s 
famous resettlement of Cilicians actually occurred.
714
  Syme placed it in 64, Frank and 
Jones both in 67, and Freeman suggests that some resettling was still happening in 62.
715
  
After all, Pompey could only resettle the Cilicians in territory that he could access, 
though he might well promise other territory at the conclusion of the eastern wars.  It may 
be worth noting that Tigranes had recently, after taking Cilicia, transplanted many Greeks 
from Cilicia into northern Mesopotamia.
716
  This might have provided openings on the 
land for Pompey to use.  What, we may wonder, did Pompey’s clemency amount to in the 
intervening years?  Did some resettlement happen immediately in Spain and Greece, such 
as at Dyme, on the Gulf of Corinth?
717
  If some of the pirates defeated at Coracesium 
were waiting until 62 for Pompey to give them land, what did they do in the intervening 
4-5 years?  
If one accepts the question, the most plausible answer is that this settlement was 
conditional on the pirates assisting Pompey against Mithridates, who had done a 
reasonably adequate job of harassing and skirmishing with the Roman fleet in the Black 
Sea.  This task would then be rewarded with tracts of land in Lower Cilicia, from which 
Marcius Rex had already driven any opposing Cappadocian and Armenian forces.
718
  
This was quite a reasonable offer for Pompey, after all, with the defeat of the pirates, and 
the capture of many ships, he had a surfeit of ships but perhaps a lack of people to man 
them.  Furthermore, Cilicians in Pompey’s employ might be able to negotiate with 
Cilicians in the employ of Mithridates or even recall any such Cilician mercenaries.  At 
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minimum, employing the Cilicians precluded Mithridates from hiring them out of his 
apparently-limitless war chest. 
At this point, one should recall the triumphal captives taken from Metellus.  To 
posit an unorthodox explanation: if Pompey had defeated the pirates and hired the 
survivors to work for him, he would, logically, have had no available pirates to parade.  
His initial command, however, was against the pirates, so he had to have pirate 
captives—even if he had to manufacture them.  Seizing those of Metellus was a 
productive way of saving face, with the added bonus of snubbing Metellus. 
Pompey’s Cilician arrangement also serves to explain the strange event, noted 
only in Dio (36.18-19), where Metellus executes the Cilician companions of Octavius, 
Pompey’s representative.719 
 
καίτοι τοῦ Ὀκταουίου αὐτὴν κατέχοντος, ἐκ προσβολῆς εἷλε, καὶ ἐκεῖνον μὲν οὐδὲν 
κακὸν εἰργάσατο, τοὺς δὲ δὴ  Κίλικας τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ ὄντας ἔφθειρεν 
 
“He took the city where Octavius was staying by assault and though he did no harm to 
that man, he killed the Cilicians who were with him.” 
 
In Dio’s account, there is no mention of why the Cilicians were there.  Plutarch tells us 
that Pompey kept no captives, and that his treatment of the Cilicians raised much Roman 
ire.  We might therefore guess that the Cilicians here were pardoned ‘pirates’ who 
accompanied Octavius as proofs of Pompey’s clemency or as ambassadors of his new 
Cilician allies.  In Metellus’s hands, however, these were enemies who Pompey was 
going to traitorously fail to execute.  Thus he did it himself to set matters aright.  One 
might also argue that Pompey’s stealing of the captives held by Metellus was in 
recompense for the Cilicians Metellus killed, but nowhere does Dio claim that those 
Cilicians were actually captives.  While the accounts of Metellus’s campaign are sparse, 
they generally do conclude with (or are shortly followed by) the assertion that Metellus 
organized Crete into a province.
720
  The precision of this detail is of greater significance 
than is immediately apparent.  The distinction the historians are keen to let us know is not 
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simply that it was done, but rather that Metellus was the one to do it and to be credited 
with it. 
Crete was combined with Cyrene, not with any of the new eastern provinces or 
with Achaea.  I suspect the abbreviated versions of the event we have themselves come 
from a more elaborate explanation in Livy of Metellus organizing Crete by a method 
decidedly unlike Pompey’s organizations in Anatolia and Syria.  While Pompey’s eastern 
decisions were criticized by the Senate, Metellus’s pass unmentioned.  I suspect that they 
may have been held up by some as a model by which provinces should be created.  His 
system appears unusual also, though.  Even though there was no set method for 
organizing a province, in the second century, it was usually a board of multiple people, 
sent out by the Senate.
721
  No such board is mentioned for Metellus, though the accounts 
are short enough to not preclude one having been sent and remaining unmentioned.  
Nevertheless, it appears that if Metellus employed a commission at all, it was out of his 
military staff. 
Pompey’s clemency may well have been tied to ideas of future use of these 
groups.  In the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, besides Romans, we also see these 
eastern groups appearing in Pompey’s force, including erstwhile ‘pirate peoples’ like the 
Cilicians and Cretans.
722
  Pompey’s allies come from all over the east, but it is notable 
that Pompey’s former enemies side with him rather than his enemy.  Indeed, Cilician 
ships come to escort him in his flight to Egypt.
723
  His acts of clemency won him allies 
that were not solely ‘fair-weather’. 
It may even be fair to speculate that Pompey’s demands that all his acta be 
ratified together stem not solely from arrogance.  It is probably fair to say that his 
clemency toward the Cilicians and even rewarding them with land was his most 
unpopular decision, coupled with his snubbing of Metellus Creticus, and Plutarch says 
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that even his friends disagreed with him here.
724
  The snubbing of Lucullus and canceling 
of his decisions must have run close, as well.  If Pompey did gain twenty thousand pirates 
loyal to himself in 67, these individuals may have had the most to lose by the acta not 
being ratified.  By demanding that the acta be ratified together, Pompey coupled a 
potential ‘unlanding’ of the former pirates to a potential renewed war with Armenia and 
perhaps even a new one with Parthia.  After defeating Pompey, Julius Caesar did evict 
the Cilician colony at Dyme and turned it over to his veterans.
725
 
It is easy to compare Pompey to a Hellenistic monarch, but his treatment of piracy 
is not normally included amongst the reasons.  Pompey’s treatment of the Cilicians is 
more reminiscent of the Greek reaction to piracy.  Pompey’s clemency might well be 
rooted in Greek philosophy, but perhaps also in personal gain.
726
 
 
Conclusions 
Pompey’s campaigns prove excellent examples of the Roman tendency to reframe 
and reimagine the enemy.  In his own portrayal, he strove to be identified with figures 
like Alexander, Scipio Africanus, and even Poseidon.  In retrospect, virtually all of 
Pompey’s campaigns exhibited a tendency to associate the enemy leaders with banditry 
and piracy.  Some of these were contemporary accusations (as was the case with Caesar), 
others apparently belated (as with Sertorius).  Yet his own associations with pirates are 
difficult to deny.  This might suggest that the self-portrayal as destroyer of pirates was, at 
least partially, defensive in nature. 
For the purposes of seeking triumphs, accusations of banditry were useful.  By 
custom, triumphs could not be held over other Romans.  As noted above, the portrayal of 
Sertorius as barbarian, and a leader of Iberians, not Romans, was thus useful for the 
triumphal desires of Metellus and Pompey.  Similarly, Pompey and Caesar tried to 
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position themselves as the ‘true Romans’ and the other as siding with foreigners and 
bandits.  Regardless of the truth of the claims, the claims themselves serve as an 
indication of how legitimacy was sought.  This is not even so petty a motivation as to 
‘simply’ attain a triumph.  Rather, at the larger scale, the successful triumph was a sign of 
attainment of legitimacy.   
As a result of the campaigns of Pompey, many polities in Spain and Asia became 
dependents not of Rome, but of Pompey primarily, and this only truly becomes clear in 
the civil wars decades later.  The loyalty of the Cilicians was notable, but it was a loyalty 
to Pompey.  What was true of polities was also true of individuals.  The ironic result was 
that the at-large warrior became something that the Roman state tried to eliminate 
(through becoming the sole market for military manpower) while Roman individuals, like 
Pompey, tried to maintain its existence.  In particular, the Romans, consciously or 
unconsciously, repeatedly forced the areas that had been major suppliers of manpower 
out of that market, which forced the Hellenistic monarchs, the main employers of 
mercenaries, to adapt their military organization.  Mithridates serves as a prime example 
in this chapter, but this is a continuation of a longer-term trend.  
The portrayal of the individual is extremely important.  The history of the first 
century was frequently recorded as the biographies of great men: Marius, Sulla, Pompey, 
Sertorius, Catiline, Cicero, Caesar, to name a few.  And the non-Romans get their share 
as well: Spartacus, Jugurtha, and Mithridates similarly appear as notable figures.  Roman 
historical writing about the first century really represents a history from the top.  It is 
difficult, as always, to write a history from the bottom with such sources.  Furthermore it 
is difficult to be more on the bottom than slaves and pirates.  Elite Roman associations of 
others with these ‘bottom folks’ is thus very significant.  Cicero’s usage of pirate 
vocabulary to describe elite Romans thus deserves examination and it is these issues that 
will dominate the following section. 
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Chapter Six: Legitimacy and Rhetoric 
In this section, I step away from analysis of the history to refocus on the historical 
accounts and how they came about.  I have argued above, repeatedly, that the historians 
present conflicting or inaccurate accounts through their beliefs of how history had to 
function or through ‘retrojecting’ ideas from their own period into the past.  This chapter 
and the next strive to explain how that state came about.  I suggest the principal causes 
come in two varieties: intentional and unintentional.  Of these, the first principally arises 
from a desire to portray certain individuals positively or negatively and the second, from 
authorial preconceptions.  In this chapter, I explain how the rhetoric of piracy was 
employed to establish legitimacy for one group and/or take it away for another.  
Embedded within this conflict of legitimacy were genuine debates about legality and also 
the rules surrounding the triumph.  These aspects of legitimacy are important for a study 
of the freelancer, who is consistently described with pejoratives, even when employed by 
a legitimate commander and on the victorious side. 
The Role of Legitimacy 
As I hope has already become clear, legitimacy was an important factor in 
conflicts involving bands of freelancers.  Such figures could be auxiliaries, mercenaries, 
or pirates, dependent not on how they acted, but instead on whether the author regarded 
those acts as acceptable.  It may be possible to view these outsiders as bands with ‘too 
much freedom’.  The Romans certainly sought to curtail power and freedom to act for 
everyone, high to low.  Faced with bands of at-large warriors, who could pack up and 
move whenever they wanted and were difficult to compel without bribes or threats of 
force, it is easy to see how that degree of independence was difficult to work into the 
Roman framework of legitimacy. 
The Romans wanted the state to have a monopoly on violence.  Any individual 
who inflicted violence had to do so with the blessing of the state or be liable to the 
punishment of the state.  Now, on the other hand, that blessing could be as little as 
recognizing prerogatives, such as the authority of the paterfamilias over his household.  
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This was a way for the state to recognize legitimate authority to commit violent acts 
against a curtailed segment of the population.   
As mentioned before in chapter 2, there can well be states that do not understand 
or recognize the ‘state monopoly’ concept.  Teuta’s Illyrian state may stand as the 
archetype for the non-monopoly-state—the state that does not infringe upon the 
individual’s right to commit violence.  Rome, by contrast, stands as the archetype of the 
monopoly-state—violence condoned by the state was inherently acceptable, but other 
violence was inherently suspect. 
This is a functional way to examine the discrepancy between Rome and Illyria.  
We do not have to conceive of it in such a way, however.  In such a state as Illyria, the 
rules are not particularly different: the state, again, recognizes a set of prerogatives, albeit 
wider.  The Illyrian state chooses to recognize the individual’s right to inflict violence on 
non-Illyrians.  The real distinction is one of non-interference.  It is not an instance of the 
state decreeing it right or wrong, but of the state deciding to be apart from the decision. 
The ‘at-large’ or freelance warrior, one who inflicts violence as a profession, does 
not fit the Roman concept of the world with state monopolies on violence.  The freelance 
warrior, however, may or may not have a state and if he does have one, that state may or 
may not able to compel him.  His trade is to do harm as a means of acquiring wealth, 
whether that be direct or indirect.  If he finds a situation where he can act within the 
state’s favor, he generally does so.  Though there must be exceptions, the majority of 
bandits and pirates appear to act like the mercenaries released from Persian service: 
acting independently until they can be hired again.
727
 
The legitimacy of the mercenary, and the at-large warrior in general, rests upon 
employment and employer, not the nature of his actions.  The propensity of the 
mercenary to turn bandit when unemployed, however, creates a new set of expectations.  
Soldiers or employed mercenaries who plunder indiscriminately are ‘acting like 
bandits’.728  Greek and Roman attitude toward war spoils was generally positive, so the 
negative associations rest heavily on its indiscriminate nature.  A controlled force of 
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freelancers that inflicted violence in a directed manner was acceptable.  If the force, 
however, was uncontrolled this was even worse than a regular enemy force, because 
negotiation with them was not regarded as a possibility.  This question of legitimacy in 
violence is especially important in trying to understand the evolution of social structures 
in Iberia because there was an ongoing contest for political legitimacy between native 
Iberians, Carthaginians and Romans.  That is, the Roman seizure of Iberia from Carthage 
inherited existing ambiguities without recognizing them, and this situation resulted in a 
century-long power struggle rooted in ongoing refusals by both Iberians and Romans to 
accept the legitimacy claimed by the other.  In describing wars in Iberia as banditry, the 
Iberians’ actions are cast as illegitimate violence, though once they reach a certain scale 
they become wars (bella).
729
  New tactics emerge.  Declaring foes pirates or bandits 
‘proved’ their illegitimacy and defeating them was a sign of one’s own legitimacy.730  
Doing so, however, weakened one’s potential claim to a more prestigious victory; 
defeating bandits did not extend the empire.   
Some depictions of bandits, however, reveal a noble bandit, combining a virtuous 
spirit with criminal activity.  What then, is the noble bandit? Hobsbawm’s category of the 
noble bandit may be useful.
731
  Hobsbawm, writing of an entirely different period, 
suggests that the noble bandit is motivated by injustice, rights wrongs, derives support 
from the locals or lower classes and in turn supports them, is superhumanly competent at 
fighting or flight, and, in the end, falls only to treachery.
732
  While Hobsbawm’s 
categories might not reflect the Roman depiction of the latro, there are some parallels 
with characters such as Viriathus, Jugurtha, Sertorius, Spartacus, Catiline, and Arminius.  
Spann argues that Sertorius is actually the exemplar of ‘Sabine virtue’.733  This is no 
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mean observation.  Viriathus is cast as a reflection of the archaic hero, for whom 
plundering on one’s own authority was an act of virtue.734 
Grünewald’s account divides the set of bandits into ‘common’ and ‘noble’ types, 
and then into four categories: ‘robbers’, ‘rebels’, ‘rivals’, and ‘avengers’.735 In assigning 
instances to each of these divisions, he highlights particular characteristics and themes in 
the portrayal of the latro, though perhaps misses for comparisons between instances 
contained in different chapters.  Grünewald’s overall contention is that the latro has 
become a literary convention and poorly reflects real latrocinium.  
In Iberia, Viriathus appears as a most interesting character, and his career seems 
to foreshadow that of Sertorius rather closely.  Moreover, the characters of Viriathus as 
drawn by Dio and Catiline as drawn by Sallust also appear strangely similar.
736
 These fall 
into Grünewald’s category of the “edle Räuber”737  For Catiline, however, Grünewald 
explicitly notes that Catiline is “afforded none of the traits of [the] ‘noble’ bandit...”.738  
Though he is specifically talking about Cicero’s polemic, Grünewald is perhaps 
examining Cicero too closely and Sallust insufficiently.  Sallust’s account clearly does 
grant Catiline virtues—specifically some of those used to describe the ‘noble bandit’. 
The overall narrative of the Viriathic War also causes us to reexamine the other 
terminology employed.  The bandit-gangs and their leaders (λῃστήρια and λῄσταρχοι) are 
not portrayed as actively plundering and the booty (λείαν) captured in each case is taken 
not from the countryside, but rather, from the Roman armies or camps.  In other words, 
these bandits are strikingly Robin Hood-esque, and if an ancient example were to fit the 
bandits of Hobsbawm, this would likely be it.  Appian is clearly critical of Roman 
conduct in this campaign, and even praises Viriathus.  Indeed, he avoids associating any 
of the bandit terminology with Viriathus. 
The question remains: does Appian exclude these bandits from the main narrative 
of Viriathus for the sake of the portrayal of Brutus or of Viriathus?  Arguably, Appian 
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tries to portray Viriathus as a legitimate leader of the Lusitani and employment of these 
λῃστήρια would weaken that portrayal.  Alternately, by having Brutus engage λῃστήρια 
instead of the armies under Viriathus, Brutus can be seen in a more positive light, rather 
than the mixed view he promotes of the rest of the Roman campaigners.  The brutality of 
his suppression of the province can hardly be wholly positive, but is it not clearly more 
positive than if these had been irregulars under the command of Viriathus? 
In our records, Marius cleansed ‘bandits’ (λῃστηρίων) from Hispania Ulterior, but 
his successors in the province are faced with revolts.
739
  Such terms are warning signs 
that the history is slanted.  There is not much evidence to show one way or another what 
is going on or whether these are indeed different groups.  What we do consistently see is 
Appian avoiding using negative terminology at all for the few Roman commanders in 
Spain he approves of, and describing their enemies in a particularly negative way.  This is 
a subtle amelioration in the portrayal of the Roman side, but a notable one.  Even the 
worse Roman commanders, however greedy for plunder, are never bandits. 
Similarly, Livy, when he describes the assault on Vergium, rather than describe it 
as Cato taking a side in a civil war or in taking the town by treachery, instead Cato is 
clearing a town of the praedones who had captured it.  Obviously, the praedones can 
have no legitimate claim to the city and Cato can only be restoring order.
740
  The term 
immediately invokes past experiences to support a specific version of events.  Again it 
does not matter whether the controllers of Vergium were praedones or not to realize that 
Livy’s use of the term predisposes the reader to choose the same side as Cato. 
The most telling depictions, however, are those of Lucullus and Galba in 151-
150.
741
  These appear to be the worst (i.e. most treacherous or potentially bandit-like) 
examples of Romans in Spain.  They are described as treacherous and wicked, but in 
none of the accounts are they actually described as bandits.  Appian charges them with 
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imitating barbarians.  Galba was later charged with wrongdoing, but acquitted.
742
  Misuse 
of force was not lacking authority to use force.  By contrast, the Apulian herdsmen 
revolting in the 150s were called bandits.
743
  If these were the most overt episodes, they 
were not unique.  Cicero tells us that Cato and the tribune Libo attempted to stem 
excesses in Spain, and thereby acquired the enmity of many (cum multis gravis 
inimicitias).
744
   
Bandits were blamed (perhaps correctly) by Caepio in 106 for absconding with 
the plunder taken from the temple Tolosa.
745
  Regardless of whether this group was 
indeed engaging in latrocinium (and not, for example, raiders affiliated with Tolosa), it 
serves as a telling instance where the commander’s acts had to be justified because of the 
unforeseen acts of banditry.  That is, bandits’ acts were the most politically acceptable 
explanation of the situation, that he looted temples yet still had no money to deposit in 
Rome.  Caepio judged it better to have been defeated by bandits than charged with 
corruption. 
Iberia, I argue, provides the perfect grounds for judging the role of legitimacy as it 
plays out in the historians.  However reprehensible the Roman commanders may have 
been, they bore legitimate authority.  Their opponents, however justified, often were not 
considered to bear such authority, because they had no state to grant it to them.  Thus, 
bandit-rhetoric is frequently used for ‘revolting’ forces and less so for forces that were 
previously and definitely independent. 
De Souza concludes that the Romans describing certain maritime communities as 
pirates was a deliberate mischaracterization, “intended to demonize them in 
contemporary eyes in order to justify imperialist aggression against them for far less 
                                                 
742
 Cicero deemed him one of the foremost authorities of his day.  A brief account of the case may be found 
at Cicero, Brut. 89-90 (and a longer one, involving the merits of Galba’s oratorical skills throughout 80-
94).  Galba’s defense was (according to Livy Per. 49) simply that he only broke the truce first, but the 
Iberians were about to do so. 
Cicero used the case of Galba as evidence for Roman corruption in the Pro Murena (59) though elsewhere 
(e.g. Brut. 90) states that it was the tactic of putting his children on display that won over the jury. 
743
 Livy, 39.29. 
744
 Cicero, Div. Caec. 66.  Cato also apparently described the event and included his speech in his Origines 
(Cicero, De Or. 1.227, Livy Per. 49, Valerius Maximus, 8.1.2) 
745
 See Strabo 4.1.13, Dio, 22-29.90, Cicero, Nat D 3.74, Broughton1951 (MRR I) 553.  Caepio was later 
punished for sacrilege. 
183 
 
noble reasons.”746  The next question, then, is simply: “why does this work?”  It seems 
unlikely that the Roman listeners, attuned as they were to the nuances of rhetoric, would 
simply fall to such suggestions.  The sheer bulk of such charges and the omissions of 
other counter-responses show that even if the majority of attempts to ascribe piracy to an 
opponent were unsuccessful, it was occasionally an effective tactic.  The discredited 
charge, however, carried little penalty.  Unlike a false charge in a formal court case, the 
attributions of banditry to a people, if disbelieved, merely meant that a hoped-for triumph 
would not materialize.  In short, even if success was not common, the risks were 
relatively low for a substantial potential gain.  De Souza argues convincingly that the 
Romans created a perception of piracy, which they then proceeded to hang upon every 
sea-going foe they fought for the next 300 years.
747
 
For Romans accused of piracy, legitimacy is often tied up with imperium.  Our 
richest source of information comes from Cicero.  Cicero, in talking about his enemies, 
frequently depicts them as overstepping their authority.  Actions beyond their authority 
are naturally banditlike.
748
  This usage of pirate terminology was not limited to Cicero or 
the 60s BC either, but continued through the civil war period, being leveled against 
Caesar, Antony, and both the elder and younger Pompey.  Both Brutus and Lentulus 
called Caesar a bandit.
749
 Appian records Pompey as accusing Caesar of practicing piracy 
(λῃστεύοντα).750  This was clearly a widespread tactic. 
As a political gambit, it was a productive point of attack to go after the legitimacy 
of individual magistrates. By transgressing the authority that naturally rested in the hands 
of the Roman Senate and the Roman People, individual office-holders became regarded 
as illegitimate.  Thus political attacks might dwell upon force and destruction for their 
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emotional appeal, but an accusation of banditry was an assertion that the magistrates had 
far exceeded their authority.  
The portrayal of foreigners as bandits/pirates is slightly different than the 
portrayal of Romans as bandits/pirates.  The foreigner, qua bandit, is not a legitimate 
leader and certain formalities of warfare need not be observed.  When one’s legitimacy as 
a leader is actually unassailable (for example, that of Mithridates who was the king of 
Pontus) the attacks on legitimacy are naturally directed at his subordinates.  Thus, in his 
entrusting power to those who do not deserve to hold it, that leader is seen as weak, 
capricious, and untrustworthy.  These are fundamentally similar to the charges of ‘going 
native’ levelled at characters like Sertorius or Antony.  
 
Perceptions and Triumphs 
While the motives of individual historians need to be noted, there is a 
preponderance of material portraying certain places as piratical, to the extent that 
individuals of such extractions are understood as piratical even without an explicit 
statement to this effect.  For Crete in particular, Brulé has argued against exaggeration of 
the stereotype.
751
  This use of the stereotype is problematic and dangerously circular.  On 
the one hand, it helps us understand the depiction of the Cilician Tryphon as a pirate, 
rooted in Strabo, but it also allows us to question whether that piratic nuance was really 
there in the first place.
752
  Likewise, the scholarly depiction of Lasthenes the Cretan as a 
pirate is rooted entirely in a fragment of Diodorus.
753
  Nevertheless, these characters bear 
the reputation of their homelands.  In these examples, the single classical reference 
carries undue weight for modern historical accounts. 
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So what were these ‘pirate lands’?  If we start with Cilicia, Crete, Illyria, Liguria, 
Sardinia, and Iberia, we have a solid foundation.  The previously discussed Balearics falls 
into this, as Metellus was likely the governor of Spain, but it seems unlikely that they had 
the reputation of the others for any prolonged period.  Each of these bear similarities.  
They are mountainous lands, known to produce mercenaries, and posed particular 
challenges to outside domination.  Moreover, these areas rarely had any form of regional 
unity except when imposed upon them. 
Governors of ‘pirate lands’ were especially likely to seek and celebrate triumphs.  
This could be construed as evidence either that these areas remained hostile and relatively 
unsubdued or that they simply provided good bases for piracy.  Alternatively, however, a 
land’s reputation for piracy may have facilitated triumphal claims.  In theory, a triumph 
was supposed to signify a final victory and an extension of Roman power, and was not 
permitted until the campaign truly ended.  In practice, magistrates assigned Hispania, 
Liguria, or Cilicia could be seen to triumph year after year without any clear indication 
that affairs were settled. 
Using the example of Cilicia as a model, I argue we can begin to see 
correspondences in the campaigns of other areas.
754
  Perhaps other governors did not 
have a young Rufus back in Italy such as Cicero did, urging him to find something he 
could both defeat and gain a triumph for.  Nevertheless, the same dynamics that applied 
to Cicero applied to earlier governors.  The presence of freelance warriors, in any 
capacity, lent veracity to the claims that military action was necessary.  These places 
were regarded as lawless and disordered.  
The seeking of military honors in Iberia may also hold a key to some of the 
seeming contradictions discussed in the previous section.  Since triumphs were expected 
to be awarded at the end of a finished war/campaign, it was unseemly to have further 
fighting there in following years.  In this light, the recipients or potential recipients of the 
triumphs had glory and reputation at stake, and so it behooved them to portray such 
conflict as a rebellion or banditry, anything but the continuation of hostilities that they 
also argue have been concluded. 
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It might be worthwhile to compare the triumph of Metellus Delmaticus to some of 
the victories of the civil wars of the first century.  Since it was at best impolitic to 
celebrate a triumph over other Romans, a triumph over a non-Roman ally of your Roman 
enemy could suffice.  So we see this with Caesar’s victories celebrated over Juba and 
Cleopatra.  Pedius and Fabius Maximus celebrated triumphs over Spanish tribes in 45 
(not the Pompeian remnants)
755
 and Augustus claimed a triumph over ‘pirates’ in Sicily 
(not specifically Sextus Pompey) in 36.  A similar situation might be noted with 
Sertorius, as the campaigns of Metellus and Pompey would be more praiseworthy if 
Sertorius were the traitorous leader of the Lusitani rather than another civil war contender 
with Lusitani allies.
756
  This spin of enemy was common enough that Florus remarked 
upon its lack when Lepidus failed at a revolution when Sulla died.
757
 
The need to portray the enemy as an outsider was crucial.  When Julius Caesar 
celebrated his triumphs ex Hispania and ex Africa, the Roman citizenry were not 
amused.
758
  Even the vast exploits of Caesar could not fully justify his claims for 
triumphs where he did not meet the criteria.  While he had the political clout to go 
through with his quadruple triumph, we should assume that the state of triumphal politics 
was certainly no more laissez faire. 
Accordingly, I suggest that the Dalmatian triumph of Metellus Delmaticus had 
more to do with politics in Rome than his campaigning of that year.  The reason for the 
triumph, I argue, was actually principally the war with the Segestani.  The reasoning 
behind this could have many sources.  The Delmatae (Dalmatians) were probably a more 
familiar name and may have carried more prestige, either in that tribe’s relative proximity 
or with that tribe functioning as a metonym for central Illyria.  Politics in Rome may have 
barred him from being awarded a triumph but further politics in the next year reversed 
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that decision.  If this were the case, it would be expedient to use the name of a different 
tribe. 
Campaigns might be seen as resulting from a provocation, either first- or 
secondhand. Florus, following Livy, clearly sees plundering raids as sufficient 
provocation for the Romans to invade and subjugate.
759
  So the Dalmatians are caught in 
latrocinia, clearly a negative description, but the Pannonians a few sentences earlier are 
described as populati proximos (prone to plunder).
760
  This latter phrase emphasizes the 
warlike nature of the Pannonians, while the former emphasizes the illegitimate nature of 
the Dalmatians.
761
  Cicero asserted that the Romans had frequently before come to the aid 
of Roman financial interests abroad.
762
  Yet this does not appear to be particularly well 
borne out by history, and the best that might be asserted is that they tried to protect the 
lives of Romans who had financial interests abroad.   
While a ‘safer’ expedition politically, campaigns against the illegitimate 
freelancers were also seen as intrinsically less dangerous.  Imperial sources held that 
defeats of brigands, slaves, or pirates merited a mere ovatio.
763
  This rule seems dubious, 
given the evidence of the first century (featuring triumphs by Antonius, Servilius Vatia, 
Pompey, Metellus, and others, all against such individuals).
764
 Appian tells us that 
salutation as imperator required 10,000 kills, though also suggests the numbers were 
lower in earlier days.
765
  The triumph may have been in a state of flux for some time, as 
according to Valerius Maximus, the rules for triumphs were just being codified in the 
second century.
766
  Nevertheless, the rules seem to have remained flexible, and it appears 
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that the most pertinent criteria for meriting a triumph was convincing others that one’s 
actions merited a triumph.  The technicalities of the triumph, if the Periochae of Livy are 
to be believed, should have prevented not just the triumph of Metellus Delmaticus, but 
also that of Tuditanus, who was saved from utter defeat by the intervention of Decimus 
Iunius Brutus.
767
 
This triumph also serves as an important comparandum, as Tuditanus waged war 
not merely against the Iapydes, but also against the Histri, Taurisci and Liburni: 
essentially the entire northern coast of Illyricum.  Evidence for this is found in 
inscriptions at Aquileia, some fragments of which have been found, but also mentioned 
by Pliny.
768
  Wilkes argues that it is surprising that Tuditanus made it as far as the 
Delmatae, but in examining the earlier campaigns it should be fairly obvious that the 
direction of advance was principally northwest rather than southeast.  The decision of 
Tuditanus to commemorate his victories at Aquileia may serve as corroboration.  
Furthermore, Metellus was actually assigned to fight the Segestani, who lived in the 
interior northeast of the Iapydes.  Tuditanus, though his exploits against the Iapydes may 
have been less than worthy, may have used his further campaigns in Illyria to justify his 
triumph.  Florus, when discussing the wars of Augustus in North Africa, calls them more 
disturbances than wars.  In keeping with his criticisms of the later wars, he claims (2.31) 
that Cossus Gaetulicus did not deserve his title, and that Quirinius would have been 
Quirinius Marmaricus if he had simply reported the outcome differently.
769
 
While triumphs were hotly contested, military honors were not the only goal.  The 
economic incentive behind such campaigns should not be discounted.  And as Harris 
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(1985) does, it is convenient to look at all personal gain together.
770
  The desire for 
money, prestige, glory, and political advancement were well intertwined and trying to 
assess which of these was at the fore is simply not that important for our purposes.  
Triumphing was not necessarily easy.  A fragment of Quadrigarius: Romam venit, 
vix superat quin triumphus decernatur ( “He came to Rome, and scarcely won that a 
triumph would be allowed.”) implies that obtaining the right to triumph was not always a 
sure thing in the second century.
771
  Increasingly, as battles moved further and further 
afield, triumphs were not observed by as many witnesses, and whether a victory merited a 
triumph or not rested more and more within debates in the Senate.  Certainly some 
wanted to preserve the triumph for truly noteworthy victories while for others, it became 
a political pawn. 
Cicero was hunting for a triumph in Cilicia.  He also claims that the orator 
Crassus, the consul of 95, sought for an Alpine tribe he might attack and defeat for the 
sake of a triumph.
772
  Similarly, Cotta, whom Cicero terms ‘a man of supreme genius’, 
also failed to find an enemy to defeat.
773
  Thus the search for the triumph was attributed 
to even positive characters, and not generally seen as greedy.  Triumph-hunting was not 
expressly dishonorable.  Desiring a triumph essentially came down to desiring an 
improvement in the fortunes of the Roman state, so describing that desire negatively 
meant showing that the campaign was both an aggrandizement of the would-be 
triumphator and actually injurious to the state. 
The role of the greedy would-be triumphator was reserved for those who made 
war upon allies.  By those criteria, Appian clearly holds Delmaticus to have been a 
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triumph-hunter.
774
  Spann describes T. Didius, who triumphed in 93, as another example 
of the triumph-hunter.
775
  Cicero’s letters to magistrates in Cilicia and Cyprus (where he 
had been governor) remind them of the allied status of certain towns.  Such notices may 
have been intended to serve simply as a recommendation, but perhaps they also served to 
warn these magistrates that those towns were not legitimate targets for military honors. 
Military honors, unsurprisingly, were helpful to a political career. Harris argues 
that triumphing praetors had a substantial edge over their rivals in contesting the 
consulship.
776
  Over 75% of praetors who triumphed in the second century also held a 
later consulship.  Thus, the triumph did have a substantial benefit to the commander 
beyond the honor.  Yet what about the consular triumphators? They might well seek re-
election but there is still another rationale.  Consuls who won a triumph were partially 
protected by that honor from political prosecution.  The famous Scipio Africanus even 
refused to allow himself to be taken to trial because that would irreparably tarnish the 
past.
777
  
Strangely, military defeats, even at the hands of bandits (or ‘bandits’) did not have 
a correspondingly negative impact on one’s political career or that of one’s family.  
Contrarily, they appear to have a positive effect (or at least, correlation).  Clark recently 
pointed out that ‘it could be an electoral advantage to have been defeated’ and this is 
even more of an advantage for the sons of a magistrate who died amid a Roman defeat.
778
  
Aggression was regarded as a positive trait in a commander, regardless of the outcome. 
With the exception of Cilicia, piracy is never the cause for a Roman campaign, 
only a pretext.  Even in the case of Cilicia, piracy seems to be a pretext up until the 70s.  
Of the other campaigns, many are at the instigation of a Roman ally (particularly 
Massilia).  While in those cases piracy or raiding may be a factor for the ally asking for 
aid, it bears little import for Roman decision-making.  The Romans had a clear history of 
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regularly aiding their allies.  Maintaining this reputation, I argue, was far more important 
to the Roman decision-makers than trying to ascertain right and wrong, which they 
reserved more for disagreements among allies. 
Why, then, was piracy not an issue for actual decision-making but lauded as 
though it were in the aftermath?  The answer, I believe lies in the regular behavior of the 
senators and the equestrian class.  The senators made the decisions to go to war, but they 
had to sell these wars to the people in a legislative assembly.  Or to put it another way, 
the Senate/magistrates decided where and the people decided whether, though it was rare 
for the people to say no.  The equestrian class, however, conducted the vast majority of 
overseas trade and inasmuch as Romans were affected by piracy, it was 
disproportionately these equestrians who were affected.  This meant that a defeat of 
pirates (or ‘pirates’) could be spun to appeal to the equestrians, but also that the 
magistrates involved rarely had any personal stake in eliminating piracy.  Up until the 
Late Republic, defeat of piracy was a means to an end, not an end in its own right. 
By the second quarter of the first century, however, there were two substantial 
shifts regarding piracy.  First, the pirates began to kidnap and ransom Roman aristocrats, 
which would logically make the senatorial class start to care far more about piracy.  
Second, the equestrian class had grown in power to the point where gaining equestrian 
support through suppressing pirates was more politically advantageous. If one accepts the 
framework I have just presented, either shift could result in the further-reaching 
commands such as those given to Antonius or Pompey.  I think the second more likely, 
however.  Beyond the pirates’ abduction of prominent senatorial figures like Antonia, 
Julius Caesar, or Clodius, the equestrian class would have been hit at least as hard, not to 
mention that this class was actually involved with maritime trade.
779
   
Certainly, the prominence of those figures makes their stories also more 
prominent, and there is little reason to think that abduction and ransom by pirates was not 
even more widespread among the less famous but still wealthy Romans.  If it could be 
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shown that the pirates did target the aristocracy in particular, that might be an indication 
that the piracy formed a sort of social banditry involving the lower classes of the Roman 
Empire in opposition to the highest classes.  In such a scenario, we should logically 
expect the historians, with their elite bias, to report such activity as criminal.  
Nevertheless such speculation has little to support it and a far readier explanation for 
widespread piracy can be found in the presence of at-large, stateless warriors who had 
either been displaced by the Mithridatic wars, various civil wars, or simply chosen the 
wrong side in one of these conflicts. 
  
Repeated Claims of Victory 
To most modern and ancient historians, the plague of piracy in the Mediterranean 
died in 67 at Coracesium.
780
  A significant number will further remark on the delightful 
irony of the son of the man who defeated piracy in the Mediterranean turning pirate 
himself (referring to the activities of Sextus Pompey 44-35 BC).
781
  Nonetheless, across 
history, we see a marked pattern of individuals claiming credit for putting an end to 
piracy.
782
  Such claims were made for Eumelus, the Rhodian state, Marius, Antonius 
(Orator), Pompey, and Caesar.
783
  Even Sextus Pompey was given some credit for 
eliminating the threat of piracy.
784
  At a smaller scale, such claims were touted by 
individual praetors and governors.
785
  Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus is simply the most 
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famous of these.
786
  Octavian was praised by many for eliminating illegitimate violence; 
the most famous expression of this perhaps being the claim of Velleius: “the Augustan 
peace keeps every alley of the entire world safe from fear of banditry.”787  For all the 
rhetoric of the major figures of the Republic, the majority of attestations of 
banditry/piracy come from the empire.
788
 
These claims need not be hypocritical.  Piracy can return swiftly.  Its rapid 
resurgence is noted in Cicero’s incidental defense of Pompey: essentially claiming ‘he 
never claimed they wouldn’t come back!’ in the Pro Flacco.789  The sole admission of 
endless piracy I have seen comes from Cassius Dio (36.20), who attributes it to human 
nature.  In this context, the anti-pirate campaign is less about stopping the activity of 
piracy than about restricting its scale, or possibly, its targets.  The evidence, however, 
does suggest that the freelance warriors were convinced to take up another occupation 
and then fell back into piracy when events changed, such as was the case for the pirates 
of Dyme.
790
  As I have argued before, piracy was, for most pirates, the backup profession.  
While employed in other occupations, ipso facto, the pirates ceased to be pirates. 
Furthermore, some of the destroyers of piracy likely did so by hiring freelance 
warriors.  I have already suggested that Pompey’s peace with the pirates involved directly 
hiring some of those pirates.  But even without such a direct link, this is a link we should 
expect.  Even when the hired freelancers were from another population, this would 
happen.  By reducing the supply of unemployed warriors, the quantity of bandits and 
pirates would likewise be reduced.  In particular, the boldest pirates, willing to sack and 
even to take over cities, would almost certainly be men who had already used these 
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talents in the service of one country or another.  Thus, increases in piracy are most likely 
to occur some time after freelancers have been discharged from service and turn to an 
alternate method of support.
791
  This is true regardless of which side the freelancers had 
been employed upon, though such circumstances naturally affected the time before 
freelancers turned to ‘alternative employment’. 
I argue that this logic partially accounts for when pirates appear in our historians.  
One might imagine that pirates appear in times of relative peace because their relative 
importance increases at the time, and because dealing with pirates was naturally put aside 
as a lesser priority during wars with Carthage, Macedon, Syria, or Pontus.  Such a theory, 
though appealing and logical, I think is fundamentally flawed.  Episodes of piracy and 
plundering appear intermixed with everything else in Livy.  The pirates were freelance 
warriors, and that means that in times of relative peace, more of these freelancers would 
be ‘self-employed’, that is, practice their trade without the aegis of a legitimate state.  At 
the end of a war, civil or external, illegitimate plundering as a means for subsistence 
increases.  Some of these illegitimate raiders are former partisans of the losing side.  
Piracy is, therefore, a natural product of peace, given the normal operation of the 
Mediterranean military economy. 
 
Conclusions 
Here I have reinforced a number of observations from earlier chapters.  Piracy 
should be seen as illegitimate acts of violence, but of a curtailed nature: that is, 
committed under no recognized authority for the action.  While the morality of 
plundering can be debated, plundering under legal authority to plunder is simply not 
piracy.  To understand piracy, one must understand that the moral overtones attached to 
piracy are merely attached to piracy, not a fundamental part of the definition. 
The language used for piracy shows that it was considered a bad thing.  The 
rationale for why piracy was a bad thing, however, has been misunderstood due to 
                                                 
791
 Besides the Dyme example, some examples (some discussed earlier) are Diodorus 17.106, 111 for the 
Persians’ mercenaries, Strabo 14.5.2 for the Cilicians after Roman intervention (and several civil wars) in 
Syria, Appian, Mith. 63 for the pirates’ expansion after the defeat of Mithridates, and Appian B Civ 5.132, 
Suetonius Aug. 32.1 for troubles following the civil wars against the younger Pompey. 
195 
 
modern conceptions.  Simply put, the ancient and the modern person both opposed and 
decried piracy, but largely for different reasons.  The modern person opposes piracy as 
criminal activity on the grounds that killing and looting are fundamentally wrong while 
the ancient writers opposed it on the grounds that such actions were the prerogative of the 
state. 
Not all pirates may have been pirates.  For a number of reasons, waging wars 
against pirates was popular and politically advantageous.  Thus non-piratical foes may 
have been described as pirates to further the aims of the claimant.  Furthermore, the 
impossibility of detecting and identifying pirates meant that defeats of pirates were 
difficult to prove false. 
We can detect an internal Roman debate concerning the best method for dealing 
with pirates.  The rhetoric around Pompey’s success made much of Pompey’s clemency 
as a method of eliminating pirates.  Others touted Vatia’s supposed strategy of 
eliminating pirate bases on the land, or the severity of a Metellus.
792
  Pompey’s solution, 
popular as it was to imperial-era historians, was very unpopular throughout his life.  
Caesar, notably, after the death of Pompey, confiscated much (though not all) of the 
farmland given to Pompey’s Cilician supporters.793  There is little evidence for what 
happened to them, though it seems that many of these uprooted traveled to Spain to join 
up with Sextus Pompey. 
Ancient authors disagreed about piracy, its causes, and its solution.  Piracy was 
rooted less in disorder or general poverty than in the issue of surplus military manpower.  
The historians also disagreed about how much of a place there was for the mercenary in 
ancient society.  The divide between soldier, mercenary and pirate was fuzzy rather than 
distinct, and we see accusations of individuals crossing this line.  These issues will be 
explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Seven: The Author’s Baggage 
In this, the last chapter, I focus on uncovering preconceptions of the ancient 
authors that altered their descriptions of leisteia or latrocinia.  When groups definitely 
operating under state authority are described as acting ‘like bandits’, this provides us with 
material useful to define the concept of the bandit.  The mercenary freelancer acquires a 
more equivocal reception than the pirate or bandit, but it is still a negative one.  In some 
ways, I argue, the negative reception was self-perpetuating.  Moreover, the elite 
mercenary troops filled the wartime role of the aristocracy to some degree, so it is hardly 
surprising that aristocratic writers held strong opinions about mercenaries.  It is 
overwhelmingly clear that whether called mercenary, pirate, or bandit, the freelancer was 
a little-loved figure.  Why then, were these groups so resilient?  Why did the Hellenistic 
monarchs and the Roman consuls not exert more effort to their elimination?  For most of 
the period described in this work, freelancers simply seem to have been too useful. 
Not all figures received a wholly negative treatment, and so Roman allies accused 
of engaging in this undeclared violence or freelance warfare (such as Cilicians or 
Numidians) might be given a pass on the ground that they were allies.  Even though their 
actions might be discredited in Roman sources, the alliance was of greater importance.  
Like the Hellenistic monarchs’ reaction to mercenaries, the Romans found their wayward 
allies too useful to punish meaningfully for raiding 
Philosophical traditions are also partially to blame for modern misunderstandings.  
Different ancient authors posit different rationales for why people engage in illegitimate 
plundering.  Essentially, these boil down to two explanations. One, principally Latin, 
tradition argues that such acts are committed by people who are uncivilized, greedy, or 
simply bad. The other, principally Greek, tradition instead argues that people are driven 
to it through lack of options and enduring poverty.  In an examination of these accounts, 
it is tempting to pick a side, as others have done.  Further examination of these accounts, 
however, reveals an additional distinction.  For the Romans, such choices are often put to 
leaders specifically, and for the Greeks, to peoples generally.  Thus the choice is 
intrinsically seen as coming from the top or from the bottom, and in that circumstance, 
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the arguments are not necessarily in conflict.  In that case, the historical argument 
becomes not one of why the pirates pirated, but whether the piracy was instigated from 
above or from below. 
 
The Causes of Piracy. 
The evidence of the Balearic campaign under Metellus highlights this dichotomy 
admirably.
794
  Concerning the historical traditions about the Balaerics, we have in the two 
traditions what appear to be two philosophical schools.  The Greek tradition, rooted in 
Strabo and Poseidonius (a tradition on which Appian appears to rely) maintains that 
piracy and banditry were rooted in poverty and that those in possession of a productive 
land were unlikely to resort to piracy.  Contra this position (though not in all respects), 
we have the Roman annalistic tradition, whence come Livy and Florus, and we see some 
nods to this in Plutarch, as well.  This position essentially holds that banditry is 
committed by uncivilized peoples.
795
  For Florus the Ligurians “make banditry rather 
than war.”796  For the one, the cause is economic, for the other, it is cultural.  While I 
discussed the Balearic campaign in some length earlier, I would now like to address the 
questions of how and why ancient authors described the campaigns in this way.   
In the Greek tradition, genuine piracy must be instigated by some economic cause 
or disorder.  In explaining Etruscan piracy, for example, Strabo indicates that social 
disorder deprived large numbers of Etruscans of their livelihoods, and pushed them to 
engage in piracy, despite the relative fertility of northern Italy.  This need not be an 
accurate picture of Etruscan economic history.  It does clearly identify Strabo’s motive, 
however.  Having established a generally sound, rule, he must then explain various 
counterexamples.  For the Baleares, he does this by a twofold process.  First, he 
establishes that the Balearic Islands were fruitful and productive, thereby removing a 
need for piracy.  Second, he shows that they were falsely accused of piracy for dealing 
with or associating with the real culprits.  Cilicia forms another special case, where 
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Strabo tries to explain the rapid Hellenization of Cilicia through Pompey’s removal of 
their poverty.
797
 
Despite my criticism of Strabo’s explanation, he need not be wrong.  Strabo has 
clearly read other historians’ accounts and entertained some suspicions about the events 
these contained.  The entirety of 3.5.1 consists of oblique references to other accounts.  
Though there are undoubtedly others, the most likely accounts are Posidonius and 
Diodorus Siculus, both lost.
798
  Florus is unlikely to be following Strabo, but both authors 
appear to have read Diodorus (or his sources).
799
   
From my earlier examination of the LdPP and the Cilicians in chapter 4, we might 
conclude that the Romans considered those trading with pirates to be equally guilty as the 
pirates and their attack on the Baleares shows a punitive policy in play.  This solution 
accords with later legal practice, whereby the punishment was the same as for piracy if 
the traders knew they were trading with pirates.  This solution, however, is only accurate 
for the surface.  It is accurate insofar as it was likely the public understanding of the 
matter.  The commanders had their own rationales for campaigns, whether it be greed, 
triumph-hunting, or even a need to distribute land or booty to the troops.  Each of these 
things brought benefit to the commander. 
Thus there is an accusation of piracy as a pretext.  This pretext is widely 
understood to be rooted in the Baleares’ associations with undesirables, whether they be 
pirates, refugee Sardinians, unemployed freelance warriors, or all three simultaneously.  
On another level, the commanders would frequently have ulterior motives to determine 
whether they would launch a campaign.  With such a broad definition of piracy 
functioning as an adequate pretext, I suspect that this third factor was often the driving 
one. 
Most of the Roman historians record philosophical rationales for piracy after 
official hostility towards piracy has been clearly established in their own day, and this 
affects how they record the events of previous centuries.  Already, I have shown a 
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considerable amount of evidence indicating that the Roman hostility towards piracy most 
likely began at a relatively late date.  In some cases, however, the historians do not 
appear to realize this.  Strabo 14.5.2 is an important example: 
[...]ἔγνωσαν δὲ κακίᾳ τῶν ἀρχόντων συμβαῖνον τοῦτο, εἰ καὶ τὴν κατὰ γένος διαδοχὴν 
τὴν ἀπὸ Σελεύκου τοῦ Νικάτορος αὐτοὶ κεκυρωκότες ᾐδοῦντο ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. [...] εἶτ᾽ 
αὐξηθέντας ἠναγκάσθησαν καταλύειν Ῥωμαῖοι πολέμῳ καὶ μετὰ στρατιᾶς οὓς 
αὐξομένους οὐκ ἐκώλυσαν. ὀλιγωρίαν μὲν οὖν αὐτῶν χαλεπὸν καταγνῶναι: πρὸς ἑτέροις 
δὲ ὄντες τοῖς ἐγγυτέρω καὶ κατὰ χεῖρα μᾶλλον οὐχ οἷοί τε ἦσαν τὰ ἀπωτέρω σκοπεῖν. 
They knew that the outcomes came from the misdeeds of the rulers, still, since they 
themselves had determined the succession to descend through the line of Seleucus 
Nicator, they were ashamed to rescind it. [...] After [the Cilicians] grew in power, the 
Romans were compelled to destroy them in war and with an army, though they did not 
hinder their increase. Now it is difficult to claim contempt [by Rome], as they paid 
attention to all those things nearby and close at hand rather than those which were further 
away.  
Here, Strabo effectively apologizes twice for the Roman failure to stop piracy, and earlier 
he allows that the Roman demand for slaves had also created a demand for pirates.  But, 
according to Strabo, the Romans cannot be entirely faulted for letting the Syrians monitor 
their own possessions and for failing to pay attention so far afield.  These apologies 
indicate that Strabo believed that the Romans had an obligation that they failed to uphold.  
They do not prove that second-century Romans believed they had such an obligation.  
Strabo clearly finds the earlier rationales unsatisfying and attempts to supplement them. 
There were certain characteristics of pirates that the Romans disliked, which can 
emerge almost out of defensiveness regarding their own actions.  Livy, for example, tells 
us of an unusual pirate in early Roman history: one that refrains from piracy.
800
  When 
passing the Lipari Isles by the Strait of Messina on a trip to Delphi, the Roman envoys 
are captured by a pirate (one with the Greek name Timasitheus).  Upon learning of the 
Romans’ mission, he decides to permit them to sail on to Delphi.  Following this, 
peaceful relations were established between the Romans and the Lipareans.  Livy depicts 
Timasitheus in unusual terms: Romanis uir similior quam suis.  In praising Timasitheus, 
however faintly, he is specifically unlike his countrymen.  Livy’s choice of words here 
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does much to characterize both pirates and Romans.  The Lipareans are clearly pirates 
with their custom of publicum latrocinium.  The action described, however, is more 
Roman than pirate, and thus Romans, whatever else they may be, are somehow the 
opposite of pirates. 
It is unusual for Livy to praise a pirate, and the way he does so here suggests a 
motive.  Livy, in recording Roman friendly relations with pirates, must make the pirate 
unusual to permit such friendship.  This is a careful construction of identity all the way 
around.  The Romans are only characterized indirectly.  Timasitheus exhibits mercy and 
piety and is thus praised as being similar to a Roman.  His followers, however are the 
opposite. As pirates and non-Romans, they are discredited and immoral, yet out of 
gratitude to their leader, an arrangement is made between Romans and Lipareans.  Again, 
this gratitude shows how the Romans repay their debts, while implying that those peoples 
that did fall to Rome were more similar to the pirates than to Timasitheus.  Furthermore, 
this explanation of the story allows Livy to discuss an alliance with Lipara that avoids 
either Roman association with piracy or any hint that they may have made a deal to be 
exempt from Liparean piracy. 
In some ways, Livy’s story seems too good to be true.  In the early books of Livy, 
it is apparent that the Romans are unable to easily prevent their ships from being taken by 
Greek pirates.  That the Romans might have bought or negotiated protection of some sort 
from Lipari is almost expected.  Such agreements between the Cretan city-states and their 
northern counterparts in the Aegean or on the mainland were common.
801
  Livy’s story, 
however, provides an honorable rationale for such a negotiation.   
In the environment where the pirate was persona non grata, the piratae gratae of 
the past posed a particular problem to the historian.  This was especially true because the 
historic exempla were understood to serve as models for future activity.
802
  Rather than 
reflect a true understanding of second-, third-, or fourth-century behavior, it was easier to 
reflect first-century behavior and biases, importing them into the scenario of an earlier 
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event.  This historiographical practice serves to rationalize a sort of Roman Realpolitik, 
where the activities of the potential allies are ignored so long as good service and conduct 
towards Rome can be ensured. 
 
They Roam Like Bandits  latronum modo percursant 
In Livy’s account of the Second Punic War, a Samnite delegation tells Hannibal 
that the Romans are roaming like bandits. 
iam ne manipulatim quidem sed latronum modo percursant totis finibus nostris 
neglegentius quam si in Romano uagarentur agro. (Livy 23.42) 
“Now they travel about carefree, not together in companies, but bandit-style, through all 
our lands, as if they were wandering in a Roman field.” 
Though not about freelancers, this description nevertheless exemplifies the freelancer.  
Allegedly beholden to money rather than patriotism, the freelancer roams about to 
increase his gains from war.  Though it might seem strange at first, the well-paid 
mercenary may actually engage in less plundering than his conscript or volunteer 
counterpart.  For the latter, of course, plunder was the principal means by which 
economic gains could be attained.  The freelancer, however, would often not go to such 
lengths—so long as the regular pay kept coming.  Failure to pay a mercenary force, as 
seen before, could result in plundering of allied and enemy territory and goods alike.  The 
function of plunder as an economic incentive for both mercenary and volunteer forces 
should not be minimized.   
In the passage quoted above, the Samnite’s purpose is clear and twofold: to tell 
Hannibal that he has an obligation to defend allied territory and suggest that it will take 
little effort to do so.  What is latronum modo?  The passage itself suggests a clear 
opposite:  manipulatim.  The Romans, therefore, are not in formation but scattered as 
irregulars.  As the rest of the passage makes clear, they can do this because there is no 
opposing force within striking distance (which is what the delegation is requesting from 
Hannibal).  The comparison to a Roman field makes it even clearer that the soldiers in 
question are entirely safe.  The bandit is certainly plundering, but this sense of unchecked 
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disorder is more important.  In this particular case, that disorder is intentional, but more 
often it appears to be unintentional.   
Elsewhere we have various instances of latrocinia being used for events that are 
not typical acts of raiding or brigandage.  For example, Cicero describes (among many 
others) Piso’s men as latrocini (bandit gangs).803  In each case, the men are undisciplined 
and, if under control at all, only barely.  The fault is meant to lie on the commander either 
for being unable or unwilling to rein them in or even for joining in their greed. 
A similar example from Caesar (B Civ. 3.112) says diripere more praedonum (to 
plunder in the manner of praedones).  This, I argue, is somewhat different.  In the first 
place, Caesar is reversing the normal order, where the townspeople on Pharos can raid the 
ships.  Secondly, they are not clearly engaging in warfare at all.  It retains, however, the 
sense of disorganized activity. 
Likewise, this character trait can be applied to the mercenary freelancer.  In each 
case, if we ask if the core criticism can be a disordered lack of discipline, the answer is 
yes.
804
  Polybius ascribes banditry to the Aetolians under the command of an Aetolian 
general, though the specific campaign was not approved by the League.
805
  More 
noteworthy is his comment that the Aetolians were not bound by custom to seek official 
sanction for their plundering.  I would argue that this official sanction is the critical 
distinction our sources use, consciously or not, to define an act as piracy.
806
 
As noted before, it was often difficult to tell whether a raid was committed by 
pirates, mercenaries, or regular troops.  For example, Polyaenus tells us that Iphicrates 
had his men ravage and loot the Argive countryside, then he sent to the Argives, 
reporting that he had defeated their rebels (phugadas-‘fugitives’) and was returning their 
plunder.
807
  Thus the ‘defeat’ of a purely fictional band of brigands paid political 
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dividends.  The criticism of soldiers of acting like bandits is rooted less in their activity 
than in what their activity signifies: that they are either disordered or not obedient to the 
state’s authority.  The freelance warrior plunders because that is what the freelance 
warrior does.  The criticism appears chiefly when the freelance warrior acts either 
without orders or contrary to authority.  
Not only might Roman rhetoric be used to impose the name of latro upon Roman 
enemies, it might also be used to shield Roman allies from such nomenclature.  For 
examples of such allies, we have the Derbene Antipater and the Cilician 
Tarcondimotus,
808
 both of whom Cicero spoke approvingly of in his letters.
809
  Indeed, 
given the context of 13.73, Cicero actually appears to be trying to intercede on 
Antipater’s behalf.810  On the other hand, Strabo refers to Derbe as a part of Cappadocia 
recently ruled by Antipater the pirate (τοῦ λῃστοῦ).811  Tarcondimotus was one of the 
Cilicians pardoned and reinstalled by Pompey.  
Whether other scholars are right or wrong in attributing banditry to Antipater, the 
use of rhetoric played a major role in the perception of these minor rulers and could even 
determine how long they stayed in power. 
Other similar instances of mixed descriptions noted by Grünewald are those of 
Tarcondimotus, Cleon, Zeniketes, and Lysias.
812
  All are local Anatolian rulers who also 
pursued some form of banditry or piracy according to certain sources (usually Strabo).  
Tarcondimotus was one of the Cilician leaders who accepted Pompey’s amnesty and then 
proved to have unusually poor luck in picking sides in civil wars as he backed Pompey, 
Cassius, and Antony in turn.  It was not unusual for Romans to dismiss certain ‘mini-
states’ as led by bandit kings.  But the absence of such judgments on Antipater or 
Tarcondimotus suggests that the principal Roman concerns were not on such rulers’ 
activities but rather on their allegiance and usefulness.  Strabo’s later judgments reveal 
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some offense on these leaders having been treated so well (particularly Cleon) by the 
Romans.
813
 
The Cilicians also, surprisingly, appear to have had a reputation for nigh-
unshakeable loyalty, as evidenced by Seleucus standing by Mithridates, the Cilician 
pirate-settlers escorting Pompey after his defeat in Greece, and Tarcondimotus, the 
above-mentioned Cilician dynast.  For Cicero, of course, this stands as a rationale to 
protect characters like Antipater.  Octavian confirms the son of Tarcondimotus as a 
Cilician dynast.  Given other evidence, such as the defense of Numidian auxiliaries’ 
refusal to fight other Numidians in Appian and Livy, their loyalty persists as a sentiment 
to be praised even when it makes them unable to be trusted at the time.
814
   
In particular, violent conduct that we might expect to be considered illegitimate is 
less important in the scheme of foreign affairs than loyalty to Rome.  This is not to say 
that the Romans did not care about that illegitimate violence, but rather, they consistently 
subordinated these issues to the greater desire of preserving their alliance.  
In times of civil war, the allied states what chose wrongly are sometimes 
punished, sometimes not.  Certainly, African and Spanish former allies were chosen to 
justify a triumph.  When no such triumph was sought, the ally was presented as trying to 
provide loyal service to Rome (as was the case for Deiotarus in Galatia and 
Tarcondimotus in Cilicia).  While the desire for a triumph surely played a role, part of 
this decision may also have involved whether the state in question sought gain out of the 
civil war (as claimed for Egypt’s support of Antony, Iberian support of Sertorius or 
Pompey, or African support of Pompey under Juba).
815
   
Earlier, I argued that accounts of past negotiations and agreements with bandits 
and pirates were devised that created a satisfactory historical situation.  Yet the alliances 
with contemporary figures described as bandits show little difference in practice.  The 
evidence from these examples shows that this process was functional, even for 
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contemporary events.  From the Antiates to the Derbenes and Cilicians, there were 
always ‘a few good bandits’.  ‘Good’ in this case meant that they could be relied upon to 
support Roman aims.  In the end, this meant that the Romans might sometimes agree that 
‘yes, they are bandits, but they are our bandits’. 
 
The Use and Abuse of Mercenaries 
Historical accounts also took part in an ongoing debate about the role of 
mercenaries in warfare.  The historian writing in the Classical and Hellenistic period was 
also a political theorist, and as a political theorist, needed to venture an opinion on the use 
of mercenaries.  Opinions ranged from wholly negative to tentatively positive, though no 
author was to argue for dispensing entirely with a citizen army.  Later authors had a 
trickier balance to walk, as the empire of Rome was largely created by a conscript army 
and defended by a mercenary one.
816
  Some authors also tried to differentiate at length 
between a foreign mercenary force and a native one.
817
 
When a mercenary appears in a historical account, however, it is crucial to 
understand where the author stands on the subject of mercenary service. Not only does 
this indicate what terms may be employed to describe the freelancer, it also changes how 
that fighter is regarded.  Polybius and Polyaenus, for example, both have a fairly negative 
view of any figure denoted as a mercenary.
818
  Diodorus Siculus and Xenophon, however, 
have a much more positive view on the situational use of mercenaries generally, though 
Diodorus retains a low view of Cretan and Campanian freelancers.
819
   
There was substantial debate about the effectiveness of mercenaries, and some 
historians asserted that a low view of mercenaries and their skill is often held by the 
general population.  For example, Polybius relates that the Roman soldiers held Punic 
mercenaries in contempt, while Plutarch tells us that the Syracusans distrusted Dion’s 
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mercenaries.
820
  The Spartans, according to Plutarch, felt more shame at being defeated 
by mercenary peltasts than they would if they had been defeated by citizens.
821
  
Mercenaries could also be pitiable.  The comment of Isocrates that men were compelled 
to take up mercenary service likely reflects an understanding (perhaps an unconscious 
one) that fighting men were intrinsically of a class that should not have been forced to 
such ends.
822
  Plato and Aristotle idealized the citizen-soldier as braver (and therefore 
more effective) than the dispassionate profession, despite the latter’s technical 
expertise.
823
  Xenophon, however, argued that the Arcadians were hired because of their 
bravery, superior to that of other Greeks.
824
  Xenophon advocated for an expanded use of 
mercenaries by states and indicated that a standing force of mercenaries provided 
experience and examples for the relatively inexperienced citizen soldier. We see this 
recommendation also in Aeneas Tacticus.
825
  Polybius also asserts mercenaries possessed 
superior skill.
826
 
The ratio of mercenaries to citizen soldiers in a state’s forces was a particularly 
prominent concern.  Diodorus represents a fifth-century argument as “Let us not in our 
eagerness for mercenary troops (xenikoi) throw away our own citizen forces, and, in 
reaching for what is unseen, lose our mastery of that which is in sight.”827  Here, the 
objection is less to hiring mercenary troops than to letting them outweigh citizen 
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821
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826
 Polybius, 11.13.5 
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contributions.
828
  A standing mercenary force could lend experience to untried citizen 
volunteers, but too large a force threatened the possibility of a coup.  Elsewhere. 
Diodorus praises the mercenary army: see, for example, 29.6, where he outlines the 
Carthaginian advantages—which stem from a mercenary force of specialists.  As Trundle 
puts it: Diodorus “has reflected trends in mercenary activity in Greek history in his 
Bibliotheke, consciously or otherwise.  This has distinct ramifications for the way he 
should be regarded.”829 
The question of loyalty was one of prime concern.  Repeatedly, in Diodorus, the 
main issue of concern is not mercenary disloyalty, but their loyalty to a tyrant rather than 
a state.  He accuses several figures of staying in power principally through the employ of 
mercenaries.
830
  To Diodorus this becomes not the state’s employ of mercenaries for its 
own ends, but the ends of the state being obviated by the tyrant’s use of mercenaries.  
Mercenaries with obviously split loyalties were avoided: during the Social War, Lucius 
Caesar enlisted some Numidian cavalry which he had to disband when the Italians 
produced a son of Jugurtha on their side.
831
  The Libyphoenician Muttines may shine as 
an example of the shifting allegiances of the at-large warrior.  He was the most effective 
Carthaginian general in Sicily, but scorned by Hanno as an African, he switched sides 
and delivered Agrigentum (and, effectively, Sicily) to the Romans (Livy 26.40).
832
  His 
Numidians are repeatedly named treacherous both for the seizure of Agrigentum and their 
earlier declaration of neutrality, but such a charge relies on their having loyalty to a state 
rather than an individual.
833
 
Sometimes, harsh treatment of mercenaries is praised by the historians.  
Philopoemen is recorded as ordering his men to spare none of the defeated mercenaries 
after the defeat of Machanidas.
834
  Diodorus approves Dionysius the elder dismissing his 
Campanian mercenaries on account of their fickleness.  Yet, at loose ends, these 
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Campanians sacked and took over the city of Entella.
835
  Diodorus ignores the 
consequences of the actions when it suits him. With all these debates, it is unsurprising 
that the accounts of mercenary activity tend to reflect the authors’ opinions.  Some events 
are only mentioned in the first place as evidence to support the authors’ statements. 
The ancient authors repeatedly discuss aspects of treachery by mercenaries.
836
  
We have seen that the historians each have their own agenda in discussing them.  For 
many, the accounts of treachery serve as a rationale for excluding mercenaries.  Taken 
further, that very rationale leads to the fabrication of accounts of treachery as a means of 
justifying acts towards mercenaries.
837
  For the most part, modern historians have largely 
accepted that mercenaries were unreliable, though this has some pushback recently.  
Presumably, this modern opinion is at least partially shaped by the reputation of the 
(much later) Italian condottieri.
838
  
Mercenaries were attacked on grounds general and specific.  In 468, the 
Syracusans revoked the citizenship that had been granted to Gelon’s mercenaries, 
sparking a civil war.  Diodorus offers two possibilities: that they were deemed simply 
unworthy or that the former mercenaries could not be trusted with the magistracies.
839
  
He finds the second more likely.  Cato certainly has little good to say on mercenaries: 
 
Compluriens eorum milites mercennarii inter se multi alteri alteros in castris occidere, 
compluriens multi simul ad hostes transfugere, compluriens in imperatorem inpetum 
facere. 
 
“Often their mercenary soldiers kill each other in their camp, often they run off all 
together to the enemy, often they make an attack on their own general.”840 
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This trifecta of treachery might be more artistic than historic, yet Cato’s prominence 
indicates that this was an entirely conventional view.  Polybius also has nothing good to 
say about Nabis’s mercenaries: “and they were murderers and corpse-defilers, clothing-
thieves, and burglars (οὗτοι δ᾽ ἦσαν ἀνδροφόνοι καὶ παρασχίσται, λωποδύται, 
τοιχωρύχοι).841  
Polybius warns (2.5.12) that one should never have a mercenary force stronger 
than one’s own, using the Epirote example (of 231 BC) as a negative exemplum.  Here, 
he criticizes the Epirotes also for trusting Gauls/Galatians.
842
  Later, Polybius criticizes 
the Egyptians (possibly just the Alexandrians) for always maintaining a foreign 
mercenary force.
843
  The treachery of the Celtiberians is mentioned repeatedly.
844
  All of 
these examples are meant to illustrate the wisdom of Polybius on mercenaries.  He 
regards mercenaries as highly-skilled specialists whose employment should be strictly 
limited.  This is not to say they are not useful, for he criticizes Elis for not making use of 
mercenaries.
845
 
Polybius, on the beginnings of the Mercenary War, admonishes the reader to take 
this event as an object lesson as to “what sort of things those who make use of mercenary 
forces should foresee and guard against”846  Even more prescriptive is his comparison of 
Roman and Carthaginian military systems (6.52), where he asserts that the Carthaginian 
reliance on mercenaries for their infantry gives the Carthaginians little staying power in 
war.
847
  While the outcome in history might give this some weight, Polybius exhibits a 
clear bias.  Furthermore, it appears to be, even for the Romans, standard practice for 
states to specialize in a role and acquire specialists from other states for other roles.  
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Accordingly, Polybius asserts an ethnic superiority in bravery for the Italians to explain 
the Roman defeat of the Carthaginians at sea (their chosen specialty). 
Eckstein argues that Polybius’s fear of mercenaries stems from a belief that they 
disrupt his orderly society.
848
  Furthermore, he argues that Polybius saw mercenaries as 
being innately criminal.  In his ‘universal’ history, Polybius has explicitly described his 
agenda as it concerned loyalty and responsibility to the state.  This notably colors his 
views on the matter, even though they would not have matched the views of some of his 
favorite statesmen.
849
  Nevertheless, Polybius expresses a definite preference for citizen 
troops, but does not engage in a complete dismissal of the utility of mercenaries and 
frequently he is more even-handed toward them than other historians. 
Livy’s disdain for mercenaries may come by way of Polybius or may be his own.  
He is ill-disposed toward the Celtiberian mercenaries that Scipio hires, and expects 
Hannibal’s mercenaries to turn on him. 850 The real disdain for these forces finds 
expression in his praise of Hannibal’s knowledge of his limitations by putting the 
untrustworthy scum of seasoned mercenaries in front of the trustworthy and untried 
Carthaginian citizens.
851
  Polybius (15.16) presents the same battle plan, yet the rationale 
for the tactic is completely different, with the mercenaries and the Italian veterans 
hemming the Carthaginians in to force them to fight.
852
 Appian’s account follows 
Polybius, while Frontinus’s follows Livy.853  In this way, differing accounts reveal the 
differing aims of the historians.  
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Another example occurs in the accounts of the Mithridatic Wars.  According to 
Plutarch, the Romans pursuing Mithridates left off pursuit to plunder the treasure carried 
by one of his mules, a great example of Roman avarice.
854
  In Memnon’s account, 
however, the ‘Roman’ pursuers were Galatian mercenaries employed by Lucullus.855   
Many of the historians insisted that certain groups were treacherous (Aetolians, 
Galatians, and Cretans for Polybius) while others had definite ideas about how much 
power should be given to any particular individual.
856
  Some of these peoples are 
‘naturally’ deceitful.857 So Cato names the Ligurians: sed ipsi,...inliterati mendacesque 
sunt et vera minus meminere (“but they...are illiterate and liars and they recall the truth 
less”).858  Such an accusation is also levied against the Aetolians and most famously, the 
Cretans.
859
  It can at times be difficult to pinpoint the root of the accusations against 
mercenaries, as ethnic stereotypes are so inextricably bound up in them.
860
  
Rhodian freelancers were regarded as uniquely reliable.  In some ways, this is an 
argument of omission.  When mercenaries are treacherous, they never appear to have had 
a Rhodian at the head.
861
  Rhodian mercenaries also appear most commonly as generals 
and as skirmishers, very rarely as hoplites.  Is this reliability grounded in Roman opinion 
of Rhodes (generally favorable)?  That may have helped, but this reliability also clearly 
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predates Roman involvement in the east. The Cretans, as mentioned before, were 
particularly untrustworthy.  Livy (45.6) tells us the story of a Cretan by the name of 
Oroandas hired to transport Perseus to Cotys, but took the money and fled without 
Perseus.  Nepos informs us that Hannibal, in fleeing the Romans, successfully deceived 
the Cretans who wanted to rob him.
862
  Polybius claims Nabis was in league with the 
Cretans.
863
  Polybius’s hero, Philopoemen, spent at least 15 years in Crete, probably as a 
mercenary, but Polybius is strangely silent on this period.
864
 
We also see hiring practices on the basis of ethnicity.  The elder Dionysius relied 
on Italians and Italian Celts while the younger Dionysius and Dion relied on Greeks.
865
  
This sort of ethnic preference may have been rooted in availability, but more likely had 
other causes.  The agreed-upon payment might have included land or plunder, 
stipulations that have definite foreign and domestic policy implications.  If trust was an 
issue, the employer’s trust was probably a bigger factor than the employees’ 
trustworthiness.  Expelling and replacing a predecessor’s mercenaries was a logically 
cautious move.  Nevertheless, the Syracusan tyrants tended to each have their own 
preferred group. 
The historians exhibit an expectation that mercenaries would turn coat at the right 
time.  In his account of the Hannibalic War, Livy expects Hannibal’s mercenaries to 
desert him, especially the Iberians (maxime Hispani generis).
866
  Mithridates hired pirate 
mercenaries to fight Rome, and in one instance, when Mithridates trusts his person to 
them, Plutarch displays a two-fold shock, both that he would so entrust himself, and that 
he arrived safely.
867
  Thus the expectation of treachery was so great that its absence was 
even worthy of comment.  In Memnon’s account, Seleucus (the leader of the Cilician 
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mercenaries) was also portrayed as both foiling an attempted betrayal of Sinope and as 
trying to betray the city himself.
868
 
The expectation of treachery also left other mercenaries bereft of any side to fight 
on.  There are numerous examples of what I call ‘the letter trick’.  Simply put, a 
commander writes a false message to the enemies’ mercenaries/auxiliaries ‘confirming’ 
the details of a treacherous plot wherein the mercenaries would change sides.  Then the 
letter is sent in a manner that would make it sure to be intercepted.  With this ‘proof’ of 
treachery, the force in question is dismissed, thus weakening the enemy, just as the 
commander had hoped.  Iphicrates once sent a fake message to two thousand turncoat 
Athenian mercenaries, implying that they would change sides at the right time.  The 
Lacedaimonians with whom they had joined thus sent them away.
869
  Dionysius did the 
same in Sicily to get the Carthaginians to dismiss all their Greek mercenaries.
870
 Lycus 
dismissed Andron after the ἀρχιπειράτης had delivered him Ephesus.  When Polyaenus 
records this, he agrees that Lycus could not depend on them.
871
  Overall, this stratagem 
may be an inverted variant on Xenophon’s ψευδαυτόμολοι.872  Another variant calls for 
fake deserters, again, often mercenaries, to deliver false news of the general’s plans.873  
The effectiveness of the ploy and its variants speaks volumes as to the general perception 
of mercenaries.   
The trick can even work in both directions.  Livy (24.31) shows the letter trick 
being used by Hippocrates to turn the mercenaries against the Syracusan commanders, 
when the Cretan mercenaries intercept a false plot: to side with Rome and kill all the 
‘untrustworthy’ mercenaries.  Believing their employers out to murder them, the Cretans 
turn against them.  This ploy, and the expectation that the ploy will be believed, are 
doubly interesting; first, the letter itself states that the mercenaries are untrustworthy and 
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second, the letter suggests the leaders should execute all the mercenaries, which the 
mercenaries believe.  Both employee and employer are thus implicated as being 
potentially treacherous.   
 
Mercenaries, Manpower, and Toleration 
At this point, I believe that there is a clear disconnect between history as 
described by the historians and historic practice when it comes to the issue of contingent 
manpower.  The historians largely advise avoidance or caution in the use of such forces.  
Nevertheless, mercenaries are employed in great numbers, and in several cases it appears 
that demand outstrips supply. The distaste, distrust, and disdain towards mercenaries had 
minimal effect on their employment.  Perhaps the employ of freelancers was grudging or 
accompanied by a desire to replace them, they did not go away.
874
  
It is rare that any ancient author comments on the general quantity of available 
mercenaries.  The Persian king, Artaxerxes, is said to have contemplated calming the 
Greek wars on the mainland in the hopes that he would be able to hire more of them as 
mercenaries.
875
  This supports my argument in the previous chapter that peacetime 
produced more mercenaries than defeats and exiles.  Whether it is the belief of Diodorus 
or his interpretation of what Artaxerxes believed scarcely matters.  The important aspect 
is that someone in antiquity recognized that there was a form of contingent manpower 
market directly affected by international conflicts. 
The freelancers underwent redefinition.  Functionally, what was the difference 
between a mercenary and a Roman auxiliary but the terms of employment?  The gradual 
change of the role of soldier from a temporary profession to a permanent one meant that 
the at-large-warrior was already being gradually afforded a legitimate status within the 
system. 
The role of poverty in mercenary and bandit activity is fairly unassailable.  The 
extent of that role, however, is open to debate. Some of the historians may err in leaping 
to poverty immediately as a sole cause.  While the role of poverty as a cause of piracy is 
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repeatedly mentioned, far less often noted is the role of poverty in contributing to the 
numbers of mercenaries and indeed, the general enlistment of soldiers in any capacity.  
The importance of mercenaries to military manpower (and vice versa) is clear.  
Predominantly, both groups come from the same pools of people.  Certain areas thus 
became famous for providing surplus manpower.  That manpower could make itself 
known via state-sponsored military activity, mercenary service abroad, or piracy. 
While recruitment or conscription allowed the state to make use of its own 
manpower, ‘mercenary recruitment’ seems principally reserved for the state’s use of 
external manpower. Actions in wars often appear designed to take control of manpower 
pools.  One of the problems with keeping such a pool of manpower, however, was 
maintaining its population, wealth, and experience without employing it constantly. 
While some argue that Athens or the Pontic kings attempted to put an end to 
piracy, the Rhodian state is the only state of the Hellenistic period that can really be 
shown to try to combat piracy above and beyond simply protecting their native shipping.  
One might well ask why the much larger states like the Successor kingdoms or the other 
Greek leagues did not try to do this.  Part of the answer is portrayal:  one’s own citizens 
are soldiers, while the other states’ are pirates.  The primary answer, however, is that they 
were too valuable as a reserve source of military manpower and experience. 
As the Galatian evidence shows, the Hellenistic states were not adverse to making 
common cause with a recent enemy and hiring them.
876
  The professional warrior was a 
valuable commodity and would not be held accountable for the sides chosen (though the 
commander might).  That value was most noticeable in the premiums in land, cash, or 
citizenship offered Greek/Macedonian hoplites/phalangites by Egypt and Syracuse.  The 
desire to cultivate a local infantry force was notable, as was the apparent lukewarm 
success of both states in so attracting new citizens.   
Most at-large warriors found the calling of mercenary preferable to that of pirate.  
All other things being equal, the non-Greek freelancer was less likely to achieve 
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mercenary employment and more likely to resort to self-employment, i.e. piracy.  
Generally, however, the illegitimate activities of freelancers in the Hellenistic world were 
grudgingly tolerated.  Maintaining the freelancers would break the bank, chasing them off 
or killing them would eliminate a potential resource for the state  The best solution, 
though rarely achieved, was to encourage them to seek employment abroad while still 
maintaining a prior claim on their services should a need materialize.  The second best 
solution was to gain individual immunity from the freelancers’ activities.  These two 
solutions explain perfectly the treaty situations we see appearing in the Aegean in the 
fourth-second centuries. 
The Roman evidence for military manpower recruitment provides a far different 
picture that nevertheless makes the same point.  The Roman system of requiring allies to 
contribute manpower meant the Romans could field armies far larger than the citizen 
body would allow, even if numerically, the Romans provided a larger percentage of the 
force.  As Rome expanded, so did both their citizen manpower pool and their allied 
manpower pool.
877
 
The Romans initially followed Carthaginian practice and made use of the same 
liminal groups as mercenaries and as a supplemental manpower pool.  For example, in 
Spain from the beginning of the second Punic War onward, mercenary troops were a very 
important addition.  Likewise, in Anatolia at least up to the second war with Mithridates, 
the majority of troops were allies or locally recruited. This practice, however, was 
gradually discontinued.  There may have been a realization that the mercenary manpower 
pool was of both more use to Rome’s neighbors (who did not have the internal manpower 
pool the Romans possessed) and was more easily accessed by Rome’s neighbors, who 
had the financial wherewithal to win bidding wars.  To control the contingent military, 
therefore, Rome had to conquer it.  In most cases, even simply eliminating this resource 
was ultimately beneficial to Rome.  Thus the wars against certain ‘piratical peoples’ 
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served to deny naval auxiliaries to states that had previously relied upon accessing these 
forces.   
And upon becoming subjects of Rome, the freelance warriors of various tribes 
and cities could be provided, as part of the treaty obligations, to serve Rome.  This works 
because many of the individual bands did have ties to a state and could not simply 
migrate elsewhere.  Those less tied down or with their city destroyed might well be at 
loose ends and move elsewhere, a circumstance I believe I have accounted for, and one 
that, I believe explains some of the proliferation of campaigns in small areas.   
This all works together if one accepts that controlling the manpower pool was a 
fundamental motive of Roman warfare (conscious or not).  The modern historian thinks 
of controlling territory, of drawing lines on a map.  The ancient Romans thought of 
territory second, but of controlling peoples first.  Thus a campaign that seized territory 
but could not catch the people was less effective than one in which the people were 
captured and deported but the territory itself was left alone (see the Ligurian and 
Sardinian campaigns for evidence).   
In the Hellenistic World, groups of freelance warriors on the fringe of society 
were tolerated because they provided a ready source of professional experienced warriors 
for the next inevitable round of civil wars.  There was no profit in destroying these 
groups.  If they actually posed a threat, they could be bought off.  This may even have 
been more affordable than maintaining one’s own standing armies.  Initially, the Romans 
acted little different.  They tolerated their own citizens’ and subjects’ raiding and were 
fine with accepting the proceeds.  The major difference, however, was that there was no 
secondary motive to keeping the freelance warriors around.  The Romans maintained an 
alternate system for the acquisition of military manpower. 
In controlling military manpower, the Romans caused another problem for 
themselves, exemplified in a well-known comment of Polybius: that the Romans 
embarked on a war largely because they feared their forces had gotten out of practice.
878
  
This practice had been not only provided by the troops campaigning and then passing 
their skills down through the ranks, but also by individual initiative, especially that of the 
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allied forces.  Through combatting the problems posed by freelance warriors, the 
manpower over which the Romans held their monopoly became more inexperienced. 
As far as the activities of the petty monarchs, again, the Romans appeared 
perfectly willing to abide by their actions so long as they didn’t cause problems.  If they 
did cause problems, conflicts occurred.  In recording earlier conflicts, the historians, 
being aware of the scale of the problems in the first century, naturally found the issue of 
piracy or banditry a more appealing rationale.  To do otherwise was to lay undue 
criticism at Roman feet.  Moreover, recording a different historical policy would fail to 
provide a suitable example for future generations of statesmen.   
Despite a philosophical conflict in the their understanding of the nature of 
freelancers, Roman and Hellenistic policy towards freelance warfare, that is, piracy, both 
appear to have been fundamentally pragmatic.  Even the Rhodians might tolerate piracy 
against their enemies.
879
  Immunity from piracy, not elimination of piracy, was the object 
sought. 
 
Conclusions 
While certainly there were objections made to piracy on a moral level, on a 
political level, those objections were relatively unimportant.  Roman and Hellenistic 
approaches to piracy were rooted, on average, in controlling an edge in exploitable 
manpower.  The root defining characteristic of the praedo or the leistes was the taking of 
something by force, yet theft and force were not at all the most objectionable traits of the 
freelancer.  Rather, the pirate was conceived of as a figure that refused higher authority, 
and, lacking that authority, lived a life of anarchy and disorder in all respects, including 
in military engagements.  The mercenary freelancer was little better: imagined as a pirate 
only temporarily reined in by state authority. 
Thus, losing to pirates, mercenaries or other groups of freelancers appears 
shameful because the freelance group, perceived of as lacking the necessary order and 
discipline of a state force was naturally weaker.  The real band of freelancers, on the 
other hand, did not lack such discipline of necessity, and indeed, by dint of greater 
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experience, was often more disciplined than their foes.  This experience, after all, is what 
led the Hellenistic monarchs to recruit Greek mercenaries for their wars in the East. 
It appears more accurate to view pirates as unemployed mercenaries rather than 
mercenaries as employed pirates.  Contra Trundle’s argument that a distinction must be 
made between misthophoros and leistes, such a distinction does a real disservice to the 
understanding of the freelancer.
880
  This condemnation of the freelancers has had lasting 
effect.   
The assumption that the bandit or mercenary was intrinsically stateless is a false 
one.  Some certainly were.  Others might formally lose citizenship status through 
becoming a freelancer.  Nevertheless, it is plain that even under the Roman empire, many 
soldiers retained ties to a land, city or state, and those ties were used to control them, 
however tentatively.  The role of the freelancer was deeply affected by economic and 
political forces, and the Roman ‘elimination’ of piracy was due more to constant Roman 
campaigning providing legitimate employment to warriors who might otherwise become 
freelancers. 
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Conclusions 
I set out to show that the categories of mercenary, bandit, and pirate were rather 
artificial constructs better understood as variants of a single category: that of the 
freelancer.  The freelancer, in turn, held a status in society that was substantially affected 
by both contemporary and later representation.  The nuances in portrayal meant an 
individual freelancer or a band of such freelancers could get differing receptions 
depending on how they were described.  While the excesses of the freelancers’ actions 
are often criticized, the real point of contention is that their actions are not constrained by 
a higher authority.   
The fundamental goal in ascribing piracy to anyone is to establish their actions as 
lacking legitimacy.  By other standards, those acts may be legitimate or illegitimate.  The 
existence of genuinely villainous pirates should not be doubted.  The goal of the rhetoric, 
however, is to hang this deserved reputation upon other foes.  When the rhetoric was 
believed, the freelancer became less able to engage with legitimate powers because of the 
reputation gained. 
In the background history (cc. 1-2), I established that freelancers were often not 
rejected by their contemporaries.  Many of the historians recording such outright 
rejection misinterpret earlier history by the standards of their own day, or reshape it 
intentionally to fit the didactic purpose of the work.  Earlier historians, such as Xenophon 
or Thucydides, reflect a more nuanced and pragmatic view of freelance raiding, while 
still expressing serious reservations about widescale employment of them.  While it is 
clear that the historians disliked freelancers, it is also clear that kings and politicians 
found ample use for them. 
Secondly (cc. 3-5), I detailed the representation of foreign groups and traditional 
enemies as bandits, the similar depiction of slave revolts, defeats by ‘illegitimate’ forces, 
the shifting Roman perception of freelance warfare, and the portrayal of foreign enemies 
as illegitimate for domestic political advantage.  The evidence shows that ‘bandit-
terminology’ was widely used for political attacks on both individuals and groups.  Being 
defeated by such illegitimate forces was shameful, but defeating them could lead to high 
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military honors.  Indeed accusations of banditry could be used as a means of provoking a 
campaign from which a campaign might be wrested.  In regards to their interactions with 
freelancers, the activities of certain central figures, most notably Mithridates and Pompey 
the Great, hold notable similarities to the Hellenistic monarchs of the second and third 
centuries.  Lastly, I argue that the disappearing freelancer can be detected appearing 
within the Roman ranks in the first century. 
In the last chapters (cc. 6-7), I make arguments that are more historiographic.  
There I establish again that state control of warriors and plunderers is more important 
than actually policing their conduct.  That is, the theoretical ability to rein them in stands 
more prominently than actually preventing any pillaging.  I discuss the different 
purported causes of piracy to indicate that the historians followed one of two general 
beliefs concerning the existence of piracy: either piracy had a root economic cause or a 
root (im)moral cause.  Upon further exploration, this same understanding could be 
extended to mercenaries.  The historians’ biases naturally led to anti-bandit invective 
being heaped upon their foes, while evidence that the freelancers in question were 
working well within the norms of their own state was set aside.  The historians 
unconsciously uncover the historic trend to employ professional soldiers and control key 
areas from which soldiers could easily be recovered. 
This study has focused on episodes of the second and first centuries.  Certainly 
more could be done through a more thorough examination of Cicero’s rhetoric toward his 
political enemies or the propaganda surrounding the struggle between Octavian and 
Sextus Pompey, both issues I allude to but do not bring into full detail.  I suspect such 
detail would merely emphasize the issues I have already highlighted: political enemies 
were portrayed as bandits to make their activities seem illegitimate and convince others 
not to work with them.  I would expect these conclusions to be testable for the Principate 
as well.  Beginning with Augustus, the emperors would emphasize their role in ending 
banditry.
881
  Like provincial governors in the Republic, they found suppressing banditry 
to be a way of establishing prestige and legitimacy through military action against an 
indefensible foe.  No one could object to the defeat of bandits.  The shift towards the 
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professional mercenary army employed by the state continued and it is perhaps telling 
that imperial bandits often have their beginnings of as army deserters.  In a way, for most 
of the Mediterranean world, there became a single legitimate employer for the violence-
specialist, which created an entirely new dynamic. 
As far as modern implications of the research, there are certainly parallels to be 
drawn between ancient and modern piracy, or between piracy and terrorism.  These 
connections have not been missed, and several recent articles have drawn parallels 
between ancient and modern piracy or, more recently, terrorism.
882
  Others have 
examined modern takes on ‘public’ vs. ‘private’ violence in the cases of corporations 
such as Sandline International.
883
  Is it worthwhile to examine these freebooting bands of 
individuals in search of a solution to modern counterparts?  In my opinion, the answer is 
both yes and no.  The problem with a quick examination is that it grasps at sometimes 
superficial similarities without regard to the social context.  Thus we might see a one-line 
reference to Pompey’s success in the argument for a policy precisely the opposite of 
Pompey’s.  Nevertheless there have been a number of attempts at a solution.884  In some 
cases of comparisons, we see the state’s desire for a monopoly on violence operating in 
the face of a functional inability to actually acquire that monopoly. 
The tactic of portraying the enemy as illegitimate, however, is fundamentally 
unchanging.  In the early 21
st
 century, the word ‘terrorist’ bears a knee-jerk negative 
meaning.  In many cases, it has stopped being a functional definition in favor of 
becoming a broad designation of villainy.  Designating someone as a ‘terrorist’ or 
‘suspected terrorist’ today functionally removes the societal protections the same way a 
designation of ‘pirate’ did 2100 years ago.  In theory, anyone could be so named, 
regardless of actions taken.  In reality, such a designation would not usually be taken as 
credible without some sort of evidence or a widespread lack of support for the 
pirate/terrorist. 
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Everyone in the modern day wants to be anti-terrorist.  In the same way, I argue, 
all Romans wanted to be anti-pirate.  This is simultaneously excluding a group and 
fostering unity within the non-excluded.  This is the most convenient type of enemy.  
Furthermore, once so designated, the normal terms of engagement and legal action do not 
apply.  Cicero’s opinion makes that fairly clear: ‘no oath to a pirate need be kept”885  For 
the modern period, suspicion of planning to provide material support to a terrorist is a 
jailable offense.   
In light of all this, we might well argue that Demetrius, Mithridates and Pompey 
had discovered a simple and effective way of removing piracy: through employment (to 
put it nicely) or bribery (to be less nice).  This is a functional realization of the economic 
causes and motivations of piracy, and so long as the underlying cause has economic 
roots, this will work.  It may remain to be seen whether this is the case for modern 
counterparts.  Motivations are difficult to disentangle.  Cultural and religious motivations 
may mingle with the economic. 
The rhetoric about illegitimate warfare shaped both the freelancer and society.  As 
far as imposing societal rules, it encouraged freelancers to work within the system—
though that did not necessarily remove the freelancer’s stigma.  The portrayal of the 
freelancer or the enemy combatant as ‘bad’ also allowed more easily the portrayal of 
one’s own state as ‘good’.  As Clark recently pointed out, Roman society “required an 
exquisitely careful rhetoric of war” to flourish, and indeed, to function in the way it 
did.
886
  That rhetoric was applied concerning allied and enemy combatants alike.  
Nevertheless, amid the flurry of accusations and stereotypes in the sources, it can be 
possible to lose sight of the ‘real’ freelancers and the ‘purported’ freelancers. Real 
freelancers certainly existed.  Sometimes a pirate is simply a pirate. 
Overall, I have argued that, in the Ancient Mediterranean, those in charge largely 
ignored bandits and pirates unless they were directly affected.  And they did this because 
they knew that the ‘at-large warrior’ was both the mercenary in wartime and the pirate in 
peacetime.  Ignoring their piratic actions was a tradeoff for not having to support them in 
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times of peace.  They thus formed a backup pool of manpower to be drawn upon when 
necessary.  The freelancers’ impact on Mediterranean warfare became undeniable by the 
fourth century, though it had been growing for years.  The reaction of the powers-that-be 
in the Mediterranean World was to establish some control over the supply of freelancers, 
often by limiting access to these freelancers.  There were also increasing efforts to enroll 
them as non-freelancers, often through land-grants. 
For the Romans, it became more complicated.  The Roman system took a 
different approach to acquiring manpower.  Allies were obliged to contribute sizable 
contingents to Roman forces.  Thus existence of a flexible pool of manpower, regardless 
of employment, was of lesser use to the Romans and could be eliminated.  There was 
initially, however, no attempts to stop piracy or to stop allies from hiring pirates.  The 
Roman decision to eliminate piracy was founded upon strategic goals, not moral ones.   
This combination partially explains, the prevalence of piracy in the Mediterranean 
as well as the incongruities evident for the praise of the Romans ending it in the first 
century.  The multiple roles of the people who performed piracy meant that pirates could 
change jobs, so that the elimination of piracy was never a main concern.  The Roman 
efforts of the first century were partly determined by rhetoric bent on proclaiming lofty 
goals; they were also a more forceful attempt to control piracy than had been tried before.  
If we consider pirates to be illegitimate violence-professionals, the quickest way to 
eliminate them was simply to put them under the command of someone with legitimate 
authority.  This does not change their organization, methods, or morality, but for ancient 
purposes, ‘legitimate’ leadership was of the greatest importance.  Simply put, for the 
Roman perspective, it does not matter how well the dog is trained as much as whether the 
dog is leashed. 
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Appendix 1. The Boundaries of Cilicia 
Cilicia, most famous as homeland of the pirates, is a land that appears with 
regularity in this work.  Since the province changed so frequently and had such 
ambiguous boundaries, it behooves me to go into some further detail here.  First off, 
Cilicia was a province with a very limited lifespan.  First designated as a command in 
102 BC, for the praetor pro consule Marcus Antonius Orator, it was eliminated by the 
late forties or early thirties BC, with its territory thence divided and distributed to several 
provinces. Between its annexation from Egypt and return, the island of Cyprus was 
attached to this province.  At points the Pamphylian territory was given to the Galatians 
and various parts of Lycaonia, Isauria or Cilicia Tracheia to Cappadocia, while during the 
empire at different points Cilicia reemerged as a province or was established as a client-
kingdom. 
Defining Cilicia is difficult, and often almost tautological.  Roman Cilicia was the 
area the Romans controlled and called Cilicia.  The reasons for this lie partially in lack of 
evidence, partially in inconsistent nomenclature, but more importantly, in frequently 
shifting boundaries and the use of the term Cilicia for territory not under Roman control 
as well.  The borders have never been well-defined, and it takes considerable guesswork 
to surmise with any degree of accuracy.
887
  The Roman province rarely corresponded to 
the same boundaries as the Persian satrapy (which did largely comprise the territory 
‘normally’ thought of as Cilicia.  The terms Cilicia Pedia and Cilicia Tracheia (‘Plains’ 
and ‘Rough’) are frequently used by archaeologists to talk about the area, but frequently 
did not correspond to political boundaries.
888
 
Cilicia was a land of Hellenized Anatolians more than a land of Greeks.  The 
Greeks had settled in Cilicia much later than in other parts of Anatolia.
889
  This can serve 
as something of a negative definition.  The first references to Cilician territory are not 
references to Cilicia.  Vulso, in prosecuting the war against Antiochus, led troops east of 
Caria and Lycia and towns such as Cibyra and Aspendus were plundered.  After Apamea, 
Rome entered treaties with the city of Cibyra (in the 180s),
890
 marking an expansion of 
Roman influence, if not necessarily Roman control.  Despite what influence Rome may 
have had in southern Anatolia, it had little interest in it.  Strabo’s assertion of Roman 
disinterest in Cilicia is only strengthened by the near-absence of second-century Latin 
inscriptions or references to Rome in the Bay of Pamphylia and eastwards. The first 
evidence of Roman involvement is the campaign of Antonius Orator beginning in 102.
891
 
                                                 
887
 See Freeman 1986, 257, summarizing the work of others, most notably Syme 1939.  Syme calls Cilicia 
‘the most ambiguous of terms’ (299). 
888
 Contra Bing 1998, 50-51, who attempts to clarify Nepos (Datames) by arguing for Roman Cilicia being 
split along these lines.  While Bing is correct in saying that Nepos intends no diminishment of the satrapy 
in question, the clarification of Nepos is almost certainly because his first-century readership were well 
aware of the rapid changes to Cilicia.  (The Datames was probably written after Cilicia’s dismantling in the 
30s) 
889
 For Greek settlement in Cilicia, see Graham 1982, 92-93 for the Archaic Period (in which there was next 
to none) and Mellink 1988 for later periods. 
890
 For Cibyra, see OGI, 762, Magie 1939, 178-179 
891
 For details of this campaign, see chapter 4. 
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The earliest reference to Cilician territory as a Roman possession is in the lex de 
provinciis praetoriis, passed around 101 or 100.  Therein, it is mentioned that Lycaonia 
and Cilicia were Roman possessions.  It does not necessarily follow that they were 
provinces.  Indeed, Lycaonia was attached (at this time) to Asia.
892
  By omission, it 
appears as though Cilicia was not attached to another province though and was a province 
itself.
893
  Here, Roman Cilicia is naturally assumed to be the territory conquered by 
Antonius Orator 102-100, but should also include some of the Pamphylian territory 
annexed by Pergamum and then inherited by Rome.  At this point Cilicia probably 
included none of Cilicia Pedia, and perhaps none of Cilicia Tracheia either.  The initial 
territory probably included a swath of territory south and west of Iconium down to the 
region around Side and Aspendus, enclosing principally area normally thought of as 
Pamphylian.
894
  Antonius does not appear to have successfully linked the two (if he even 
tried to do so), as Vatia claims this honor twenty years later.  Attestations of Pamphylia in 
Roman sources must also be scrutinized, as they may refer to this province.
895
 
Between 100 and 78, we know very little about developments in Cilicia.  Sulla 
reorganized the two provinces of Asia and Cilicia, and at this time, more territory inland 
from the Bay of Pamphylia appears to have been held by Rome.  If Sulla’s 92 (or 96) 
command was chiefly in Cappadocia and Commagene, then the question of how he 
accessed it is an interesting one.
896
  The average reader probably assumes a 
straightforward northward march out of Cilicia Pedia and through the famous Cilician 
Gates, but there is no evidence that this was Roman-controlled at the time.  Far more 
likely is an arrival in either Asia or eastern Lycia, and a march through Pamphylia or 
Lycaonia.  Similarly, we know little of Quintus Oppius, who held Cilicia in 88, but 
Appian reports him with 40,000 men in the mountains of Cappadocia at the outbreak of 
the First Mithridatic War.
897
  How he proceeded to Cappadocia remains a mystery, but he 
was captured at Laodicea, perhaps suggesting that Cappadocia was conceived of as 
ending much further west.
898
  Alternatively, one might suppose that Cappadocia extended 
to the sea and that eastern Cilicia was actually considered Cappadocia.  Such is suggested 
                                                 
892
 Lycaonia, while itself possessed of flexible borders, invariably appears to comprise the city of Iconium 
and the surrounding territory. 
893
 See Sherwin-White 1976, 6 ff. for arguments against Cilicia being separate from Asia. 
894
 From the few cities we know to be included in this territory, Cilicia appears to be principally the Melas 
and Eurymedon river valleys, with Aspendus and Side serving as the major settlements.  Ormerod 1924 
also asserts that the initial province of Cilicia was principally the former Attalid possessions in Pamphylia, 
not new conquests. 
As recently as 112, Aspendus was the residence of Antiochus Grypus, though this may well have been a 
place of exile, not under his rule. (Eusebius, Chron. p. 122-123) 
895
 For example, Cicero, in Verr. 2.1.93, is probably referring to the province of Cilicia, but chooses 
Pamphylia to avoid the negative reputation of the other term.  See Syme 1939, 299-300, for this general 
point.  Sherwin-White 1976, 3 also notes a close association between Pamphylia and Cilicia. 
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 This is so suggested in Tomaschitz 2013, 57. 
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 App. Mith. 17: Ὄππιος δὲ ἔτερος στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρῶν τῶν Καππαδοκίας, ἱππέας ἔχων ἕκαστος 
αὐτῶν καὶ πεζοὺς ἀμφὶ τοὺς τετρακισμυρίους.  Note that all three armies have the same numbers, and 
Appian may thus be generalizing in addition to his tendency to round to the nearest myriad. 
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 Appian, Mith. 20 for Laodicea.  Laodicea is perhaps 100 miles inland from the Aegean. 
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by Diodorus’s reference to Cappadocian ships.899 I do not, however, find that argument 
particularly convincing, as Diodorus also stresses their inexperience with fighting aboard 
ships.  It makes the most sense not to see Oppius as marching through Cilicia Tracheia, 
but northward out of Pamphylia. 
In the 80s, Cilicia and Asia may have been held by the same governor, as appears 
to have been the case for Murena and Lentulus.  On the western border of Cilicia, in 81, 
Murena took territory from Cibyra and distributed it between Asia and the Lycian league.  
In this period, Cilicia was surely seen as a province or staging grounds to check 
Mithridates rather than to govern.  The Pamphylian cities of Aspendus and Side appear to 
have been the principal cities of pre-78 Roman Cilicia.  At least under Dolabella and 
Verres (80-79), these cities were in Cilicia rather than Asia, which was governed by 
Minucius Thermus and Claudius Nero.
900
 
For five years, Publius Servilius Vatia held command in Cilicia and Isauria.  
Florus informs us that he took Phaselis, Olympus and Isauri.  We cannot, however, argue 
that the entirety of Cilicia was brought under control by Isauricus.
901
  Capturing does not 
necessitate keeping, and Phaselis, at least had been, in theory, already part of allied 
territory.
902
  Some portions were still seen as Seleucid, to be later absorbed by Tigranes.  
Appian (Mith. 118) notes that after having fought Mithridates for forty-two years, 
numerous provinces of Asia were added including ‘parts of Cilicia not subject to Rome’ 
which now paid tribute.  These parts of Cilicia are undoubtedly the Seleucid possessions 
that passed briefly through the hands of Tigranes.  Which cities, precisely, were 
encompassed by this is rather unclear.  Tomaschitz suggested that no part of Cilicia east 
of the Melas river was explicitly under Roman control before 67.
903
  Given that the Melas 
river is traditionally the border between Pamphylia and Cilicia, this is rather 
uninformative.  The campaigns of Isauricus seem centered in Western Cilicia (Cilicia 
Tracheia), or, more probably, southern Lycaonia, and it is probable that Eastern Cilicia 
(Cilicia Pedia) remained outside of Roman hands until Pompey’s campaigns.  It would 
seem difficult, however, for proconsuls in Cilicia Tracheia to undertake campaigns 
against Mithridates in Cappadocia, without either control of Tarsus and the Cilician Gates 
or Adana and the Sarus river valley.   
Alternatively, of course, the parts of Asia we now term Pamphylia and Pisidia 
may well have been grouped into a larger conception of Cilicia.  Indeed, when the 
province was more officially organized in the 50s, Pamphylia and Pisidia, along with 
Cyprus, each had their own conventus within the larger province of Cilicia.  This too 
would allow the proconsuls of Cilicia to bypass the mountains, by marching around the 
north side on the southern edge of Galatia. 
Furthermore, if we presume that this was the line of advance, then the campaigns 
of Isauricus become far different.  They cease to be an expansion north and east from 
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 Diodorus 37.28.   
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 See Broughton 1951 (MRR II), 80-85 for sources, of which Cicero (e.g. Verr. 1.11, 2.1.41-104) serves 
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 Cicero (Verr. 2.4.10) indicates that it had been Lycian but that the pirates had informally taken over.  He 
then indicates that it served as a major trading port for the pirates. 
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256 
 
bases in Pamphylia, but instead they become a southward thrust into the mountains from 
friendly territory that would, incidentally, secure lines of march and supply through 
Lycaonia and into Cappadocia.  Vatia also connected Lycaonia and Pamphylia, perhaps 
for the first time.  Syme asserts that Isauricus approached Isauria overland from the east.  
Cicero too, when travelling to Cilicia, traveled overland from Asia, rather than sailing to 
a port on the southern coast.  Marcius Rex traveled similarly.  While Side appears to be 
referenced as a/the main port of Cilicia, it does not appear to be treated that way.  Much 
of Lycaonia was probably transferred to the Cilicia province from Asia at this time, if not 
earlier. 
In addition to changing boundaries, Cilicia had generally increasing territory, as 
well.  Cilicia’s greatest extent probably was in the late fifties.  At this point, the conquests 
of Lucullus, Marcius, and Pompey were added, Cyprus had been annexed in 58, and part 
of eastern Asia had been added in 56 (mainly territory that had been attached to Asia by 
Pompey).  The additions from Asia removed all Asia’s borders with foreign states, and 
while the Cilician border was long, it was also mainly with allied Galatia and 
Cappadocia.  By Cicero’s gubernatorial turn, the province contained eight conventus.  
This included Cilicia and Cyprus, but apparently also parts of Pamphylia, Pisidia, Lycia, 
and possibly Cappadocia.
904
  Thus, the Ciceronian province stretched from outside 
Iconium to the Amanus mountains and included Cyprus.  This would overstate Roman 
control, however, as some cities were allied and autonomous, and some larger states 
within these borders were nominally independent, such as the territories of the Cilician 
Tarcondimotus and presumably Antipater (though our information about Antipater comes 
mainly from the following decade).  Appian notes that Tigranes was forced to cede a 
portion of Cilicia and that some Cilician cities were attached to Cappadocia.
905
  Like 
Cilicia, Cappadocia varied in boundaries as well, sometimes stretching through Lycaonia, 
but was usually landlocked.   
The 40s and 30s saw Cilicia shrink into nonexistence.  Following Cicero’s 
command, the territory taken from Asia was returned and some of the northern territory 
with it.  After Caesar’s defeat of Pompey, he probably returned Cyprus to Cleopatra.  
Side and Pamphylia were attached to Asia by 43, but probably earlier, for in a letter of 
that year from Spinther to Cicero, we read Side forms the furthest border of his province.  
In 45, L. Volcatius Tullus held a Cilicia restricted to Cilicia Pedia, part of Lycaonia, and 
what little of Cilicia Tracheia was not held by Tarcondimotus, Antipater, or the Olban 
queen Aba.  This province may also have been held by Antony in 41, though he spent 
little time in Cilicia.  In Antony’s reorganization, Galatia gained Pamphylian and Pisidian 
territory, probably including the port of Side; Lycaonia, with the city of Iconium, was 
given to a certain Polemo, Cilicia Pedia divided between Tarcondimotus and the province 
of Syria, and the remaining part of Cilicia Tracheia granted to Cleopatra.
906
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 Cicero refers to travelling through Cappadocia into his province but also asserts that he is already in his 
province (Fam. 3.6.6) and refers to the mountain of Amanus as his border with Bibulus (Fam. 2.10.2). He 
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gave (Ariobarzanes) the city Castabala and others of Cilicia.” 
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257 
 
While the rapid shifts in boundaries may be interesting as a curiosity in and of 
themselves, I argue that these shifts reveal the different ideas of Roman leaders as to what 
a province should be and how it should be administered.  Initially, it was probably 
nothing more than a military command designed for an expansion eastward.  According 
to Syme, Sulla had clear plans to make Cilicia the principal provincia of Asia Minor with 
Asia as the secondary.
907
  Following Sulla, the commanders in Cilicia kept expanding (or 
trying to expand eastward).  Accordingly, territory was added and removed to the 
province as was necessary to support the force in the field but not overburden the 
governor with administrative tasks.  Following Pompey, the province became more of an 
administrative one, but after Pompey’s death the territories were divided up.  Ultimately, 
when Antony gave away the land-route to Syria, this reflects several new changes in 
Rome’s situation.  First, with the possession of new ports at Tarsus and Antioch, the land 
route was less important.  Second, a second land route to the east, along the northern 
coast of Asia Minor was now in hands friendly to Antony.  Thirdly, the abandoned 
regions of central Anatolia were difficult for Rome to control directly, and easier to put in 
the hands of a vassal. 
I argue that the solution of the borders of Cilicia is likely to lie in a realization of 
overthinking.  Rather than possessing set boundaries, I argue that the Romans conceived 
of Cilicia and Asia as the two provinces of Anatolia, and with Cilicia being the principal 
one until Pompey’s annexation of Syria.  Thus Anatolia consisted of allied Greek cities 
states, unallied Greek states (chiefly Pontus), and territory subject to Rome which was 
divided between Asia and Cilicia.  As Cilicia expanded east, the western conventus were 
handed over to Asia or to allies.  And as the locations of the major towns where the levies 
and courts were held show, the military significance of Cilicia was a secure land route to 
the east.  Reducing city-states, conquering hill tribes and even eliminating piracy had to 
fall second to the security of the road that gave the Romans access to the east.  This too 
had been the priority of Persians and Seleucids who held Cilicia. Until the defeat of 
Mithridates in the third war, Cilicia was a military command far more than an 
administrative one.  The province’s role in policing the sea has been overstated.  The 
conquests of Vatia were within previously controlled territory or far from the sea.  After 
Vatia, reinforcements and troop movements came through Asia, not by sea.  No fleet of 
any capacity appears to have been stationed there, and if one was required, it was 
assembled from nearby Greek allied cities, particularly Rhodes.   
The Asia/Cilicia division also divided the magistrates into military and 
administrative roles: Cilicia was designed to support military operations in Anatolia, 
while by reducing Asia’s border length, more cohorts could be shifted to Cilicia.  This 
may have been part of Sulla’s plan as well, or simply according to how the province 
developed.  Furthermore, the magistrates in Cilicia show that governing Cilicia required 
significant and regular armed conflict.  While no doubt exaggerated for triumphal bids, 
this also supports the moving of boundaries to enclose new territory.  The role of allied 
states should not be downplayed.  The Romans frequently tried to purchase the goodwill 
of various states through the gifts of territory unimportant to their overall aims. 
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Appendix 2:  A Sallustian Topos?   
Character Portraits of ‘Noble Brigands’ in History 
 
As remarked upon several times in this dissertation, a number of the character 
portraits bear clear similarities in their construction.  The oldest of these portraits are 
most likely those found in Sallust, and I argue that the later historians have taken this 
characterization as a framework to describe other figures.  Nevertheless, for the purposes 
of the dissertation, this appendix features more as a place to place these eight descriptions 
side by side without detracting from the overall narrative than as an argument important 
to the dissertation. 
Sallust may be attempting to copy the style of his favorite model, Thucydides, in 
his depiction of Alcibiades (e.g. 5.43.2), though the relation is not particularly strong.
908
  
Character portraits in Greek historiography tended to be either overwhelmingly positive 
or negative, such as the descriptions of Scipio in Polybius or of Philip in Theopompus or 
Polybius.
909
  As I discuss later, however, there is a possible earlier parallel in Diodorus.  
Sallust’s descriptions of Catiline and Jugurtha are echoed in later writers such as Dio, 
Plutarch, and Florus, each time for characters of questionable legitimacy.  Of the 
biographies of Nepos, the closest parallel is probably the life of Dion, and even that one 
is not particularly notable (though Dion’s legitimacy is questioned in the biography).910   
These descriptions, I would argue, form a thematic style akin to the pair in 
Sallust’s works.  This is not a similarity entirely drawn from their dubious legitimacy: 
Polybius relates a description of the pirate Dikaiarchus that bears little similarity to the 
following passages.
911
  Moreover, Catiline and Jugurtha do not fit the paradigm of 
freelancer particularly well.  Nevertheless, these portraits are chosen as the model by 
which to describe these later figures. 
The passages I elected to examine below are portrayals of Viriathus, Jugurtha, 
Spartacus, Sertorius, and Catiline.  They are ordered by chronology of setting (rather than 
author).  The accounts of Spartacus are very short and I will be focusing on the others. 
 
A. Viriathus
912
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Orosius 5.4: 
Viriatus in Hispania genere Lusitanus, homo pastoralis et latro, primum infestando uias 
deinde uastando prouincias postremo exercitus praetorum et consulum Romanorum 
uincendo fugando subigendo maximo terrori Romanis omnibus fuit. siquidem Hiberum et 
Tagum, maxima et diuersissimorum locorum flumina, late transgredienti et peruaganti C. 
Vecilius praetor occurrit: qui continuo caeso usque ad internecionem paene omni 
exercitu suo uix ipse praetor cum paucis fuga lapsus euasit.  
“In Spain, Viriathus, a Lusitanian by birth but a shepherd and bandit by calling, infested 
the roads and devastated the provinces. He also defeated, routed, and subdued armies 
commanded by Roman praetors and consuls. As a result he was the greatest terror to all 
Romans. Then Viriathus encountered the praetor Gaius Vetilius as the latter was passing 
through and roaming over the broad territories of the Ebro and Tagus, rivers that were 
very large and widely separated from each other. He defeated the army of Vetilius and 
slaughtered its soldiers almost to the point of extermination; the praetor himself barely 
managed to slip away and escape with a few followers.” 
Dio, 22 fr. 73.1-4 
ὅτι Οὐιρίαθος ἀνὴρ Λυσιτανός, ἀφανέστατος μὲν γένος ὥς γέ τισι δοκεῖ ὤν, 
περιβοητότατα δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι χρησάμενος, λῃστής τε γέγονεν ἐκ ποιμένος, καὶ μετὰ 
τοῦτο καὶ στρατηγός. ἐπεφύκει γὰρ καὶ ἤσκητο τάχιστος μὲν διῶξαί τε καὶ φυγεῖν, 
ἰσχυρότατος δὲ ἐν σταδίᾳ μάχῃ εἶναι: καὶ τήν τε τροφὴν τὴν ἀεὶ παροῦσαν καὶ τὸ ποτὸν 
τὸ προστυχὸν ἥδιστα ἐλάμβανεν, ὑπαίθριός τε τὸν πλείω τοῦ βίου χρόνον διῃτᾶτο, καὶ 
ταῖς αὐτοφυέσι στρωμναῖς ἠρκεῖτο. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα παντὸς μὲν καύματος, παντὸς δὲ 
ψύχους κρείσσων ἦν, καὶ οὔθ᾽ ὑπὸ λιμοῦ ποτε ἐπόνησεν οὔθ᾽ ὑπὸ ἄλλης τινὸς ἀκηδίας 
ἐταλαιπώρησεν, ἅτε καὶ πάντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐκ τῶν ἀεὶ παρόντων ὡς καὶ ἀρίστων 
ἀπολαύων ἱκανώτατα. τοιούτου δ᾽ αὐτῷ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκ τῆς φύσεως καὶ ἐκ τῆς 
ἀσκήσεως ὄντος, πολὺ ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρεταῖς ὑπερέφερε. ταχὺς μὲν γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δέον 
ἐπινοῆσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἦν ῾τό τε γὰρ πρακτέον ἅμα ἐγίγνωσκε, καὶ τὸν καιρὸν αὐτοῦ 
ἠπίστατὀ, δεινὸς δὲ  τά τε ἐμφανέστατα ἀγνοεῖν καὶ τὰ ἀφανέστατα εἰδέναι 
προσποιήσασθαι. πρὸς δ᾽ ἔτι καὶ στρατηγὸς καὶ ὑπηρέτης αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἐς πάντα ὁμοίως 
γιγνόμενος, οὔτε ταπεινὸς οὔτε ἐπαχθὴς ἑωρᾶτο, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω πρός τε τὴν τοῦ γένους 
ἀσθένειαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἰσχύος ἀξίωσιν ἐκέκρατο ὥστε μήτε χείρων τινὸς μήτε 
κρείσσων δοκεῖν εἶναι. τό τε σύμπαν εἰπεῖν, οὔτε πλεονεξίας οὔτε δυναστείας ἢ καὶ 
ὀργῆς ἕνεκα τὸν πόλεμον, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ ἐποιεῖτο, κἀκ τούτου τὰ μάλιστα 
καὶ φιλοπόλεμος καὶ εὐπόλεμος ἐλογίσθη. 
 
Viriathus was a Lusitanian man.  He was of an unknown family, as it seems to some, but 
became quite famous on account of his deeds.  From a shepherd he became a leistes, and 
after that, a general also.  He was (both from nature and from training) very swift, both in 
pursuit and in flight and very tough in close combat.
913
  He was always prepared to eat 
whatever was at hand and drink easily whatever water he came upon.  He lived most of 
his life out in the open and was satisfied with the bed that grew from the ground.  
Because of this life, he was superior to any heat or cold and he never suffered from 
hunger nor afflicted by any other lack.  He fully enjoyed the necessities of life always 
from the things present, just as if they were of the best quality.  But even though he had 
such a body from nature and from exercise, he bore a mind of still greater worth.  For he 
was swift both to think of what needed to be done and to do it, and he perceived the thing 
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fight’, which might preserve the parallelism better  
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to be done and he knew the right time for it.  He was clever at seeming to ignore things 
that were obvious and know those that were hidden.  He was both general and his own 
servant in all things, He appeared neither excessively arrogant nor excessively humble.  
In this way, weakness in his lineage and worthiness in his toughness mingled so that he 
appeared to be neither greater nor lesser to anyone.  In short, he pursued the war not on 
account of gain or of power or of passion, but because of the deeds themselves.  And 
from this, he was deemed both a lover of warfare and a master of warfare. 
 
 Florus 2.17.15-17  
Ceterum Lusitanos Viriatus erexit, vir calliditatis acerrimae. Qui ex venatore latro, ex 
latrone subito dux atque imperator. et, si fortuna cessisset, Hispaniae Romulus, non 
contentus libertatem suorum defendere, per quattuordecim annos omnia citra ultraque 
Hiberum et Tagum igni ferroque populatus, castra etiam praetorum et praesidia 
adgressus, Claudium Unimanum paene ad internicionem exercitus cecidit et insignia 
trabeis et fascibus nostris quae ceperat in montibus suis tropaea fixit. Tandem et eum 
Fabius Maximus consul oppresserat; sed a successore Popilio violata victoria est. 
Quippe qui conficiendae rei cupidus, fractum ducem et extrema deditionis agitantem per 
fraudem et insidias et domesticos percussores adgressus, hanc hosti gloriam dedit, ut 
videretur aliter vinci non posse.
914
 
 
And Viriathus, a man of harshest cunning, raised the remaining Lusitanians. Viriathus 
who, from a hunter became a latro, and from a latro, suddenly a leader and commander, 
and if fortune had allowed, the Romulus of Spain.  Not content to defend the freedom of 
his people, for 14 years, he devastated, with fire and sword, every land both on this side 
and the other side of the Ebro and the Tagus, he attacked the camps of the praetors and 
the garrisons, he defeated Claudius Unimanus, and his army almost to the point of 
extermination, and he set up the robes and fasces which he had captured as trophies in his 
own mountains.  Finally, the consul Fabius Maximus defeated him also, but victory was 
corrupted by his successor Popilius, who, desiring to complete the war, attacked the 
defeated leader and through treachery and traps and domestic assassination, gave this 
glory to the enemy: that it seemed impossible for him to be defeated otherwise. 
 
B. Jugurtha 
Sallust, Iug. 6  
Qui ubi primum adolevit, pollens viribus, decora facie, sed multo maxume ingenio 
validus, non se luxu neque inertiae corrumpendum dedit, sed, uti mos gentis illius est, 
equitare, iaculari, cursu cum aequalibus certare, et cum omnis gloria anteiret, omnibus 
tamen carus esse; ad hoc pleraque tempora in venando agere, leonem atque alias feras 
primus aut in primis ferire, plurumum facere, et minumum ipse de se loqui. 
 
Jugurtha, who was, when he first grew up, strong, handsome, but most of all, intelligent, 
did not give himself to be corrupted by luxury and laziness, but instead, as was the 
custom of his people, to ride, to throw the javelin, and to compete in races with his peers, 
and while he surpassed all in glory, he was nevertheless dear to everyone.  He gave over 
much time to riding in the hunt, he was first or among the first to strike the lion and other 
savage beasts, he did much and spoke about himself the least. 
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C. Spartacus 
 
Plutarch, Cras. 8: 
ὧν πρῶτος ἦν Σπάρτακος, ἀνὴρ Θρᾷξ τοῦ Νομαδικοῦ γένους, οὐ μόνον φρόνημα μέγα καὶ 
ῥώμην ἔχων, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνέσει καὶ πρᾳότητι τῆς τύχης ἀμείνων καὶ τοῦ γένους 
Ἑλληνικώτερος, 
Of these, the first was Spartacus, a Thracian man of Nomad stock, who had not only great 
strength of body, but also in foresight and in temperance, he was better than his fortune, 
and more Greek-like than his race. 
 
Florus, 3.20.8-9: 
Nec abnuit ille de stipendiario Thrace miles, de milite desertor, inde latro, deinde in 
honorem virium gladiator. Quin defunctorum quoque proelio ducum funera imperatoriis 
celebravit exsequiis, captivosque circa rogum iussit armis depugnare, quasi plane 
expiaturus omne praeteritum dedecus, si de gladiatore munerarius fuisset. Inde iam 
consulares quoque adgressus in Appenino Lentuli exercitum cecidit, apud Mutinam Publi 
Crassi castra delevit. Quibus elatus victoriis de invadenda urbe Romana — quod satis est 
turpitudini nostrae — deliberavit. 
 
Nor did he refuse, that man, who from a Thracian mercenary became a soldier, from a 
soldier, a deserter, then a bandit, then, due to his strength, a gladiator.  He also celebrated 
the funerals of his leaders fallen in battle with rites akin to those for generals, and ordered 
captives to fight with weapons around the pyre, as if all his past dishonor would be 
expiated, if from a gladiator he had become a games-master.  Thence, he attacked 
consular forces, he defeated the army of Lentulus in the Apennines, and he leveled the 
camp of Publius Crassus near Mutina.  Elated by these victories, he determined the city 
of Rome itself needed to be invaded, a thought which is enough of a disgrace to us in 
itself. 
 
D. Sertorius 
Plutarch, Sertorius 13.1-2 
τῷ δὲ Σερτωρίῳ συνειστήκει πνεύματος ἀκμαίου γέμοντι καί κατεσκευασμένον ἔχοντι 
θαυμασίως τὸ σῶμα ῥώμῃ καί τάχει καί λιτότητι. μέθης μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ῥᾳθυμῶν ἥπτετο, 
πόνους δὲ μεγάλους καί μακρὰς ὁδοιπορίας καί συνεχεῖς ἀγρυπνίας ὀλίγοις εἴθιστο καί 
φαύλοις ἀρκούμενος σιτίοις διαφέρειν, πλάνοις δὲ χρώμενος ἀεὶ καί κυνηγεσίοις ὁπότε 
σχολάζοι, πάσης διεκδύσεως φεύγοντι καί διώκοντι κυκλώσεως ἀβάτων τε καί βασίμων 
τόπων ἐμπειρίαν προσειλήφει. διὸ τῷ μὲν εἰργομένῳ μάχης ὅσα νικώμενοι πάσχουσιν 
ἄνθρωποι βλάπτεσθαι συνέβαινεν, ὁ δὲ τῷ φεύγειν εἶχε τὰ τῶν διωκόντων. 
 
But Sertorius, filled with the breath of vigor and having a body amazingly equipped with 
strength, speed, and hardiness.  For he would not partake of strong drink even in leisure, 
and he was accustomed to great toils and long marches and little sleep altogether and he 
was satisfied to carry on with cheap bread.  Since he was always wandering around or 
hunting when he had time, he received experience in every method of escape in flight or 
of encircling in pursuit, and of places both traveled and untraveled.  Thus, he (Metellus), 
shut off from the fight, suffered as defeated men suffered, while he (Sertorius) had, in his 
flight, the role of men pursuing. 
 
E. Catiline 
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Sallust, BC 5. 1-8 
L. Catilina, nobili genere natus, fuit magna vi et animi et corporis, sed ingenio malo 
pravoque. 2 Huic ab adulescentia bella intestina, caedes, rapinae, discordia civilis grata 
fuere ibique iuventutem suam exercuit. 3 Corpus patiens inediae, algoris, vigiliae supra 
quam quoiquam credibile est.4 Animus audax, subdolus, varius, quoius rei lubet 
simulator ac dissimulator, alieni adpetens, sui profusus, ardens in cupiditatibus; satis 
eloquentiae, sapientiae parum. 5 Vastus animus inmoderata, incredibilia, nimis alta 
semper cupiebat. 6 Hunc post dominationem L. Sullae lubido maxuma invaserat rei 
publicae capiundae; neque id quibus modis adsequeretur, dum sibi regnum pararet, 
quicquam pensi habebat. 7 Agitabatur magis magisque in dies animus ferox inopia rei 
familiaris et conscientia scelerum, quae utraque iis artibus auxerat, quas supra 
memoravi. 8 Incitabant praeterea corrupti civitatis mores, quos pessuma ac divorsa inter 
se mala, luxuria atque avaritia, vexabant. 
 
Lucius Catiline, born of a noble family, had great power both of mind and of body, but 
was wicked and depraved.  From adolescence, civil war, slaughter, rapine and public 
disorder were pleasing to him, and in these pursuits he spent his youth.  He had a body 
capable of enduring hunger, cold, sleeplessness, more than can be believed by anyone.  
His mind was bold, tricky, changeable, able to pretend to be or not to be any thing it 
pleased, he was desirous of others’ possessions, generous of his own, he was burning in 
his desires.  He had enough of eloquence; too little of wisdom.  His devastated spirit was 
always desiring excessive things, unbelievable things, too many things.  After the regime 
of Sulla, the greatest desire of capturing the state possessed him, nor did he consider in 
what manner anything happened to be of any value, so long as it prepared the kingdom 
for himself, His savage spirit was agitated more and more every day by the lack of his 
patrimony and his awareness of evils committed, both which had increased by these arts 
which I have recounted above.  Furthermore, the customs of the corrupt state were urging 
him on, which two evils threatened, opposite and terrible between them—avarice and 
luxury. 
 
These eight passages have a number of traits in common.  These common traits 
are perhaps the model for the noble brigand. Repeatedly the figure has a physique of 
almost unbelievable quality, yet that physique is put to shame by the character’s mind.  
Beyond intelligent, they have a knack (whether divinely inspired or innate or both).
915
  
They are capable of deceit and skilled at it.  They are energetic and spend little time 
sleeping.  Not only are they skilled at warfare, but they actively enjoy it.  This gives rise 
to a largely positive picture, and one of a figure more uncultured than wicked. 
The formulation of progression in the depictions of Viriathus is similar to that of 
Spartacus (shepherd/hunter—bandit—leader/general vs. mercenary—soldier—bandit—
gladiator—general).916  The progression is arguably reversed, but nonetheless present.  
The sources all bear some sympathy for the character described (with the possible 
exception of Catiline, who is at least more positive than his Ciceronian portrayal). 
                                                 
915
 Beyond the above portrait, Sertorius also claimed that he could read the future via a white fawn gifted to 
him by Diana (Plutarch, Ser. 11.2).  Spartacus was married to a Thracian prophetess, (Cras. 8) and the 
leaders of the earlier servile wars also have prophetic powers. 
916
 Noted above, ch. 4, see Grünewald 2004, 64-68. 
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The ‘noble brigand’ is also a villain, however.  These figures have great moral 
potential which often gives way to wickedness.  Thus Catiline’s depravity is echoed in 
the savagery of Spartacus, a savagery that only increases as Plutarch continues.  The 
continuation of the Jugurtha passage reveals a lack of trust in Jugurtha by the Numidian 
king and proceeds into a struggle for power from which Jugurtha hardly appears as 
normal as he does in BJ 6.
 917
  Whether intentional or not, the noble brigand always 
overreaches.  In some cases, like Spartacus or Sertorius, the overreach is imposed by the 
troops, but in others, like Catiline, it is an internal motive.  Each of these also bears a 
desire to establish a state, whether a new state or in becoming ruler of their existing state.   
The chief unifying feature of these portraits, however, is that they have mixed 
depictions, while in earlier historians, character portraits tended to be wholly positive or 
wholly negative, and Sallust, in writing of characters with a mix of attributes, provides an 
example for a later portrayal of characters with mixed receptions.  We could also, 
however, see these characters as violations of the Aristotelian mean—whether their acts 
are good or bad, they are extreme. 
Strangely, a fragment of Diodorus contains a depiction of Pompey that roughly 
fits the mold.
918
  In this description, the youthful Pompey is possessed of similar 
endurance and intellect.  Though we should probably not assess Pompey as a ‘noble 
brigand’, we can use this passage as evidence for the ‘noble’ side of the portrait.  
Moreover, Diodorus, as a slightly earlier contemporary of Sallust, might perhaps serve as 
model for the character portrait.  But for Diodorus, the historical model was Polybius, not 
Thucydides.
919
   
In the end, I would argue that the framework of the character portrait becomes so 
internalized that the presence of merely some of the trappings carries the air of the others.  
Thus the usage of such a framework carries an indelible air of illegitimacy in the 
description of the leader. 
 
                                                 
917
 Appian, 1.113 also depicts a wicked and corrupt Sertorius (B.Civ 1.113) but Appian does not appear to 
use this framework I describe in this appendix 
918
 Diodorus 38/39.9  
Ὅτι Γνάιος Πομπήιος στρατιωτικὸν βίον ἑλόμενος ἐνεκαρτέρει ταῖς καθ' ἡμέραν 
κακοπαθείαις καὶ ταχὺ τὸ πρωτεῖον ἀπηνέγκατο τῆς ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἔργοις ἀσκήσεως. 
πᾶσαν δὲ ῥᾳστώνην καὶ σχολὴν ἀποτριψάμενος διετέλει καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτωρ ἀεί τι 
πράττων τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον χρησίμων. διαίτῃ μὲν γὰρ ἐχρῆτο λιτῇ, λουτρῶν δὲ καὶ 
συμπεριφορᾶς τρυφὴν ἐχούσης ἀπείχετο. καὶ τὴν μὲν τροφὴν καθήμενος προσεφέρετο, πρὸς 
δὲ τὸν ὕπνον ἀπεμέριζε χρόνον ἐλάττονα τῆς ἐκ τῆς φύσεως ἀνάγκης· τὸν δὲ ἐν νυκτὶ πόνον 
παρεδίδου τῇ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιμελείᾳ, ἐπαγρυπνῶν τοῖς τῆς στρατηγίας ἐντεύγμασι· διὰ δὲ τῆς 
συνήθους τῶν ἀπίστων μελέτης ἀθλητὴς ἐγένετο τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἀγώνων. τοιγαροῦν ὅσῳ 
χρόνῳ τις ἕτοιμον οὐκ ἂν παρέλαβε στράτευμα, πολὺ τάχιον οὗτος συνελέξατο καὶ διατάξας 
καθώπλισε. προσαγγελθεισῶν δὲ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν πράξεων εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, ἅπαντες οὐ τὴν 
ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ λογιζόμενοι κατ' ἀρχὰς κατεφρόνησαν, ὡς τῶν 
προσαγγελλόντων κενῶς τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τραγῳδούντων· ὡς δ' ἡ προσηγγελμένη φήμη διὰ τῶν 
ἀποτελεσμάτων ἀληθὴς ἐφάνη, ἡ σύγκλητος ἐξέπεμψεν Ἰούνιον, ὃν τρεψάμενος ἐνίκησεν. 
 
919
 For more on the probable models of Diodorus, see Sacks 1990. 
